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P R E F A g^E 
She main aim of this study is to explain Nonalignmont 
in tiieory andl practice \«Jith particular reference to the foreign 
policies of India and the United Arab Republic^two of the 
three leading nonaligned countries* 
This study developed out of a feeling of dissatisfaction 
with the general run of explanations and analysts of Non-
alignment presented to the literate public both in India and 
abroad. On tlie one hand, these explanations seemed to be at 
variance x^ ith tiie foreign policy of India in practice. On 
the other hand, many of these explanations of Jiidia, foreign 
policy both by India's spokesmen on foreign policy and by 
scholars appeared to contradict the very bases of international 
politics and tii© objectives of foreign policy. 
It was, therefore^  found necessary to make a study of 
Nonaiigmnent in depth, with a view to understanding it and 
making a realistic appraisal of its merits and demerits. 
Tne study is divided into two ma^or parts and a 
Conclusion. 
In PaJ-'t I, an effort has been made to analyse Non-
alignment laying primary stress on the speeches of the archi-
tect of India's Nonalignment in particular, and Nonalignment 
in general, Jawaharlal Kehru, supplemented by the speeches of 
Gamal Abdel Nasser, the architect of Arab Nonalignment, and of 
a few other leaders of Nonalib'nment like Sukarno. 
- II • 
Since Monalignment has been so naich misinterpreted and 
misunderstood an effort has been made in the first two chapters 
to dispel these ioi sunder standings and misconceptions, leading 
to an analysis of Nonaiigmaent and its meaning in chapter 
three* 
In Part II, the foreign policies of India and the iBiited 
Arab Republic have been examined from their beginnings. This 
section is divided into five chapters, each dealing vith the 
foreign policy of the two coufitries in tiie major international 
crises since I960, in which one or the other was directly in-
volved or in whidi eather or both have played major roles* An 
attempt is mad© to compare the foreign policies of the two 
countries so as to bring out their closeness and also their 
differences, if any, 
An attempt has also been made to understand the bases 
of the closeness and also the sti'esses and strains in the 
relations between India and the United Arab Republic and to 
examine whether or not the two countries need each oth«r»s 
understanding and cooperation in future, 
This is followed by a concluding section wherein some 
recent problems jfacing, the two coimtries are touched upon 
with a view to suggesting a few guide lines for future policy. 
.c 0 It y g 
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NQMALIGKMSMT s M , ANALYSIS 
•Sae United Arab Bepubllc was formed in February 1968 W the Union of Sgypt and Syria. Ihe Unioa was dissolved W Syria*s withdrawal from it in September 1961, Egypt retaining ttia little of the ifoited Arab Republic* For the sake of uniformity this title alone is us©d throughout this study and it refers to Egypt alone* 
C H A P T E R I 
COBWEBS AND ILLUSION 
The Chinese aggression on India»s borders in the last 
quarter of 1962 had "swept away many accumulated cobwebs and 
illusions" about Nonalignment from the Indian mind, said an 
editorial in The Indian Express of November 29, 1962. This 
might have been a confesslcm. It cannot be taken as a general-
isation for some important and somewhat paradoxical reasons• 
Firstly, Nehru, the Foreign Minister of India, at the 
time, had no illusions of any kind about the fundamentals of 
his foreign policy, notwithstanding his confessionj" soon after 
the Chinese invasion that "we were getting out of touch with 
reality and were living in an artificial atmosphere of 
our own creation." This confession had limited application, 
at the most, to only a few aspects of India's China policy as 
2 Nehru had later clarified* About Nonalignment as such he had 
no illusions. In his famous message to the nation, broadcast 
3 on October 22, 1962, he declared} "we have followed a policy 
See The Hindu (Madras) 26 October, 1962. 
2. 12 November, 1962. See also K.P.S.Menon, *Nehru and World Peace', The Mall (Madras) 3 January 1966. 
3. See, Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches Volume IV, 1957-63, 
(Publications Division, Ministiy of Information and 
Broadcasting, Government of India, 1964), p.239 (Here-
after referred to as Nehyt^ * p Speect^ es 
2 -
Of nonallgnment and sought friendship of all n a t i o n I ttelleve 
In that policy fully and we shall continue to follow It, We 
are not going to give up our principles because of the present 
difficulty. Even this difficulty wiU be more effectively met 
by our continuing that policy," Kehru was, I believe, perfectly 
right* Be did not have to learn anything from the Himalayan 
tragedy. None of the ma^or assumptions of Nonallgnment was 
disproved by Chinese aggression^  On the other hand, these 
were further strengthened during this crisis as shall be seen 
4 later. 
Secondly, It is, however, not yet certain that all the 
accumulated cobwebs and illusions have completely been swept 
away from the minds of the Indians as well as the Westerners, 
For, while only a few of the Illusions have disappeared, some 
new ones have since developed or are in the process of develop-
ment. 
It is, therefore, necessary to dispel and destroy, as 
far as possible, all these cobwebs and illusions, past, present 
and those that are in the procesis of development. Then only 
will it be possible to understand Nonallgnment properly and 
to make a proper evaluation of its worth and validity or other-
wise as a principle of foreign policy. 
4, See below, p^.Also see K»P,S. Menon, loc.cit. 
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Ihe most widely held misconception is the claim that 
India's foreign policy "has its foundations in India's culture 
and traditions, in her religiophilosophic idealogy, In her 
Ifumediate and remote past", all of which have "found best 
6 
expression in recent times in Mahatma Gandhi's writings," Non-
violence or peaceful settlement of disputes and the employment 
of ^ ust means to achieve 4ust ends, besides Nonalignment, are 7 
claimed to be the really noteworthy features of India's foreign 
policy* 
ft. See I,M.P#Mahadevan, 'India's Policy of Nonalignment j A 
philosophical point of View', The Indian Year Book of Intei-^  
national Affair3^ 1963 (Volume II),p»97# See also K.P.Menon. 
loc.cit,, and India and the Cold War^  (Bharatiya Vldya 
Bhawan, Bombay, 1906), p.e>6. See below note 26, 
6. See A.Appadoral, *Ihe Foreign Policy of India', in J*E, 
Black and mompson, Ed., PQXjcj.^ ^ iU ^QKl^ 
of Change (Harper and Row Publishers, New York, 1963), 
p.488, 
M»9 Also see M«S.Rajan, ifl„,¥Qy'jL4 Affalfg 1964»S6 (Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1963), pp.31-48. Professor Raman's views, as expressed in this book, are inconsistent and self-contradictory. For example, he says that "Ihe rlghtness of a policy of action depended as much on the means by which a certain objective was sought to be achieved, as the Inherent rlghtness of the objective Itself" (p,31)# Therefore,," even i^ hlle fully supporting the Egyptian act of nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company in July, 1956, Indian spokesmen did criticise the way it was done." Similarly, "India's sympathies for the Hungarian national aspiration of Independence was tempered by the fact that it took the shape of violent uprising — — and India believed violence was not a worthy means even to 
WQTte (pp« 31-32. Italics are mine - see below chapters V and VI respectively for an analysis of India's policy on the Suez and the Hungarian crises). At 
Contd...... 
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8 It is, however, admitted that "the ideal set by 
Gandhi^ 1 is a very lofty one, even with the liiaitations 
of which he himself was conscious. It is but naturalj there-
fore, that in our attempt to follow in the footsteps of the 
mhatma we should fail sometimes, and fail grieviously." It g 
is also admitted that "How far in the implementation of 
(Continued from previous page) 
the sametime he also asserts that "there was, and is never, 
any question In the isinds of the Indian policy makers of 
consciously trying to operate on an idealistic or moral 
plane An world affairS" Biere is here not merely 
a self-contradiction but also a strange double*standard* 
Xhat is, while India did not adhere to these ideals, its 
spokesjsen and scholars not only spoke of them, but also 
fudged the actions of other nations on such ideals. ITet 
Professor Ha^an writes that "when Indian foreign policy 
spokesmen sometimes talked in idealistic and moral gensra« 
lities (as the spokesmen of any other country are wont to 
do), they were misunderstood to be following a wholly 
idealistic or ethical policy many a foreign critic 
not merejy sc^ cumbed to this error, but also made the 
further error of criticising Indian policies and actions 
in the world from idealistic and ethical planes «•«••"' 
(pp» 39-40)• These views, claims Professor Ra^an in the 
preface to the book, represent a 'typical Indian view*. 
In * Chinese Aggression and The Future of India's Kon^ 
alignment'. International Studies (Vol.V t July 1963-April 
1964), Professor Ra^an has succeeded in freeing himself of 
these inconsistencies but ho has blamed our policy makers 
and the Congress leaders for having confused Konalignment 
with nonviolence and for having treated Nonalignment as a 
•fetish to worship', asserting at ttoe same time that "the 
Government of India has never been a devotee of noni-
violence" (p.l28)# 
8* tiahadevan, op.cit., p«88» 
9. Appa^rai, op.cit., p«489. Thus Professor Appadorai says that in the case of Goa, India simply decided to use force and against China too, Nehru was not "prepared to take the risks involved in the adoption of Nonviolence as a way of resolving international disputes" (p. 514). 
« 18 * 
ITorelgn policy India has kept up the ideal is a matter for 
investigation in each specific instance," **Yet", it is 
10 
assertedi "there is no denying the fact that Gandhian ideology 
is a pov^ erful force in our outlook and policy", and, that 
"the nonviolent tradition is an integral part of the thinking 
of Indian leaders." 
12 
Therefore, it is concluded that "India's foreign policy 
is on the cross*roads, not in the sense in vhich some members 
of the Indian Parliament viei^ ed it substitution of align-
ment for nonalignment but. in the more fundamental sense 
of finding adequate sanctions for a policy based on Panch 13 
Sheel." At the same time, it is asserted that "China*5 aggre-
ssion on India's soil shows that it is veiy Important for a 
nonaligned country especially, to have its defeaoices in readi-
ness, in case, the other party is not prepared to negotiate 
on just conditions*" le. mhadevan, op.cit*, p* 98* 
11. Appa(toral, op.cit,, p,614» According to Professor Michael Brecher, Nonviolence is one of the 'pillars* of India's Foreign Policy — See India's foreign RqUcv t An Inter-pretatlon^  (International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1967, Mimeographed) p.9. 
12« p«ai3. 
13. i^., p* 419, 
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Neither of these concXusJLoas is correct^ It did cuot 
take 'China* 13 aggression on India«s soil* for Nehru to grasp 
the iiaportan(3e of having th® country's defences in readiness 
The fact that India suffered a heavy defeat at the hands of 
the Chinese forces does not mean that- Nehru did not realise 
this earlier. The fact is that Nehru realised it very early 
and he said it a number of times. In a spe^h in the Const!-
tuent Assembly (Legislative) on llai^ h 8, 1948, Nehru said 
that "nothing is more important in the opinion of this Govern^ 
ment than to make India strong economically and militarily-. 
not strong in the big power sense, because that is beyond our 
capacity, but as strong as can to defend ourselves if any-
16 
body attacks Again, on March 82, 1949, Nohru said» "tho 
first duty of every country is to protect itself. Protecting 
oneself unfortunately means relying on tho armed forces and 
the like and so ^ e build up, inhere necessity arises, our 
defence apparatus. We cannot take the risk of not doing so, 16 although Mahatma Gandhi t^ ould have talcen the risk no doubt 
1-6. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreiim Policy i Select«^ d 
i m , (Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Gover* nment of India, New Delhi, 1031 j, p. 36 (Hereafter referr.ad to as Nehru). 
16. M'P PP* 46-46. 
16* Nehru had stated on other occasions that even Gandhiji 
i';as in favour of the use of force in certain cases liko 
Kashmir (See below pp. 9.-ri). Professor llahadevan xjrote 
that Gandhi^i "was advocating only a limited form of 
nonvjUjlence, 'nonviolence restricted to the purpose of 
Contd. 
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and I dare not say that he would have been vmng* liideed, 
if a coimti^ is strong enough to take the risk it will not 
17 only surifive^  but it v?ill become a great country* But w© 18 
are siaall folk and dare mt take that risk If there 
is fear of future aggression we have to protect ourselves again-
st that»" 
That was exactly wib^  the Government of India sent forces 
19 into Kashmir in 1947* ISiereforei the view that the foreign 
(Continued from previous page) 
if^ inning our freedom and laierefore perhaps for preaching 
the regulation of interiaatiohal relations ly nonviolent 
means*" (op*cit«, p»@8)* ^ d Prof* Bimla Prasad has observed! 
that "where the way for nonviolont resistance is not open, 
Gandhi prepared tk> appreciate violent resistance, pro-
vided it did not involve m e destruction of the entire 
society on ^ h^ose behalf it ^las carried on." Prof• Prasad 
was, therefore, justiried in holding that a thorough study 
of Gandhi^i's views on ^ Jorld affairs is needed (see •Survey 
of Recent Research Studies on Indians Foreign Policy and 
Relations* M^yft^^toMl.• Vol#V,July 1963-April 64J, 
p»436« Prof*i^asad expressed these views in a comment on 
Paul F-Baver, Gandhi on Affairs (London, 1961)* 
17* See Appadorai, op*oit«, p»S31 for a similar view. 
IB. But Kdiru was never tired of saying that India was a great countiy and tiiat we would not be conquered by force. It vould appear that Nehru was trying to point out that Gandhi-Ji*s ideals did not suit us, i^everj great we might be* As Gandhi^i identified himself with India»s policy oaB Kashmir in October, 1947, it is possible to argue that perhaps he himself realised this towards the end of his career, as Plato did, though like Plato he might have insisted that it was all the more necessary that we should know the Ideal, 
19* See Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative^  Debates^  
Part II, Vol# VI, Ifo»l, 28 November, 1949, p*8 (Hereafter 
referred to as (?»A>D»). see below p«^ ifor Nehru* s statement. 
w 8 •• 
policy of India is based on tii© philosophy of lionviolence 
20 21 
preaohea W Ganflhiji, Buddha and Asoka is not in accord with 
facts. Ab an Indian scholar has put it.** A concept so 
patently abstird may not need a contradiction laut for the fact 23 that it is oft®i repeated Igr many important people in 3hdia 
20» Buddhism was never totally accepted in India - See belo^ 
note S3« 
21» It is doutitfiil if Asoka*s conversion to Buddhism mad© him 
believe in nonviolence totally, Though, with the defeat 
of Kalinga, he overcame the last significant obstacle to 
the control of iidia, Asoka did not seem to have reduced 
his arisy* Similarly he did not seem to have either xmIXmsl 
relaxed the metlm^ ds of punishment prescribed tiyr earlier 
Kauryan kings, or abolished capital punishment (See 
Charles l>rekmei»r« Ktofi^ U^* , ^  ga^te .MA^i 
Bombay, 1962), p. 173). Asoka *s commitment 
to nonviolence seems to have been not more ISian Nehru* s, 
for Wehru said that "If ^ e are pledged to nonviolence, surely ^J© would not keep any Army, Nayy or Air Jiarce" (See 
below/." See also a«H«Jansen, 
(Faber and Faber, I,ondon, 1966), chapter VI, pp* 115-141 
for a s-tmilar discussion of Panch Sheel and pacts. 
2^ * K.P.Karunakaran, ed., , g^ e ffofllrggt^ i A OiC 
.m^, gflMRn l^UQi^s M.MQm. fiemtelag (gtQpl^ lg Fa^ligftte lQ^ g^ t New Delhi, 1^3), p.7. Seo also Karunakar Guota^ India's Jg'orelgn pQllcv ^ n (v.'orld press, Calcutta, 1966), ppi 1S-X4* But see L.P.Karunakaran5 India in l^ orld Affa|.rs 1947^50 (0*U.P#j London»1962) p#24, Wherein the author had himself subsaribed to this 'absurd' view and wrote that •'Perhaps the difficullgr of a modem Government in adopting a nonviolent technique was more manifest in the Indian Government's internal policy than in her relations with Pakistan.'* 
23. Nehru had himself done this quite often, especially after 
the conclusion of tiie Panch Sheel Agreement with China 
and the Bandung Conference. See Mehj^ u, op»cit., pp« 99* 
104. See below, note 48. 
•• 9 •• 
and abroad," Fori "there is nothing in the political beha-
viour of the Indian people and the administrative and other 
measures of the Indian Ooverament vhich substantiated this 
concept. In both Kashmir and Hyderabad the Indian government, 
used its armed forces and acted more or less in the same vay 
as other governments have acted in similar situations*" 
U^ru hiraself explained clearjy the reasons for his 
decision to .discard the Gandhian ethics in a speech in the 
Constituent Assembly on mrcli 8j 1919j 
"We were bred in a high tradition under Mahatma 
Gandhi •««*••#« 
"iind \;ith that idealism and ethical background 
we now face practical problems and it becomes an 
exceedingly difficult thing to apply that particular 
doctrine to the solution of these problems, Uiat is 
a conflict which individuals and groups and nations 
have often had to face, We have not often thought 
enough of Gandhi^i and his great doctrine) of his 
great ioessage and while we praised it often enough 
we felt, 
"Are we hyiJoeriteS) talking about it and being unable to live upto it if we are hypocriteSf 
then surely our future is dark* We m ^ be hypocri-tical about the small things of life but it is a dangerous thing to be hypocritical about the great things of life. Md it would have been the greatest tragedy if we exploited the name and prestige of our 
24, See C.A«D.. Part II, Yoi, II, 0 March, 1949* pp.l229w 
t2S0« (Italics are mine), ©xat such an important part 
of this speech had been omitted from the collection of 
Nehru's speeches (supra n.l4) is rather unfortunate. 
Similarly Nehru*s speech of 28 November, 1949 (See 
above n,19), does not find a place in this otherwise 
excellent collection of Nehru's speeches on Foreign 
Bolicy. 
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Great Leadeiff took shelter under It and dialed 
in our hearts, In our activities, the message 
that he brought to this country and the world 
w© can not and I am quite positive that 
our great leader would not have had us behave 
as bljjid automatjtons Just cariylng out x-hat he 
had said without reference to the changes in 
ev^ tfl« •« * ft 
'"It was a curious thing that we who carried 
on tho struggle for jfreedom in a non*violent suid 
peaceful way should have had to undertake' 
a kind of war in a part of the country. Ihe whole 
thing seemed to be a complete reversal of all that 
we stood for, and yet circumstances were such that 
I am quite convinced that we had no other way and 
that vB^ we ^ ok was the right one. 
"May I mention to the House that towards the end of October I W , when the question of Kashmir suddenly came upon us »*••• I went as I oftaa did to f^atma Gandhi, for his advice« It was not natural for him to give advice about military matters, What did he know about themt His struggles were struggles of the spirit* But listening to me, if I anay with all respect say so, he did not saySno* to the course of action that I proposed* He saw that Government as we were had to follow J.ts duty even 
i^WK^Uoft^ 
arose.. And throughout those few months, before he 
was tdken from us, I conferred with him on many occ* 
asions about Kashmir and it was a great happiness 
to me that I had his blessings in the step we took." 
Nehru was mora categoX'i^ &l ^ d unequivocal, when during 
25 
a debate on Goa, he told the Indian Parliament on July 26, 
1966, in reply to a question from a member of the Parliament 
that! 
"Achaiya Kripaiani put a straight question j whether 
our Government was pledged to non.^ violence. The 
an^er to that is no, the Government is not. As far 
as I can conceive, under ^ e eaiisting circumstances, 
26* Nehru, op.cit,, pp. 116--116. (Italics are mine). 
^ 11 • 
no Government ean be pledged to non-violence, JX 
we are Pledged to nonlvlolenOe sugely we would 
Achaiya Kripalani reminded us of i^hatma Gandhi, 
saying that the Polish deface against the German 
armies i^ght also be called satyagraha. Jisa 
Gandhiil defended not onlY defended but in 
Kashmir against the raiders, smUuUi^ 
committed to noiswyiolence should do that kind 
at M 9S^ms-
tancea, admitted tiie right of the state as It is 
qon^ tituted,. to coByait violence in defence, jhe 
Goyernment of Ir^ dia cannot give up that right in 
These statements prove beyond the shadow of a doubt 
that India's foreign policy is or was not based on non-violence 
and that even Gandhiji had accepted the use of force whenever 
and where^ver necessary, 
23 
But in the opinion of another ][hdian scholar who 
does not seem to take N^ru or anybody else seriously "we 
26, R,Bhaskaran, 'The Philosophical Basis of Indian Foreign 
BolicyS , Indian X^ MV. Qt 
1963^  (Volume XII)J p,448. Prof. Bhaskaran claims that 
India's foreign policy is based on the * transcendental 
urge* which, according to him, moves Indian »politicians 
as it does the illiterate peasant or the learned phi-
losopher*. Ihe learned professor attributes this »urge» 
even to such down-to-earth acts of Indian poli^itians 
as "proposing to go into a sort of political 'retreat* 
to rejuvenate the party and clean the administration." 
This is a reference to what was at the time known as the 
Kamara^ l plan as it was the brainchild of Kamaraj, the 
president of the Congress Party from 1964 to 1967. ISader 
Contd....... 
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iiave let our ijhlloBophy actually guide our conduct as. persons 
and group" and thats 
"Our nonaligjciizient like our noncooperation and non* 
violence Is a principle of conduct tested and proved 
viable in four miHenia of civilised existence 
It is essentially an JQadian principle demanding an 
open eyed indifference to the discipline of conse-
quences* Its baai© like that of everytJaing else 
mdian is. religJ^ us, and is to be found in the 
peraanmt uashsOceable faith in a divine ordering 
of the universe which perioits endless variety and 
does m % call for human exertion to extinguish 
difference and proas?te uniforiDity,*' 
27 
It is also claimed that "ho^ e^ver distasteful SM may be to the 
sophisticated architects and exponents of our foreign policy 
in its duirnal manifestations to consider its roots, it is the 
Hindu view of the ultimate truth that nourishes th^ ,*^  
(Continued from previous page) 
this scheme a few top ranking congress politicians 
including Xial Bahadur Shastri i^ ere made to resign 
office to work for the party. Not all these congress* 
m m «are *clean* theiaselvesi and had to face inqui* 
ries on charges of corruption subsequently* Boveveri 
neither the party «as rejuvenated nor the adMnis-
tration cleaned* me learned professor claims that 
such acts "sho^ how utterly impossible it is to *make 
sense* of our thoughts and actions without the key to 
understanding furnished by our philosophy." It does not 
seem io at all* It is a different matter if such acts 
would *mak€ sense* to some only when they were given a 
oystical or philospphical coating. If this were true, it 
is difficult to blame Nehru for having so often resorted 
to this method. After all, he had to justify M s foreign 
policy to his people in the language^ they understood* 
This perhaps gives us a clue to an understanding of the 
^dian mind and Philosophy. 
27* Needless to SEQT this is a reference to Nehru and ot2ier British oriented Indian leaders* 
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That tills View ©f Nonallgnmeat is not correct vili 
become evident in chapter three* Here certain facts have to 
he noted which go against the claim that Honaligniaent is an 
Indian and hence a reUgious principle* Firstly, Nehru was 
the chief architect of Indians foreign policy* It is incorr-
ect to ssy that he y&s nowrished 'the Hindu view of the 
ultiaate truthPerhaps it would be easier to make such a 
28 
clialm about Gaadhijl* But Gandhi^ 1 himself is reported to 
have said that 'Mehru is an Bagllshiaan*, For the same reason, 
dondhijl and Nehru differed on almost all Important political 
Issues. former did not favour parliamentary democracy. He 
did not like the Indian National Congress to function as a 
political party after independence. He was not a socialist. 
Finally^ he was not in favour of t^ ie use of force at least in 
internal affairs* In eveiy one of these matters Nehru's out-
look was shaped by European currents of thought. Nonallgnment 
was also a product of these influences. As a well infomed 29 
Indian writer put it, *'In fact it is tho British and west 
European currents of thought which have for decades been deter-
mining Indian elite taiinking on world affairs resulting on the 
28* See Loui Fischer, 
(Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1962), p. 126» 
29. Slslr Gupta, India and Regional Integration in Asia 
(Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1©66), p. 92, See 
K.P.S.Henon, .gaj^, n.2 for the contraiy view. 
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otio iiand in oa overly enthusiastio participation In European 
affairs md in a broad socialistic fervour on tb© other#.«,, 
Secondlyi it is a well recognised fact that Honalignmeni; 
is practised sucaessfully isy a large number of Afro-Asian 
30 3i nations9 especially the tiiited Arab EepubliO| not to speak of 
^^ ugoslavia* Indiai ^ugosla^ia and the Dhited Arab Hepublic 
32 
evolved it independently thou^ simultaneously, and dre» 
Inspiration from one another and in fact collaborated uith. 
each other, espcciaHy in t^e United Nations as will be seen 
in later chapters* 
30# Ao K*P#K«runakaran has observed in the introduction to" 
(op.cit^ , P«97), "the policy of 
nohaligniaent in the cold war is not that of India alone, 
but is also the policy of laaiy Governments like those 
of ara«lj Ceylon, Buraa, Indonesia, and Ghana, 
and therefore, there must be something common to these 
countries which is at the source*" 
31. Ihe foreign policy of the IJ#A,R. is considered to be the most aggressive and dynamic among the nonaligned nations*. See K«R»Singh 'Positive Heutralily*, in K.P. Karunakarm, ed., op«cit,, p.l61. See also Bimla Prasad, •Report on Se^ar on Asian Studies, ifttfrsftattoal-^Wies {Vol.VII, No#l, July-September 1966), p,113. 
32» See Peter I^on, Heutrallsm (Leicester diversity Press, 
1963}, p*120, according to whom "India, Yugoslavia, and 
the Saited Arab Republic are the contemporary neutralist 
states pju: ^ assaJLiSQSS* Each of these has pioneered poll, 
cies which are notu in some respects at least, generally 
regarded as being typically neutralist*" 
* 25 -
Ihirda^ s there has been a demand from an liapottant 
section of the ;[n<ilan public for the abandonment of Hon-
alignment by India on the ground that India is not strong 
enough to face the Chinese threat or to take Kashisoir from 
Pakistan. Among the advocates of this policy are leaders like 
33 
Ra^agopalachari and K*H#Mu)rxshl, vho are known for their 
attachment , to Hinduisia and Gandhisia, And the ujost i?ocal 
champion of dependence on the Iftilted States and the need for 
the manufacture of atom bombs bar India, Is the cwst militant 
of the Indian poll tic parties, the Jan Sangh, which claims 
to be the champion of Hindalsm In India, against ¥hat It calls 
the commmalism of taie Congress Party. Are all these gentle-
then, not nourished by «the Hindu view of the ultimate 
tru^»? Or have they all lost their religious moorings to 
demand the abandonment of Konalignmaat^ ? 
Finally,, Kehru always spoke of Asia and Africa rather 
36 than of India alone* He said that Asia as a whol© «as 
33» C^Ba^agopalacharl was almost the first leader to oppose 
publicly ;indla*s Honallgnment, tihen he founded the 
Swatantra party, opi«>sltlon to Nonallgnment became its 
foreign policy plai&« 
For a study of Jan Sangh's Foreign Rollcy see M.A,Klshore, 
Jan Sangh«s Approach to Problems of Indians Foreign finllcv 
(mpubllshed thesis presented to the Aligaih Muslim 
miverslty, Aligarh). 
d&» N^ruf op.cit»| p« 23* 
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different from Europ©i and that Asia and Africa liad cojaajon 
experiences and elreufflstances favouring Nonaligmaent, 
©lerefore^  the argument that Konallgnm^t is either 
an Indian principle or a religious principle has to be rejec-
ted as ultra vires the facts. 
In order to appreciate this better, it is necessary 
to examine ^ e reasons for these wide* spread misconceptions* 
Firstly, the close similarity of the word Nonallgnment 
to words like nonviolence and noncooperatlon seems to have 
37 been a factor. For example a western Scholar has observed 
36t pp*248^262 and 280-281. In view of this fact, it would appear wrong to say that "Peoples and nations out-side India do not have a similar history and all of them, national Idio^ncracios notv;ithstandlng, have opted for the western power-oriented attitude and for deliberate participation" (See R.Bhaskaran, op.cit; ,p.448). There is not a shred of evidence in the fentlre argument of professor Bhaskaran to show that India's foreign policy itself is not power-oriented ^cept an assertion to the contrary. Such attempts as this, to prove the greatness of India, appear to be, to s^ the least, entirely mis-placed. 
37. U.R#Ehrenfels, »The Culturological Approach to Non-alignment «, Bpofe, pf latgy^ atiOflflj. M^UVVt 1956, pp, 126-127# 
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that "Nonalignmeiit, fcy Its very tern Is a negative conception. 
In this it resembles the idea of non-resistance, non-violence 
and nirvana (non-illusion) »• »• 2Siis view conflicts with 
Nehru* s own views^  In fact Nehru rarely used the term 
38 
alignment in his early speeches on Foreign Policy* He is 
39 
also reported to have expressed dissatisfaction with it for 
its supposedly negative connotation. For the same reasoni 40 Nasser and other Arabs prefer the term *ibsltive Neutralismi 
38» See speeches under the title »An independent 
policy* in Kehru, op.cit,,pp«24-S6, In this section the 
word occurs only on pp.79 and 83. Kehru also used the 
terffl once in a speech in Parliament on 29 September, 1964, 
But see belowv^ for what appears to be the 
earliest recorded use of the term Honallgnment by Kehru 
himself* It has also to be borne in mind that it was only 
at the Belgrade Conference of the Honaligned States in 
1961j tSiat the term Noaalignment was officially accepted 
lay aH states* Even then the Arabs seem to have disliked 
it (See belowJ note 4o). 
39*. See M*S.Hajan» InUu.M ^ ^Q^M ACiCalfS op.cit*, 
40« The Arabs* dislike of the term Honalignment, was voiced by Fayez A*Sayegh, the distinguished Arab scholar in a coafflient on the Belgrade conferencei "tJon&lignment*, sele« cted in Belgrade is essentially and incapably 
negative s and yet it was chosen at the gathering at which the most militaatly affirmative of meanings was assigned ^ the policy pursued bjr the participants* It was ironi-cal that the supreme leaders of neutralism should have Bh chosen its iissst affirmative moment as the occasion fot broadcasting the purely negative element of their policy** (See Fay62 A*Sayegh, ed*t Qf im^rmim in 
(chandler Publishing Company, San Fr^cisco, 1964p»4« 
• IB • 
41 Nehru did not appro-^ e even this term* He had instead preferred 
48 
such phrajses as^ keeping from bloCs*| 'iadependrnt 
policy', and f^riendly relations with all't etc, and he declared 
repeatedly that his foreign policy was neither negative nor 43 
passive* In 1947, for eacaaple, he saidi "We have, proclaimed 
during this past year that will not attach ourselves to any 
particular groi^. Siat has nothing to do with neutrality or 44 pa&BSvil^ or anything else#" And in 1962 he saidj •'Xou may 
caH it neutraJ. or whatever you like it but" i, for aor part, fail 
to see how this approach is neutral Again^  in 1968, 
46 
he decared* "When we say our policy is one of nonalignment, 
obviously ws mean nonaligniaent with inilitaiy blocs, it is not 
a negative poMcy, It is a positive one and, I hope, a dynamic 
one 2Sitis was not an empty elaiia as will be se^ in 
ohapter three* 
Another factor which appears to have contributed to the 
misconceptions in question was a wrong understanding of the 
41» See Nehru, op»cit,, p»86.Nehru said t "I do not even like 
•positive neutralil^' as is done in some countries 
He said further "iv© are unaHiaied we are uncommit* 
.^ e^  to military policies, but the imjM^ rtant fact is that 
<?QPimi1;W4 ..^Q vaUQMg ,vaffto^ s^ and various prinoiales^  very q?ich so> (Italics are mine)* 
42» PP* £24-26, 
43* , p»24,. 
J^M P* 
46*- M^t P# 
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46 Indian role in the Korean crisis and the nature of the Panch 
Sheel| as viil be made clear In chapters three and four* A 
third factor waS| of comrs©! Kehru's owa reference to the 48 past in some of his speeches> especially after the Panch Sheel 
agreement* While Mehru had used such arguments for under* 
standable reasons^ Indian scholars took them at face value. 
Even Mhm Nehru ^ as clear and expllclti he was laisliiterpreted 
60 
or as has be<m noted earlier, Ho gl've another ezasw. 
pie, here la a stateisent of Hehru which has often been quoted 
In support of the view that India *s foreign policy Is li^ sed on 
46. See beloi;?, chapter I^T for an analysis of Indians policy 
In the Korean crisis. 
47. See below ;p. 32 for another factor of Importance. 
48. See Nehru's speeches under the title »Panch Sheel and 
Coexistence* in Nehru op.cit, . pp.99».106. On p. 101 Hehru 
said i "Peaceful coexistence is not a new idea for us in 
India. It has been our way of life and is as old as our 
thought and culture. About 2,200 Years ago, a great son of 
India. Ashoka, proclaimed it ^ d inscribed it on rock and 
stone^. It has already been indicated that Asoka*s cojomit* 
ment to non-violence or coexistence ims not total (see 
alJove note 21). It laay also be added that many of Asoka's 
edicts had no binding force and \iere only ideal statements 
(See Charles Drekmeier, op.cit.,p»l67}. It is also iopor-
tsait to note that these reisarks vere made Hehru in a 
speech at a ar civic reception to Bulganin and Khrushchev 
at Calcutta on November, 30,1966. 
49. As indi<3ated earlier. Prof. Ra^an has written that "natik. 
rally «««•• Indian foreign policy spokesmen sometimes talk-
ed in idealistic and moral generalities (as the spokesmen 
of any other country are wont to do)...*."(See above note 
60. See above p. ^ ^ ^  
61. For exajaple see A»Appardorai, op.cit., p. 487. 
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&2 mdXa*a culture aad religion. Nehpu said that "it is a policy 
iahermt in the circtaastances of Iridia> inJierent in the condi» 
tioning of the Indian laind during our struggle for freedonit 
inherent in the circumstances of the world today ii 
It is on ttiQ basis of this and similar other statements 
of Nehru snd, particularlyi of the phrase ••mental outlook of 
India*, that the whole edifice of the philosophical or cultural 
basis of India's foreign policy has been raised l^r Indian 
scholars. "!£h© essence of that mental out look", says Professor 
Appardoraiy "is a spirit of tolerance an»ng the Comnwn people 
in India, who have inherited the traditions from their scrip-
tures and from their history^ *' Mid^  according to Prof. 
Bhaskaran^ '^Fes^ t foreigners can acqiaire the patience and equlpmenti 
Hehru, op»cit»| pp* 80 ^ d 83 (Italics are mine). 
63. l.Appador^i, op.cit.^  p.487* 2his is a questionable view. 
&B has been noted earlier (see above p. IS.), Prof.Baskaran 
wrote that Noaalignmeaat "is essentially an Indian principle 
demanding an open ^ ed ;^ differei^ ce to the discipline of 
consequences.*' (Italics are mine). This indifference rathea 
than tolerance appears to N the dominant Jtrait of the 
Indian mind as the existence of si^h social evils 9t as 
•Sati» and »unk»i:whabiiityi go to show. 332e evil of »Sati» 
was abolished only with the help of the British might in 
Iii4ia. And Gan^i^i understood the *sln* of untouchability 
in South Africa and not in India. It would have been hy« 
pocricy Oil his part to tolerate »untouchability* any more 
in Ihdia after his experiences in South Africa. He sacrifi-
ced his life for religious tolerance in India. Does this 
prove that religious tolerance has been a tradition of the 
Contd.«•••••« 
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for tfae pFopef s^ udy of our foreign policy while nost Indians 
t^ ho are interested have no. uaeed to spell out and justify for 
themselves the drives which govern our policy for they are llko 
the foundations of a building which the resident has no need to 
e x a m i n e * * T h i s is to ignore the fact that Nehru had 
hiiDself tfiicen the greatest pains> thitjugh^ut his long career 
as Indians Foreign lOnister, to explain and to justify his 
foreign policy to his countrymen crore than to foreisaers# 
(Continued fro©'previous page) 
• Indian mind? Frof. Appadorai himself admits that "Ihe rise 
of commual outlook in the first half of this c^tury endin}' 
in the partition of India, and the prevalence of untouch-
ability as a custom warn us that one can never be 
comjacent of the strength of the tolerant attitude in all 
the people** <pt488)* «find Buddha*s teaching of ahimfla would 
have been superfluous if ahimsa and tolerance ^ e^re alroa<^ 
part of tihe life of the common man* Dr.Radhakrishnan vrote.t 
"Buddhism would ^ Justify Buddha's attitude by saying that 
every religion exaggerates the suffering of llfep for the 
aim of religion is the redemption from sin and suffering. 
With a happy world tiiere would have been no need for reli-
gion»" (See Indian Hillosophy (The MacMlllian Company, New 
York, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1968), p»364, If 
"Buddha overemi^ iasises the. dark side of things", it is proof 
of the Intensity of his feeling as}/ well as of the complets 
or near complete absence of good around him. ISie fall of 
Buddhism in India is also proof of t2ie absence, of tolerance 
and the predominance of indifference in India, for as Dr# 
Radhakrishnan (op.cit.p.6o8) put it-."slow absorption and 
silent indifference are the causes of. the fall of 
Buddhism^ '* In politics also nonviolence does not seem to 
have been the predominaat force in ancient India. See J. 
Duncan J^ uDeritt, 'The Maintenance of Peace In The Hindu 
Worlds gg^H Pf. fot^^yAattoal Afjfaiyg, 1958. One has only to name Kautl3ya»s •Artiiasastra* in this regard 
See T.M«P*Mahadevan, op»cit.,pp*99-104, for a contrary view-
Nehru attributed Gandhi^i's attachment to nonviolence to his 
early life in Gujarat and -fee Jain doctrine of nonvioikence. 
Be denied that India as a whole was influenced by this doc-' 
trine » See J.Nehru, The Discovery of India (Asia Publishing 
House, Bombay, 1967), p» 4'?9» 
64. Op.cit., p.446. 
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Similarly> the fact tiiat Holiru iiad laid the greatest 
stress on M^fl'y,- .t^ t^f„ffl^ g 
.M.• fefii^^, „ iffi^S * t is either ^ orgott^ or 
36 
bypassed* As already indicatedi IJehru also said that these 
oircurastances were coaimon to the whole of Asia as well as to 
jftfriea* mr^ civer^  there is nothing in stateiaent to 
stiggest that he Has referriiig to the iniluease of Hiadu philo* 
sophy ^ ad scriptures on India *s foreign policy* As seen 
already he had clearly rejected Gandhijl's ideals as iiuprac-
ticahle quite early in his career as India's Foreign Hinistor. 
Thus the words 'inherent in the whole mental outlook of India' 
do not refer to the influence of :a3idian philosopi^ and scrip-
tares at all* All that Nehru meant waS| in w opinion, that 
India's foreign policy^  "was in line vith the policqr which w© 
had broaday thought of even before «e became independent.*' 
though the pre«oindependence thinking of the 2hdian leaders was 
idealistic and moralistic, mainly under the Influence of Gandhiji 
See aboire,pp* 
See above, pp* ^ ~ Kehru also appears to have convinced 
Gandhi^i in this regard see above note 18» 
67* Hehrui op*cit», p»97 and also pp* BS and 85* For a good 
studr of the vievs of the Indian National Congress on 
Foreign policy matters prior to independence, See Bimla 
P3^ asad, p^^ gyigte gf U U m jTomfia FoUgy i jto^it^-a 
edition^ , Calcutta, 1962)» 
23 -
Hehra made it cXear^  as early as that it did not suit 
&B 
aa Independezit ladia^  because, as he said **FoPei©a affairs 
are utteriy realistic today- A false step, a false phrase 
jaakes ail the differsnce**' this realism has been the aiost 
distinct feature of India's foreign policy as also of the 
United Arab Republic- It was the failure to understand this 
subtle change from the pre-independence days that had misled 60 many to dub sviiru as an idealist and a dreamer* 
ffny^aligmaent and Islaiat 
Hasser has often said ^at **our policy emanj^ es from 
our coimtxy our landf and our conscience*" Does this mean 
th&t the Nonalignment of the Arabs has its basis in Xslacff 
62 03 Rasser has never claimed that it is so* As Faye» A^Sayegh 
Hehru} op*cit*yp»27. see also Speech at pp.6o»66« iSieflQ speeches of Nehru are ejctremely laportont frtr an imdnr,. 
g^tofi Qi: l a m ^ appgo^ gfa to,,,if* 
SB, Ibid. 
60* See Werner Levi, Free Mdia in Asia (iCLnneapoliSf Iiaiver« 
sity of liinnesota i^ess, 1962), p*£0# 
61* See O^ted Arab Eepublic l^oro^tion Departm^t, greBidqnt 
Q w x il^ Msi, ,6fl4 loss, pp»88 and 100* (Hereafter cited as Hasssr'a speeches:)*See 
62* See Fayez A*S5^egh, 'Islam and Neutralism' in J*Harris 
Proctor^  ed* Mlm Jnl^^ynaUona fiei^Uauat (Paii^ Haii Pi-ess, liondon, 1966) p.71* m© learned author saysi have not read eirery book, article, statement, and intenriew 
Contd*«*«* 
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has observed^  ''fiie marks of Islam upon t^ e thought prooesses 
and expressions of Musllis leaders^  In matters relating to inter-
nal affairs is pervasive and umaistalcalalej but in matters per-
taining to international affairs in general and neutralism iJi 
partioulari the reasoning of the contemporary generation of 
liuslim leaders is indistinguishahle from that of non*Muslims* 
Nasiri &nd Nicrumah ««••* seem to speak the same language 
and to dra^  inspiration from the same pulslic philosopibQr when 
they discourse on neutralism and the cold var He has 
64 also observed t&at "leadership in establishing the doctrinaire 
(Continued previous page) 
of every contemporary Muslim statesman. But I have 
studied «*««* a fairly representative corss*section of the 
voluminous literature in question* 
I have fomd neither indications nor admissions 
of such influeneei neither explicit references nor alli»» 
sionsi! 0ee also the contribution by P««r*Vatikiotisy 
* Islamic and the Foreign Policy of Egypt % for a'somoHhat 
qualified acceptance of these View®. 
M*f P* ?3« 
pp«82»83. See also Fayez A.Sayeghf M | op.cit* Xn the introduction to t^ is (p*10) t^e author makes a . distinction betfe?een MftlrlgaaiJLia and Pragamatio neutyalisi^ ^ In View of the dismissal above of the vieti that India's Foreign Bolicy had any doctrinaire basis| this , classification of Fay&z A.sayegh loses sigaificance* Nehru had been, as much •impervious* to the doctrinaire factors in. foreign policy as any other nezialigned statesman had been, though he might have philosophied or th^rised more often than others* It Ttfill be shown in the following chapters that India's foreign policy from 1947 onwards ha» been as practical as that of Nasser's from 1964* 
^ 2& m 
grounds of neutralist policy lias come £tom outside tl^ e ranks 
of Muslim statosmansbip, pairtic«3.ai'ly from Hindu and Buddhist J 
statesmsuci«f #9«whj@n a im^ Kusli® leaders^  notably Sukamos Nasirt 
and Sekou fours began some vhat belatedljr to in|$ct some do^ s^* 
trinaire elements into l^ iiir neutralist viewsj th^ did S0| 
as the terminology and the conceptual context of their expr©ss«» 
ions clearly. demonstrate, not tgr drafe'ing inspiration from the 
spiritual heritage of Islam but echoing the words and |^ra-
phrasing the thoughts of non-Muslim nettralistsf especially 
Hehru* ^e ma^ orilgr of Muslim neutraOist. leaders, '.hoveveri 
ha^e remained impervious to the doctrinaire factor in neutj^ 
XlSM^* In siiort, as he has put it "isljua is irrelevant to 
It ^ ms the absence of religiosity that, in fact| made 
it possible for Hehru and Nasser to collaborate on many inter-
national issues* Indeed, as Ptot* Boutras Boutras-Ghali has 
observed, Hasser had abimdoned his idea of Islam as the 'third 
67 
circle* of which the Uiited Arab Republic should form the 
centre, in favour of l^e more influential and powerful circle 
of the nonaligned states. It is not without significance tiiat 
M'f P* (Author»s Italics). 
66, »aie Foreign Policy of Egypt* in J.E.Black and 
l&ompson, ed; op*cit*| p*331« 
67* See S^A^Hasser, ^ e Philpso^ of Ihe Bevolutiony 
(Ministiy of National Guidance information Administration) 
pp» 61 & 70. 
* m m 
there ar© now signs of soa© strains in Jjtido-U.A^ R, reiationst 
partly as a result of tia© influeaee of relglious propaganda 
on the foreign policy of itxdia and some Arab countries^ though 
68 not tha United /^ rah Eepuhlio itself, as -will be seen later^  
M practice t2i© foreign policy of ^ e liaited Arab 
69 Hepublie has been higha^ pragiaatic and dovn* to-earth, in 
70 the long*drawn-out dispute Xsrealj Nasser's stand has 
71 
been as ui^Mgnsus as possible* He has always declared that 
he would not«indeedj he could liot-recognise Xsreal unless 
Isreal accepted the Security Council Resolutioas 4m Palestine 
and the Arab Hefugees. He secured weapons from tShe Soviet 
Union to meet liie Isreali threats of aggression, yhm the west 
M^C.Chagla the Foreign Minister of India for a short while, 
gave public expression to these feelings against some Arab 
countries - See tffie Hl^ du^  fiardi M967. 
see belov Chapter V for an accomt of l^e evolution of 
the Honalignment of ^ e Dhited Arab Eepublic* 
70* See Magser^s Speeehes,^  1968| op.cit., pp*317-318, and 
374»37o» for Nasser's views on Israel. Also see Nasser's 
Speeches^  1959, op*cit«, pp. 681-684, 
71* M'f PP* 317-318* 
2? 
72 refused sueh help to iiiiB# He has depended upon the United 
Nations for a Just solution of th© problem^ moximhiXe iie has 
73 
declared that the Oalted Arab Republic is at war with Israel* 
He has n@9er claimed that he \^ ould solve the dispute throt^ 
pea<seful negotiationsf as Nehru did in the ease of Ooa* 
But if H^ru wanted a peaceful settlement to the piobleis 
of Go% it wa!3 not because ho was either attached to noo-
i?iolence or bislieved iM a di'^ ino ordering of things, as alreadjr 
74 
indicated. In Octoberi 1961» he told a Seminar on Bsrtuguese 
Col^ nialisiai in Hew Oelhi| l^at *'At no time did ^ e in our mindg. 
72* Supra^  
73« Hasser*s stand has not changed so far^  even after the 
jime 1867 war with Isreal* See belo^ i €5hapter V, for a 
iMPief analysis of tiiis mstx erisis* 
See op.clt,, pp,367«368. 
Speaking at a mass rall^at chowpathy, Bombay, held under 
the auspices of the Seminar o» Bortugueee Colonialism, on 
October S3, N^ru repeated tiie warning - See 
. October 34, 1961* See also R»P# RaO| Jftrtiiguese Rul^ m 
Goa .1 (Asia ^ ubMshing House, Bombay| 19^), 
p« 6» ah vie^ of this and oth^ categorical statements 
of Hehru <See bej^ ?^ note 82), the charge that "ISje non-
aligned countries mless th^ menage to Clarify their 
attitudes and the situations in %ihich they regard the use 
of force as justified, are open to the charge that toy 
do not differ fundammtaily from the Great Powers csee <r*^ «Burton, .1 A .V^miSL 
(Cambridge Haiversi^ Press, London, ld&6),p«S03 appears to be contrary to facts* A large part of his study of 
m$simsk Honalignment appears to be contrary to facts « 
See Robert IrtRothstein, Alignments, Nonalignmmt, and 
small Bowers 1946-66j .iRteyft^ UftQe^ a. (Vol.20, 
No,4i 1(366'), pp. - 397-418* 
and in our aafelons renounoe tfee possibJLXl^ ot jailltajcy action 
«,««# a3?e not in anjr sense tied d©wn absolutely to pursuing 
the policy ythich have thus far pursued in the Interest ot 
remv&l of Ctol^ onialisa. If we have to take some other aotion* 
ye shaU tslc© it* We keep an open inlad*'' 33iat India did not 
r^aoanced of force completely also evident from 
f V 
the fitter oppositioJi of India to the Western s^>port to 
Portugal over Goa?® Otherwise, as an Indien gcholar'^^ut it, 
is inexplicable that the aovermi^nt of India should express 
r 
so ffluch ooncom towards the Anglo^B^rtugal Alliance and the 
t^ hich ^ o^uld co^e into ttie picture only in case of 
an ariried attack against the territories of the contracting 
77 ' parties," Nehru also said that "I do not say that it is 
impossible for India or some other country to have a llialted 
war* It may yield results too*** 
But he did not like to use force against Goa becausei 
78 
he iaidi **we are fighting against tiiese vague ghosts and 
pbantoKS which create the cold var If we cursives nsove 
75» 1SS7.63, op.cit., pp* 113.116* See H.P^ 
Ha0| op»cit« I pp. 140*143 and H«S«Ra4an| * Stresses Md 
Strains^  In Indo-British Relations l^tematioi^i^ 
studies (Vol, n, IIo»2, October I960), pp4l6-173, for a 
full discussion of Indo»Briti^ and 2hdo»ll»S* differences 
on @oa« 
76. K.I3arayima Eao, 'The Problem of Goa», The Indian Year 
SQffi^  fti^^muo^, „„ACiTAiigst pp« 6o->6i« 
77. Kehrui op.clt. p#116. 
78. Ibid. (Italics are mine). 
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away- ffom that lev^l and thiak in terms of soffle kind of polio e 
action or limited war, then are injuring all t^e larger 
79 
causes that vq stand fq;, and possiblY ear selves ea^ 
tangled in great dif^ letilties," For, as a British Scholar^ '^ has 
ot)served s "if *aggr©ssion« can bo justified in Goa it c m 
be justified in cases in ^ h^ich there are rejnaiants of colonialismj 
and in which ^er© are boundaries arbitrarily drawn by colo-
nial rulers". 12iough the Government of India defended their 81 
acceptance of the Chinese occupation of Sibet on ground 
that the British Policy on libet was imperialist! they were not 
prepared to accept it either on Ladakh or ||*E*F«il* But they 
did not have the strength to defend India against an invasion 
from China, Nehru was afraid that if 3hdia took military action 
in Goat China might be tempted to do the same in Ladakh and 
H»£*F»A«y as it did in fibet. I^is was what he must have had 
in mind when he told®® the fia^jk Sal^a on March 2Gf 1962, while 
79» ahis was precisely the line adopted ty the delegate of the 
United States of America in the Security council in his 
bitter attack against India on its military action in Goa« 
see ImM^}!, Of MUoftSt ld61f 
80. a"*y»Burton, op.cit, |pp»202»203» 52ae author also wrote that "if til© nonaiigned nations justify the use of fo2?ce by 
themselves in the post-colonial situationS| their position 
would seem absurd when they protest against the actions ol' 
m^ov powers to which they take exception." 
8l« See Kehr% op.cit*» pp*313 and 382* See also t^ ehru* a Sneecl^ eSf 1957*1963| op.Cit«| pp, 188. 
82* See . giffn^^^m, t Rajya sabt^ a^  Volume-Ho.7i, 
20 iprch, 1962, cols. 80S.803* Nehru reminded the House that »I declared 2 thiidj: in this House, about six months before the Goa operation that we did not rule out any stronger steps, military steps" (col* 80© )• 
m BQ m 
MQVing the Constitution ^ eadmmt Bill for tbe integration 
of Goa into tii0 Jadian Onioni t^ at i ^'It is true that vhm 
w© decided to send araed forces to Goa I did so vith a great 
deal of reluotanoei not feeeause it was not right in my 
opinion, not because it vas not needed that is 've sent 
i t b u t bocause we felt that this might be aiado an excuse 
by other countries and olSier people for lailitary excursions 
even ^ ough the^  were not Justified* People do not go into 
the long history, not laaow all 12ie facts, they only see 
a certain result*^ 
It y&Sf again, this fear that appears to have restraiutja 
Kehru from undert^ng strong jseasures against China for a 
83 very long tiiae# t^e fact remains that as som as mdia 
84 
ata^ed military measures against CSiinai it took advantage 
of the situation by laountlng a large scale offensive on sa Iadia»s borders in October, 1962, just as Israel did against 
83* See Hehru's Speeches^  1057*1963, op»cit«| p*322* 
84, for an account U^rtt of the measures 
India took and of their liiaitations* Thus, it is diffi-cult to believe t^at Kehru %^ ould have taken these mea* sures ^i?ithout being assured of positive results or that th€p?e vas no fear of an attack froa China on a massive scale* or both, Hehru iiiiaself confessed that "we expec*. ted that tb^ t^ ould not attack in suda large nuabers and to bring about a regular invasion with several divisionSt as did*' pp»237-238). See below pp. 100-106 
for fur^er ^scussion* An American Scholar han^writtea that through these military measures India had provoked China to attack* See Harold C« Hinton, 
Vjorld Pftlltl<^ Si. (Houghton Mifflin Co.,Boston, 1966), 
pp,S99 and 307* See below Chapter V for a case study of l^ ese two crises. 
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to United Arab Kepubllc in 1986, andj again, in 19S7# 
It is elear nov? that policy of peaceftil settle^ 
gS ment of Oisputes lias been a polioijr of eaqpediency m m than of 
87 
principle. ThuSf one© Goa was li^ eedi Kebru declared that 
there vm m change in India's adherence to this policy* But, 
as indicated above, H ^ u it difficult to stick to this 
policy on China and had to resort to the use 6t force, with 
disastrous rosults. And when Pakistan &mt infiltrator® into 
Kashisir in 1966, Prime ilinister aiastrl ordered the occupation 
of the Ha4i pir Pa&n on the Pakistani side of the international 
border which, in turn, precipitated the 2S days* >?ar vith 89 
Pakistan in S€jptefflber, 196S* At iTashkent, however, both 
Shastrl €ind Ayub agreed tso solve their disputes through ne^tla. 
tions, which appears unlikely in near future* 
See S#A.H*HaqQi, •Some Reflections on 3hdia<8 Foreign ^ U G f U l^e Indism Jour^ of Jb3,itlcal Scl^ce (Vol*^IX, Sot If January i^rch, 1956), pp.48«49* It is Interesting to note that right upto the ^ Mtary action in Goa, Indian scholars have been citing India*s policy on Goa as the mat impreesive illustaration of iadia'e adherence to ttke prin-ciple of peaceful settlejo^ nt of disputes* See M.S*Baian, pidia In World Affair^ 1954»S6- op#cit., pp^dS and 36, and also A.Appadorai, op»eit*,p»Sl4. As the occupation of Goa occured after Prof* A^adoral sent his paper to the editor he had to a<M a foot»note saying "one ^ e^ after thie paper vas sent to the editor, Goa vas taken by Jhdia through whJit the Gov^mn^t haa officiaiay termed police action*.,,*' 
See A*Appadorai, op*cit«, p.614, n#97* 
88* see Uik (Hereaft^ cited as iukStSs.). fii^d Seriee. Twelftti Session,Vol*XLIV, Nos.1^10, August 30,1963, Col* 2631 for Chavan»a (thm Defence mnister) annoisiceinent. 
89. See 'Sue Sta^esm^t ^ Hovember, 1966, for the text of the 
Tashkent Declaration* 
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It is also clear that there is no correlation between 
nonvioimce as is generally mderstood in India, and the prim* 
ciple of peaceful settlement of disputes. 32ie latter is a 
principle of international law of long usage and is not at all 
90 of Mian "origin* It is t2ae failure to make this distinction 
91 
that is at the root of tii^e j&isoonception that Honalignmmt is 
based on nonviolence of the Qandhian t^ pe* India adhered to 
and advocated the peaceful settlement of disputes on occasionsj 
vMle it has never been coamUltted to the former, 
Anodes ffiiseonception about Honalignment «hich needs to 
be dispelled is the view that it means noniaterference or aon^ 
intervention in tfee affairs of others, which one laay add, forme^ l 
92 part of t^i© ^ mch Sheel* Every independent nation which has tha 
poller to do so ^ ould resent and oppose umecessary interference 
» . « . 
of otiaers in its o m affairs w&iie it would itself ace^t 
90» Prof. A.Appadorai -wrotet for examploi toat nonviolence or 
peaceful settlement of disputes and the employment of Just 
m^s to achieve ^ ust ends are the really noteworthgr fesw 
tures of India's Foreign Policy* See above, p.^ 
91* See MsS.Bajan, * Chinese Aggression 4nd Bie Future of . 
Indians Nonaligim^tt, op^cit*,p*128 (See above,note 
9 
Sed Foreign fiqlicv of India i Toasts of Deeuaents 
aid edition, (Lok Sat&a Secretariat, New Delhi),p. 104 for 
the l>^ ch Sneel l^ reectent between JDadia and China* See aliso 
the Cbou Eh^iai * Nehru statement of June 28,1964 iM*f pp.iia.114 Hereafter cited as .S^ s^ s^ of 
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foreign help if circumstances deiaand it* l&ich depends upon 
93 the attitude of tiie Government concerned* 
But a British scholar®^  has written that " If a 
nonaligned Governiaent vbi'b to enter into any agreements 
under which it could receive protection from another nation, 
its nonaligiMttent would automatically be destroyed, 
Neither can a nonaligued nation support any intervention in 
the internal affairs^  ©f any other country, and revolt 
or political change in policy is a joatter for the people 
coneei'ned.»* 
tiiis View would reduce Honalignment to neutrality. 
The author himself admits that " M many matttsrs the 
nonaligned countries have a duty to be neutral, in the 
traditional sense 25iis is sSjuply not true as ]?ehr« 
afid Nasser had rightly emphasised over and over again in 
96 
their speeches and statements, as has been indicated 
earlier. They have not acted on this principle as shall 
be seen in the following chapters, Honalignemeat haS 
nothing to do with neutrality or impartiality • 
93# See J.M.Burton, op.cit. ,p,120» 
p«224. This is a presumption rathei* tiian a 
statement of fact. But it will represents the claim 
in qu estion. 
9a. Ibid. 
96. In a ,joint statement issued by NQhru and Tito on 
December 23, 1964 a specific reference vas made to 
this aspect of Konalignment — See Texts of Documents, 
op.cit«,p«146. 
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97 Ttes^ e are no such obligations. la Its jaost elementajy seas© 
Noaailgna^t laeaas £reeaoai frojs all obligations and commitiaeiits* 
SB Hchi'u mm. that "we ar© free to ioia an aHiaace.T. 
In practice the iionaligaQd states interfsre and have 
interferred in tha internal affairs of neighbouring states as . i 
the other big po^^s do or h&v& done, ^dia had continuously 
interferred isri th© domestie affairs of her neighboxir© liko 
99 Nepalj Bhutan caid Sikkio* 2Ms aspect of India's foreign policy 
loo 
has b^a foroefuHy essplained Ijy an Jiidian seholar, who wrote 
that "w© find that in deaHng witii these territories^  India 
simply took up fee i^ntle of the old British Diplomacy of direct 
or indirect control over ttiese territories, if only for the 
securilsr of India, Indian policy in Hyderabad,Kashmir and 
Juaagadh comes wader this category. Ihe agre^ ffients with Sikkim 
and Bhutan place thea as vassal states of Jtodia* Slhoijgh Hepal 
97* <op*oit*|pp»21S*227) has evolved an elaborate tti^ry of rights a^ id duties of Nonaligniaent %?hich appear to be far- reeved from the facts. It is hoped that this stu^ ifould bear out l^ ais poJjit. See aboVe, N#74» 
98» Hehru, op»cit<|p.61 See below pp» 69-81 ^^^ furth^ discussion* 
99» See below pp^SWa for furiaier discussion. 
100* Karunakar Gi^ta, op«oit«, pp« 38»39« Ihe position has 
undergone a change so far as nepal is concerned^ Hbs 
ruler of Sikkia has recently expressed a desire for greater autonoaor. See jms-SMSs September 10, 1967 and The Statesman, June 16, lH?. ^^^ 
is gtlll regarded as a sovereiga state, Interference by India 
in her domestic affairs is now too well known and is resented 
aiaong the vocal sections of tiie Nepalese population. As in 
otiier temtorieSf tlie question of Madia's security iouet have 
been tiie predominant liioiight behind this intereference#«»»*." 
The aid given b/ India to Burm during the Civil War in 
1949 has been criticised as interfermice in Burma's internal 101 
affairs^  thoijgb. Nehru denied it* Hehru's opposition to 
Pakistan's acceptance of arme fro© the liiited statea could be 
called 'interference* in the internal affairs of neighbouring 102 countries* lletou did not deny this, but, he said that the 
matter vias too important for India to remain silent* He w^t 
103 further and said that it vbs not laerely against the freedom 
of India but af^ ainst the freedom of Asia as a whole* Nehru 
lO^ 
opposed the l3outh East Asia !Ecea1?sr Organisation on much the 
same lines. In fact, Nehru's *Asia Policy• or the 'peace ai-ea* 
approach was a sort of >jonroe Doctrine which declared that 106 South Asia was JMla^s primary concern as shall be semi later* 
101» See below ppl46«48 for further discussion* 
102« See Nehru, op^cit., pp4. 471^72^ 
10^ # JjJ,, p*89# How far Nehru was justified in these views ^shall be examined in the nes:t chapter s^ below pp« ^ -
105, See below pp*14S.163, 
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Finally^  India is said to have violated the Panch Sheel 
106 vhen it gave aaylma to the Dalai Lama in 1969* For example, 
"trff 
Lord Linesay of Birker ^ ^ has observed % "the reasoas for tha 
revolt in 19S9 belong to Chinese internal policies. !Bie 
Intei'national repuraussions eaiae from Indian expressions of 
syiigjathy with the revolt*^ ' 
Nasser also has his own sphere of influence in ttie Arab 
world| in vhich he does not want the interference of any fore-
ign power* !Ehis is the basis of his ^ ab Nationalisck^^It 
llO s^as wrong to say t^ a^t Arab Nationalism is a It is on 
the basis of Arab nationalism that iTasser has boeoi opposed to 111 the Western Policies in the Arab Viorld» And it was in the najse 
106» For an account of the flight of the Dalai Lama from Tibet 
to j^ dia see FraiA KoroeSf 33ie Revolt in Tlbety (Sterling 
Publishej.-s Private Limited, Jullundur ^ d Delhi, lS66),pp. 
107* * Chinese Foreign Policy i Recent Developnents*. Xear Boe^ 
m ^ M t 1961, p* 86. 
lOS. See passer's Speeohe^ y 1968 op.clt.,pp.49»60,88f13a.l34, 236»237, 260*^  It is in this sense only that one can say tiaat Nasser interfers in the affairs of his Arab nelgli. boors* But the Arab League gives him the initiative* It iSf therefor©! difficult to call him an imperialist as many western scholars and writers depict hlm# Nasser's so-called imperialism springs from his opposition to the att®apts of the big povjers to dominate the Arab world* 
109* Ibid. 
HO* J^ny people in Iiidia and abroad seem to belive in the ajytti of A^ab Nationalism* Clovis Maksoud, the former CStiief Represen-tative of the Arab League in India, vehemently dmied that it was airrth in a Seminar on 3hdo«»Arab rela-tions held at the Aligarh Muslim ^ ftiiversitgr, Aligarh* 111* See below Chapter V for further discussion* 
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of Arab Nationalism that he crossed swords with Khrushchev ia 
112 1959, when the latter accused him of anticoxomunism. Indeed, 
this policy vas not Nasser's, it was inherent in his coiintry's 
113 position in the Arab world, Nasser, however, translated it 
into reality bjr his bold policies. 13iis is the secret of his 
114 success and popularity* 
It is no^ possible to conclude safely that Konalignment 
has not been a policy of either nonviolence or pacifism, it has 
no commitments, not even a coEsnitment to peaceful settlement of 
disputes* Its basis is not religious, be it Hinduism, Buddhism 
or Islam* It does not mean non»int^fer^ce or neutrality in 
any sense of the term* 
These, one might say, are one category of misconceptions 
on lionalignment. In the next chapter, another category of miscoiv 
ceptions will be discussed* To this we now turn* 
In a classic sentence Nasser said; "If Khrushchev raises 
today to defend a small minority of the sons of our countiy • ••••sayiiig tiiat he is defending communism as a principle 
we tell him that we do not consider ttiis as defence of the 
communist principle, but as intervention in our affairs"—— 
See 1969, op*cit.y).164. 
113* See Hasser»s Speeches^  1968» pp*215-^6 and p*269. See 
Charles D„Cremeans, The Arabs ^ d ihe World (Frederick A» 
Praeger, Wei^  York, London, 1963), p*24. 
114, This does not mean that Nasser has no opposition in the 
Arab world. But ttxose who oppose him, like Habib Bourguiba 
of Tunisa are unpopular in the Arab World. See below 
Chapter V, for an analysis of the evolution of Nasser's 
Nonalignment. 
C H A P T E R II 
oQm QF wm^mmn 
la this chapter some or tiie professed objectives of 
Nonaligmaent vill be exaiained so as to determine their validity 
or otlierwise. 
1 
AS Hehru put it in 19404 *'The main objectives of that 
policy are s th© pursuit of peace, not through alignment witii 
any major group of povers but through m independent approach 
to each controversial or disputed issuej the liberation of 
subjected p<K3ples, the maintenance of freedom, both national 
and individual, the elimination of racial discrimination and 
the elimination of want, disease and ignorance, which afflict 
the greater part of the world's population." 
From this and similar stateiaents of Hehru have flowed o. the arguments''that "the pursuit of peace*, *the liberation of 
subjected peoples', »the elimination of racialism', and also 
3 
according ^ some, t4ie containment of communism, at least in 
Asia, through democracy and social reform, have been the icajoP 
1. See m7-63, op.cit*, p* 401* 
See M.S.Bajan, India in ArfairSy op.cit,,pp.40«^7i, B.S.K.Hurty, Hehru's Foreign Pnllcy (The Beacon Information And Publications, India, New Delhi, 1963), pp.lo^H, and K.P.Karunakaran, India in Vnrld Affairs^ 1947»60» op»cit», p. 23« 
3, See Sisia* Gupta, op.cit., pp. 11-14. 
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objectives of the foreign policy of India* Sbia© of these 
4 have also been variously described as th6 »principles» or the 
6 6 'pillars* of laie foreign policy of India. And that Nonalign-
ment is only "a means by vhlQh ladia seeks to achieve her 
policy objectives." By comaion consmt, the first three have 
been accepted'as the main objectives of ail the nonaligned 
8 
states^  and indeedi of all Airo^Asim statos* including tiiose 
that have joined the Power BloCs» 
It will be argued belov that though Konalignment is a 
means to an end, it has not been primarily concerned with aryr 
of file objectives motioned above, including the 'pursuit of 
peace.« 13iese also have been means to an end, namely, the 
'security and progress» of the country, which in Nehru's own 
9 
wordSf are the first objectives of the foreign policy of every 
country, Including India. 
4* See B.S.H.Murty^ loc.cit., and Karunakar Gupta, op.cit., pp»43»44* 
6. See Chapter I, note ll« 
6. Raj an, India In.Viorld Affairp^  op.cit., p. 68, and Sisir 
Gupta, op.cit., p.9. 
7. 
8. 
see fie qC StatQ Off GpY^raiB^t Qt Unn-
aligned countries. Belgrade,, September (Publicise. 
tico-Izdavacki aivod, Yugoslavia, 1961), pp» 263-61 CHereafte.r cited as 
See L^t i^ ivQ la W t y 
In Diver si ty^  (Issued by i Information Service Indonesia j 
Embassy of thefiPublic . of Indonesia, New Delhi), pp.20&-216. 
9. Nehru, op.cit.,p.79» See also Chapter 3 below, pp. $3.^ 86. See also A.Appadorai, op.cit., p. 482. 
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to begin taien, the role of India and l^e United Arab 
fiepublic in toe •liberation of subjected peoples* will be 
examined first^  in as bclef a way as possible- At the Asian 
Relations Conference held in Hsa-i Delbi, in 1947, \sider hie 
patronage, Kehru said^^that "the old imperialisflis are fading 
aw^*" passing it may be noted that ty old imperialisms 
Nehru meaat w©istern empires, implying theretoy that he did not 
distinguish between Colonialism and Imperialism. He used the 
two words as synonyms more or less. However, it is xi?ell known 
that, Hehru acted ii?ith a crusader's zeal in the case of the 
11 .12 . freedoia. of Indonesia. As tftferner LeJUt' has sire as tic ally, but 
apply put it, "suoh ambitious heights ii?ere never reached again, 
though oppertunit^ has not been lacking." Again, in his speech 
at the Belgrade conference of the Heads of State or Government 
13 
of Honaligned Coimtries, in 1961, lidiru observedi "the. era of 
Classic Colonialism is gone and is dead, though, of course, it 
survives and gives a lot of trouble yet, but essentially it is 
over", said tiierefore, "the most Important tiiing" was tiie -
H^ V i^ejj:^ .^^  (Asian Relations Organisation 
Neiv Delhi, 3hdia,1948), p. 23. (Hereafter cited as Aslap 
Mi^Msmi)* 
11. See below pp.i46-46i'or an analysis of Indians part in the case of IDadonesian freedom. 
12. op.cit., p. 114. 
13. See Belgrade Report* op.cit., p. 107. 
41 -
redueiiag of tension toetween tiie Great Powers. For Nasser, as 
a pubileatjloa^ '^  ot the Government of the Iftilted Arab Republic 
reiterated^ "©lere v;as no question of priorities, U'orid peace 
and CtolonialisiB were both equally iiaportaht, th^ were — » as 
they still are correlated and thus eailed for simultaneous 
and urgent action on t&ie pai-t of the conference.*' For, as a 
British Scholar^\as put it, Nehru's claim that the era of 
Classic ColonJ.aliSffi was over," was at that tlme^  for more true 
16 
of 4sia than of Africa," As Hasser pointed out in his 
speech, the ^ -abs and the Africans were fighting bitter battles 
against Colonialism in tiie Congo, in Algeria, in Angola and 
elsewheire* Ev^ in Asia, and in India especially, Colonies 
existed. In less ih^n three montans after the Belgrade Con-
ference iidia freed Goa from Portuguese.Colonialism, W 17 
use of force* As indicated earlier, the United States atta-
cked this action of India as a set back for the cause of world 
poace and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. 
And an American scholar^has written that *'3iidian motives for 
,Q.iC (Ministry of National Guidance s State Information Service, Cairo« UiA.R, p.S?» 15, Peter Lyon, op^cit*, p.188 (Author»s Italics)« 
16, Belgrade Report, op»cit*,pp.4o«61 
17. <2iapter I, n.79* 
18. Charles H.Heimsath, »Nonalignment Reassessed i Ihe Experi-
ence of India*, in Roger Hilsman and Robert C.Good, ed., 
Insteiments,, (Jolm Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Maryland, 1966), p.Sir^thur M.Schleslnger A !aiousand Days t 
back, Mayflower Books Ltd., London, 1967)|P.423. Prof. Schle-
singer Jr^attributes this view to G.L.Mehta,a former 2ssM» 
Indian Ambassador to the United States* See below,Chapter 
- 42 . 
seizing Goa surely Included India's deslr© to reinforce 
its anti-eolonialist bonafides aarong African governments", 
which "were beginning to view India as a sup^rter of great 
power interests in Africa, partly boeause of its role in tkie 
19 Congo l-uC^ Chagla, appears to have been juore accurate 
in his reported statement that *'If we can send an aruy contia-
» 
gent to the CongO) to safeguard the integri^ of that country, 
why cannot we send an ariay to Goa to safeguard the integrity 
of o w own coimtry." Hc^ever, the united Arab Republic gave 
20 full support to India in this ventsire, whereas India followed 
21 
a fflore cautious policy in the Congo, than the former had 
wanted, for well over a yeaJ*, though ultimately, it had accep-
ted a inore Mlitant role# 
Similarly^ whereas India had ear 11^ supported the 
deaiands for- freedom for MDrocco and Tunisia from french 
22, 23 Colonialism, it was hesitant in its attltuie towards Algerian 
m See l^yvey q£ .m^rmUQml Afrajrg^ 1^61, (Oxford, London, 1065), (Hereafter cited as Survey >> 
20« See y^ar Book of Ihe United Nations^ 1^1, pp. 129»13JL 
21. See below Chapter VII for a sti»iy of the role of India 
and the United Arab Republic in this Crisis. 
22. See Karun^ar Gupta, op»cit.,pp#37-46 for a critical study 
of India's anticolonialisai up to 1905. See also Werner 
Levi, op.clt,,pp,60»60 and lia.l28» Meither study appears 
to be complete in itself. 
23. see M.S.Ra^ Jan, India Iq World Affairs^ o|^ .clt.,pp.573-S76. 
See below, Chapter V, n*7i , for a brief explanation of 
this attitude of India. 
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freedjoffi. Again mdia Kehru ware indignaiat at the Brltli^ 
and the Ohited States* support to Portugal on Goa» It was In 
this context that Kehru went so far as to declare in Parlia* 
ment on July 26, 1966^  a sort of Itonro© Doctrine for Indiaf^ 
"ai^ attMipt bQ?' a foreign po^ -^er to interfere in any way witii 
India is a thing vjhich India cannot tolerate and which subject 
to her strengtii, she wiH oppose* That is the doctrine X lay 
down»" 
as 
But, as Prof# Rajan has rightly observed, "there was 
probably little divergence in «•«•« fundamental objectives", 
between India and Britain in reg^d to British Colonial poli» 
cies.. This similarity beteeen Indian and British objectives 
came into sharp relief in India's stand on the struggle betue^ 
Britain and the United Arab Republic over tiie Suez military 
base and later over l^e Suez Canal itself, as will be seen 
27 
later. Suffice it to add here, that evoa at the lieight of the 
Anglo-Freich - Israeli aggression on the l&iited Arab Republic, 
India»s policy was only inildly anti-British, notwithstanding 
Supra^  Chapter I, n#76» 
Ibid% Nehru had made a specific reference to Presideaat f^onroe»s Declaration of 1823* 
26, M,S»Raja3i, 'Stressed strains in Indo^British Relations, 
op»clt.,p«181» See also Vera Micheles Dean, Jigs 
„q£ m m P M m . M (0.0.P#,I.oridon,19S9),pp« 
169-.170. 
27* See below, Chapter V. 
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the indignation expressed against the aggressors, 
Iwo things clearly eaierg© froia tiiis brief factual 
account* The first is an apparent inconsistency in 3hdia*s 
support to the liberation of subjected peoples everywherei the 
second an apparent difference between ikke attitudes of India 
and the united Arab Republic, tiie latter appearing to be niore 
vocal and militant in its anticolonialism* Neither is in fact' 
true as a proper understanding of Nonaligninent would reveal, 
i«e,, as the Foreign Policy of a country and not as the pursuit 
of moral principles or huaian ideals. Faced with the apparent 
inconsistency iji India's pursuit of anticolonialisia, <in its 
2g 
narrower and anti-western sense), an Indian scholar has 
observed t^at & "sudh diversity of policy clearly indicates that 
India has to sjoderate her principles to suit the situation like 
any other state in defence of 'National Interest*"• This does 
not appear to be the whole truth* 
For^ a closer examination of India's foJ'elgn policy 
x^ ould reveal that in everyone of tiiese cases, whether in its 
29 
support to tbe independence movements, as in Indonesia, or its 
hesitation to support them fully, as in the Svt&z crisisf^India's 
28* Karimakapc Gupta, op*cit«, p. 44, 
30# m27* 
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policy has been,, first ot all, a policy of protecting its 
security and other vital interests, as will be shown in part 
of this stu<3y. Thus Indians championship of the liberation of 
subjected peoples before and after independence was part of 
31 Nehru*s strategy, along with Honsiignment, to protect India's 
freedom and security* Besides^ N^ru championed Afro-Asian 
freedom movementsj in one way or oilier, because Nehru once 
32 
said that : in the long run it is to the advantage of 
India to try to attract to Itself the sympathy and hope of 
millions of people in the world without offending others." 
In 'Siis respect India's championship of freedom movements 
was very much similar to that of the Soviet Union and might 
well have been inspired by it, as their close collaboration in 
the Uhited Nation's organs during the late forties would suggest 
It was this collaboration! also reflected in ttie Internal 
support given by the Communist Party of India to the foreign 
Policy of India, that appears to have misled the western PowerS| 
especially the United States, into believing that India was in 
33 the Soviet bloc. 
Even he3.'ej one might presume, that iadia was tiying to 
compylete with the Soviet Union for tiie "sympathy and hope of 
3l« See above pp6*»ll and also t^ ow PP* 32.35, 
32. Nehru, op.cit., p.34. Nehru also said : "I do not think it Is purely idealistic § I think it is, if you like, oppor-tuniiS^  in the long run" (p.3o). 33, See Karunakar Gupta, op.cit., pp. 37«'38. 
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millions of people in the world" j as N«iiru iaad put It, However, 
soon llGiiru had to use this instrument against the Communists 
themaelves in' South East Asia to meet the increased pressure 
that the latter were applying on same of these states, espe-36 
cially, Bvs^m and Indonesia* It was perhaps the realisation 
of this fact that was responsible for tiie sudden increase in 
the Communist polemics against l^ e nationalist leadership in as 
India, Burma and" Indonesia in early 1949. It was only yhm 
the Soviet Oaion and China realised that their pressure tactics 
against these leaders in India, Burma and Indonesia, and more 
importantly, in Yugoslavia, would only push the latter closer 
to the Western bloc, as was evident from Nehru's decision to 37 remain in the Commonwealth and Tito's acceptance of Western 
38 
Military support and protection, and that it would be far more 
advantageous to wean them away from the Vest era bloc, rather 
34. EconQyaisty London, had been right when it said that 
ttie Conference on Indonesia had the effect of "taking liie 
wind out of Russian anti-imperialist sails- by giving 
leadership to Asian opinion on ttoe subject. i^'tP* 43. See 
below. Chapter 4, for further discussion. 
36. See below, Chapter IV, pp. 
36. For details see J.C.Kundra, India's Foreign Bollcy i A 
qS .^ '^fg^ rn gto waiters t 
Groningfen, Hetherlands Yora & Co., Publishers Ltd., 
Bombay, 1965), p. 120. 
37. See below pp. ©i^ggfor an account of Nehru's visit to 
,for an analysis 
>nwealth« 
 
the United States in 1949, and PPtTAo^ Rii'
of India's decision to remain in tK^ usmmoj: 
38. See Survey 1961, op.cit., pp* 210-216 and S46-S48. 
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tiian toT^e them into the CoiEfflUnist bloCi that the Soviet Iftilon 
and China appear to have made a tactical shift in their policy 
39 towards these countries* 
Nassersupport to the Revolutionary moveinents in 
Algeria and Xeaan compares well ^ ith Nehru*s supi»rt to Indo-
nesian nationalists and toe Burmese Govea^ nnsint against the 
Gomunistsi as his Arab Nationalism has been as much a struggle 
against the growth of Communism in these areas, as it has been 
40 
against the colonial and other reactionary forces* ikid Nasser 
went to the rescue of Syria in 1968 by accepting its merger 
with his country, as it was the only way in which he could fight 
the commmists In ^ riaf^ As has been indicated earlier, when 
Khrushchev tried to protect "ttie communists in Iraq, in 1959, 
Nasser had made it clear ttiat he would not tolerate it. Bius 
Nasser* s support to the Independence ir©vements in Africa and in 
the Arab world, is not only to rid the ar«as of viestem domina-
tion, but also to prevent the infiltration of Communism into 
these areas, as botia are equally dangerous for the independcaice 43 and integrity of the Arab States* As shall be seen later 
39* 13ae Shift, however, became evident during t2ie Korean 
crisis, See below, Chapter 4, PP*x77»i79 
4o# See above, Chapter I, pp. ^ 
41# See Haaser's Speeches^ 19e9,op*clt., pp. 147-48, 16&.167, 
and 221-226. 
42^ iilHSi nM* 
43. See Below, Chapter 7. 
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Nasser's policy in ISae Congo reflected, among other things, 
this dual purposef And if he is still Intensely anticoloniai 
and anti«.\/\fest, it is only because of tSie continuing presence 
of British protectorates, and American bases, in the Arab 
world, not to speak of the consistent Western si;^ port to an 
aggressive Israel, which is a constant reininder of Western 
domination and injustices, as against the more cautious policy 
of the Soviet Union, Nasser had given enough proof of willing-
ness to cooperate wil^ the V/est on^ the basis of equality and 
45 
non-interference in t^e domestic affairs- The ifaited States 
has not so far shovn sin willingness, it vould seejoi, to iiiake any 46concession to the Arabs against Israel* 
Nasser's continuing preoccupation with Western Colonla* 
llsm and Israel, to an apparent neglect of problems of world 
peace, compares well with India's and other Asians' neglect of 
world problems in the early years of the United Nations. As 
44, See Nasser Speeches<19^>op»clt»*p.36S where Nasser had 
explained this basis of his policy. See also Peter Mansfield 
Nasser's Egypt. (Penguin SoQks,> Harmondeworth, 1966),pp. 
95i-97 for a good analysis of the problem* See below, chap-
ter 6 for further discussion. 
4fi. This was particularly so, when he signed the 1954 treaty yith Britain, See below Chapter 6, 
46. 2Sls seems to be so inspite of the US pressure on Israel 
for Its withdrawal from Arab territories in 1956*67, which, 
however, Israel did under certain guarantees. Bie US ur^ 
willingness to do anything against Israel became fully 
evident during the 1967-June Israeli aggression on Arab 
countries • See below, Chapter 6 for an analysis of the two 
Israeli aggressions
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47 ArlSiur Lalj the scholar-.dipioaat from ladia has writtea, there 
was pj*©occupation with ttiemselves to the exclusion of 
an interest in world problems except in so far as those pro-
blems concerned the questions of colonialism And tJiat 
"during the United Nations early years there wa& 'pi'actical3y 
no Contribution from Asia on such questions as disarmament, 
the peaceful use of atomic energy, the calling of international 
conferences W tiie ECOSOC, or even t^e enlargement of the 
EOOSOC* ISheir own affairs, colonial questions, and, as far as 
the Arabs were concerned, their relations with Israel practi« 
cally constituted t^ e whole domain of interest for ttie Asian 
48 
nations in tShese years»" And'it is well to rem(^ber that 
India and Uie Oaited Arab^ Republic were the chief spokesmen 
of Asia as China was represented tiny Formosa* 
And if Nasser«s condemaation of Colonialism appears too 
hostile, one has only to look into l^ e speeches of Nehru in 
49 support of Indonesian freedom, or the condemnation of military 
SO pacts as at the Banduag Conference, to realise that what 
47^ fmTM'an NaUons And m e O^^mlmUQ^ 
(Vol. 19,Ho.1960),pp. 734-.7S&. 48« Arthur tel writes t^at the absaice of <Shina 'the Natural helmsman* of Asia from the tlH must be taken into accotmt *in assessing tfce part played by the Asian countries* in the m* (Ibid# 49* See j«Heiiru, op*cit»,pp#407-409» See also Boss N«Berkes and iHohinder S.Bedi, The DlPloisaGy of India i Indl^ 
to, .goMfy ,U rm (Stanford, 1968), pp.9^10 for an interesting discussion of this nature* 60* Hehru*s Speech to the Political Committee meeting on 22 April 19S5* Text in G.H»Kahin, (Cornell University Press, 1966) pp#64-»g2# See also figsmm^g ,0,B,ifltfCT^ Uoh^ A AUU^.St (0.0*p.,London, 1968), pp»413^20 (Hereafter cited as Documer^ ts 
« £0 « 
Hasser still says or threatens to do is little different from 
tijhat Nehru dli^a on siiailar occasions, x^on BuHos of the 
< 
Uiiitea states of flasser«s Mtter attack against tiie 
61 
West du?^ liig t^i© Suez crisis, HelJi'u is reported to have said 
that it 'MtkB a produot of t^e fonaei^ 's youtli and inexperience. 
Kefaru would have been jaore acetirate, if he iiad said that it was 
natijral* he himself eondemed t^e.tripartite aggression 62 
lat^^ in very severe language^  ^ hich, according to ProftBrecherj 
was •highly charged. • 
It is mjw clear that neither H([^ ru nor Nasser had been 
• doctrinaire* In their apiaros<Si to the question of the liberat-» 
ion of subjected peoples^ Soi* did they approach it as a jaorai 
principle even though itiey had taB:ed that vay, it is also 
important to note that ttiey were tyo% unaware of the fact that 
Cosmmlm was also eag^ ansioaist* ^11 this has been veil put 
by Nehru hiiaself in explaining the Gov^naent of Indians atti-
tude towards Biritish Colonialism, in particular, and^  imperialisiuj 
in getneralt Iji reply to a debate on foreign affairsi in the 
33 Parliaaent of Indiat Kd^ru said on June 12,l©62t 
' See Terence Robertson^ 
CUutchinson, Iiondon, 1866>, p. 126. 
62. See Hicbael Brecher, m e Mew States of Aaia a A BQlltio^^ 
Analysis, (0 • , London. 1963 )| p. 119. Kenon*s language^  
writes JRrof.Brecher was *^int^perate" <p»138)* 
63. see Uehru, op*cit#,p,6? and also pp#161<»162. (Italics are 
ffline). Kiese views of N^ru should prove that the charge 
that, " there was an a priori assumption that px'actically 
a n western diplomacy was motivated ty iaperialiaa", is 
not correct (sterner Levi, op.cit.f p. 113)# 
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"It is necessary for us to fimcUoa as a laature 
nation^ It is very m&y to talk against ijaper» 
ialism as some iion* Members di4» I do not dec^ 
tliat iisp0t*ialisffi exists bat is hardly what 
it in tho past. Let Bm* Hemisers mderstaad 
what it IB* Let them also imderstaad that there 
are otiier imperialisms that are growing 
British iiaperiali0a does flotarish in iialaya, in 
Afriea hut today»#«»#is an exhausted 
thing# I hope this Hou$e has respect for the way 
HSigland has tackled her problems since the war and 
t^ e eourage vlth whiish she has faced them»#««« 
are still ^ loniee that belong to 
certain powers* I have no doubt that an end 
should be put to them all Let us by a n 
means put an end to what remains of colonialism 
in Asia^  In Africa and wherever else it exists, 
ISie *real conflict* is a struggle for po^ er« Colonialism 
or imperialism has always been the result of this struggle 
between powers* Saus every big power is imperialist to some 
extent| if only for the ss^e of its o m security* ^is holds 
good in the case of India and even the t^ted Amb Eepi;yblio* 
In its behaviour towards its immediate neighbours, Ihdla is 
said to have followed or adopted the British policies of imperi-
alism» China«s ooci^ a^tion of tibet «ras an act of imperialism* 
India would have followed and insisted on following the British 
66 policy on Tibet, if it had the strength to do lt# Sbat India, 
64* See above, pp,34-36 and belcsw, pp»16l-S2 jt may be added 
that India had colonies in the past. See jawaharlal Nehru, 
Mjlai op.cit., P^ISS and Chester Bowles, 
gO»S<?A^e^g^ ^  .^.^mlf (Harper and Bow, sew l^rk, 1962) 
660 See below, ppj.79-9^or an analysis of 3ndia*s Jibet Policy, 
03f ratheri Nehru could and should havo done so» is the charge 
that is ievellad against Mehru by the critics of his diina 
67 
Policy* A few writers have^ however^ written that Nehru, only 
did, what the British in India thaaselves had don% in sijailar 
circi«astances. It was, however, jayaprakash Narayaaf that 
posed t&e isoral issue involved in Indians acceptance of China»a 
occupation of Tihet| in his reported statement that It is 
ti'ue that we could not have preveated the Oiinese from annes« 
iiig fibet* But we could have saved ourselves from being par^ 
to a Tbe Government of India was not motivated by 
siach fi^rals. it accepted the Chinese imperialism in Hbet in 
the hope that the latter would recognise its interests in 69 fibet as well as in Soutai Asia, as shall be seen later* But 
even Uim^ Nehru as well as other spokesmen of India's foreign 
60 policy, def^ded its action in terms of a departure from 
56. see Franlt mraes, op.cit»|pp#117*130| V«B»Kamiijled| China 
Invades ind^ a,. (Bharatiya ¥idya Bhawan, Bombay 
and P,C,Chakaravarty, jaM^^g g^ia^.ftiU^^t (Indiana 
University Press, Blooailngton, 1962), pp, 31-39. 
See i^ ark C.Freer, •Tibet In Sino^Indian Relations', India QuarterXYf CQetob^^Decembery 1963), p.378, and Purushottam U Mehra, •India, China and Sibet i9eo-64», (Jai«(ary«.March 1936), p,19. 
68« Cited in Frank 2§?raes» op*cit», p* 
60# Ibid^  
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British Ifflperialisfli. ISie teiaptation to use the Jaogeor of anti-
coloJiialism, obvioiasly, appears to iiav© been too strong, qv&i 
for Keiiru to resist it. 
Th© same aaturity is reflected In the attitudes of 
laOia and the Onited Arab Republic to^vards the Soviet Colonia-
61 lism or lisperialissi in Eastern Eiirope, rather than what a 
62 
majority of the Xt'estern scholars would have one beU.eve> that 
this attitude of the Afro-Asians has been a product of lack 
of experience with the Soviet Onion as against the experience 
vith t«@stern Colonialism and racialism, and also of the influ-
ence of Marscisia and Leninism on Hehru, if not the other non-
aligned leaders, this does not appear to be substantiated W 
facts, as for example, the attitudes and policies of India and 
the IMlted Arab Republic in regard to the liberation of sub» 
jected peoples* On the other hand, t^e scholars themselves 63 appear to be prejudiced against Kehru and Nasser and other 
61* See below ppJi£-l7for further analysis* 
62, See mchael Brecher, !lhe New States of Asia^  op.cit.,pp. 
116-116, David J.Dailin, Fo^eim P<3U9Y §4agg 
JjfealiBi (J.B. Lippincott Coy, New Zork, 1861), pp. 288-289, 
Feter tyon, op.clt«, pp«76«82, v/erner Levi., |^ p.e4t«,p« 
113. An JQadlan Scholar Prof* Simla JPrasad has also 
written that Kehru "continued to believe that imperialism 
was a product of caitttalism" see The origins of India's 
te^J.m .XfiXtef op«iit., p.239* 
63. ISiis appears to be particularly so with ?rof*Bre<^er whose 
approach to Nonalignment is strongly influ^ced by these 
feelings as his criticism of the policies of India during 
the Suez and Huji^ arlan crises of 1966 reveals* (op*cit.| 
pp. 118-120) See below, caiapters 6 & 6 for a refutation ' 
of this criticism. Another important illustration is provi 
ded by his vie^ taiat India's attiti^e towards Israel has 
been shaped by racial and anticolonial sentiments (op.cit.^  
pp.121-. 138) See below p.^ sojn.sotfor -aay comments. 
» S4 « 
nonaiigned leaders* •Qiere ar© some p^ple la India like tiie 
leader of the pra^a Socialist Party and member of Parliament^  
S«N*Dwive<3yf^  ^tio seem to beliove that Nehru's approach to the 
Soviet Onion and China particularly dogmatic* As Prof* 
S#A»H» Haqqi pointed out^  Kehru's mind was particularly freo 
66 
from dogmatism* It will be shoyn in the next chapter that 
the policies of India and tiie Uhited Arab Republic towards the 
Soviet Union, asj indeed, their entire foreign policy, has 
been based on a sound understanding of the world balance of 
power and a very realistic appraise of, "Bae mutality of 12ieir 
interests with the Sotlet Onion, v/hile the struggle against 
the west and a western backed Israel have been the major Q2 Nehru, 
factors in Nasser's relations with the Soviet Ohion,/on the 
otJier hand, appears to have cultivated tfao Soviet friendship 
more as a counter against China's and Pakistan's threat to 68 
India's security, than from any fear of a v/estem attack, 
which did not .and does not exist* 
64* Sri Dwivedi had made this observation during a speech at a Seminar on 'India And Her Wei^bours', held at the Aligarh Kuslim University, Aligarh, on December 4,1966* 
66* Prof*Haqqi made this observation in his closing remarks 
at the Seminar* See also Loui Fischer, op.clt«, pp. 
126-127, for an analysis of Nehru's political and economic 
views* 
66* See below, pp* 82-99 
67* See Nasser 's SoeQChea. 1958, op*cit*,pp*374.-376 and pp* 
163-186 for an exposition of the OAJUSoviet relations* 
Also see below Chapter 
68* See below pp* 82-99 
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It do^s not, therefore} seem correct to argue that the 
Nonallgruuent of India has a poXloy ajUaed at the establish* 
inent of ^e superiority of the democratic system in Asia, as 
some prominent ts?riters in India and America seem to faelifive. 
69 
prof* J'torgenthan, for example^  has written that "As India seas 
it, in Asia^  at least, the issue between Ck>mmunlsm and demo-
cracy has been joined and ^ lill be decided on the plane of 
social reform*" This is not so much objectionable as what he 
says n©xt»" such a policy vhXch thinks of the struggle 
I'/ith communism in terms of competition between different social 
systems is not only unable to take interest in military measures, 
but must also regard western emphasis upon them as a pernicious 
interference with that competitive struggle." Echoing these ?0 
arguments Sisir Gupta has observed that" in the Indian concep-
tion of the Communist problem^  the military aspects of the 
challenge were relatively unimportant, what is Important 
is to establish the superiority of the democratic system even 
for Asian and other backward countries*" 
69, Cited in Slsir Cuptai op.cit.', pp. 12-13* 
70» M*f P*3.4 See. also J.C.Kundra, op.cit., p»86. Till the 
Chinese aggression on India in late 1962* Indian scholars, 
some at least, seem to have believed in wiis view. See 
M.s.Kajans .imm ymip^ A m x m op.cit., p^  ei. 
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mis ^ 'ould mean that India did not realise the 
Chinese military threat to her security and th:it it was 
not interested in building its ailitary strength. 2his 
is so obviuuslyj and, completely contrary to f'-^ cts, tiiat 
Sisir Gupta hastens'^ ^ to add " that it would not be 
entirely correct to say that India did not take into 
account the military problem ^at China posed for her 
72 
security?". " iet, he holdSj it was secondary to " the 
more cliallenging task of competing vath China in other 
spheres." This, to my mina, 'dppao^rs a compl»ste 73 reversal of India»s China policy, ifor, if this were 
the truth, Nehru stands condemned before history as the 
74 
l^eiv' 2imes angrily prophesied during the Korean 
crisis. But this is not the truth as Nehru was awai'e of 
76 
the Chinese iailitary threat from the beginning . Othervise, 
one might ask, what the panch Sheul^^ was about, with 
its stress on 'nonaggression', * territorial integrity', 
•non-iiiterffcrence* and * Peaceful co-existence*, etc.? 
71. JMS. 
73. See boto, Chapter 4 for an analysis of Indi^ '^s China 
Policy. 
74. Cited in the Moufarn Review^  (Vol.LXOTIII, No.6, November, 1950),p.368. 
75. Sue below, pp, 9CN.99 and Supra, n,73. 
76. Supra. Chapter I, n. 92, 
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35iis search £or seeurlty against China launched by Sidia 
tvom the day Giiiaa ejaergod Independent md$r Communism as will 
77 
isade clear lateri fo^ t the Panch Sheel was nothing but the 
consisamatlon of this effort| as It appeared thea. 
, Another defect In the Itorgmtha^ j^ &wpta theory Is that 
It appears to make a distinction bela^ eeai Soviet eommunlsia and 
Chinese Goffla«n.ism< So far as deioocracy is eoncemed there 
seems precious little bet^ /eeaa them to choose* For, if 
78 
Khrushchev had started the process of de-Stalinlsationi he had 
also crushed a 'spontaneous revolution» in Huiigaryj in as 
rutailess a aamer as Stalin might ha'^ e don© vith India remain-79 
ing a passive on-.3^ok^ mst of ttie time^  For Sehru, however* 
it was not the liberalisation of the Commuaist farty of either 
China or the Soviet Cbion that was important* It was the 
inherent or latent political struggle between the two Communist 80 giants that ii/as important for him and Xndla# 
But, then, did Mehru accept western d^nocray in t»to? 
Did he not it M>re socialistic 14ian osa^  western democracy, 
including Etoglaadj ever conceived of? If Nehru was really 
77' SuprajnV76* sea Lo^e Jhdla's Quest For Securitvi 
-- Defence (Uhiversity of California Press, ' Berkeley and Los AngSles, 1967 )• for a very good t^udy of India's defence policies* I could consult this book only • after this stiady was completed* 78. For details l£j£mi Chapter 6, n.l. 79* See Chapter for India's role in this crisis, 80'. See Chester Bowles, !ftmbassador»s Report (Comet Books, Collins, l,ondon,1954>,pp»167^ 160 for a good analysis of this aspect of Indians*, and mother like minded Asians* attitu-de towards China and the Soviet Uhion. Also see belo^ pp« 
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interested in establishing the superiority of deajocracy 
through economic and social progress, why did he begin to 
industiiaiiso the country on the Soviet model, which was 81 
consiatil ed iniaical to the development of a sound econojuy? 
The answers to these questions, would appear to suggest 
that India's policies in Uxe econoiaic sphere represented 
&2 
a success of socialist Viewsj as against the denjocratic 
principles of free interpiise. And for the iJest, and 
especially, the United States, deciocracy means as saich 
free enterprise as free elections* However, Nehru was pei'haps 83 
as lauch influenced by the British Labour Party as by 
Soviet Gocialisia. 
Above ail, Nehi'u did not consider the struggle between 
the Soviet Union and the United states as a sti-ugiile between 
84 democracy and cosuKUnisffi. For him it was a power*.struggle, pur© 
81* See Loul i'ischt;r, op.clt,,pp4ll9..122 for a highly 
Uiisympathetic criticism of this aspect of the Asians* 
econoxaic policy. Among the many diastic comments, th© one 
thatstands out as particularly so is t "rapid industriali-
sation is the new Asian religion and steel is god" (p»120). 
82, See David J.Dallin, op^cit. ,p.303, 
83, It has alieady b-s^ n indicated that Nehru*s political and 
economic ideas were shaped by western European currents 
of thought * Supra, Chapter I, n#29, According to Krishna 
Menon* s biographer, it was the influence of England in 
particular that waS responsible for the affinity in the 
thoughts and outlook of Nehru and Menon on international 
affairs and economic problems- See.T.J*S*George, Krishna 
Menon^  (Jonathan Cape, London, 1964), pp«l02~117, 
84* Nehrii, op.cit*,pp.63 and 69. See also the 'AppGndix* 
entitled *Ialks with Nehru', in Michael Brecher, Sie Hew 
States of Asi% op»cit.,pp.203-204. 
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and simple* ISie doctrinal eleia^ Gt? only added to its intensity* 
That he was right was aiaply pro"?od W the tact that the l&ited 
States supported Tito with massive assistance when he defected 
from the So vis t bloc. Eie Sinc>.&>viet conflict vhich was 
clearly anticipated further confirmed it» Similarly, it is 
unthirdsable that ^ e Soviet Hiion would have given economic 
and military assistance to India and &e United Arab Hepublic 
on siKJh a large scale, if their policy iwas one of containment 
of Communism on the social plane. It is to keep toese states 
out of sphere of western influence permanently that the 
Soviet Union has been giving them aid. 
Sius Dulles»s view that "there is occurins"| be1»#e©n 
India and China," a competition as to whether ways of freedom 
or police state methods can achieve better social progress", 
Sf 
which Ambassador Bo^ /les has qiK>ted with approval, appears to 
be more an American 'wish tSian the fact of ta^ e situation. The 
real confrontation bete^ ?een India and C2iina ^ a^s a military one* 
Supra, n«80# For analysis of the Sino-Soviet conflict. 
See Eichard Lowenthal, Hq^U, ,CgOTWll8a i tion of A Secular Faim^ (0*0.?., New York, 19G4) and Klaus Kehnert, Peking And Msscqv, (Ueidenfeld and Kicolson 1963). 
86. See X»Etinger and o.Melikyan. ,3Ppl|.^y.„of (Progress Publishers, Moscow),pp. ^scovj has now to 
contain Baking also# Shis dualitjr is best illustrated in, its present relations with Pakistan and with the OAR since the 1967 v/ar with Israel if not earlier. Indeed Soviet policies tov?ards nonaligned nations appear to have had tiiis underlying goal from 1964 • See Klaus Mehnert, op.cit pp. 399-402, 
8?. Ambassador * s ReporJ;* op.cit., p. 161. It is interesting to note here that the liS-oriented political parties in India 
Contd.. 
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Hov?ever, neither Dulles nor Bowles appear to iiave bc^ en serious 
in their belief^  in that both of them have acted on the contrary 
assumption* And Hehru refused to t)© drawn into Dulles »s scheme 
of things precisely because he realised the military threat froc 
China. ISiat Hehru sai-j it and acted accordingly has been accep-
88 
ted Bo^ l^es himself. It was again because of this that Nehru 
decided on the industrialisation of the conn try as rapidly as 
possible^ under deiK>cratic methods^ to the neglect of ^ ood and 
agricultural production, necessitating depend^ce upon foreign 
co\mtries for ^ ood* But the choice had to be madej and vas 93. made deliberately, as Kehru made it clear* 
Nasser is an enesy of Coinimjnism, but he has close rela-
tions with the Soviet l2aion and also China. And he is very much 
92 interested in social reform and the progress of his people* But 
(Continued from previous page) 
viZfj ttiQ Swataatra and the Jan Sangh, advocate a ban on 
ttie Communist Party of JOadia. Siey do not seem to believe 
that this might affect Indians democracy^See below,Chap» 
ter Sspp^ i^ce-iefoi* ^ e o^er-»side of i^is argument* 
88* M»i pp.:t6©» 178 and IBO^lBS^ 
89» See belo\; pp* 103-106. 
90» See Nehru, op»cit.|p*374 where K^ru attributed India*s 
failure to match China in military strength to its democ-
racy* See also K»P»i^runakaran, 'Impact of the Sino-Indian 
Conflict on the Indian Bolitical Scene*, International 
Studies^  m i A ' : July 1963 - April 1964), p. 103, 
91* pp«371*372, see below, p^^ X06. 
92# See Nasser's Speech at tiie Bandung Conference for a brief 
suciaary of the aims of his revolution t Suor^j n»8fP*63« 
Also see yital_Speeche^ of /i!he Dav^ (New Xork, Volume 21, 
Ifo#16, June 1, 1^6), p, 1104. 
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this does not make ais struggle a struggle for demoeracy* H© 
93 has equal aversion for it, as it is understood in the West. 
While Nehru did not have an aversion for democracy, he yas 
94 certainly not a crusader in its service* 
Kehru jmight have made statements occasionally which 
%?ould support an argument like Prof* Morgenthau*s# They might 
have, more often than not, been prompted by extraneous clrcufiis» 
tances or factors which have to be taken into consideration by 
the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister of a country like 
India, The ifaited States' insistence on giving aid only to those 
96 
countries which professed to be anticommunist along with them, 
might have occasioned such statements to make it easy for the 
American policy makers to get aid legislation passed. Even 96 
Dulles*s statement appears to have been motivated fcy this 
desire. 
This is easy to see from the speeches and statements 
made by Nehru during his first trip to the Omted States in 
93* Siis is true in general of most Arabs - See Fs^ez A.Sayegh., 
DyitaftAcg .QjC JeHt^WsB isi.m op.cit»,p*i72. 
See Ambassador'a Report^ op#olt»,p# 66, See also, Nehru, 
op»cit., pp. 68-69. 
96. Pakistan* s alliance with ttxe US was of this nature. 
96. See above, p. §0 
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1949* In the early years of independeace, wlien toere was a 
bitter opposition from the v-^est as well as the East to India's 
Nonalignmentj, there was the danger of ladia being, left isoia-
97 ted, and helpless^ when it desperately needed aid of all 
kinds. Nehru was sure that once his foreign policy was pro-* 
98 perly understood, aid would be forthcoadng from both sides. 
But, at that time, the Soviet Union was applying' increased 
99 
pressure on India through tnB Coffimmist Party of India, i^nd 
China had ^ ust emerged as a CoDuamlst Bower. Ihe United 
states, on the other hand, was anxious to rope India into an lOC^  
alliance against Communism, which Nehru did not want. But, 
Nehru appears to have calculated that the time was ripe to 
convince ttie United States that he was interested in social 
reform and tdbio building of a strong economy which was consi* -
dered necessary by the Western powers to combat Commimii^ 
97. As will be seen later, it was this veiy real fear of 
isolation that led Nehru to remain in the Commonwealth, 
12ius ensuring atleast British cooperation, if not that 
of United States also - See below, pp. 
98. Nehru, op.cit., pp. 26, 27 and 36. 2he help given to Jugoslavia by the United States could not have gone unnoticed by Nehru. 
99. See Ambassador's Resort> op.cit.,pp* 77*80 for a brief 
account of the CommiMist activities during 1948-60. 
100. See J.G.Kundra, op.cit*, pp. 116-120 and L.NataraJan, American Shadow Over ladla (People's Publiehing House BombsQr 1962), pp. 124-130. 
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internally. The Truman Doctrine^^^and the Marshal Plan^®^ 
reflected this aspect of the Western policy. 
It vas ^ ith the ahov© aim that Nehru visited the Iftilted 
States ^  Canada in 1949« In a speech to the. Constituent 103 
Assembly of inaia, on 2S fiov©mber> 1949| Hehru explained the 
purpose and achievements of this visit in tJie following i^ ordsi 
"The o.bjective vhieh I had in going tx> America-both the United 
States and Canada - was achieved to m complete satisfaction* 
I did not go toere for deals and for bargains and for intrigues* 
I did go there to create a friendly impression, if I may say 
a friendly interest in oui' problemsj and generally to create 
m atmosphere of goodwill between the two comtries, I believe 
we succeeded in doing thatj and I believe that the responsible 
people in the ttiited States thoroughly appreciated, if I may 
say so^  the frank way in which I explained our position in 
world affairs^ " 
101# See Dpcuq^ enta 1947-48, op»cit»| pp.S-? for the text of 
the Truman Boctrine* B0® also pp# 7-.10 for the Russian 
criticism of this in Ijpvestia of 13 March, 1947. 
102, J^ a,, pp. 23-26 for the text of the speech l^y Secretary 
of State Marshal, outlining his plan. 
103. .OiiaSM part II, Vol. VI, No.l, 28 November, 1949, p»9« 
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Til© timiiig^^of ttils visit was also significant* Nehru 
had already prepax'ed the ground for this W deciding 'to 
remain in tSie Coiaffionwealth, which proved beyond the shadow 
of a doubt tha,t h© -was not in the Coauaunist camp as the 
Americans had Idiought and believed. It was during this trip 
105 
that Hehru drgjw elaborate parallels befe^ een the Indi^ and 
American Struggles for independencei between Indian deiaocracy 
and t3ie American dei2K>cracy and, indeed, between his foreign 
policy and that of the ISiited States* founding fathers* It 
was during this trip taiat Nehru told the United States 
Congress that "vjhere JD^ eedom is menaced or justice threatened 
or where aggression takes place, we cannot be an<i shall not be 
neutral*" 
the extent to which Nehru succeeded in his objectives 
was evident from fact that he felt it quite safe to recog-
107 nis© the Government of Comaiunist China, soon after his return 
lOi, See J.C.Kundra, op.cit*, pp. 116^120 for an account of ^Xb 
- Visit of Nehru to the United States. Ihe author wrote (p.ll6j„ that it was difficult to understand the reasons for Nehru*s acceptance of the invitation to visit the United States in May 1949,when he had rejected such an 
- offer in March 1949. 
106. See Nehru, op.cit.,pp«689»e^, l^ ny American experts had accepted the view that India's foreign policy was essentia . ally the same ajg their policy of »isolation* • See alter Lippm^m, cited in Karmiakar Gupta, op.cit.,pp.6i-64, Bowles, 0p.cit.,pp.l66 and 
Vincent Sheean, Nahru t !I!he Ye^s of Power (Victor Ooll^ ancz, London I960), pp.l24»28. 
1061 P» 
107. See .fc^ i^a (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India New Delhi) p*l. 
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108 from the felted States, As J.G^Kundra has pointed out tiilB 
did not create serious and immediate differences with 
the Dhited States of i^ merica", as "India was not alone in 
according recognition to the Peking Governiaent but was joined 
in this W the 0»S*A, «s principal partner in the &)ld War, the 
United Kingdoia, Secondly the United States* attitude had not 
yet fully haidaned*" !Eie failure to do so would have under-
mined N^u*s position aoong t^e Cocaaunist^  inside and outside 
ttoe country who had after his decision to remain in tiie Ctoamon-
wealth, begun to accuse him of having aligned India with the 
\'jestern bloC| and the visit to ^ yaerica made them still aiore 
109 
angry. ^ Thus the principal aim of Nehru in undertaking this 
visit to the United States was not only to deraonstrate to the 
West his'independence of the Soviet Union, but also to demons-
trate to the Soviet Union t^ at he was not afraid of moving 
closer to the Westi if the situation so demanded it. 
Nasser *s policies towards the Great Powers and Oiina 
during 1964-66 present a close parallel to those of Mehru 
discing 1948»§o» as will be seen later*^^Xet, here alsof Dulles 
acted, as though Kasser was a Coomjaiist and unsuccessfully 
111 tried to bring his downfall* 
108. Cp*cit»| p« 123., 
109. See Hehru, op.cit.i p. 69, for Nehru's defence of this 
criticism in the Parliament of India. See also J.C.Kundraj 
op.cit^ i ppm 120. 
llOi See below, pp. 211-
Ill* Ibid* 
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and Noaallgnmenta 
it would, be , therefore, not unreasonable to hold| 
that neither anticoiaffionlsm nor anticoloniallsm have been the 
ma^or ob^ jectives of either India's or tiie Waited Arab Repub-
lic's Nonaligwaent, Ihey only opposed Ctolonialifim and Coaaaunisc 
to the extent they posed a threat to t^ eir security. And they 
championed the cause of other Colonial peoples to the extent 
they furthered their security and other vital interests* ISiese 
have^ therefore, been means, raider than ends, of Nonalignment* 
This if} equally true of antiracialism and such other 
factors as the elimination of w^t, disease and ignorancep 
India's interest in combating South Africa's racial policies 
is too obvious to need 4an elabo^ fate explanation* As Autiior 
112 Lai has observed, it "a matter of direct interest to 
itself*" It still is» And as expected, Ihdia has been a 
113 
ma^or rec^ipient of aid from the Big Pbwers directly, more 
than through the IMited Nations agg®icies# 
That anticolonialisffl and antiracialism have not been the 
ma^or objectives of Honalignment, and that there is no intrinsic 
112» Op*cit»| p* 735* See also Nehru, op#cit», pp, 48 & 643-
113. ii., piu 746-746* 
^ e? -
relation-ship betsdem ^ eia. Is further evident ^ om th.© allga* 
merit of Pakistim. For, PaMstaa iias remained as much anti-
colonial and antiracial even aftei* its alliance with the west, 
as it vas prior to it| as its policies in the m i ted Rations 
114 
on these issues illustrate. As an Indian Scholar has 
explained, ^ough Pakistan followed a pro^western policy on 
important v^ orld issuesf "in respect of several other problems 
she acted lllf.e a nonaligned country* Ihis latter fact vas 
true particularly in respect of colonial questions, and apar-
thded, on vhicJi her delegates even attacked United States' 
policies bitterly*" As a British scholar^^\as written,"These 
are -p—» featia^ es shared by all /ifro»Asian countries, includiaig 
those whida ai'e aligned." 
116 
It is» therefore, difficult to agree with tdie viSw 
that these "have been important in the developcaent of non» 
alignment and...Will continue to influence nations in that 117 direction*" For, according to the same scholar, "tJi^ are not 
an essential precondition" and "are not the distinctive influ-
IIS ences which finally determine the foreign policies of a nation.' 
114* B.C.fiastogi, 'Alignment and Non-alignment in Pakistan's 
Foreign Policy', (Vol.XIIf No.2, 
October 1961), p. 178. 
116. J*W,Bii«Ptonj op.Citi, p, 186. 
116. Ibid. 
117. Ibid., 
118. j[i.>p«S07. See also K.P.Karunakaran,ed.,op.cit.,p.75. 
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Here again', the case of Pakistan is illustrative. A 
119 
careful study, of the alignment of i^kistan with the United 
States, reveals that the factors that influenced it were t^ ie 
same as those that influenced India*s Nonaligniaent, naiaely, 
national security and ecoiiomic dovelopment.. Thus even the 
pro'olems of economic development are iKjt unique to Nonalign-121 
fflent* And the recent shift in tiie foreign policy of Pakistan 
tov?ards closer relation with ttie Cojwaunist Ba^ wers, have also 
been influenced ^ the aame factors* Neither anticolonialism 
nor antiraciaaasffi has been responsible for this shift. 
It may, therefore, be concluded that the basic objec-
tives are the same for both alignment and Konaiignment* As 
Burton has observed i "Konalign^nt then is a condition 
which tends to occur whenever the pressures of circumstances 
are not sufficiently strong to justify aligniaents." And N<^ru 
123 
himself adisittedj "we might have be^ compelled Ijy circums-
tances, but we ai'e not compelled by circumstances to give up, 
119. See B*C»Rastogl, op.cit#,pp^l6S-170 and 17? and M.S. Venkatramani, *AjseriGa*s llilitary Alliance with Pakistan* The Svolution And Course of An Uneasy partnership*. Ihternatignal (Vol.8, Hos. 1-8, July-October 1966), pp*97-98. 
120. SMBa*. n.9, 
121. See M.Ayub Khan, •2he Pakistan-Ac^rican Alliance t 
Stresses And Strains*, gorelgn AffairCVol%42,Ko.2, 
Janu^,1964),pp.l9S.209...^^^ S.Venkataraaani, 
122» Op.cit., p. 207. 
123. Nehru, op.cit*, p. 
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because It does amount to giving up our independence in order 
to gain the goodwill of this country or that country." 
NpnalisnjEont and Indeoendencet 
Here is anotaier misconception on Nonalignment ^ d also 
alignm^^t. As Nehru had put its "fefhat does joining a bloc 
mean? After all it can only mean one thing t give up your 
view about a particular question^  adopt tiie other party's 
view on that question in order to please it and gain its 
favour#" 
It would appear from these statements that Honalignment 
is synonymous with independence. To he aligned is to lose 
one*s independence altogether. aSiis is an extreme view to 
I 
which Nehru did not al'^ /ays subscribe. In reply to a demand 
from a member of Parliament that India should withdraw from the 
125 
Commonwealth of Nations^ Nehru said on June 12,1962 t 
Nations must act with dignity and strength, adopt what they 
consider the right course and adhere* It is open to ua tn be 
associated In an alliance with any country. We have ayol^ a^i^  
aUiStfVggg ^S so far ug are concerned 
124. P* 36. 
pp*@0«61, and| also p«133 (Italics are mine), a^ 
said furtaier s "we have associated ourselves with the 
UN. This association does not deprive us of our inde-
pendence. Of course it limits our freedom in the sense 
in which it limits the freedom of every member country. 
That some limit should be placed on our freedom of action 
is the natural consequence of our joining on organisation 
of that nature." (p.63). 
« 70 
ye are preparred to enter into a treaty of Xtlendshlp witii 
every country ixi the world In an alliance, one invariably 
takes some tiling and gives soaefeing in retuwi. Sach feomtry 
binds itself dovn to a certain extent and relinquishes its 
freedom of action to the extent to which it commits itself in 
the alliance or agreem^t, .^UlmQ^t itWfftfa^ X^ gSt BQfig 
Paradoxically, however, when Pakistan accepted military 
125 
aid from the United States in 1954, Hehru declared that it 
"goes to the root of the problem of peace as well as the free-. 
dom of many countries in 4sia* Diese countries, including 
India liave onJy recently attained ind©pendeac©# !Bi©y will only 
retain it so long as they are wortiiy of it and are capable of 127 
defending it./' Be also said? "I can understand! although 
I would not approve, military alliances between great powers. 
But I do not landerstand military pacts and alliances between 
a huge giant of a power and a little pigmy of a country*.to 
attach small countries to themselves in alliances really means-
and I say so ifeith all respect to those countries - that they 
are becoming very much dependent on these Oountries**^  
126. Cited in H-S^aa^an, Indja 3ft Mmi^S 
oPfCit., p.430» See also Nehru, op»cit., pp# 471-472 for similar views» 
127» Kehrui op.cit^, p. 06, 
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This Inconsistaacy in Nehru* s views is more apparent 
than real# for, Nehru objected to the ^ JIllted States' military 
aid to Pakistan and the SEA130 and Baghdad pacts not because 
he was really Interested in the freedom of Pakistani but beca-
use he afraid l^ at the United States* military aid to 
128 
Pakistan would pose a problem for iadia's security* It is 
also difficult to believe that Nehru really thought that 
Pakistan would lose its independence or that Pakistan was not 
interested in Its own independence* He was, on the oth&r 
hand, afraid that Pakistan would become stronger militarily 
and that the United States might gain greater influence in 130 
Indo-Pakistan affaire. There was no Question of Paklstsaa 
losing its freedom or independence of action in foreign affairs. 
Though this was not accepted earlier by many Indian scholars| 
ttiere is now general acceptance of it as is evident from the 131 following report! 
128. p,476 for a frank admission of this by Nehru. 
129* As pointed out earlier^  Nehru himself had said that an alliance need not stand in the way of the independence of a nation (See above» p^Q)* 1!he only way in which we can explain this inconsistency in Nehru's views is that Nehru was toaking an all out effort to restrain Pakistan from taking tiie US aid» He might have been trying to mobilise opinion in other Asian countries and appealing to the Pakistani public, over the heads of the Pakistani leaders, as was his habit in India. 
130. See below pp. ^ ^^ g^^ 
131. See Simla Prasad, 'Report on the Seminar on Asian studies' oplcit.,p,ll5 (Italics mine). See also K.P.Karunakaran, ed.,op.cit., p'.7&« 
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"liie discussion on tiie foreign policies of Pakistan and 
Japan led to sympatJietic understanding of alignment. It i-^aa 
generally felt fcJaat recent trends and developiaeats in the .fone-
Ign policies of these countries shov that alignment With power 
blocs doe^ not always comproniise freedom and initiative in 
rorelen policy* For these aligned countries have been able to 
follow a reasonably independent policy and to establish friendly 
relations vlth Powers opposed to the leading members of the 
bloc to which tJiey belong. On the other hand, several non--
aligned states have felt compelled to seek military aid from 
the loading I'/orld Powers which are leaders of military allian-
ces. In view of these developments, it was felt that the tei^ 
• alignment» and 'non-alignment* have jUsst at least some of their 
original meaning and force. 
This is a misconception which has gained currency since 
the Chinese aggression against India and the latter's acceptance 
of military aid from the Big Powers. It is a ma^or contention 
of this study that neither 'alignment* nor ^nonallgnment' has 
lost, its original meaning. This misconception is obviously 
based on the fallacies that alignment meant loss of indepen-
dence, and that Honalignment meant a total rejection of not 
only alliances but also military aid from the Big powers. 
It has already been indicated above, that alignment does 
not lead to a loss of independence of a country as admitted by 
73 -
Netiru himself* It iS| therefor©, not correct to say that only 
"the recent tr«aids and developments In the foreign policies 
of"Pakistan and Japanj "show that alignment with Power blocs 
does not alwj^s compromise freedom and initiative in foreign 
policy^" Xbe implication in ^ e argument that Pakistan did 
not act independ€»tly in certain cases is that it did not act 
vith the majority of the Afro-Asians, or the nonaligned states^  
tJaough there is no reason why it should have done so, if it 
132 
were really independent* For example^  it is stated that 
•'On the Hungarian question, Pakistan has voted constantly and 
consistently with the United States." But, it is forgotten 
that India had voted with tlxe Soviet Onion on the juost crucial 133 
resolution on the Hungarian issue. And those who rem^ber ttiis 
134t 
explain, that India had to deviate from the theory of Non-
alignment in defence of her vital interests. 
Pakistanis stand on the Sues crisis should prove beyond 
doubt that it was as independent as any other state was. ©le 
132» See B.C.Hastogi, op.cit., p. 172. 
1S3# See be3.ow, Chapter 6 for an analysis of the voting record 
of India and the Qnited Arab Republic on the Hungarian 
issue iJi the United Nations. It may also be added that 
a careful study of the voting behaviour of India on all 
Cold war issues would reveal that on a good number of 
them India voted with this or that bloc. During the 
Korean crisis India had voted more often with the mited 
States than voting * independently» See CSiester Bowles 
.^ bafiffgdoytis Re,Bap If op. cit., p. 172. 
134» See Bimla Prasad, »Report on Seminar on Asian Studies^  op.cit., p. 112, 
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135 arguments that although she voted always vltfa Afro»Asian 
group la the United Nations, the tone of her delegates* speech 
waa jallder than that of many others In the group", and tSiat 
"Even outside the ON, her government's reaction was not in 
conformity wltb. the popular feelings which rose to a high pit<di 
of sympathy for the Egyptians and of condemnation of the agg-
ressors", do not at all prove l^ iat Pakistan was not indepen-
« 'Ofl 
dent, if all tkxe facts of the case are kept in mind. It will 
be siisilarly wrong as already indicated, to assume that India 
had been blind:iy px'o»Onited Arab-Republic during the Suez 
crisis* 
Perhaps, the most important reason for Pakistan's 
refusal to vote with the majorily of the Afro-Asians, was that 
it amounted to voting with India, And it joined the Power bloc« 
only when it appeared to further its vital interests ^ d causes 
against India while India did the same, in reverse, as their 
voting on the Hungarian issue, said much else of their foreign 
136* See B.C*Rastogi, op.cit#, p. 172. 
136. Inhere was no particular reason why Pakistan should have 
gone all out in condemning England with which it shared 
defence alliances and membership of the Commonwealth, 
x^ hereas, its relations with the United Arab Republic were 
not very happy. In fact. Pakistan and Iraq took the 
initiative in proposing Buspend Britain from the 
Baghdad Pact# It is Interesting to note that some Indian 
spokesman and scholars have defended jDidia's role in the 
Hungariian crisis and also Nehru*s criticism of Nasser's 
nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company on the ground 
that its policy was one of nonviolence in words as well 
as deeds (See above, Chapter I, n.S)* 
137* See above,ppt 43 • 44 , 
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138 poll<^ reveals* Pakistan's alliance vlth the United States 
and Indians opposition to it reveal the same fact. As already 
139 
indicated, India opposed, tooth and nail, the Qnited States* 
military aid to Pakistan, because, it ^ a^s an attempt on the 
part of Pakistan, to end its isolation, successfully caused ly 
India and to boost its military strength vis-avis India. For, 
as long.as Pakistan remained nonaligned, it could not pose a 
threat to Indians security. In the then existing atmosphere of 140 
hatred and suspician on both sides, the fear of an attack from 
the other, on either side, was natural, far more so on taie side 
of Pakistan before 19M, because of its small size, absurd 
geographical position and comparitive weakness, and according 141 
to Nirad C.Choudhuri, this feax- on the part of Pakistan up to 
1964, was not entirely unfounded* 
138, See M»S#Ea^an, 'India and Pakistan As factors in Each Other's i?oreign Policy And Relations', internat^ p^ns^ ;^  Studies (Vol.lIl,Ko»4, A-prii, 1962), and ^ Tayant Kumar Ray, 'India and Pakistan as Factors in Each Other's Foreign Policies', :^ teri;^ atiQnal Studies (Vol.VIII,No8. 1-2 July-October 1966), for a detailed study of the impact of the 'cold war' between India-Pakistan on their policies. The authors seek to prove tSaat India's preoccupation witii fakistan is not as great as that of Pakistan with India, and, that even then, India's preoccupation with Pakistan is a sort of distortion from her general foreign policy. Xhis argiament, I feel, itself distorts India's foreign policy. 
139t See above n.ll9# Also see Hirad C^Choudh* 
«Pif 2ihe Continent of Circe,. (Jaioo Publication House, Bombay 1967) pp. 293^ 29S.' 140.' Nehru, op.cit**p,82 Nehru singled out Pakistan as the only coiaitry with which India's relations were not clean. See also Sisir Gupta, 'India's Policy lowards Pakistan', International Studies (Vol.8,No8.1-2, July-October 1966), p. 38. 141. op.cit., p. 293, 
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and 
ComiJag to the other fallacy that Konalignment meant a 
total rejection of all klads of alliances and also niilltary 
aid, it has to h© pointed out that it is contrary to facts* 
For, it is a well established fact that India and ^e United 
Arab Republic as well as all other leading nonalignod nations 
have not always oppos^i all military alliances, either in 
142 principle or in practice. in a four-fold classification of 
143 
pacts, Fayesz A„Ss^egh, has pointed out that pacts like ttie 
'*Arab League do not arouse any opposition", and that the three 
kinds of pacts in the ascending order of objectionability are, 
"voluntary associations", "Cold M&v pacts p^r excellence"^  and 
finally SEAio and GSHIO pacts agldnst whom "the main opposition 
of neutralists has been directed," 
144 
Hehru's opposition and criticism of the NA®) alliance 
was mainly in connection witSi the western supix>rt to Bortugal 
142» See J»C.Kundra, op.cit*, pp,87-98 for a more or less 
objective study of India's anti-pactism. See also H. 
Parameeharan Nayar, 'Nationalism As A factor JQa India's 
Foreign Policy', 
Affairs,, 1 9 6 2 , S h e criteria for Nonalignment evolved| 
at the preparatory meeting in Cairo for tiie 3elgrado 
Conference of Honaligned States also made a distinction 
between Pacts. 
143. OynMj.fii? nf U op.cit.^pp* 46-47. 
144, NehrUj op»cit», pp, 89-90 smd Suora,, n#60« 
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on Goa, or his anger witai the SEATD and Baghdad Pacts. Nasser's 
146 
opposition to NAIO appears to bave been a l^ y-product of his 
opposition to the Baghdad Pact and the support given by the 
Western Pov^ ers to Israel* Besides^ India's association with 146 
the Comajonwealth, and the United Arab Republic's treaty of 
147 1964, vith Britain, showed that botai the countries were willing 
to accept British help in the event of an attack by an outside 
148 
Power* The Comjuonwealth, however, as M^ru rightly stressed, 
had no comaitjaents on either side, especially of a military na-
ture* In fact, however, India undertook certain obligations in 
149 
Burma, in its own interests* And India had accepted British 
co-operation in building its defence forces* As Panikkar^^^has 
written "If the Indian army was to be something more than a 
See Nasser«s Speeches^  1968, op*Cit.,pp*49-60, 133-134, 
183* In fact one does not find a direct reference to NA2X) 
in these speeches* 
146, 
146. 
1968), pp. 281*283. See H.V.Hodson, 'Problems Before !Ehe 
Commonwealth', India Quarterly^  (Volume V,No*3, July-
September, 1949), p.234. 
147. For the text see fO^  op.cit.,pp.248-64* 
See Ahmad Bussain, 'The New Egypt i Domestic and Foreign 
Policies', Yita^ l Speeches of The Day (21,(11) March 16, 
1966, New Xork), p.1104. ^ 
148* Nehru,op.cit.,p* 144. "v/e cannot remain completely isola» 
ted, and so inevitably by stress of circumstancea» we 
have to incline in some direction or other ...."said Nehru. 
149* See below. Chapter IV, p. 146* 148* 
160. K.il.Panikkar, Qf., MjLaa A^ f^ flcg (Asia Publishing House, Bombay, I960), p.34. 
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second class force meant only for internal security, then its 
training and organisation had to he based on the latest know, 
ledge. It vas impossible without adequate co-operation from 
one of the aa^or {K>wers to acquire this knowledge. Close 
association with Britain was for India the only practical 
alternative and India chose it unhesitatingly.*' 
Nasser accepted the British stipulation to reactivate 
the Suez base in the event of aai attack on any of the powers 
of the area not only because he realised the need for British 
help in the event of an attack but also because he had to 
161 depend upon Britain for the supply of defence equipment etc« 
Nehru's early attitusSe to defence and defence prepara»-
tions comes to light from the two Comuniques issued by tiie 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London in 1©48) to which Nehru 
subscribed. Ihe fii'st on©| issued on October 20, 1948, said, 
intei^ alia i "Defence and tiie maintenance of world peace were 
the subjects of discussion at ttie Prime Ministers meeting this 
morning and afternoon", and that "In tiie discussion there was 
agreement that tlie danger of war must be met building up 
the armed forces in order to deter any would be aggressor, and 
161. Siis stipulation was incorported in Article 4 of the 
treaty « Suora, n. 147. Also see below, p. 2i3.214» 
162. CUed^n ^ Q m WiiVf^f X^7«»o0. op.cit. ,pp« 40.41. 
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that f3?eedoa umst be not only by military 
defensive measures but also W advancing social and 
163 
economic welfare," The second CoimainlQue issued on 
October 22, 1<348> had said, inter alia i "Ihe Discussions 
have shown a substantial coiamunity of outlook among all 
Common!^ ealth Governments in their approach to present 
world problems*" 
154 
It will bv shown in iiie next chapter that Non» 
alignment has always meant a readiness to accept military 
assistance in the .-vent of foreign aggression. In simplest 
meaning viz./freedom of action in foreign reiations> it 
could not have meant the contrary, noti^ /ithstandlng Nehru»s 
ov/n statements to this effect. 
It is J therefore^  possible to conclude that Kehani's 
opposition to the cold pacts on id^logical and moral 
im 
grounds was in itself a cold war tactic. As Devdutt has 
explained, The Government of India committed more or less 
the same error as the big Ihe cold war mehtali^ in 
a sense implies the intioduction of nonpolitical, particularly 
153, 
164. See below, pp» 9S-.99, 
1&6, See K,P#Karunakaran, ed,, op.cit,,p*73. 
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the laorai or ideological considerations, into the evolving 
of foreign policies In fac^ howeverself-interest 
rather than id<2ological or logical consistency has been her 
ifl^iin objective^ Moral ends entered the foreign policy only as 
means or attitude-building factors." Seen from this point of 
viev;, the so-called^^"divergence In the Oovermaent of India's 
precepts and practice nearer home vhere her national interest 
is involved", disappear 
fiiiailarly, it win be shown in J^t II of this study 
that Indians role in crises like Korea, Suez, Hungary, and, the 
Congo, was consistent throughout vith her actions and policies 
on issues like Kashioir, libet, and Goa etc. The so-called 
inconsistencies that are pointed out W various writers arise 
out of the fact that Honallgnment has not been properly mder-
stood by a aajority of tSie people eveiy^where. 
A few examples would serve to Illustrate the point bett-
169 
er# According to one group of writers, "The reaction of manj' 
of the nonaligned nations towards events in Hungary in 1966", 
was divergent from the theory of Nonalignment, Another scholar^ '^  
has said feat the Jiidian action in Goa was "an aberration from 
India's foreign poli<g^  style", forgetting India's action in 
167* JC§*9 p*88» 168. Ibid. 169* SUBSSs mldl, p«112» 
ISO. Sisir Gupta, jQdla md-fieglonal Integration in Asia,. op»cit«, Mote* 63« 
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Kashmir in I W and its support to the United Nations* military 
m 
action in tiie Congo. Kasbialr again, is an exception to the rule 
for Communists and other leftist leaders^^^in Jhdia 
have called the acceptance of aiilitary aid from the United States 
during and since ^ e Chinese aggression, not a mere aherratj^n, 
but a flia^or departure, from Konaligruaent* 
All tiiis divergence reveals that each has his own vie*? of 
Nonalignment and refuses to see it as a whole* As i^ orman I># 
Palmer has aptly put it, "in India tAxe major stronghold 
of neutralism most people who have any views at ail on such 
matters seem to approve of the foreign policies of their Govern^ 
mentj but their concepts of the nature of neutralism differ 
greatly. Some ta?ands of Indian neutralism are vague and naive, 
with a strong »out of this vorid* flavourj others are w611 
thought out and politically realistic. Some Indians lean as far 
toviards Communism and the Soviet Union as their 8o«>called nei:^  
tralism permits, vhereas others seem to be definitely neutral on 
the side of democracy and haVe a strong pro-western orientation*" 
As against all tills, Nehru simply saidi "I am on my country"s 
side and on no body else*s"« 
161. See below Chapter VII for an analysis of India* s role in the Congo crisis. 
163, Krishna Menon said i our acceptance of aid and advice 
were at once basic and n catastrophic changes....'* See 
MS-MBS^i February 6, 1967^  
164* '^Changing Balance of Power i "The »Neutral» Nations In the 
(Asia Publishing House, Bombay 1961), pp. 43-46. 
166. fifbru, op.cit., p.64. For a similar statement ty Nasser 
see Ifigggy»§ 19&d, op.cit*, p.33. 
C H A P T E R III 
• M KSARSfG Qf NOtlAIiMmS 
Aspects of WonallgnfflQnti 
NonallgiMaeiit; Is a policy based on the balance of power 
principle and its main objective is the protection of the 
se^ urltgr of the nation. It is not a simple policy but a complex 
wjaole having different aspectsj all of vhich aim at Urn samo 
main objectlvei Vi2»t the security of the nation. Its various 
aspects were very well explained, as follows, ty Nehru in the 
debates on Foreign Affairs in the Indian Parliament on December 
9, 1968t 
"When we say our policy is one of nonalignment, 
obviously we mean nonalignment with militazy 
blocs !Shis in itself is not a policy,it 
is on3^ part of a policy. 
•"SSie policy itself can only be a policy 
of acting according to our best judgement,and 
furthering the principal objectives and ideals 
that we have# Every <5ount3^ *s foreign poliey 
first 0^ aH, is concerned with its own secu^ 
ritgr ?and with protecting its own progress. 
Security can be obtained in many ways* £^he nor-
mal idea is that security is protected by armies* 
IJiat is only partly truej it is equal^true that 
security is protested W policies* A deliberate 
policy of friendship with other countries goes 
further in gaining security than almost anything 
else* 
"Apart fa?oia this, from the larger point of 
view of the world also, we have laboured to the 
best of our ability for world peace ••••• 
1* Sehru, op*eit*, pp* 79-80* 
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"Our foreign policy iias this positive aspect of 
peace* The ottoei- positive aspects are an en-
largement of freedom in ttie world, replacement 
of colonialism Isy free and independmt coun-
tries and a large degree of cooperation among 
nations*****'^  
In the previous chapter the policies of anti-coloniaiism 
and ant^acialism have been examined* Only t^e major aspects 
now remain to he explained* 
To begjjif thenj what did Nehru mean by 'acting according 
to our best judgement* and *an independent approach to each 
controversial or disputed issu^? Did it mean objectivity or 2 impartiality as has been often claimed by many persons in 
a 
India and abroad? 13ae answer is no» For, Nehru said in 1948 
that "Our instructions to our delegates have always been 
firstly, to consider each question in terms of India's interest 
secondly on its merits X mean to s^ if it did not affect 
India, naturally on its merits and not merely to do something 
or give a vote just to please t&is Power or liiat,Power, though, 
of course! it is perfectly natural that in our desire to, have 
friendship with other Powers, we avoid doing anything which 
might irritate them." 
2. See j.W*Burtontop*cit*ip.220* M^ny a tfestem critic has 
criticised Konaligned Nations for lack of objectivity in 
matters of vital importance j^ to them — • See Bertrand 
Russel, tfnaiTffied » (Penguin Books Harmonds-
worth, Mddlese;)^  1963p*64* See also William C. Johnstonts, 
Mm^ln iQ^Qim IqU^zIi A in NQatrffaiiga (Harvard 
University Pressj Cambridge, Massachusets, 1963),p»277. 
See also .J*B».Kripalanit "For Principled Neutrality", 
iQX^to, ,(Vol.38,No.If October, 1969), p.68* 
3* Nehru, op.cit*| p. 33, 
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Indians Interests are paraiaomt bocaijjsei as Nehru 
4 saldi 
"XhQ art of conduetJjig the foreign affairs of a 
country lies la finding out vhat is laost advanp. 
tageous to t^e eounta^ .. Ve ma^ talk about inter-
national good^ i^ll and mean ^ hat say. Me cay 
talk about peaoe and freedom and earnestly mean 
what we say* But in the ultimate analysis, a 
government functions for the good of liie coiaitry 
it governs and no government dare do anything 
which in the short or long run is manifestly to 
the disadvantage of that comtry» 
" Otoerefore, whether a country is imperia-. 
list or Socialist or Communist, its Foreign 
Minister thinks primarily of me interests of 
that countiyf But of course some people 
may think of tbe interests of their country 
r©gard3.ess of other consequences or take a short 
distance view. Ql^^rgj^y t^ jriH tti^l? In tj^ e 
JU t^m„WH, qS oyiii 
CQunl^ ry* The interest of peace is more important 
because if war comes every one suffers so that in 
the^ 'long dist^c© view, self-interest may itself 
demand a policy of co-operation with other nations, 
goodwi:Ll for other nations, as, Indeed, it does 
demand,'" 
SSius neither peace nor goodi^ fill for other nations have 
been ends in themselves* Peace is necessary to the extent it 
secures India's securit^ y and development, "therefore", said 
Hehru, ''We propose to look after India's interests in the 
context of world Cooperation and world peace, in so far as world 
4* Jd,, p. 28 (Italics are taine}* 
6. Ibid. 
76 -peace aan be preserved*" B«t x^ ar^ fare, said NehrU|"can not fee 
avoided another part^ starts Itf or if there la aggression 
on© has to meet that« That Is originally we had to go to 
Kashmlrj that is why have stj^ed on — . that Is, our armed 
forces have stiiyed on — ^ d not wltaidraw our 
forces from there m long as there is any danger left toj aggre-
ssion from outside.#.«.»" 
7 
SiMlariyj M r u said that "we cannot perhaps he friendly 
always with every country»##.* Naturally you are i»>re frlend3^ 
with those cowntrles witJi whom you have closer relations 
Naturally, again, ^ e are likely to be more friendly to some 
Countries than to others because this may be to be our mutual 
advantage bu.t even so, our friendship with other coun-
tries should not bring us inevitably into conflict witii some 
other com try." 
Vea?y few people seem to realise that this policy of 
Konallgnment v/itii military blocs and friendship with all 
countries to protect the security of the nation is in reality 
6. See C>A*P»t part II, Vol.VI, No»l, 28 Nov, 194% p.8, 
7* Nehru, op.cit*, p. 46. 
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a policy based on tbe balance or povor |>riaclpl©. ISie dlffi* 
culty arises out o£ mlscoiiceptions about Honalignment such 
as those ezaaiined earlier,)also of ttie balance of power prin-
ciple itself. As prof« PeorosAaa apply observed i "Uie idea 
of a balance of power is often a stumbling bloc to the general 
reader^ and soasetimes a source of confusion to the sti»a©at of . 
international relations fherefore, a suitable deflnl»» 
tion of the idea of the balaaice of power seems necessary to 
9 dispel the confusion. In t^ ie v?ords of B?of. Penrose| 
"A pre2j.iainary explanation «•• may best start 
W considering the position of the stateamen 
entrusted vith conduct of foreign affairs 
in any indepead^t state* obviously, tiieir first 
concern aust be survival of the state and 
the preservation of its independence.* 
meeting ^ese responsibilities states-
men are obliged to take account of the distri-
bution of power in mind* 'fhey must strive to es^ 
tablish such relations iwith other countries as 
i^ ill ensure t&at no preponderance of power among 
the latter^ siiisJy or collectively, will threaten 
i^Bir indepmde^e or encompass their doi^ nfall. 
In the pursuit of this defensive aim they may 
decide, from time to time, to ©titer into or fom 
alliances "with other poviers, particularly when 
those countries whose designs they fear are liiv 
ked i^r treaty engagements. ^ gj 
mm^^i MOit M, ^ 
fflt^l'te tolfQ ytQPl^ a ftfcgSUU^ 
qL feg, .ffongjLs.lfS 
8. E.F. Penrose, VQIiUMQI^  Siail^ma^iOfia ^ X^^ t^ flftS » 
A t^rUdy, aa g^ Xaflff^  Q^ (Frank Cas0s & Co»i Ltd,, London,1966), pp»6-7-
9. ibid> (Italics are mtoe)* !nhe identity of the aim of sur-
vival between alignment ^ d nonalignment stressed here 
has already been indicated in the previous chapter 
See above, pp.^g ^ 79 
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. to S each gtat© is mique in size, however defined in resoxirces aad in geographical position in relation to other states* Gonsoquently the precise uteaaure appro-priate to the laaintenanoe o£ a defensive baiancse* of«po^er differ in different countries* tihat is coffliaon is tiie aim of siirvival#" 
This, ISient is the first aspect of Nonalignment, that 
is, not 4oiniJ.ig power blocs or ^t^ling alliances, or^  as 
Prof* Penrose has described it^  the 'maintenance of a defiant 
sive fc)alance-*<gf-power»» 
Ihere were many circtaastances, upon which Prof. Penrose 
10 
and Nehru hli&self| have laid stress, that were favourable for 
the Noaaligraaent of so many Afro-Asian states. 
Afliong the aost iiaportant of these was tiie emergence of 
a more or less stable balance-of-power among the Big ftjwers, 
by or so, which not only ruled out the possibility of 
another World War, even before the advent of nuclear parilgrj"^  
but also created an atmosphere congenial for Nonaiignment. 
N^ru was quick to grasp this fact, for it was in 19^6 that 
10* Nehru, op*cit.| pp* 32 and 35# 
11. See Arfiold foynbee, *A Turning Point M 12ie Cold war*, 
(X2sri, 4, October 1960), p. 467 and especially F.H.Hinslt^, Mt Peace» (Cambridge tijivergit^  Press, 1963}, p^348* See also Herbert S.Dinerstein, *!Jhe Irans^raiatioh of Alliance Systems*, 
R,evleWft (Volume I.IX, No#3, September 1965), p. 690* 
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h© first came out vlth his declaration, of Nonalignxaent as the 12 
basis of I»<lia*s foreign policy. M d in 1949 he declared 
cat^ goslcall^ ^ ttiat ''theirs has hoen. a great deal of talk about 
the possibility of war world war I laean. So far as I can 
judgOi such possibilities as tl^iero w^e hav^ receded^  I don«t 
thiiak Uiere is any great chance of ai:jy t^ ar on a big scale | oa 
a x-^ orid scale iUi the near 
Again in a debate in th.Q Parliament of Ihdia in 1965, 
13 Kehru said! 
"As things are today, we have reached a certain 
kihd of balance it laay be' a very unstable 
balance, but it is still some kind of balance 
when any kind of major aggression is likely 
to leatl to a ^ orld "Shat itselt is a restra-
Ining factor, whether aggression t^es place 
in a small couati^ or a big one, it tends to up* 
set the unstable balance in 13ae world and is, 
therefbre, likeHy to lead to war* It is because 
of tiiis that in the G^eva ConfereniJe there was 
so Buch argument about the Jjido-^ Chi^ ia states. 
Either of the ma^or parties was afJ'aid that if 
any of tSiese states lined up with or coerced 
into joining one group, it would be to the dis-
advantage of the other*... So at Geneva they wisely 
decided, more ©r^ less, tiiough not in clear lan-
guage, mat Uie Indo-C2iina states ^ ould keep 
out of military pacts or alliances on ei^er 
side, or in otherwords, remain neutralised* 
*'lf you extend the argument, you will see 
mat the only way to avoid conflicts is to accept 
things sore or less as they axe. Ho doubt, maj:^  
12. .gt,At.I>*t Vol.11, Part II, 23 1949, p. 
13. Ndiru, op.cit., p. 67* 
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things require to be changed, but you must not 
think of ohanging tfoem in^  yar ...» Further by 
enlarging the area of peace, t^at is of coun-
tries which are not aligned to tills group or 
that, but are fitiendly to both, you 
reduce the chance of 
fhis statement of Nehru accurately explains the basis 
14 
of Nonalignment as a balance-of-power policy, iind if the big 
Powers were suspicious of each other and were keen to have as 
man^ of the small states of Asia and Africa aligned on their 
side, as was tlie case in the lat© 1S40*b, the small states were 
more suspicious of the big Powers because of their strength 
and power* IJius ^ e desire not to antagonise tSiem was rein-
forced by a desire to keep as aloof from them as possible, or 
in other words, not to have exclusive dependence on either, 
whida was bomd to antagonise the otJier, From the very begimv-
Ing Nehru was determined to make India, as far as possible, self« 
reliant. Monalignment would serve both these aims. 
14. It is, ttierefore, not correct to hold, as is done In some quarterSj that there is no basis in Nehru's Speeches for such a view of Nonaiignment. Nor is it mcessavy to say that the Foreign Mnister does not always make everythiiig clear. See A.P.Rana, 'Sie Nature of India«s Foreign Policy (An Sxaaination of the Relation of Indian Non^ ^ alignment to the concept of the Balance of Power in the Nuclear ;rfidia Quarterly, (XXII, No.2, April-June, 
1966), pp. 101-139^  Girl Lai Jain, 'Indian Nonaiignment And Balance of Power*, Id., pp. 177-179 and A.P.Rana, Indian Nonaiignment AnOalance of Power - A Rejoinder', (No.3, July-September, 1966), pp.279-286. 
1S» Nasser told a group of American pressmen in 1968 that "I 
suspect all of tSie big powers" - Nasser*s Soeechesy 1958, 
op.cit., p. 366. 
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Jhe desire not to ant^onise tbe Soviet Union, at aa^ 
cost, has been due to the fact that it was the laost powerful 
state on India's borderS| capable of threatening its security, 
16 
when India became independent^  as Ndiru had pointed out, as 
early as 1931, in a masterly analysis of Indians strategic-
military position, though it 'was not likely to attempt it, as 
it would then Is^ itself open to attack from the European 
Powers, !I3ie emergence of the Cold ^v'ar almost ruled out even 
this remote possibility, Ihe surest way to antagonise the 
Soviet Union would have been an alliance with the West which 
Nehru, any way, did not want for other reasons as well* In 17 
1960f for example, Nehru said* "So far as Sadia was concerned, 
placed as she was historically said geographical3Ly it would 
have been quite astonishingly foolish to fall into tiiis busi-
ness of the cold war, either on grounds of principle or on 2B 
grounds of e2.p^ diency#" And K»P.S.Menon, has written t4iat 
"Nehru wrote to Isaf Ali and myself as the first Ambassadors 
of independent India, on Uie eve of our departure for Washing-
ton and waiOcing respectively *2he Soviet l&iion being 
16. See BiJEla Prasad, M^.,MU^^USM, 
op.cit.« Appendix Ilf pp.280I^S. Ghina> Nehru wrote^ wovad not be such a great threat for a very J^ng time. 
Nehru, op.cit., p. 83. 
18» India and the Gold War^  op.cit*, p.29 (Italics are mine). 
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our neighixjur, we shall inevitably develop closer relations 
with it. V^ e ean not afford to antagonise Hussia merely because 
ve thipk that this m r ^rritate some one else.. . Nor Indeed can 
Fnenship with t^ e Ihited States was essential because, 
it was not only the on© power capable of providing substantial 
19 
economic help Tor India's economic prosperil^ rt but, of course, 
also the only i^ wer which could effectively check the Russian 
ambitions of territorial expansion^  if any. From the point of 
View of mdia»s security, friendship witJi the Soviet iJaion 20 
appears to have been more important for geographical reasons. 
After all, the United states' interest in India becaae real 
only after the rise of Communist China, heralding the failure 
of the United States' policies in catiina. oaiough it is very 
difficult to substantiate, Nehru appears to have calculated 
that Russia would look upon India as a possible ally against 
an expansiohiist China, either under i^o or under C&iang Kai^ Shek^  
19, It is for this reason that perhaps Nehru stated once or 
twice that foreign policy is the outcome of economic policy. 
See N ^ U | op«clt.,p, 24, ^so see below, p. lo6» 107. 
20. ISie geographical closeness of India and ttie Soviet Union 
appears to have been one of the reasons for Neham's oppos* 
ition to the creation of fakistan as an independent nation 
— See J.Nehru, Discovery of Ihdia, op.clt., pp. 666-
667, If this were so, tiie fact l^at a hostile Pakistan 
came ihto being with an independent India might have in^ 
creased the need for closer relations witii the Soviet Ubion 
and for not antagonising it -Ifest the former might exploit 
the situation. Indeed K#M.Panikkar (op.cit., pp. 39-40) 
wrote that the creation of Pakistan had created a defence 
problem of great magnitude for India. 
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108 Far, Nehru had written in the early 1940*3 Itself, that 
thou^ the Russian leaders vere far too bu^ with their own 
problems to think of Indians Indep^ iiienc©, "yet they were not 
likely to ignore India which touched their frontiers in Asia,.," 
It is laore likely tiiat Nehru had from the beginning looked upon 
. Russia as a possible aUy against an expanslonst China, It Is 
unlikely ^at Nehru could have neglected the emergence of a 
powerful China and its Impact on ]Dadla. For, even in 1927 
22 
Nehru declared that "Ihe Chinese Revolution Is not An event of 
local Interest and importance. It is a world phenomenon of 
the greatest historic importance «•,,. the country which will 
be most affected W the issue will be India," 
Whether or not aU these considerations were taken fully 
into consideration, it is clear that some thought was given to 
the emerging Chinese problem* Nehru told the Indian Parliament 
23 
in 19&9J "Even before the Chines© Revolution we tried to 
develop friendly relations with the C3ilang-Kai-»Shek (xovemment" 
Once it was evident that China had gone Communist and was not 24 
prepared to accept Indians friendship and partnership in Asia, 
for that was what ]jadia wanted from it, India could not but 
give full thought to the problem, To quote Nehru againi 
21* _ » p. 623, 
22, Cited in V^B.Karnik, op,cit,, pp,100 <& 106# 
23, Nehru, op,Cit*, p* 368, 
24, See below pp, 144 . . 
26, Nehru, op.cit,, p, 369, 
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"Ever sinco th© Chinese Revolution, we naturally 
had to think of what the nm China was likely to 
be» realised that ttiis revolution x^ as going 
to 13© a very big factor in Asia, in the woria, 
and in regard to us» realised - we know 
that aittount of history that a strong Chiaa 
is normally an expansionist China. Biroughout 
histoi?y that has been tifie case. And we felt that 
the great push towards indus-^rialisation of that 
country, plus t^e aaazing pace of its population 
increase, would together create a Biost diuig$rt»us 
situation* Daken also wit^ the fact of China 
somewhat inherent tendency to he expansive when 
she is strong, we realised the danger to Ihdia* 
We have discussed it here, and it has been dis» 
cussed in other countries* As the years have 
gone this fact has heoome mi^e and more 
apparent and obvious* If any person iinagines 
that we have followed our China policy without 
realising the conse^ Juences, he is mistaken. If 
he tbinks that we followed it because of fear of 
China, he is doubly mistaken**' 
Perhaps Nehru was right in his claim that his China 
policy was not based on fear of China* For, while he realised 
that Communist China was a danger to India, he appears to have 
26 
calculated iAiat it was not an iiamediate danger, as he told 
the Indian Parliament in *'Rlght from I960 or, at any 
rate from 1961, when tiie Chinese forces came into Tibet we 
have had this problem before us. It has not suddenly come up 
before us this year or last year. v.'e have had this problem 
before us and this developing picture *«••• of two power states 
merging, two power states coming face to face with each other 
on a tiem^dous boi'der^  Ever since 1960, this was the picture 
26, See KA.iya Sabha Dcibafcesj part II, Vol. 27, December 1,1959 
cols. 1983^86, 
befoi?© us« vie may have differed as to the timing in our 
minds, as to when t^is wAil happen, vhether in five yearsf 
ten yearsi thirty yearsf fifteen yearSf it vas difficult to 
say. But we had Uie pioti^e* 
Therefor©! while he took all necessary steps to meet 
27 
any possible threat from China, he rightly pz^ceeded to cial* 
tivate China's friendship on the basis of mutual interests 
as will be seen in Hie next chapter* England also appears 28 
to have proceeded on the same assumption* llheir aim appears 
to have been to give the Chinese government the necessary 
international recognitioni so that it need not have to depend 
upon the Soviet Union exclusively for diplomatic support* Evm 
after this effort failed, "teirot^ h vhat might have been a 20 
deliberate effort on the part of the Soviet union, and China 
signed the treaty of friendship with its big nel^bouri India 
hoped that it might still be possible to make friends with 
the Communist giants, remaining nonaligned* Indians 
alignment 
tvjth the United States at this stage would have 
definitely antagonised the Soviet Union and China, and possi» 
bly made them permanent meaies, tiius increasing the threat 
to its security* 
27. See below, pp. 142 - 160 
28. See J.F.Jain, ^Chinese Reaction To British Recognition Of The People's Republic of China*, Intgynat^ onaj. (Volume 2ir, Ho.l, July 1952), p, 28. 
29. pp. 40-41. 
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30 k^ has b©^ in&loate^ ear lies, leaders in India and 
many other Aslim eomti^ ies were hopeful that sooner or later^  
China and the Soviet lailon were tJounsd fco fall apart« It was 
all the mtQ neeessairy, therefore, for India to remain 
aligned* Bins the Sino»Soviet split, when it finally came 
about, only confirmed the basis of Nonaiignment. It was not 
31 so much against the ^ 'est as against China t2iat Hehru declared 
that the Soviet Union was Indians second front and vice versa* 
32 
Indeed, he is reported to have told the toited States that 
the Soviet ljhi.on considers India as its second line of defence 
against Oiina^ , 
In I960 these developments were only anticipated* Nehru, 
therefore, wanted to make it clear to ^ e Soviet Union and 
China what h© meant W Konalignaent, fbr, they appeared to 
have takm it for granted that Honalignment meant permanent 
hostility to the itfest, especially the United States of America^ 
for it was the itoited States that was bitterly opposed to Ihdls^ s 
33 Honalignment* I^us Hehru li^ de it clear to the Ck>mtaunist 
30* See above, pp. 53-5?• 
31» See Sellg Harrison, *Troubled India and Her Neighbours*, 
foreign Affairs^ 0rol.43,No,2 January 1965, p.325). 
32, see Sisir Gupte, M i a and ReKiona!^  integration in Ab:^ ,^ 
0p«Cit*;» P«r 16« 
33g See above, Ciiapter II, p, 65 Also see below pp* 142-151. 
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Powers that he would ru&t hesitate to accept Vfestorn aid, if 
not an alliance, if India*® security was threatened, by his 
decision to remain in the Commonwealth, his support to the-
Burjaese Government against the Coaimunlsts, and putting the 
Cofflmunists in India in 4ail| in their thousands. Stalin migh't 
haife already loamt his lesson JTrom 2ito*s successful defection 
from his contx'ol and the prompt support given tjy the ISiited 
States to the latter* 12iis aust have been a heartening deve-
lopment for India* 
If Stalin had learnt his lesson veil, it yas reasonahlo 
to conclude, that the Soviet Onion would not IJJce to drive 
India into the Western caiap, supporting ai^ big Chinese 
move against India* If, ho^ e^ver, this happened India was sure 
of Western help, alliance or no alliance, as Nehru wrote in 
34 
1931i country will tolerate the idea of another gaining 
dominion over India and thus acquiring the commanding position 
vhich England occupied for so long* If any power was covetous 
eiK)Ugh to malce the attempt, all the others would combine to 
prevent tSiis to trounce the intruder^ 32iis mutual rivalry 
would in itself be ttie surest guarantee against an attack on 
India/^  But tSie West might be checkmated by the Soviet Onion 
if India entered Into an alliance ^ lUi the United States or 
16« 
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even Britaiuj even against Ciiina, for the primary concern of the 
3& 
Soviet Ooion has always been to prevent the growth of Western 
influence in these countries, if it x could not increase its 
ovn« But this is possible, in so far as India is concerned, 
only when it io prepared to do laore than remain neutral, in 
the event of a massive Chinese thrust against Xndia, for, India 
does not possess the strength to withstand it, nor would it be 
able to do it for a long time to come, without outside assis-
tance, which could come only from ^ e West if it did not come 
from the Soviet Union* Obviously, the Soviet Union appears to 
have fulfilled this requirement in 1962, at least, in a partial 
36 way* 
Ihis explains the ma^or plank of India*s defence policy, 
and indeed, of all the nonaligned nations* liiere has always 
been a tacit dependence upon the world balanee-.^ f-power and 
37 38 
great power support in times of crisis, Panikkar has written 
that India's Honaiignment "does not mean that in case she is 
acttmlly attacked she would not accept assistance from others* 
35, See above, chapter, II, n»@6* 
36* See Met^ ru«8.,Speechest 1957-1963, op*cit,,pp»246-246. In 1966 Soviet Union moved away from its traditional policy 
of support to India on Kashmir and thus appears to have 
fulfilled this re<iuirQment beteveen India and Pakistan, 
37. See Cecil V,Crabb Jr., Cgysg^  I A .SVviAr Qt m m M m m % $ (Frederick A.Praeger, N*X.,1966), pp.30-33 for a good discussion of this aspect of Nonallgn»-ment. 
38. K.H. Panikkar, op.cit., pp. 128*129. 
Ko country has ever held sucsh a view. Faced with Najji aggre-
ssion, Britain and France laid for Soviet support, ^ m Hitler 
attacked the Soviet Union, Moscow welcomed the help of America 
and. the Vie stern allies* That is different from basing one*© 
defence policy on support from stronger powers, or taking 
shelter betoind the strength of otSiers." 
This is vhat Hehru seems to have had in mind ^ hen he 
39 
told the Indian Pariia©«it on Koveiaber 27, 1969, l^ at s ^'tEh© 
policy of non-alignment and of having friendly relations Is, 
I believe, basically a right policy under all circumstances* 
But if t»o countries fall out and, in ttoe extreme instance, go 
to war, obviously that policy does not apply to tiiem, Itr 
peace is t^ -oken, we deal with the situation in so far as we 
c^* ISie policy remains good all the same and it applies to 
the rest of tiie world, and later, to that part of the world too, 
because war is not a pem^ent phenomenon*" 
Paradoxical as it might appear, this is what Honalignment 
means, both in theory and in practice* Explaining his reasons 
for rejecting the Baghdad Pact and the British protection, 
40 
Nasser said in 19S8 i "On February 20, 196£, I met iir^ Eden, 
the British Premier in Cairo* At that time the British Foreign 
39* Nehru, op«cit*, pp« 36^366* 
40* See liasser Vs Speeqh^ ^^  1968, op.cit*, p. 236, 
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Secretaa^ y was promping the cause of the Baghdad Pact in the 
Middie East I said we could defend ourselves, that in 
the ease of Soviet aggression we would have recourse to the 
Western Powersj and ^at we would ask for the help of the 
Soviet Union if we are attacked by the Western Powers 
41 
It has already been Indicated that India's association witii 
the Coaaaonwealth and the United Arab Bepublic's treaty with 
Britain, both meant the tacit acceptance of British help in 
the event of an attack* !I!hus, if N^ru had refused to commit 
himself in advance for the acceptance of aid from the West, 
it does not seem correct Co think that either he, or the Govern. 42 
ment of India, treated Nonalignm«it as a 'fetish' or a moral 
principle, for the simple reason that the mommt it was evident 
that the Oiinese attack was a massive aggression, he appealed 
to aH powers for help which came immediately from the west and 
also belatedly from the Soviet Unions Vihat is important is 
not that th© Soviet Union was slow to respond, but that it 
did respond in a positive way., Hence Nehru was quite justified 
in holding t^ sit the abandonment of Konalignment would be a 
"moral failure", not so much because it was a moral principle, 
but because it proved valid and stood justified, in its ma^ Jor 
assumptions regardii^ iadia's defence and security. Even today 
India can not be conquered W C&ina and it knows this well. 
41* See above, chapter 11, p. jgi,^  
42. See il.S.Ra;isn, ^ Chinese Aggression And !Ehe Future of 
Nonaiignjisent', op.cit*, p* 128. 
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mis does not mean that Ciilna»s advance into Uadian 
terpitoiy in 1962 was not a loss for India, It is very much 
so* But it vould not be easy for China to loaJne similar gains 
in future, unless the Government of India and its defence forces 
commit same mistake again, tiiat of not anticipating the 
43 Chijaese attack vhich Nehru himself admitted. 
It is, however, difficult to understand how the Govern-
ment of In<iia failed to anticipate' tiie Chinese attack* Even 
if the military intolligeac© primitive, as the HEFA inquiry 
44 
revealed, and failed to perform the most elementary function 
of as-certaining the military preparations of China for a 
massive attack on a Ijorder spreading over some 2,000 miles, 
it should not have heen difficult to anticipate liie attack* 
It appears to me, that any one ^ lith a little knowledge of the 
Chinese behaviour could have forese®a that China was likely to 
expJ^it the extremely delicate international situation existing 4S in October 1962, as it did in I960, when it occupied Tibet* 
43. See Mehru«s Speeches^  1957-1963, op*clt,, pp.237»238. 
See i:.t,aen.B,M*Kaul, m e United Storv^  (Allied Publishers 
Bombay 1967), pp»17B-549, for interesting facts relating 
to the HimalaysBi tragedy, Kaul claims that he had predic-
ted the Chinese attack, early in 1962 and had told Ambassa-
dor Bowles about it$ \wo promised to do his best to per-
suade Kennedy to help India (pp»341-342), 
44. See Shird Series, Fifth Session, ?ol.X3^2 Septembei 
1963, cols. 3849-61 for Defence l^ linister Chavan's state-
ment placing a s\aamary statement of ttie inquiry which has 
not been published. For tifie text see A#G#Noorani, Oi^ r 
•teeatail^ y. m ^ (Ramdas G.Bhatkal, Bombay, 1963), 
Appendix 3, 
46» See below, p. i83» 
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It is difficult to say J for want of any liiformation, If the 
Foreign Idlnistry and the Defence Ministry had ta&en proper 
steps to under {Stand Oiinese behaviour and tactics. 
But was this tkie real reason for Vae debacle? It does 
not appear to be so* Hie then Defence Minister, Krishna Menon, 
has recently said that Hie acceptance of military aid from 
the United States after the Chinese attack was a catastrophic 
change from Honalignment, It is, th^efore, possible to con-
clude that h© was opposed to such a move and might have advised 
Hehru accordingly. It is difficult to believe that Nehru him-
self believed that the acceptance of military aid would comp-
romise Nonalignment, for tiiere v?as hardly a nonaligned state 
which had not done it at one time or the other. If he really 
believed in it he was wrong. It is true that Hehru himself 
vas always reluctant to accept foreign military aid. But he 
would hardly have failed to see IJxe need for it had be realised 
the magnitude of the Chinese preparations* It is difficult to 
say whether Kenon also believed that it i?as the sine qua. no;a 
for averting Sae Chinese attack. Or was he afraid that the 
accept^ce of the. Chinese tshreat would bring pressure on the 
Government of India to seek milit^y aid from the United States 
which he was not prepared to accept? Did he, tjy any chance, 
46. See above. Chapter II, n.l63« 
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forgea a <ieiaaa<5 for his o^n resignation and, an ®adl to his 
political earner? After all| ho is an Jntelligent and shrewd 
person* 
It wowld appear, from hindsight at leaet, that it would 
not have been difficult to prevent the attack^  if liie Chinese 
intentions ^ ere revealed to the iiorld projaptlyt Even if ttoe 
attack came neither the axss^  nor the world at large woul4l have 
been t^en surprise* At least the nonaligned nations could 
perhaps have been taken into eonfidence» As the whole diploBK 
atic practice is shrowded in secrecy, it is difficult to say 
anytfeii^  defiiaite vhethor or not any of these steps were taken 
and ¥ith vhat results. 
But the entire approach of the Government of India to 
China> in so fsa? as it can be understood from Nehru's speeches 
appears to have been one of reluctance to take up fee Chinese 
challenge, because of their weakness, and perhaps because of 
their approach to the defence of India» In a typical statement 
47 
Nehru told the Parliament of India on December 9, "In 
the early ye sirs of the Chinese Republic ^ Mr* l^ikkar was our 
Ambassador I read through his notes on the subject and 
our notes to him and our decisions* From the very first *day 
47* Hehruf 0p#cit.jpt377t According to V«K#Krishna Menon's Biographer, Nehru and lienon x/ere prepared to lease the Aksai Oiin sali^t to China See J*S.George, op.cit,, pp, 26&.266. It was also reported that Chou En»Lai was prepared to recognise the Mcl4ahon Line in return for the Aksai Chin Road • See A.G.Noorani, op*cit*, pp* 139^ 140* 
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tills problem about our frontier before us* Itoe question 
was whether we should raise it ia an acute form at that stage, 
We decided not to do we felt that wo should hold our 
position and th.at the lapse of time ^ d events would confirm 
ity and by ttie time the cihallenge came vq would be in a: much 
stronger j^sition to face Till such time n^ru wanted 
to keep China at bay tSirough tSie Panch Sheel as shall be 
explained later* One v/ould havej therefor©! expected ttie Gov©-
rniaent of India to be more vigilant and not lessj for it was 
natural to expi^ t^  ,' that China would like to settle ttoe issue 
before India was "in a imdfci stronger position to face lt»" It 
was also natural that China did not allow the issue to lapse 
into insignificance^ It did not fall into the trap which the 
Governm^t of India laid for it. 
ja^ minfi, ,0^,, ^Qftaignaffltt 
Jii fairness to Kdbru and Henon, it has to be mentioned 
that there fflj.ght have been another reason for their reluctance 
to face the Chinese challenge which the^  could have done, Ijy 
a more judicious and intelUgent use of Honalignment, And thl^ 
J, P. , 1?Q„ * For^  the Nonailgnaent of a 
newly independent nation, means, more 14ian anything else, a 
desire on its part^  to stand on its own legs, as far as possl-
blei and to build its future in its own way with tiie assistance 
and laider the protection of fs^lendly powers, especially big 
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Powers* Nataju?ai;Ly it opposes and sometimes even rejects this 
48 
assistance and protectloai l£ conditions ^ ere attached to it« 
It did not want the cold way pacts because these involved fir© 
eoJKiiaitasents to one side or tiie other which were not always in 
its iaterestsi Alliances were not considered safe iMCause they 
wo«ld su&ordinate t2ie interests of a country to those of the 49 big partners in the alliance, as iaaglaad and France Ic^mt in 
19^, and, Fakist^ in China»s spUt witfa the Soviet 60 61 Union reflects tSiis fact, no less than Frances, with tiie United 
62 
States* Saiis N^ jhru said in Parliament in 1969 1 "51iere is one 
fact which ffiight be remembered when people think sometimes of 
obtaining outside aid, probably imagine tiiat in cy conceit 
I say that I will not t^e outsldo aid. I certainly have a 
little conceit about Jadla*s standing on its own legs. I cannot, 
however, say what we may do in an eventuality. But I do not 
want this idea to get into our people that others will help us 
and preserve our freedom. I do not want India to go on crutches, 
tt 
48. See isf^ ruf op*elt#f p. 63. 
49r See Nehru, op.elt*, p. 89. 
60* See Richard I^wenthal, op.cit., Preface, P.VIII and jKlaus 
Hehaert, op.clt., pp. 398-402. 
61.- See tor'Suez Seen from Paris*, Eastern Economist (August 
17, 1966pp. S41»a4g for a remarkably accurate fore-
cast* of the things to come.* 
52. Nehru, op.cit., p. 379. 
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In tshe sam@ way, Nasser said in 1958 that| "wa wanted 
the defence of the area to emanate from the will of the Arab 
people and from ttieir land and not froa tiie will of any foreign 
colonialist power," And further that "when we asked Britain 
for arxBS to be able to resist aggression, to resist Israel 
which was gettijog arms from France and other western powers, 
Britain imposed conditions on us* She made it a condition that 
we should not attack the Baghdad met, nor oppose the pact, 
and asked as a price for those arms tiiat we join or condone 
these pacts that surround us and tiireaten our safety* our very 
existence." ISjat Nasser was not far froia the truth beeaioQ 
evident during the Suez Crisis in 1966. 
P^haps it was some such consideration that stood In 
the of Ueferu in comaitting the Government to accept Western 
help in the event of a major Chinese aggression* the United 
States* insistence on a solution of t^ e Kashmir problem in titie 
wake of tSie Chinese s^gression might have been Quite an expected 
move* Both Neliru and Menon might not have liked it at all. 
However, in the true spirit of Wonalignment Nehru had long ago 
• 
proceeded to lay the foundations of a self sufficient defmce 
force for India in all spheres. As he told "toe Indian Parlia-
ment on December 8, 1969t 
63* See I^g^gy'p 1958, op.cit.,pp*60 & 182. 64* Nehru, op.cit., pp*371-372* See K.M.Panikkar, op.cit., 
tot an account of the defence preparations of India in all spheres* panikkar admits that India's preparations were not meant tor the defence of India single handed in case of a 
Contd* • • • • 
w 1G6 « 
"If any hoa.Member thlGks that w© baa Ignored the 
question of defence In our aithuslasm for t2ie 
pan^ tiiea I ^ ould sutoit tbat h© is mis-
taken ISae basic factor in defence is the 
industrial grovtii of the country, and all tb© 
armies in the v>orld wittiout an Industrial back-
ground cannot function adequately. Our Five Years 
Plans built up ttiis industrial background* As 
the House %/ell knovis, in the last fes yearS|iBore 
especially since i^ e Second Five Year Plan came 
into beingf great stress has been laid on the 
foundations of basic industries and heavy indus-
tries in the country* It is on tiiem that defence 
can ultimately rest «•«*« they ••*«. mt only 
provide the wher%^ithali for defence •••••(but) 
are supposed to r^ise the ecommy of a country 
to higher levels, thereby putting the people in 
a stronger position to meet any ea^rgencies that 
they might have to face. 
"A country does not normally go about talMng 
of the steps it takes for defence* our stress, in 
particular, has been on peace and ¥iii continue to 
oe on peaccf but that does not' aean any kind of 
forgetllilness of the, country's basic requirements 
in regard to defence Both for guns and butter 
we have to lay, as rapidly and as firmly as we can, 
the foundations of heavy industry.**..*' 
Besides this accent on the development of heavy Industry, 
Hehru, Nasser, likrumah, Sukarno, an^ lito have all been Socia-
lists. they an favovred some form of State Socialism, ©ley 
were apprehensive of getting aid fi-om the Western countries, 
especially, the United States, in fall measure, mless they 
accepted some form of capitalism, if not otiier comaitmeats, !Bie 
(Continued from previoiis page) 
ma^or waa? (p,108)# Also see Supra^  Chapter 2,n.77. I«any 
responsible ys officials and scholars consider this self-
reliance in defence as ISie greatest asset of India- See 
Cecil V.crabb jr.,American Foreign Baliev in fhe N^elear 
MSi Second Edition (Harper & Row,New York, 1966),pp.323^ 
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only other country that couid give them ecoaomlc aid in a big 
way the Soviet Union. Even if aid was forthcomliig from 
66 
on© side only, Udiru said it was not "a wise policy to put 
all yois? eggs in one basket* Nor should one get help at the 
cost of one»s self-respect." Md Honalignment %fould give this 
freedom of choice to take aid from wherever one liked while ae 
alignment might restrict it» And as Nehru put it, "we are 
going to have it and going to get it too in large measure," 
inspite of Nonalignment* It was left to Nasser to deioDnstrate 
the wisdom of Nehru's words in some highly dramatic moves in 
57 196S-66. 
iind acceptance of aid from only one bloc, as India had 
SB 
to do, till tiie Soviet Onion came forward with help, coiald be 
dubbed as dependence on, or alliance with, that bloc, l^jr its 
opponents and their sympathisers within the nonaligned country 
itself, l^ay of the nonaligned countries possess extremely 
divergent sections of population creating an acute sense of 
56. Ibid., 
57. See below, Chapter V. 
See Nehru, op.cit., pp.47 & 59. Accepting that India was 
dependi.ng upon the Anglo-American bloc for economic aid, 
Nehru throw a challenge to the Soviet Union to enter the 
field (p. 69). 
• loe-
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disunity• In the words of an Amerloan scholar, "Jtor© than 
any other coaCQivable approach to foreign relations, nonallgn^ 
ment serves to hold these disruptive political forces In check 
and to ffls^e pocsl&lo that degree of political unity which is 
the lalnliaal price for internal stability and national survival. 
For a policy of nonallgnment Is generally acceptable to (or Is, 
at any rate not actively opposed by) the principal, g??oups 
jockeying for po^ e^r and affords some basis for compromise among 
them»" 
Does this mean t^ at Honalignment can not be practised 
W destroying anyone of t^ ese groups, say, the Ck>mmunist Party? 
60 
An Indian scholar has written that " m the domestic sphere it 
means allowing all parties including the Communists, to 
fmotion normally UsA that "Participation in the present 
cold war and military alliances under western auspices is based 
on a philoso|4iy opposed to co^istence consistence both in 
the International and in domestic fields. A government of a 
country, which has a large Communist Party, can successfully 
oppose coexistence only by destroying tise Communist Party at 
69. Cecil V.Crabb Jr., pgia,^  M^p^aal? W . m e op.cit.,K 
6 3 ^ d PsXAgy op.cit, p«320« 
60. See E*PiKarunakaran, ed., op.cit., p. 17. 
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It may J3© easy to argue In tfols way W restricting the 
field of inquiry to only a fm Asian states like India> 
Indonesia, Burjaa, otc* But Honalignment is a world phenomenon 
and the linited Arab Republic follows Honalignaent qtiite succ-
essfully even after crusiilng the Communists in the country. 
a Communist country also foUovs Nonaligrisient and is cort* 
sidered one of the leaders of th© group* 
On the other haadj m© fan of Stikamo from Bower In 
Indonesiai proves that too much freedom for the Ckimmunlst J^ rty 
is not always in the interests of Nonalignm^at, Thus, if the 
Communist Parlgr envoys freedom in Xndlaj it is only because it 
has aotyet so far posed a serious fcreat to the security of the 
nation aad has m t so far come in the of the mrmal func<» 
61 tioning of VciQ goirernment of India. l^ lhenever it exceeded its 
constitutional llmitS| Nehru came down with a very heavy hand 
62 
on it* And Hasser, has crushed it for M)r© or less th© same 
reasons, me unpopularity of the Commuaists in India and the 
United Arab Republic is in no small measure due to the accep-
tance of thejjr Nonalignment by the Soviet tjiion, depriving the 
Communists of their most potent weapon against the ruling elite, 
namely, ^ e charge of their being in the imperialist camp* !0iis 
was Is^  far the greatest domestic gain for the ruling elite from 
eU See rv,P.S.Menon, ftidi^a, i^ id The Cold l^ ar. op.cit.,p.61. 
62. Xbid«| See also o|>»cit., p. 62. 
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their NonallgmsonlJ, for it aepriv©4 the Soviet Union and C2aina 
of an instruaent of interference in t^e internal affairs of 
63 
these nonaligiied statesj as Ktiruahchev realised to his chagrit 
¥hen he attempted to shield the CoflUBVinlsts in Iraq in 1969* 
Tals is hoy the noaaligned states strive to protect 
their security tJgr maintaining a defensive balance of poi'^ er, 
that iSf lay keepiaag aloof from the laajor powers and maintain-
ing correct and friendly relations with them. But the pursuit 
of this defensive balance of povier is not enough, as its 
success depends upon the vorid balance of power. Therefore, 
the maintenance of. the world balance of poweri as far as 
possible^ becomes the second important aspect of Nonallgnment. 
In this sense it is sore or less the same as the traditional 
British policy of balance of power, though it has also a new 
and perhaps jiKjre important elej^nt in it, as will be escplained 
64 below# 
to understand this aspect i^operly, it is necessaiy 
to dismiss| one or tv>o popular but isistaken notions about 
Nonalignment* Ihe first is that Nonalignment is not *neutra* 
lit?-** I3iough this is no more disputed by any one seriously 
63. See above^  Chapter 2, p. 
64. See below, pp. 
Ill 
It still seem© to liold the fiel4 In a different form, Accor-
66 ding to Prof* BrechoTi viiose tflews may toe taken as typical of 
66 
this sohool of v;riter% amons vihom Is also JFayez A.Sijyegh, 
Honaligmasmt* ''is, rather the passive, first stage of neutralism^  
neutralism has in common with nonalignaent an expressed desire 
to remain aloof from bloc conflict* But neutralism goes much 
further, for it inwlves a positive attitude towards i^Q 
conflicts ^ ••t* In ot^er words nonalignment is liie policy guide 
J 
of the neutaraMst state, but neutralism represents an attitude 
and a policy are aaach more activist than nonalignment 
as such* Jndia is the outstanding examj^ e of the neutralist 
state »•«•« In short, neutralism is a contemporary expression 
of the time honoured theme, of neutrality*" 
67 
fo substantiate this analysis^  Eroft Breoher ijrites 
that "From I W to 1960 Delhi's posture v>as strJltingly similar 
to classical neutrality, with the frequent expression of hope 
t3iat andia could remain outside a war, should it occur. After 
the iferean war, however, tiier© was a realisation that non^ 
belligerency or neutrality were not sufficient. And so India 
moved to ^ e second stage-an open rejection of the leadership 
of both blocs but still passive in its orientations that is ; 
66* Mm. op*cit, pp. 11U112. 
664 See ffiC JsafeaU^, Cit*fp.4« 
67* M m ^ p. 113. 
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Konalignment. In the early fifties India iooved to the third 
stags«a positive role in 'fr/orid politics and attempts to alle-
viate tensions with the ultimate purpose of avoiding a global 
eonflict, in the belief l^ iat this was the ^aa a m of India 
remaining free from war. Hehru most recently has gone 
beyond neutralism because of its verbal associations and called 
this a *Positive Policy for Peace**" 
It is submitted that this analysis of Jionalignment in 
theory as well as practice by Prof*- - Brecher, is not in accord 
witii facts, as will be shovn belov, if not also faulty in its 
logic \^ ?hich, howeveri is not eacamined here, 
68 
Firstly, as indicated earlier, Nehru, and for tiiat 
matter, all m^naligned leaders, have alt^ ays denied that tiieir 
policy is neutrality or neutralism* Hehru also did not accept 
•Positive neutralism*, t;hile the Arabs seem to dislike 
alignment*, tSie least objectionable word for Nehru appears 
to have been Nonalignment, though by no means satisfactoiy*. 
Nasser uses both the vords, viz*, Positive neutralism and rion-
alignmont simultaneously, thus indicating no particular pre-69 ference for oittier. 
68* See above, Chapter I, pp. 33-34. 
60. ©lis is the impression one gathers from a study of 
Speeches published in English sffinually by the UAE Govern-
ment, 
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70 Secondly, as Mehru himself pointed out, "Neutrality as 
a policy has little aeanlng except in times of war. If you 
think there iJ5 a cold war to-day» we are certainly neutral*" 
The cold war is no war in any sense of the word» It is not 
even an ideological war. It is a struggle for power, more 
than anything else. 
!l3iirdl,yy there was no desire, at least in Jndia, to 
71 
stay aloof from war. Nehru told the Constituent AssemWy of 
India in December 1947 itsfelfi ^^ We have proclaimed during 
this past year that we will not attach ourselves to any 
particular, group. 2hat has nothing to do with neutralilgr 
or passivity or anything else. If there is a big war, there 
is no particular reason why we should ^ ump into it. Never-
theless it is a little difficult now a days in world wars to 
be neutral we are not going to join a war if we can 
help it. liQ "tonnAftte M.to Q M ' 
ia^m^t .Vh^ U tl^Q n^te to /^e .cfaoli^ * ^ere the 
matter ends." 
No doubt, Nehru had not ruled out, in theory at least, 
the possibility of India opting for neutralily in the event 
of war« But that does not seem to make Nonaligziyment the 
passive first stage of neutralism, whatever tSiat may mean. On 
70. NehrUj op.cit., p. S8. 
71« j;^) p* (Italics are mine). 
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t&e other hand^ what It seems to prove, Is that the question 
of aeutraltt^ ^ does not arise till there is a war, t&at is » 
tUl Nonaligaaent Itself fails. For, the first concern of 
WonaHgnmeat is the avoiding of war, which can bc^  no stretch 
of imagination be called a desire to keep aloof from var. 
la fact| however, Nehru ha4 ruled out the possibility 
of India reiRaining neutral in t^ e evait of war, because, it 
is difficult to do so• That was the lesson which the Americana 
learnt, to their disapjKjintaient, in the I and II tf^orld v;ars. 
Furtfeer, it is not easy to remain neutral unless both the 
sides recognise it* ^dia did not sifi^ pl^  possess the st^ mgtin 
to safeguard its neutralitgr, say against an advance W China, 
in the event of a war between the iJaited States and the 
Soviet iMion. As fee first Seeretary-General of the idinistry 
72 
of BxtornaJ. Affairs, Government of ^dia, G«S#Bajpai has 
written, ^ 'moral str®igth is not enough, either to prevent 
a collision between them or even to |»rotect a neutral's 
n«.utrali"^ »" And "tane greater the strategic importance of a 
countj^ because of its geography and resoiff'ces, the greater 73 
the threat ix> its neutrality in a world conflict,*' Sie two 
thrusts that China had mad© towards Mdia, the first in 1960, 
72f «India and "The Balance of Power*, She Indian Year Book 
gjC .iflteaaUgA^l A m ^ m tBSSf pp. 
73, Ibid. 
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and J the second In 1962, ara of signirioance here, 
liarLfXlimmBXLt as Balancijag Process t 
®ius tl:ie first concern of iadia has been to avoid a 
major conflict between the Great Bowers, for its own security 
74 
as much as for world peace* As K^ru put it s supreme 
question that one has to face to^ ay in the world is, how can 
we avoid a world war?" 
7S 
Ab indicated earlier in this chapter, Hehru said that 
only way to avoid conflicts is to accept things jaore or 
less as they are# No doubt laany things require to be changed, 
but you must not think of chs^ging thea by war Further 
by enlarging the area of peace, tiiat is of countries which 
are not aligned to tiiis groi© or laiat but which are fridndly 
to botti, you reduce the chance of war*" 
What did Nehru laean by the aoceptance of "things laore 
or less as tliey are(?" It meant the acceptance of the balance 
of power in the world, especially between the Big powers. At 
76 
the Belgrade Conference he saidi "Sie whole framework of the 
OS, ever since it was formed fifteen years e^o, was recognition 
of the balance of power in the world 2his has to be 
74. Vol.II, part II, 8 Harch, 1949, p.1236. 
7&» See above p. 88. 
112-113. 76. Belgrade Report* OP,cit.PP./ And Documents for 1961,^>617. 
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elearly vaid.©rstoo<i for a proper mderslandiag of Nonalignment. 
The acceptance of tilings as they are meant tiie acceptance of 
the pot/er position of the ti'/o major antagonists in the cold 
war, both in isia and Europe* This position should not be 
changed l3!y wax* for it x-^ ould mean a world conflict and hence any 
such attempt jihould be nipped in the bud, as/ far as possible, 
7? 
if necessaiy by force, Biis is possible only when a state 
or group of states, is in a position to act as a bai,aacer ixi 
a conflict between two sides and is free from commitmmts to 
either side, so that it can shift its weight from one side to 
the other, as tiie occasion demanded, Ihis, it will be seen 
in ^ e next chapter, was what India attempted in the Korean 
crisis, Shis is the real meaning of the policy of "pursuit 
of peace not through alignment with any ma^or groiQ) of power 
but through an independ«it approach to each controversial or 
disputed issue*.. 
2he fact that the Korean crisis was the first occasion 
for India to play the role of a balancer does not seem to 
prove that this was Si sudden shift in Its foreign policy. Nehiu 
had formulated his foreign policy as a complete whole and this 
78 
aspect has been an Integral part of It, as already indicated^ 
The Korean crisis only gave him the first opportunity to test 
166 
77. See below. Chapter I? pp*16a«./for the Government of India»s slatemmt and Hehru's statement on North Korean aggression on South Korea, in June I960. 
78. See above, p. 82, 
- 11? ^  
his policy and its assuagjtions. Svea before the Korean oriels 
Hehru had saidji "I feel that India can play a big part, and 
may he an effective part> in helping to avoid var. Therefore, 
it becomes all the aiore necessary that India should not be 
lined up with ,any group of Powers which for various reasons 
are full of fear of war and preparing for war. ISiat is the 
fliain approach of our policy," 
80 
Again, in the same speeoh he had salds 'Hve have stated 
repeatedly that our foreign policy is one of keeping aloof 
froffl ISie big blocs of nations-rival blocs-and being friendly 
to all countries and not becoming entangled in any alliances 
military or o1:her that might drag us into any possible conflict. 
• ••••If by chsince we align ourselves definitely with one group, 
we m ^ perhapjs from one point of view do some good, but I have 
not the shadow of a doubt that from a larger point of view, 
not only of India but of world peace, it will do harm. Because 
then we lose that tremendous vantage ground that we have of 
using such influ€Bice as we possess (aid that influence a Is 
going to groia year to year) in the cause of world peace. 
fhis policy of Nonalignment, it is submitted, is essen~ 
tially the same as the Briti^ policy of «freehand*, both in 
80. M^f P* 1232. 
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its language aa^ terminology an<i Its application. As a British 
Sctiolar®^as written in a reeont study British foreign policy 
"Bie policy of isolation was not one of holding aloof but to 
•avoid needless entangling mgagemnte** The phrase might be 
GXa^^tpa^^a* it meant a free hand^ 
with ^e implication that 12ie hand could applied as required 
by the cardinal principles of British policy." And according 
82 
to Lord Salisbury, the British policy was to keep absolutely 
clear of mtarigleaents and to leave the country free to take 
any action which it might think fit in the event of war,** Biore 
should be no doubt about the similaritsr of this policy with 
Nehru's independent approach to each controversial or disputed 
issue.*' 
The similaritSTi ho\^ ever, does not end there. !Ehe very 
first forajulation of foreign policy by Nehru appears to be 
British inspired in all its aspects. In i;hat is supposed to 
be a clsssic formulation of the cardinal principles of British 
S3 
foreign policy, an English authorilgr had stated that "the 
policy of Britain had to be directed so as to harjuonize with 
the general desires and Ideals cosyson to all mankind 
81* Saul Eose, 'the Foreign Policy of Britain*, Joseph E. 
Black and Kenneth Ihoa^son, ed.,op»cit.fp.30 (Itsaics ar© 
mine)* 
82, cited, p. 27. 
83. «itedj PP» 30-31. 
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England mora thm my other jaoniasular Bower, has a direct 
and positive interest in the maintenaaee of the Independence 
of natlonsi and therefore must he tiie natural eneny of any 
country threatening the independence of others and the natural 
protector of the weaker cooiEiunlties^ " This "analysis", says 
OA 
Saul Rose, "not only repree^ted a typical view of the ti®, 
but by its general acceptance helped to maintain a stereo-
tgrped approach to foreign policy !Ehtis applies wlt& 
e<lual force the approach to foreign policy in fiidia. For, 
in expressing a' 'Epical Mian view, as he has himself claimed 
an Ihdi^ scholar has written that," It so happened tiiat 
many of the policies and actions of the Indian people (e»g., 
opposition to coloniailsa and racialism) x^ ere In harmony with 
the. needs of world socletgr and the general moral values pre-
vailing in ttie world at large*" IScils is of course, the same 
British way of saying "that what is good for the world is good 
for Britain", while tM in reallt^ r it meant *'that what is good 
for Britain is good for toe world," Ihis is how India and the 
other nonali^ned states have been championing the freedom of 
peoples, etc., as already indicated above* 
84* P*^  
85, See H.S.Ra^an, ' op,oi;t« 33. 
Also see above, Chapter I, 
86, See Saul Rose, op.citi, p* 31, 
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This analysis of Nonallgnment wguld not be comploto 
until one or two objections raised against it are exajBine<i» 
Prof» Brecher, for example^  does not accept tUis viewi "Is 
nautralisai aeceiy a teentie^^c^tury variation of the balanc-
ing process? X tiiink not, Bae basic difference is that the 
United Kingdom in the nineteenth centUJ^ had sufficient power 
to prevent ttie outtoeak of warj or, if war broke outj to throw 
its weight into the scales in such a way as to ensure victory 
for one or another of the participants, Xoday no state can be 
a bai^cer in t^e nineteonth ceatury sense simply because the 
gap bet^ Jeen toe pover of the two super»»powers and all others 
is such that the addition of the pover of iadia or anybbdy 
else would not m^e any difference*" 
©lis, .'Ln^ f^fect, is an argument advanced by all tiiose 
88 
who claim that the balance of po^ ;er has become obsolete in 
the post-Second ^ orld Viar era« Ihis objection, to my mind» 
appears to spring from a wrong understanding of the balance of 
power as it ©merged after the Second v^ orld Har, as also of the 
t^pe of role that the nonaligned states can play as balancers* 
87. , M9¥ gtftl^ S M . M M i pp^clU^ pp, 123^122* 
88# See Palmer and Perkins. Internatlon^ Relatlnns s 
i^ orld^  Ck)>miqunity In Transition^  Second Edition, (Scientific 
Book Agency, Calcutta, 1©65), p, 246, See also J,v;.Burton 
op»cit#, pp# 67»68» 
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It w b© true tbat no balancing Is possible in the nineteenth 
oentury sense of the term. But is it not possible to say that 
the type of blanoing necessary in aid twentieth century is 
different from it? Has not the balance of power between the 
two super powers itself ruled out the possibility of a World 
ivar? If such a war broke out there may be precious little 
for the survivors, if ar^ r, to en^ oy the fruits of victory* 
Therefore^  l^ e type of trancing that is required is to prevent 
any local war to become a general war. Is it not possible for 
a nonaligned state, or, a group of them, to play this role in 
the event of a local war, as in Korea or Suez? Are not the 
Big Powers themselves bent upon ending all sudh local wars, as 
far possible, by throwing their weight into the scales behind 
the nonaligned states? 
It Would appear to ae toat the nonaligned states have 
been able to play this kind of balancing, precisely because 
the balance of power was so even, that no great power was 
necessary to tilt it. Moreover, the nonaligned states belonging 
to tdiree contin^ats and representing large populations cannot 
be said to be insignificant, when the Big Bowers want tiieir 
89 support against ea^ other. Hehru clearly stated that *'when 
89. Cited in Survey 1964^  op.cit., p. 286. See in this connec-
tion, Georg Schwarzenberger, *2he Scope For Neutralisms 
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there is a substantial difference in the strength of tiie two 
opposii^ forces, we in Asia, wi^ gAi limitations, v/ill not 
be able to influence the issu©» But when t^ie two opposing 
forces are eirenly matched, then it is possible to make our 
weight felt in. the balance^ " 
It is tiiis kind of role that Nehru selected for himself 
? 
and India, as it ^ as only way in which he could play a 
part in world affairs and carve out a role for Sadia and other 
small states, which would otherwise have to Join this side or 
that, dividing the world into two opposing blocs with no one 
to Control thwm# Thus 13ie very fact that certain states chose 
to reisain aloof from the blocs me^t a check to this dangerous 90 
tren4 towards bipolarity^  Thus Nehru said" I am not conceited 
enough to Imagine that we can control liie fortunes of the world 
or prevent something happening that otaiersise would happen» 
But there can be little doubt that we can occasionally at 
least make a difference. Well, I hope that this country will 
a^e that difference .whoever it has t^ ie chance and ISiat diff-
erence will b© in favour of peace* 
Whenever the super-po^ e^rs are ranged against one another, 
91 as they were in the Cuban-missile Crisis of 1962, there is 
90» C»A«p.yPart II, Volume Vl,Ho.l, 28 November, 1949, p. 10, 
91* See Susan Strange, »Cuba And Af ter>y , Year. Book mvl^ Affairs^ 1963, for one of the earliest st\;^ ies of the Cuban Crisis. 
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nothing that the nonaligned states oan do. Slaiilarly, whenever 
they are togeti^ er against the nonaligned statesf they can not 
€lo mucdit !Chis, as shall toe S€3©n in the concluding chapter, 
is the present chanlloage which the nonallgned states face, 
though it was against this trend that Nonalignment vas first 
evolvedt 
aftd J^q^c.e qX, MHm^ 
93 
There io yet anottier argument tJiiich claims that "There 
are in the fe'^entieth centi^y features wiiicfa make a balance of 
power systeiB quit© inoperative* Itoder balance of power, each 
state ijajst, as a matter of policy, be prepared to declare in 
advice of changed political circumstances its willingness to 
switch its support fro® one state or group of states to another 
regardless of all other reasons. Sucfc a condition would be 
possible only in a world of independent sovereign states having 
no cultural, political or other links with otiier states, and 
being completely Indifferent on grounds other than strategic 
grounds with whoia they had aHiancesj for eQuilibrium to be mean-
ingful, no stiite could place a value on ideology, or any other 
interest, or even developing close relationship with any other 
state, which Biight prejudice its eaejy transfer of strategic 
support as required to c^intain equilibrium.*' 
92^  See below, p. 137-»138» 
93» J»Vi.Burton, op*cit., 
rneif^ ai'e teo aspects to tiii© aygument* One is l^at 
laeology makes the balance of laoperative and the other 
4s that It is m In the twentiotii ©mtury* Biese viens appear 
to b© ejult® contrary to factsj both of tho preset dsi$r ^ orld 
and that of th© past* Id^ alogjT aot seem to hava been the 
msloi* detoriaijaant of foreiga poi^ *^ ? ^ ^ W tiase* ICugoslavlat 
a dosaatmist st&te has not rojaained in l^o Coc^unist blocs* China 
an«i ttie Soviet Uaioa ar© as far apart as anF two states 
could the Soviet Union is perhaps Mich nearer to the 
United 8tatea, at least in ©ertaiQ respects, thfe to Cbina. 
They aight still ooae closer and it ^ oold not be a surprise. 
After allj they were allies during the Second iv'orld V?ar« As 
prof* Panrose has writtmi "It ia easy to find isaiqh continui1?f 
between fee foreign policy of Gaarist Huasia and that of Soviet 
Raasia^, addifig ttiat" it does not folion that ^ ctrinal influx 
ences are thus rendered negligibl0#«»»»!Ehi8 «ae a seconded 
influence, on:ty sustained spofadicaliy over the long period of 
conflieti but it vas important vhere it oecur»d#" 
England did not give all out support to tfee Onitad 
States in "Bi© Korean Crisis and in fiido-China* England fias 
96 perhaps nearer to India in these Is^o crises* ^e United States 
94. See E«F» Penrose, op«cit«fpp* 9*16 for m eachaustiv© study, 
Mthony M m * !Ehe M^ira of m e Rt^Hon-Sly Antfaonv Bdeni 
(Cassell, Loi^n, I960), p. 128. 
ia torn did not suppo^ 't England Fraac© la the Smz war 
97 
in 1966* France has all Imt gone out of Ha to alHance* 331 e 
democratic world could not go to tfc© support of tfae Hungayian 
people against the So"»let Union £ot balance of potser reasons| 
nor could nonaJJ.gn@d India d^ so* Hspal^  supposed to be a 99 
Hindu stat0, la nonallgned bets^ reen India and China* 
Soviet Iftilon did not support d^ina against iidlia* In Arab 
World^ all are not united ©iren against Israeli If not against 100 others* 
Is tails not miough to prow that Ideology has not played 
l^e part It 1b supposed to have played since the Second VJorld 
War? The very fact t^ aat the nonallgaed states refused to tafee 
sides In the cold war was m indication that it vas of m laa^ or 
concern to thejn and that f^ oy would side with anyslde in 
accordance wltli their interests* M this sense, th^ may be 
said to have reactivated the balance of po^er which was supp* 
osed to have becois© Inoperative* 
Fro© the point of View of ideology alsoj India and other 
aonallgned statesf appear to be capaiale of playing the role 
of the balancer in tiie la6t-»West struggle as has bem recognised 
97* See below, Chapter 
m» See below, Chapter 6* 
fhls was Nepal's policy on the Sino-Mian dispute* 
iOO» funlsla and Its President, Bablb Bourguiba, are obvious examples See Petec Biansfleld, op.cit.f p* 79* 
m im ^ 
101. W '^Qstei-u. scfaolars. Acco^ diiig to Coral Bell^ **tliis 
appearis to eoni'ej? upoa tti© aeuti-allsts a role analogoue to 
UiBt of l^almcer in ttk& classical DaiaBce. of power thmry^ 
aot l3©cause q£ UiQi^ milltQS^ streagtia imhXch.y&B slight) but 
ttiej ropreseated a ixjdy of opinion v h o ^ oadorsiKBeat 
might altjtoateJ^  provo deoisivo Cpsyobologically and in varl* 
ous otiiey ways) In a struggle tfeat as Biac^  betweea ti?o 
theories of society as bets^ een tao power i^ stems*" ^coording 
W2 
to Charles H^ Hoiiasatlis "trfithio the fraae o£ refereac© sugg-
ested the ideologieal coiBpetition between the yestesa and 
So'Piet i^stma Mia's position t^ as analogous to Idiat of a 
classic holder ©f the balance of power. Si© possibility of 
coaiEitting its people to one Bystm or t3ie other gained for 
India the capability of influencing the policies of other 
states*'' 
thm Honaligaaient does not seem to provide so »an 
1G3 
alternative gaiae* to taie iJalance of power as it strengthens 
it and prevents it l^om reaching the breaking point* It is 
iOi* Suoray n. 89* 
t02» Of*Cit,| p* 
103* Burton, op^cit*, p* 164* 
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Indeed a respo»s© t^  t&e loadegmaei^s of the bipolar baiaace 
o^.po^^r, rather than of balanc© of power as forj 
there Is notSiijag like a md^X or fixed balaoo© of pover. It 
is soae»tilling is ^nmic emA evm^ ebaagin$ md its 
success se^ ms to depend «poa its flexlbilily* Ag palmer and 
Perkias^ ^^ havo writt^ *'QnOB bipolarity exists, it tmdsjt to 
became rigid as i^ ell as and a peaceful transition 
to a cofiiple3£ ts^ atice one involving maajr states becoxaes 
difficult." Hoaaiigmient was an attempt to replace this 
balance W a cos^lex balance of power in t^ bicb as mans" of the 
ma^or states or groups of states as possible could take part* 
Ihis possible only vihen tfee further polarisation 
of the ?«©rld into tiie blocs was first stopped, especially when 
jsost areas of Asia and Afpica seemed to create what are called 
106 
po^er vacctams due to the rapid decolonisation set into 
motion after tiie Second v/orld i^ ar, viUi the Great Powers intent 
to fill tlio miQQvms* Ihis is what riehru called the creation 
10^ * M*9 
X0&» Op«Cit»i, p« See also E*F» Penrose, op#cit,, pp» 4*9 for a discussion of the nature of balance of pouer* 
For a most authoritati-^ e discussion of this question i^oiJi the point of View of the peace-keeping role of the QK| see Secretary-General, Hammarsk^eold's •Introduction to the /Annual Heport on the vork of tho tSJO * <31 August 
.QSXi^ lOl mggJte, Fifteenth Session, Supplement No« lA CA/4390/Md)# (Here after citei as SlMMQjtM* )* 
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qf a »peae© aroa» in and Africa* 2a^a»s chaxapieni^p 
©f tiie ijaa©p©nde®c© of subjected peoples and tiieir iionallgniaent 
has to b© mderstood from this point of view to see it in the 
prop^ Sf p#rp©ctlv#« championship of Indonesia's firoo-
do® y&s Ifee first jaanifestation of this aspect of his appisaeh 
K>7 to wrld affair®, \sfhiah has been described as •sessianio 108 netttl?alisia» Fw&z in his characteristic st^ rXot 
109 
As Fs^m A.sayegh has eoryectly pointed'out tiiis is 
the mnt imaginatita saad also the aioet luilltant aspect of 
SonaXigniamt* Its, greatest eignificanco lay in the fact that 
it is in line with tbe provisions of the Oiarter of the Ilnited 110 
Natioae, as th^ late Secretary-Generali HaiajBarsk^ eoMj boldly 
and squarely achnoul&dged in 1960^ at t&e height oi* the Congo 
crisis* 55iiB crisis, aa is»lll bo seen in chapter seven $ ^ as 
a great ohaUesge to Honalign&ent and to t^e IJnited nations^ 
as It t&reatened to m&ck bot&# 
Once the l?ipolarlsatlon of the world is stopped it tiill 
be easier to achietfe a jBUltiple balance, in as aaich as it \Jo\ad 
be then easier for -^e siaaller powers, not all of were 
107- See belowp Chapter 4, pp. 
70» saye^'s discussion of this aspect of lionalignfiient is 
tho interesting and useful part of the book* 
1004. Ibid* 
210» JJiJEjat i06* 
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SBall anyway, t© play tiaelr part in -aorld affairAs S»rof» 
111 
Penrose has observed t structure of all balances of 
power before 1014 gave doiatoati^ position to the Great Boilers 
and ei^ oaeiied widely and deeply on tSie Independence of the 
sisailer oomtri@®| not oaly throiagh Colonialism but also 
tisrough all forias of iapea-iallsra*" Even laie Seoiiril^  Council 
had" overlooked the role '^Uim tho sjaail povers play in tii© 
international balance of power," though the CSiarter itself 
had m%% as Iaamari^|eold had interj^ eted itf in his capacity 
of the Secretary-General of the fehether or not ^ is ^ as 
actually sot that was hoi? Hehru looked at tJi© problem trom the 
beginning witb. his fine i?isioa and he set about his task with 
conviotioai sta^ engthened isy similar forces at work In ottier 
parts of Asia and Afrlca# 
112 
Thus he told the Constituent Assembly of India on 
8| 19^0 8 "I should like to deal with the general as^ 
pects of foreign affaire and foreign policy as th^ affect 
^d as ve look at them rather than say much about l^e 
smaller aapeots of main problem* 
"One of t^ e major questions of tod^ is ttie rea4-
lastoait of tfee relatione beti^ een Asia and Europe, 
^en we talk of 4sla| raaember that Ihdlaj not 
because of m ^ s^bitioh but because of circums^ 
tanceSf because of geograf^i because of histo^^ 
111« Op*cit,<» pp« 9 & 201* 
13-2* S M S s p* 1227* 
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and feecamse so imm otfeer ttiJLiigs inevitably, 
has to play a Important part 
now la tHis last jrear or asjre, 
esisrges again, tota rnaAa ts-ead ©f huoaa 
afr£iirs#«.«** 
"•.•••Asia ia me lo»g »ill«3ia of li0r 
has played a wry ii^ porteat part* so 
has iadlai of cours®} feut teing ^ e last two 
hundred years or s©f amtain 4eirelopiaents of 
seim^e md teehnolog^ ia loropof and in Amerioa 
a littl© lat^i l®d to the dominatioa of Asia 
by Europe a ^ to a restriction of her actii?itles 
in thB vorld at large. Sho becaiae confined and 
restricted* Yarioiis charges took place* 1 belieire 
is) a eonsiderahl© recognition of ^es© 
(tangos kit it is not enoiiish yet* Eveaa in 
the cowacils of me mited Nations, t&o probl^ 
of Asiai the outlook of Asia^  t^ e approach of 
Asia have failed to evoke the enthusiasm that 
•mey 
g^sra irnah aore ^ pllcit in 1966 in a speech in tJxe 
113 
tdk SalSiai 
fact of the matter is ^ at in t^e IStfe 
centurys^  a certain not happy eQuilibrlua 
^as establiished in the i^ orld by t^e dosUnance 
of certain ^ opean ^ e r s practically all 
over tShe «orld# ©lat continued till th© begino* 
ing of the First World t^ ar* !aie First t^rld 
war upset that equllihriua in laany ays-political, 
economic* Some caapires vanii^ ed* !&o period 
bets?em the t»o World iv'ars intervened, a troubled 
period, a difficult one* Always an attempt has 
been find ^ me eftuililo'ium and it has 
been a failure. "Qie Second i.'orld isar cam© and 
upset tile old 19tfe century balances still more* 
Ever since then, world has been groping 
about to find some equilitarium* J^anwhile, 
apart fii'om ^ e eiasrgence of these great giants, 
America at^ the Soviet Obion, in terms of mate* 
rial powerj this atiwalc ^ ergy comes i»-another 
upsetting factor* 
113* See J^t II, Volume III, Ho*32, 20 March 1966, 
cols* 3730*3731* 
"SMI ow 
posiU©ja ia ttot emtar^ s#tmii, aany of 
hove their position* It is not 
iQt mea to ttiamselves to tSie jaew 
iiigi til© mm feslaae^s ia ttie ^orld, the new 
balmees * apart t^m giants eoniiiig up and 
tbe urn in Asia aiii ABim eouatri^s 
bsediai^-ladep^eat ia tiiei? differeat 
it is In^ is Cliinai oj? Ia<3oa#sia or Borjoa 
or o^er ftie o M MXanees go on being 
mrg visa Qov&^mmts 
not ©asil^ r kmp faoe ^os© praetieal 
Of eours© fiast reaajfeaiae. 
faet ai?out ttds oi mm^mmsp jjroper aw^* 
ii#sS| (is) that a great eomtrr like Qiiaa is 
©f eottrs# m&y knoy it» Hover tlieloss th^ y 
to laek or oth#r@isei t^eir 
goli^ I'joijid he ditt&^mU 
l(tis liot ffi^ojy a fueetioa of Cbiaa» 
It is a question of taa«i owtlook on ail 
probi^s or African pro^l^s tho ide& 
t&at| as pr^ viousaor Usey feave to tm settled W 
great pollers ^lao® we all rospeot, iiardljr 
takijig what tli© countries of Asia 
might f@3l atiout 
"So mis Itiad of diffiottll^  is ik&te aad 
tmtB md ot^ts have g©»0 oai terioging alaout 
mm^mms i^msg^B mA miii4 of mm oan 
not keep pao©i mwi it kmp6 ia old ruts**..** 
Wo ^ mdm:" Metffvi had b^eoae sucsli a tireless ehaapioa 
of plaoe ia Gjjited Sationst fhat was th© first 
st^p for iiiiB towsr<l^  Itie reeognitioo of Asiso resurgeaoe and 
also to^ jards ©irolution of a multiple bailee of povor, for 
Oliina is a power in its o m rigiit and ono vliioh oofild 
TJi® greatest signifioanc© of Nonalignment perhaps li$o 
ia ttie faet it am^uneed me desir© of i^ ie Asian and 
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Africiai states to «sit©r tii© "balance of po^ ei? struggle in 
theJ^  ovn rigfet*" Hot all tliQ Af3?o-Aslaa states iiad the goog-
314 
radical md other advantages to realise tails aim^  It was» 
laaerefore, flttii^ t^at tfcose had tlie advantage toc^ tti© 
lead* It was not till the rise o£ Kasser la to potier that the 
Arabs cajiild Jola this strusgle la their own rlghtf as i^ all be 
seen ixx the fif^ ebaj>tey# 
lU 
fhugj m^^B of onoe faiaous Sukarno of 
Indonesia" Honalignaent does not m m becoming a buffer state 
bet^em t»o giant bloc&# SonaUgnment is active association 
In ISie cause of independence abiding peace, social justice and 
freedom to be free striving for the spee<^ sr estab-
lishmeat of a nm etjuilibrliuas* Miat do mean bif a new stable 
e^ uillbrius)(? It means all nations aust become independent* All 
nations oust Jiave freedom to be free, freedois to live their 
national Uvea la accordance witii ttieir own wishes, freedom to 
build their o m national foundations, political, economic and 
cultural* mean that all nations must be free to arrange 
International relations as they see fit, based upon principles 
of eQualitar, justice and laitual benefit* We mean ttiat no power 
shall interfere m the struggle of another nation* Ho power 
114. Sae Nehru's speech to ^ e Indian Council of world Affairs, 
6 Apriij 1960, cited in Surveyy i m , op,cit,, p*431. 
sae i.fiigi'i^ e .fi^fioy^f op«citt, p. 
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sball attempt to force aijy other i^ atioa to oJaange its ideolugy^^ 
sts-ippefi Qi its mi^ersaliss this d^ sciriptlon of Uon» 
aligaiBont is quit© accB^ate in alX essentiais^  XPonically, 
Stakarao seems to have forgottaa his © m wrds, thus paving tho 
way fo? M e own tlowu fallw 
In coi^ eiusioni it seems necessiary to mantioa t^at since 
eaelJ state, whatlier nonallgnQd oJ? aligned is first of all con-
witii its own seearit^ and oth^ vital interests, there 
are ^ und to b© differences and scmetiises ev^ disagreements 
in the pursuit of Noaalignmeat between one state and anoliieri 
a© has been noted in earlier pages. case studies of the 
Honaligmaont of India, and the United Arab Republic that follow, 
emphasise the siMlarities as veH as differences and disagree** 
aents in the practice of flonaligniseat W t»o of its three . 
acimoi#le^ed leaders* One fact that eiaerges these studies 
is that the differences and disagreeioents have been over details 
rather than over the fandaaeitals of Konaligmneat, on vhieh 
there appears to have been complete agreement and und^stsnding 
betJ^ een Jndia and m e Oaited i^ab Hepiablic, thus forg^ Jilg close 
links of friendship and cooperation between them. 
P A E I II 
C H A P T E R I? 
The primsy of India»e foreign policy has 
boea as show» above the securit/ of the couatry and H^ru 
did m>t hesitate to use force as and i^ hen it siiited the 
purpose* Hothiag illustrates this better than the irery first 
ma^or ^ tion taken Isy the Govermaeat of India in the field 
of foreign relationSf t© save Ka^ir from falling into the 
hands of Pakistan in October 1947# ISie popialari1?y of tfe© 
Governiaent of India and its foreign policy in i^e early days 
of independence appears to have hem based on this ^ pular 
action of ttie Goverafflent of IttdiaJ 
llie iiaportance of Kashmir for the security of India 
^as escplained by Mehru in a speech to the Ck>nstitmdnt Assembly 
on November 19475 "Kashmir because of its geogra^ical 
positions ^ ith its frontiers with three countries namely the 
Soviet IMion, China, and Afghanistan is intimateay connected 
i^ ith the seeiarity and international contacts of Indian Bcono-
aicaHy also Kashmir is intiaately related to lhdla» aihe 
Caravan trade routes jEToia Central Asia to India pass thiough 
See KtP#Earmakaran, India In V/orld Affair^ r 19SfV53 (Calcuttai l®i8>, p* 166* 
2* Nehru, op»cit., p. 443* 
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Sr 
the Kashiatr State**' V«P»Heaon| who played m important part 
in obtalnijag accession f^ oja ttoe Mafearaja ot Kashmir has 
written 4 ' 
»'PQrsojiall^ , whon I recoiameaded to th© Sovernment 
of Iiidia aco®ptaac« of the accession of the 
of Kashiiiir, I had in iai»d one conaide;}^ 
Uoa aad ©n© considoration alone, vlz^  tdiat th© 
invaoioa of Kashmir the raiders was a great 
threat to the Integrity of Ihdia* Ever siwce 
tSie time of Jiahmd Ghaaaavi, that is to say for 
m m 2 j eight ceataries, with feut a brief irtter-
val during ^e ^^ iDghul Epoch^  India had been sub. 
^ected to periodical invasions from the nortfawest# 
Ghamavi had led no less than Bmymtmn of 
these incursions in person* vSnd i^ ithin less tiian 
tm weeks of the establishaent of the new State 
of i^kistmi its wry first act was to let loose 
a tribal inifasion ferou^ the northwest, Srinagar 
today, Delhi toiaorrov* A nation tot forgets its 
history or its geograj^ does so at its peril,® 
Biat 1-1 as Why «ie sovernm^it of mdia decided to soad 
4 forces into Kashmir and then insisted on tiie accession of 
Kashmir to M i a before aid could be smt to it* Hehru, how-
& ever^  claimed later tSaatj 
Government of India had been a continuing body 
through the changes in India's Constitutional status^  
When India became a republic sometime after power 
had been transf^red to Indian hands, the new Govern-
ffi^t inherited not only the liabilities and duties 
ptates^ iorlmt Longman's Ltd#, 1961 Panikkai 
op*cit*) pp. 09*40 also subscribed to ISxis view* 
4* See above pp. ^ ^  gg^ 
6. Nehrus op.cit., p. 467. 
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of th© old Goi?e3?iiment tmt also Its assets and 
its rlgiits* After all, ^J© continued to b© a 
member of th© United nations without a fresh 
©l-eetion, Siiailarly it vms as much our right 
m it waa our responsibility^  to protect not 
the States whic^ had accoded to India 
hut also those vhioh had not aoceded to ?akis» 
tan# even if Kashmir had not acceded 
to India* irfe should have still heen obliged to 
protect the people of Kashiair against aggre» 
ssion» Kashmir had at no ti»© been recognised 
as/ a sovereign State under international law. 
It has alwagrs been considered part of India* 
partiIJ^ on made no difference to our responsi-
bilities in Kashffiir as long as it had not 
acceded to Pakistsa**' 
One "i^ottld havei therefore, expected the Government of 
Jtoiia to act iimediateay and to go to tfc© help of the people 
of Kashmir* But the fact tSiat th^ had accepted, instead, 
6 
MBuntbatten's advice tfaat forcea shotad be sent only after 
obtajaing the accession from the jfc^ araja, whi^ Mowitbatten 
hiiaself If/as not prepared to accept as finals suggests that 
their first concern was to obtain the acsiession of the state* 
Perhaps a great deal of loss of life and property could have 
been prevented if ^ e Government of India had sent foi^ ces mch 7 
earlier into Kashair* Ihe Maharaja's letter addressed to the 
Crovemiaent of India at the tiae of t^e accession aa^es it 
clear that he had signed t^ e Inst^um^t of Accession since aid 
could coiae onl^ after the accession of the state* Sheikh g 
Abdullah had also made a similar staten^nt at the time* 
6, See V*P*Henoat op*cit*, p, 381* 
7* Govei^ent of India, Whjtg jp^ pgr fljft ^msU .KafihfflUry pp* 
8* ipifr^ , n.21j p» 124* 
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©lis conclusion Is fwther streagt&^e<l by the fact 
feat ttie Goverim^at of had not thouslit it proper, diiring 
those ttiree dinys from October 1947, whsa the Iribal 
invasion of KashMr was lamched, to October 27, 1947, whea 
the iidiaa ariay vas fXova into Ka^air, to refer tiie matter 
9 to the Gaitdd Nations, as might have been expected of a 
10 
Goveraiaeat mid a leader, who claimed to have faith ia the 
world body* Xhe fact ho'wever, that the Govenmieat of 
India ajB ^ e^ll as Mehru, had a geauiae suspicion of the great 
power maaiaiity in the Securii^ Council o M of a is^ estem 12 ma^orit^ ia the General Assembly* It would not have been Very 
difficult to visualise that in a laatter like Kashmir ^e 
Great fbwers Eight act together and try to impose a solutioa* 
13 
Arthur I»al. has writteni "If the arraagemeats eavisaged 
ia Oiapters and Vii, of the Charter had vorked smoothly, 
it is possible that l&e fiats hmded dom tgr the Great Powers 
acting ia concert jiight on oecasioa have been not only onerousp 
but, ia tofias of Asian situations arbi1acaiy#" Indeed tSiis vas 
India*s cosplaiat ag'aiast the Security Couacil«s failure to 
See JosejE^  Korbel, OanRer in Kashmir (Priacetoa Oaiversity 
Press, Princeton, Jerseyt 19M>, pp»79-80* 
10» H^ru, 0p»cit»ip* 461. 
11» See fiossf N»Berk©s and l^iador S.Bedi, op«cit»,pp, a.3. 
Also see below, 
lg« 2his became most pronounced duriag the debates oa tiie 
•Uaitiag For Peace Resolution*- See below, pp« 333-101* 
13. Op.cit*, p» 732* 
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call Pakistan au aggressor in Kasfaiajtr ao^  Its decision to 
14 call f03? a ao.4 to iiold a pleMscit©* 
It was tails fear of Great Power fiats that appears to 
have beea the reason for taae reference of the case to ^e 
16 
Security Co«neil la^ er Chapter ijastead of Chapter 7 of the 
Charter I vfhich calls for enforcemeat action. 2he Sovemaent 
of India had. al^ a^ a^ been op£K>sed to the admission of az^ 16 foafeign forces on soil for obvious reason®* 2his is 
quite clear from the correspondence Nehru had with Iria<|at All 
1? 
Khan of Pakistan* In his telegram on Oec^^her 12, 1947, Nehru 
IB 
saidt have given thought to the question of invltliig the 
HI to advise us in t^e aattei'* Miile we are prepared to 
invite m Observers to come here and advise us as to the 
proposed plebiscite, it is not clear in what other capacity 
mi help can be sought I find Bgrself mable te suggest 
ajay thing beyoad %ihat I have offered already.** in ot^er vords, 
the Governamt of India did not wcuit to give any independent 
role to the UN in Eashairi as proposed by Pakistan's Premier. 
14* KehrUj op.citt, ppt 460| 46&>468 and 4?0» 
MSHK&i n*7, p#77# 
16. Hehru, op. cit#, pp. 
17. Bntxea n.7, pp. 66*73. 
IS. M*P P^  '73. 
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19 ^ofessor ippadorait therefore, does aot somd eon'viiv-
«iag vjiea, iii defence of t^ is aotloa of the Govemaeait of 
Iii<Ua| he sa^s ^ 'that clear p3?eof of Pakistani aggression 
W8B available onl^ soae fo«y mntkn after India referred tiie 
matter to the Securil^ Council and after Pakistan coamltted 
the act of agression*'* On' the other htod, the Government of 
India appear to have been fiai of confidence about the stre-
ngth ©f their msf, legBll^ and otherwise^ for Pakistan had 
sent its military foreee into Kashiair in the of India's 
lailitai:^  aetion* SJie military position also had turned in 
20 favour of £i<3la« Therefore^ it yaB with reluctance that the 
case appears to have been taken to the t&iited Nations, and 
21 
perhaps on the insistence of Gaadhi^i, As Sisir Gupta writesi 
^On both si<3es attitudes had hardened ^ ough and it i«as almost 
chimerical to believe that direct negotiations could succeed. 
And if ^ ey is?ould not there could be only two w s » in India's 
vlew| of solving the proble® of Kashalri to wage a war against 
the counticy ^ h^ich aided ^e Invaders or to ask the «orld to 
brmg its pressure to bear on ^e aggressors* Of this liioited 
choice, Gandhi^l's preference could never be in doubt.** 
i©« Qp«Cit«,^  p* £03* 
20. Hiis la sdaitted by ©very one# M d il^ru's critics base 
their attii«il:s on him on this point* See in this connec* 
tion t,rll«Kaul| "IdeaHsja J^aA Self Interest In Foreign 
Policy % MUmn<M.,. ^nkMi (Vol.4, No* 16, June 
11,196?, Hew Delhi )t p. 0» 
. K i ^ i t e i i ; , ,...k. I a 4l^f t a a , .fi^ i^ l^ffla,,..(Asia Publishing House,Boabay See also V.P.M^aont opfCit«| p. 
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Mot much is known about t^ e actual role of Gandfaiji. 
82 
in t^ iis crisis^  except Nehru's ovn stateaeats to the effect 
that he had accepted the smdiag of forces into Eashmlr* It 
was upon his insistence teat the Government of In^ iia appear to 23 
have agreed to hold a plebiscite in Kashoir* But Gandhi^i 
appears to have been opposed to the idea of a war with 
Pakistan to ll.herate Kashmir* He had begun» on January 13, 
1948t a fast to persu^d Ifet Govemmsat of Jtodia to pw t© 
JP^i»ta» amount (Bs, 4m to it| under the partition 
arrangefflente, which me Governiaent of Sidia had idlthheld lest 
it laight be used against Xsdia In Kashmir* It i^uld appear 
that ttie advocacy of friendly relations %>ith Pakistan along-
i»ith t^is crusade against coiasmnaliam in the Indian society 
that was responsible for his assassination^® vitfein one month 
of the reference of the Ea^imir issue to the Securitsr Council 
W India* fhis was terrible^  and laust have seared the 
Govermaent of India t^rib3^» ^us, JSehru*s later unwilling-
ness to agree to a plebiscit^in EashJai* is quite understanda-
ble* It ^ as from t^ is stage onifards that the Ka^noir issue 
got entangled ^ ith Indians secularleja* 
82» See above chapter If pp* 
83, See &#G«.ilooreiii, pte Kashmir Qaestif^ p <Manaktala*s» 
Bombay, 1964), p« 
24* NehrU} op«cit»9 pp« 
See S«K*Sarva, me Flzht Far Peace i !me Lr^ ne Bnad 
Jsa,.MmmJi (Hardy & Ally (India), Hew Delhi, 1966), p* 
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as 
It ie liowewr Incorreet to olalm that "It was essen-
tiall^ i if not entirely, Brt faith in the ynited 
HatJLona and the pa&ifXc settl^aent of disputes which actuated 
. e 4 I Ijia to ffefea? m© cas© to ^ e 0ttlt©d liatioas**' Similarly, it 
27 
«as not agatE this faitb, ox* aeeerdlag to | "anxiety 
to estafelisla peae© an^ l goo<l seighbourly rdatlons vitfe 
Palcistaii*% that laada th@ Qo^ossmmt of SatUa acc^ p^t tlia 
agreemnt ia tha Chitod Nations* f^imotig other 
^iogs^ there a "^ea:^  iisporti^ t developffient vhich api^ars 
to iiave forsed this aeceesil^ oa It ^ as China. Keiiru 
told Parllaaeat in 1962 Ifeat 'Vust about the time vhea we 
were husjr fighting th® Pakistanis^  l^ e Oiinese oame into 
Tibet* A great power vas next to u^ ^e ss8 that the 
tion has ohac^sd*" 
fo atroid these t^in dangers, one internal and the 
other ext^naif Hehru expressed willingness to partition 
Kashstir between Ihdia and Pakistan and rejected the plebis* 
29 cite as iffipractioajslef as Joseph l^rhel has recorded* 
26« Bee miv Hawaii t 
jBSSSLtoJB* (B©lhi| p#g3# See also 
Jftteag (Manhatan PiihUsher Co« my lorfc, P* 88* 
Sapra n*20« 
28* See op^clU, p. 224. 
29* op*cit.j p, 89* 
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Kastoffilr could ik> JBo3?i3 b© the concern of the 
Qovermietit of JDadjta and Jmdia was In a fairly stjrong posi* 
tlon vis-a-vls Pakistan, fhe Cihinese threat had to he met 
adequately, yhlle not giving in on Kashmir* Mich of the 
Indian foreign policy during 1949 appears to have been aimed 
at ^ is objective* 
(L 
She Chinese challenge was not un$ntici|^ ted« In a 
speech broadcast from New Delhi, six days after the forjnation 
of the ifiterim Government^ Nehru eaidt "China, that mighty 
country with a mighty past, our neighbour has been our friend 
through ttie ages and that friendship i^ ill endure and gi^w* 
We earnestly hope t^at her present troubles «ill end soon 
and a united and deioocratic China will emerge, playing a great 
part in t^e fu|herancd of world peace an<i progress*" 
But very soon Nehru came to realise that the ne^ i China 
vms in no mod to cooperate India# It ^ as not even 
prepared to accept India as an equal* Shis became evident , 
naturally, one might s^, at the &^ sian Relations Conference 
held in New Delhi during March-April 1947, uader Nehru's 
patronage* 2his was t2i© first major attengjt W K^ru to 
assume a sort of leadership of Asia atleast against the 
30* See Nehru, op*cit*, p« 3* 
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European Powers* In his Inaugural address to the Conference, 
31 
Kehru stated! "For too long have we of Asia been petitioners 
in Western courts and Chancelleries* Ihat story must noirf 
belong to tlie pagt» We propose to stand on o W legs and 
cooperate i^ lth all others who are prepared to cooperate with 
us* We do not intend to be the play-ISiings of otiiers. 
"In this crisis in World history, Asia will necess-
arily play a vital role* The countries of Asia can no longer 
be used as i)awns by othersj tiiey are bound to have their own 
policies in world affairs 
Whil€> talis was meant for the Western powers, there 
was also an assertion of India's own place in Asia* Nehru 
32 
saidt '^In this conference and in this work there are no 
leaders and no foUow^s* All countries of Asia have to meet 
together on an equal basis in a common task and mdeavour* 
It is fitting that India should play her part in this new 
phase of Asian development. Apart from the fact that Jjndia 
herself is emerging into freedom and Independence, she is the 
natural centre and focal point of the many forces at work 
in Asia* Geography is a compelling factor, and geographically 
she is so situated as to be the meeting point of Western and 
Northern said Eastern and Soutai-East Asia.»««»® 
31* See op..clt., p.,S4.», 
p. S3* 
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ISais statement vas at oace an assertion of iidia's 
interest in the regions specified and a reminder to the 
Chinese that India did not ^mt to be led tgr anylJody in Asia, 
least of all China, The reaction of China was one of indig-
nation, the sjaall nations of South and South-East Asia were 
33 „ alarmed* As pointed out i^y v^ erner Le^ it "Ihe conference ' 1 
iaarked the apex of Asian solidarity and the beginning of its 
decline. The reasons for this were aianjr and variedj the two 
ma^or sources of discord were the intense rivalry betweea 
India and China in the conference and the common distrust of 
the two Asian giants aunong the smaller t^mtries of the 
region* 
Nehru appear edj howeveri unprepared yet to take up 14io 
challenge posed ty China, for, t^ hen the Chinese delegate 
protested against a map displayed at the conference dias which 
showed fibet as a separate State, Kehru got it removed promp-
36 tly, giving the first evidence of M s future conciliatory 
36 approach to^ a^rds China* 
33. A delegation from Burma is reported to have said that 
"European Capitalism and exploitation may be replaced 
by * brown exploitatito**" And a Ceylon delegate "referred 
to the fear of small countries like CeyloU} 6unna|Halaya, 
Indonesia etc*, that they might be faced with aggression 
not necessarily political but economic and demographiC| 
by their big brothers like China aad India*" id*,pp*73*74, 
34* 0p.eit*,p*21| see also Sisir Gupta, India_And Regional 
fategrat^onyOD.cit*^pp. 36*»37 and G*H*Jansen,op»cit.,pp* 
&1 t2 35* Ibid*, 
36, See G*l.jansen, op*cit«, p* 62, 
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But -when China came into Uibet vhile the Government 
of India were busy fighting in Kashmir, the Chinese threat 
was realised. China had not yet occupied Tibet and the 
Himalayas still presented a good barrier. But tiie fall of 
either Indonesia or Burma into China*s hands might have meant 
37 
a tiireat of the greatest magnitude* India, thereforei became 
involved deeply in the freedom of South East Asia from Colo-
nialism as well as Coaaaunlsm* 2he conference on Indonesia 
convened by India in JanuaiT was tiie first major mani-
festation of Indians involvement in South-East Asia. Bie 
Importance of iadonesia's freedom for India was pointed out 38 
by Nehru when he saidj "If some kind of colonial domination 
continues in Indonesia, if it is permitted to continue, it 
will be a danger to the whole of Asia, it will be a danger 
to us in Iridia." !Qils statement of Hehru has been compared 39 
to the Monroe Doctrine tjy an Indian scholar* vaiat is impor-
tant to note, however, is ^ e fact that ^ e continuance of 
colonialism in Indonesia might have led to a Communist victory 
in Indonesia over Hie nationaULsts* Such a development would 
have been a great danger for India* This appears to have been 
37* It was the period .when the Communists were trying to 
takeover Burma, Malaysia and the fhillipines - " 
38. Nehru, op.cit*, p* 262* 
39. A.K.Srinivasa Mur^, »A Nehru Doctrine For Asia*, Xk^ .fodjm .BQgfe .Q^  XQ^ n^atipr^ al, HS^rs (Volume 2, 1953), p. 126. 
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a veiy importmt consideration with tshe Government of mdlai 
though it was not made public* But in a speech delivered at 
the Indian Goiancil of v^'orld Affairs, on March 22, 1949, Nehru 
40 
appears to have dra\-Jn attention to <4iis aspect when he saidi 
"I have no douht that the countries of Europe and America 
are themselves very much disturbed and distressed tgr what is 
) 
taking place In Indonesia I think th^ realise that 
Indonesian freedom is not only desirable In Itself, but Is 
also desirable in the larger scheme of things which they have 
before them, and if any chance any kind of imperialistic 
domination succeeds In Indonesia it will affect the larger 
plan they haVe for the future* And I realize that the Asian 
nations as a whole will be very much affected..»»«" 
It was about this time that the Government of India 
began to take interest in the civil war in Burma between the 
41 Burmese Government and the Communists* 1!he importance attached 
to the success of the Burmese Government is evident from the 
42 fact t^at««4.**«"apart from flnanclsd assistance, I^ dla had 
40* Nehru, op*Clt., p« 263. 
41« See Karunakar Gupta, op«clt», pp»3@»4o and Slslr Gupta, 
jfldla, A^l^, op*clt», pp, 7&>76 
and K^P.Karunakaran, M Aff^Arg 
op*cit,, pp* 109-111 for details, 
42* See Slslr Gupta, India And Regional Integration 3h Asla^  
op*clt,, p*76* See also'V»K.Slnha, * India And Southeast 
Asia', in A*B*Shah, ed,, Indians Defence and Foreign 
Policies^  Manaktala's, Bombay 1966), p. Ill, 
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also rendered. Mlitary assistance to Burma* There has, how-
ever been no public statement regarding the nature and extent 
of this aid." 
JUid in a speech in the ^ rliament of India on Harch 
l?i 1960| Nehru made a eautious stat^ent on the aid given 
43 - ' • • to Burma! *'33here is Burma, which has seen a great deal of 
internal trouble in the last two or three years and has faced 
enormous difficulties. Naturally our Government and our 
people are interested in the present and future of Burma. 
It is not oui' purpose-»and it is not right for us to inter-
fere in any way with other countries, but wherever , possible, 
we give such help as we can to our friends. We have ventured 
to do so in regard to Burma without any elea^nt of inter* 
« 
ferenc©.*' 
44 Nehru was also reported to have told newsmen that 
"if 
... *.. •''fear on the part of the British and other Governments 
was that if the present conditions continued, otSier elements 
in Burma may begin to play a more important role thal;\ either 
the Karens or t3ie Burmese Governm^t, which tiiey did not want 
them to play." 2he other elements referred to by Nehru were 45 only Communists. As Sisir Gupta has explained t "It was well-
43* N^ru, op.oit., pp. 29S.»293. 
44. Cited in K. P#Karunakaran, op.cit., p. HO. 
India And. Be^lonal Integration In AsiafOP.cit.y p«76. 
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icnown that the aid was largely needed to tide over the 
Commisalst revolt a situation which all tiie newly-freed coun-
tries were facing at this sta|;e#" 
As Nehru pointed out, this aid to Burma vas given with 
the consent of tSie British and other Cominonwealth Governments 
of t&e area. In fact the decision to fight Cotmmiism tfajsjugh 
economic development as well as hy strengthening military 
foroesj was t?jken at the Commonwealth prime Ministers' Con-46 ference at I^ndon in October 1948. It was from this meeting 
3 
that Ihdia's decision to remain in the Commonwealth flowed* 
This decision was taken because Kehru saidj "If we dissoci-
ate ourselves completely from the Commonwealth| then for the 
moment we are completely isolated* cannot remain completely 
isolated| and so Inevitably by stress of c ire urns tances^  we 
have to incline in some direction or other*" Sidia was not 
only isolated economicaiay and politically, but it was weak 
militarily and it was being encircled by enemies or hostile 
nations* This encirclement appeared to be complete, witii the 
first signa of the success of Coim&unists in China and their 
46» See JtC^Kundra, op,clt»| ppp3B6-194 for a detailed dis-
cussion of this aspect of Indians foreign policy. Also 
see above chapter 2| p* -^ s • 79. 
Kehru, ©p*cit,, pp* 144, See also pp. 132-146 and 168-169 
for Nehi^»s ylews on ^ e Commonweals Association, Also 
see J«C*Kuhdra, op»cit«, pp# 37-42| Karunakar Gupta, op. 
cit,| pp»22-36» Also see Balram Singh Pavadya, Mr.Hehru, 
The Mian National Congress And Indians Membership in 
l^e Gomc^ nwealth $ jR^^mUt^l^a (Vol.6, Ho.3, 
January 1963 
w im • 
48 p3?es9nce in 2JLb©t» As already indicated, the Goaffloia/ealtti 
not oaly assxu^ ed British ^ eonoiaio and militaiy help for fiidia*s 
o m progress, but it also opeaed ©haanels for help from the 
Uaited States,. Above aUf British assistance was assured in 49 the sas0 of aa eventuality like a laa^ os? clash ^ ith Cliina. 
Ui© Comaionvealth also ended the search for the much 
needed regional association or a regional organisation lay 
India which had begun with the first Asian Relations Gonfe^ 
rence?^ At the conference on In^nesiai Nehru had pleaded^^ 
for such an organisation! 
see creative and cooperative impulses seeking 
a new integration and new unity* New problems 
arise from day-'to-day which, in their implica-. 
tions, concern all of us or mxasT cf 
Americans have already recognised a certain 
coaanunity of interest and have created machinely 
for the protection and promotion of common 
interests* A similar movement is in progress 
in Europe* Is it not natural that the f^e© 
countries of Asia ^ ould begin to ^ link of some 
iiiore permanent arrangesaent than l^is conference 
for effective consultation and concerted effort 
in tile pursuit of common aims-not in a spirit 
• of selfishness or hostility to any other nation 
or group of nationsi but in order to strengthen 
and bri^ nearer fulfilment t^e aims and ideals 
of ISie Charter of the OH.*' 
48» See above^  Chapter 2| pp. ^ ^ ^  -pg^  
49« Ibid«y See in particular H»S*Ha4an. «:Che Future of 
CoxzuQonwealt^ *! Suora^  Chapter 2 n«i43« 
50. See MASB-SslaSlQBSi op.cit., p. 26. 
61* Nehruj op#cit., pp« 41o«i411. Also see G.H.Jansen, op* 
cit.| p* 89 for a comparison between Hehru*s views at 
the Asian Relations Conference and the Indonesian 
Conference and also p«2S7 for a comparison with Bandung 
Conference. 
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Slis enthusiasm «as shortliv©d| for It was evident 
tiiat such an ©rganisation with purely Afilan membership would 
he neither feasible nor would be of any benefit to India. Thus 
Neto-u told the eonstitumt Assembly of J^dia, on March 8|. 
$2 , . • 19491 ' 
"We have not yet decided what the region of 
cooperation might be* because India is 
interested in several regions of Asia« Whe-
ther a n should be grouped together or sep-
arately we do not knov?* that is for us to 
consider together ^ d decide what is more 
feasible fefhatever structure we may 
build up will be entirely witiiin the scope 
of the Charter of the OH there will 
be no binding covenants in itf and "^is will 
be largely m org^sation for the consulta-
tion and cooperation that naturally flow from 
common interests*** 
63 
As Siair Gupta has written "!aie change of Indian 
opinion illustrated hy these developments within the span of 
a year reflected a vast change that had in the meantime taJcen 
place in the Asian political scene. Even as the Asian 
delegates at the Indonesian Conferaace were deliberating) news 
from China indicated ^at Chiang Kai-Shek ^ d virtually abdl-
cated and his successor was seeking peace with the communists] 
by Vae end of the year communist revolution in China was 
Complete* It was now futile to expect any regional movement 
6S* Pas-t II, Vol. II, 8 March, 1949, pp. 1233-34.. 
India And Regional Integration Jp. Asia^  op*cit.,pp.43-44. 
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4a the Asiaa region which could l3e mad© to grow In Isolation 
from this dev©lopa©at# It was impossible to think of accepting 
China in any regional arrangement for Asia without making it 
a hot bed for eommunist intrigues| likewise any association 
formed to counter the (2iinese situation would mean a definite 
lining up of Asia with tfee West and behind some of the regimes 
of the contiaont which felt ^ ireatened by China due to their 
internal weakness* 
iVhat this argument, however^ fails to mention is that 
India Itself felt threatened by China and that Soutai East*Asla 
and Ihdia had been for sometime hotbeds of communist intri-
gues. Dadiai ^ereforof needed closer links with a frimdly 
power or powers, Ihe Commonwealth was chosen because it was 
free from commitments while providing the necessary protection 
in case of an eventuality* in this way alone could Jhdia 
rectify the Ijubaiance created by the rise of a powerful 
communist state ri^t across its borders* > 2hia decision 
Ihis does not mean that liidia was depending upon Britain 
for its defence, India itself tock certain steps* In a 
54 significant move it toc^ over ^ e administration of Sikkim 
See SMj^mH-HsSSs^Jui&es 1949. 
« 1&2 ^ 
ia Jaa© Aiid| Sn August 19^9, India conoluded a treaty 
55 
x^ ith Biiutan placing ttoo latter *s foreign relations under its 
control, mdia also signed a treatsr of friendship vith 
Nepali on July SI, All tfcis yas done^  it must be men^ 
tionedi in anticipation of tiie Chinese occupation of Tibet* 
After thiSf on December Jndia concluded a fresh treaty 
67 with Sikkimi placing Uie latter under India's protection« 
68 
on December 196o» Nehru declared in ^e Parliament unequi-
vocally thati 
"Frankly we do not like and shall not brook any 
foreif^ n interference in Nepal, vie recognise 
Nepal as an independent counti^ and wish her 
well From tiiae iBuaeinorial, the Himalayas 
have provided us with a magnificent frontier* 
Of course^  they are no longer as impassable as 
they used to be but thegr are still fairly eff-
ective* VI© can cot allow that barrier to be 
penetratedi for it is also the principal barr-
ier to India* ffiich as we stand for the indep-
^dence of Nepal, we cannot allow any^ing to 
^ wrong in Nepal or permit tliat barrier to be 
crossed or weakened) because that would be a 
risk to our own securitgr**' 
Md Nehru made a similar statement in the Parliament 
69 60 about the Mcli^on Line^  on the advice of Fannikkar^  who was 
66r See fexts of Documents^  1947-69, op*cit#, pp* 17-18 for the text* 
66. pp*31-33* fhis treaty gave India an important right 
to treat Nepal as of special significance in India's 
defence - See Nehru, op.clt., pp, 373-374* 
67* pp»39-40* l^ he King of Sikkim In a recent visit to 
India has pleaded for more autonomy Ses.a'bove, Chapter 2, 
n«100* 
Contd* • • * * 
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then aiabassadoi' to Ciiina. Panaikkar, tiierefore, appears to 
61 
have been perfectly justified when he claimed that like every 
Big jpower jDcidia had her own area of primary and strategic 
importance around herj intrusion into which by a foreign,power 
would be considered India as a 1i:ireat to her own safety, 
and this area included Nepal, Burma and in a way Ceylon and 
that India had made it cleso* to foreign (big) Powers that she 
would not tolerate any interference in the affiirs of the 
three countries* 
It is submitted here that it was to obtain the recogni-
tion of China for this area of primary and strategic importance 
to India that the diplomacy of India towards. China was devoted 
from 1950 to 1954, for, unless China accepted this, India's 
position would not be safe, as the most important threat to 
India came from China* Ihe Korean Crisis appeared to provide 
&8* Hehru, op«cit*, pp* 43&»4S6» 
69. See iia^ lva Sabha Debates^  Vol.27, Part II, 9 December 1959, 
col. 1^4-85. Also see Hehru, op.cit., p. 377. 
60. Ibid. 
61. See Ta& HlndUy August 27,1954. It is strange that an 
Indian Scholar has questioned the right and authority of 
Panikkar to speak in ttiis way as he had then left the 
diplomatic service. His argument against the existence of 
a sphere of interest is not very convincing See M.S. 
Ha^an, .toaja, MM^'l^ ,Affair,§, op.cit., p.57, n.2. and 
J. C»K«rtdra (op.cit,, p. 71 n.2), characterised this state-
ment of Panikkar as a 'confusing note*. 
^ im m 
an opportualtgr to win tbis jravour axKi Sadia exploited it vitii 
more ov less success, as ^ 111 be seen belov. 
mm'^ mxs m TO m m m m 
jjaSEoiiasJi^ sms 
2he role of India In the Korean Crisis ambraced the 
whole rang© of In<iia*s foreign policy objectives! from the 
pres^vatlon of world peace, to tiie protection and further-
ance of India's vital interests in Kashiair,and t&e not yet 
successful aim of establishing frimdly relations ylth the 
Sino-Soviet bloc* It was the Interplay of these objectives, 
that produced a policy so rich in diversity that B^sy people 
appear to have been baffled it« It was essentially a 
simple policy, dictated by a single loinded devotion to the 
pursuit of India's policy objectives as seen lay N^ru and his 
close associates* 
Ihe pattern for this policy was set quite early W 
India as a member of tiie IfeiJlted Rations Temporary Commission 
On Korea (IMTCOK)* It is, thereforei necessary to examine 
it briefly. 
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62 
The Korean dispute was broi^ht to the United Nations 
General Assembly W the Onited States on September 17$ I W . 
On September 23| 1947, ^ ftiQ General Assembly decided by a vote 
of 41 to 6 with 6 abstentions to include iiie item concerning 
Korea in its ageada md referred it to ttie First Qsmmitteo 
for Consideration,*' i^fhen "The First Coflssaittee began consider-
ation of the Korean question in its 87th meeting on October 
28, 1947,*^  The United States and the Soviet Union suteLtted 
two separate draft proposals* Sie Qaited States* <lraft pro-, 
posal provided for elections to be held bjr the occubing 
powers in the northern and southern aones of Korea and the 
constitution of national security forces before the withdrawal 
of iii® occupation troops^ ** It also provided that the appli-
cation of that resolution should be supervised t^ a United 
Nations Temporary Commission instructed to report to the 
General Assembly*" The proposal of the Sjviet Union was "^at 
the General Assembly recommended to the Governments of the 
United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the 
simultaneous withdrawal of their troops from southern and 
northern Korea, respectively thereby leaving to the Korean 
people itself the establishment of a sational Government of 
Korean" 
For a brief account of the genesis of the Korean dispute 
see Of I ie47-48* The accouat 
of the United Nations action in me dispute and tiie quo-
tations that follow are ^ e^x^ken from 12ie same souJ'ce* 
See pp* 81-86 (Hereafter cited as Y>B,U.N. ), 
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At the 91st meeting of tiae First Committee on Oetofeer 
30t 1947, ''India stated that the U#S#S«R. proposal for the Immo 
diate witaidrawal of oocupatlon forces eould «>•* lead only to 
confusion, since there was no Korean Governamt which could 
take over the administration of the comtry. On the otherhand, 
the U«S# proposal that the National Govea^ nment yhm consti-
tuted should form its own national securl^ forces and tiien 
arrange for simultaneous withdrawal of the occupation 
troops seemed to be unduly vague*" 5Bhe Indian represen-
tative, therefore, propsed that "A general election should he 
held, not on a zonal basis but on a national basis under the 
contbrol of taie MlpK, so as to remove the political and jsioral 
barrier which had been created tJsr the division of the country." 
India also proposed that elections ^ ould be W secret ballot 
and on adult suffrages ^at tfee national Assembly should meet 
immediate2y after it had been elected and form a National 
Government which should form Its national security forces and 
dissolve all foreign bases and forces end that a definite time 
limit should be fixed for wl^drawal of occupation forces. 
In the 92nd meeting of the First t^mmlttee the United 
States Introduced a revised draft resolution incorporating 
many of the suggestions made by India mid others, providing 
again for elections to be conducted by the occupying Pbwers* 
L then India submitted an amendment (ACJ/237) to the United 
f/ States' projposal to omit reference to ^ e 'occupying ]^wers* * 
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rhis amendment "vas adopted at the meeting of the First 
Gofflmittee on November I W f fey a vote of 34 to 0» with 4 
abstentions^" 
Vrfhejr, toen, did India reject the Soviet proposal and 
oppose the holding of elections on a aonal basis the 
occupying powerst India no doubti was motivated W the desire 
to establish .'an unified Korea as that had been her stand right 
63 
from 1942» But anotiier equaHy, if not more important^ motive 
appears to have been at work» Siat vas t^ e desire to avoid 
the creation of preced@ats in United Nations vhioh aight 
affect India's interests in Kashmir. !aie fact that both the 
issues arose almost simultaneously must have definitely influ« 64 enced Indian thinking on tSie Korean dispute* 
Though India had not thought of taking the Kashmir 
issue to taj© United Hations before October it was 
evident that the end of t^io iBontJii it was under tiie active 
consideration of the Government of India* Panikkar has 
65 recorded that amidst rumours in the United Nation's circles 
In 1942 tiie Indian National Congress passed two Eesolt^ ti^s dealii^ ^ititi Far Eastern issues « See Dr*P*Sitar«> 
(Padma Publications I.td*t Bombay| 1947), pp«d43-»34S for 
the Resolutions dated 7 & 8 Augustj 1942, 
64. See Hehruf optCitki where Nehru said t^at every 
question had to be viefeed from a hundred different view 
poiats. Any study of India's policy in the Korean crisis 
f feel woiald be incompletei if not also incomprehensible, 
if it does not take into account its implicationsbindia• s 
stand on the Kashmir issue. 
op^cit., p. 14. 
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that tedia was likely to charge Pakistan with aggressionf 
Mrs. Paaditf the h^aS of India's delegation to the llaited 
HationSf was asked W tiirougb a personal ©essage, to 
get into touch with ttie United States* Secretary of State, 
General Marshall and to explain India's point of view to hicii 
Momtbattm rsiised the issue for the first time, in his talks 
66 with Jianah at Lahore, on Hovember 1, 1947« On the next 
67 day, Sehru himiself made the offer in a broadcast from Delhi, 
68 and, in telegrams to Liaqat A n Ehan, on November 3 and 8-
69 
The latter accepted it on Ho vernier X6| and| suggested, inter 
alia, tiiat the 0nited Nations be requested to stop fighting | 
to arrange the wH^drawal of outside forces, and to undertake 
a plebiscite wder its direction ^ d control* As already 
70 
indicated, iftoae of these proposals i^ as acceptable to Nehru. 
The similaritsir between Liaqat Ali»s proposals on Kashmir and 
the Soviet proposals and parts of the United States* proposals 
over Korea, was too close for India to accept them vithout 
creating a precedent t^ iat could be exploited by P^istan to 
its advantage. 
66. See Joseph Korbel, op.cit*, p* 89. See also V.P.Menon, 
opttCit., p» 386* 
67. Mm&f a* 
68. M*^ PP» & 62, 
69f p. 6a. 
70* See above, p. 138. 
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71 Ihls, rather than any princiipled opposition "to 
laeasures might ©atall the partition of a country*', 
appears to have been the important eonsideration with the 
Government ot India, For, Indians policies do not suggest 
an adherence to such principles in the matter of recognition 
72 
of states* For besides accepting the partition of 3jadia it-
self, India had in 1949 established diplomatic relations with 
73 74 West Germany* -And, as already indicated, l^iy the ^ d of 
1948, N^ru was prepared to partition Kashmir itself, between 
India md Pakistan, rainier than hold a plebiscite under United 
76 
Nations' auspices. Therefore when the Interim Committee of 
the General Assembly recommended the holding of elections in 
such parts of Korea as are accessible to the Commission, India 
•76 77 accepted it* So the argument Uiat this "was completely 
71. See Karunakar Gupta, op#Cit., p, Ix 
72. As in ottier matters in this matter also the Geyernment 
of India is guided by interests rather than principles* 
And according to an Indian scholar, the Govern-
ment of India's recognition policy with regard to the 
two halves of Germaay is inconsistent with the principles 
of International law on the one hand and its own policy 
of not recognising territorially dismembered countries on 
the other* See K*P#Misra, *Recognition of the G.D.R, -
An Appraisal of India*s Policy, 13ie Indian Year Book o^ 
•ilati^ rjaal^ AQ^ ai Aff^l^g (Vol.l2,1963), p*131. it has not 
recognised East Germany* It has recognised Israel and 
yet has no diplomatic relations* 
73. See K*P.Misra, op*cit*^ p*119. 
74* See above, p. 141, 
76% This commltteo was appointed by the G^eral Assembly to 
attend to its work during its absence* The UHTCOK failed, 
to secure the cooperation of the Soviet authorities in 
Horth Korea in tiie implementation of the General Assembly 
Hesolution of November 14, 1947* It then reported tiie 
matter for the Interim Committee. See Y.B.D.N.y 1947-48, 
pp. 282-83 and 302. 
76. Ibid. 
77. Sm2£S> a* 71* 
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iaeonsistent with her policy in the icimediate past", cannot be 
78 
correct* For, "Sie ^ orld", said Nehru, "marches rapidly and 
changes, new situations develop and we have to deal with each 
situation as it comes In matters of foreign policy espe-
cially, one has to decide almost every hour what has to he 
done," Thus India*s position in Kashmir had improved very 
much* India might have also heen disenchanted with the CEommu* 
nists. India might have also been cooperating with the United 
States in the hope of winning its support on the Kashmir issue. 
Bie most import^t factor in India*s decision, however, 
would seem to be the recognition of taie reality of the situation 
80 in Korea. Heither the United States, nor the Soviet Onion, 
was prepared to accept a single Korea except on its own terms, 
81 
The only alternative to War was, therefore, two Koreas, !Ehus 
the holding of separate elections in South Korea did not 
78. N^ru, op*Cit«, p, 
79, See Karunakar Gupta, op«cit,, pp, ix-x, 
80» See K.P.S.Menon, la^a And The Cold ivar^  op.cit., pp, 3S»33 and Also see Parliamentary Debates^  Part II, Vol,V, 4 August, 1960, where a few members drew 
attention to this fact, 
81, According to an Indian Writer "Bie Commission found the 
38tti parallel constituted an insuperable barrier in its 
path, effect, 38th parallel had become a full-fledged 
international frontier," See S,L.Poplai, ^ 'The Korean 
Crisis-Some International Aspects", Ihdia Quarterly^  
(Vol,¥I, No*4, October December I960)} p, 320, 
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produce the division of Korea. It was already there. As 82 
pointed out Professor Goodrichs "It would be unfair to say 
that thet condition was taie result of UN action, as it might 
well have happened in any case as, one might may add, 
in Germany. 
Sie policy of the Government or India became further 
clear when it refused to vote for the recognition of the 
Government of South Korea as l^e Rational Government of Korea, 
because it was "too grave a step" as tiie Sadian representa-
83 
tive on the Temporary Commission put it. it should be evident 
that the Government of India accepted the division of Korea 
as the only practical solution under the circumstances, though 
ttiey were prepared to try all peaceful methods for the unifi-
cation of Korea. India, therefore, supported the United 
States'proposal for the creation of - a new UN Commission to 84 
work for the unification of Korea. India was also apprehen-
sive that the withdrawal of forces of occupation before peace-
ful negotiations are instituted might lead to a war between SB the two Governments. 
82. Leland Goodrich, "The UN And Korea', India Quarterly 
(Vol»VlI, no.3, July-September 1961), p. 268. 
83. See G.A.D.R. 3rd Session, First Committee, 232 
meeting, 7 December, 1948, p. 973. 
84. Ibid.. 
86* :ibidi. 
^ X62 ^  
Thus Vv'hein the Soviet~trained and equipped North 87 
Korean forces invaded South Korea on June 1950, it was 
clear to India that it was a challenge to ihe UN and a threat 
to ^ crld peacss and tiie Government of India decided immediately 
to work for the restoration of the Status quo (ante in Korea, 
liiereforei^  ttoth India and the United Arab Republic, who 
were then rafciobei's of the Securlfy Coimcilf voted In favour of 
88 
the Resolution adopted on June £6, I960, the operative pr^ rt 
89 
of which contained, inter alia, the following clausess 
Calls for taie imediate cessation of hostilities 
and calls uaon the authorities of North Korea to withdraw 
forthwith their armed forces to the 38th Parallel; 
Calls uman all jnembers to rendea- every assistance 
to the UN in tiie execution of this resolution and to refrain 
from giving assistance to the KortSi Korean authorities. 
As Uie North Korean authorities did not comply with 
this Security/ Council resolution, the latter adopted another 
90 
Resolution on June 1950, recoiamending tiiat the members 
of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic 
86. See Survey, 1949-50, pp, 473-477 for an account of the 
coii3iiiitiiJ.tints of support by Russia and the United States 
to tile Worth and South Korean Govei'miients, respectively, 
87, See M - t M . , p« 221, 
88* For the voting record see Security Council Official Records 
(S,C*0«R. ).5th lear, No, 15, 473rd Meeting, 25 June,I960 
p,15, 89» For tiie text of the resolution - Supra^  n, 87, p,222, 
90, M*f P* 
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of Korea as may be necessary to repel th© araed attack 
and to restrjre .International peace and security in th© 
area." India and the United Arab Kepublic could not 
participate in the voting on this resolution as their 
delegations had not received instructions from their 91 
respective Governiaents* 
me Goverrment of India accepted this resolution on 
June 29, 19&0« On the same day they issued a statement to 
92 the press vhich said, inter alia j 
"The Governffient of India have given the most careful consideration to this resolution of the Security Council in the contaxt of ^e ^ events in Korea and also of their general foreign policy* They are opposed to rjiy attempts to settle international disputes by 
9U 6th 2ear, No. 16, 474th Meeting 27 June 1950, 
pp» 14«16, Both B.N.Hau and Fawzi, the Indian and the 
UAH delegates, respectively, were very much anxious 
to take part in the votings llie former even delayed 
the proceedings of the mt;;eting in the capacity of the 
President of the Security Council for the month, in the 
hope of receiving instructions* In the end they regretted 
inability to take part in the voting • See below. 
Chapter 6 for an analysis of the UAR*s stand on Korea. 
92, 6th Year, No, 17, 476th Meeting, 3o june I960, 
pp»£-.3. The full text is in the Security Council Document 
(s/15£.0}# See also Documents for 1947*£0y pp, 636-636. 
(Italics mine)* The word, "hpwever" has been the object 
of some controversy • See Werner Levi, op.cit.,p*88 
and Shiv Dayal, op»cit.,p.81» 
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resort to aggression* For tbis reason Sir Benegal 
Rau, on behalf of the Goverjament of India voted In 
favour of the first resolution of the Security 
Council. aSie halting of aggression and the quick 
restoration of peaceful conditions are essential 
preludes to a satisfactory settlement. 2he Gove-
rnment of India therefore also accept the Second 
resolution of the Security Council* 2his decision 
of the Governiaent of liidia does not, however, 
involve any modification of their foreign poliQr» 
Shis {jolicy is based on the promotion of vorld 
peace and t±i® development of friendly relations 
with £ill countries J it remains an independent 
policy which -will continue to be determined solely 
% Indians ideals and objectives. ISie Government 
^^a 
and to sett3,e the disputes to mediation." 
9S 
ilnd on July I960, Hehru further explained India's 
policy U> a press conference in the following woi'dss 
"Vihen Nortii I503?ea launched an invasion against 
South Korea, it became evident from, all the 
information available that this was a large 
scale and well*planned invasion. Border con-
flicts between the too countries as well as 
internal <^nflicts, had a bearing on the situa*-
tion. But they were dominated by this ma^or 
fact cf a well4«pi&nned invasion and aggression 
on South Korea. In the delicate and precarious 
balance escisting in the world, any such invasion 
was fraught with t2ie most dangerous possibility. 
If aggression was allowed to succeed, the entire 
structure of tiie UN would have inevitably coll-
apsed and a large^ -scale war resulted. 
"The whole basis of the UN is to bring about 
tile settlement of international disputes by peace-
ful means* ii; aggression takes place and the 
aggressor ignores completely the UN, then only two 
choices are left s either the UN should condemn 
that aggression and try to put an end to it, or 
93. See, fhe Hindu, -July 8, 1^50. 
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it should coia@ to the conclusion that It has 
ceased to be an effective Instrument of peace 
and l&m& the decision of any dispute to war« 
".In the context of events the Security 
Council had no alternative but to declare 
Noi'th Korea the aggressor, and subsequently 
call upon the j&embers of me UN to meet this 
armed attack and restore International peace. 
Whatever Justification might be advanced for 
ttiis aggression and whatever might have pre-
ceded it may have some importance, but it does 
not take away from the fact of a well-planned 
aggression* India supported the resolutions 
of Security Council because they logically 
followed the context of events and the PN 
Charter, and because that seemed the only course 
to avoid the extension of conflict and large-
seal© warfare. In doing 60| iidia»s primary 
consideration was to serve tSie cause of peace. 
Sils did not involve any change in the basic 
foreign poli^ of India, which is one of 
^nonalignmentip with any group of nations against 
another group* In accepting the resolutions of 
^e Security Councilf India did not accept any 
enlargement of ^ ose resolutions. Ihey refer to 
aggression in Korea alone and to no other situa-
tion* * •. 
"She Government of India are of opinion that tSie admission of the People's Government of China in 12ie Security Council and the return of the IJ»S.S.R# are necessary conditions to enable the security council to discharge its functions adequateSy and to bring tiie l^rean conflict to a peaceful conclusion* tChe best assistance that India can give is to help to limit the area of conflict and try to end it. My military assistance is beyond India*s capa* city and would make little difference. Indians defence forces have been organised for the defence of the country, and not for service in distsmt threats of War*" 
ISils appears to be one of tOie rare occasions on which 
Nehru used the word Honallgnment in the late forties 
and early fiftees. 
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These statements have been reproduced here, in full, 
because toey explain quite satisfactorily, tSxe whole basis 
of In<iia»s policy during the Korean crisis* Still, Indians 
Korean policy, as it evolved fully, was widely misunderstood, 
94 
and, criticised* It Is, therefore, hecessary to explain 
again t^e essentials of Indians policy. 
Firstly, N<^ ira had mde it perfectly clear that there 
was a weH plJinned and large scale aggression on South Korea* 
Speaking in Pai'liaiQent on August 3, I960, he dismissed the 
Soviet-backed North Korean claim "that before they invaded. 
South Korea had apparently gone across the border with troops", 
as a "very feeble plea"* He also said that "There might have 
been border jjicidents, but to make that an excuse for the 
well^planned big scale invasion patently does not carry much 
94. 2he extent to which India's policy was or was not 
properly understood could be seen from the speeches of 
members of Parliament and lfehru*s replies to them* See 
ParJ.iamen^ afy Debates, Part II, Volume V* Nos* 1-6, 
July-August I960* See J#C* Kundra op*cit,, pp.\26-i4o 
for an accomt of the American reaction to Indians policy* 
See also F«B*C* te^faa^^h^ XmXXi^ ff* NaUOflfi t for an 
interesting but, in my opinion, inaccurate interpretation 
of India's policy* See also G*F.Hudson, 'Korea And Asia», 
..Ifl^ y^fl^ tfejLfiMj^ ,Mlul^ S (Vol.xxyil, Bo.l, January 1951)* 
p. 22. 
96* See Parliamentary Debates^ Part II, Volume 6, No.4,3 
August, I960, Cols* 223*224* See also in this connection 
survey p* 477. Karunakar Gupta (op.cit.,p,.xi, 
n.8) feels that the decision of India was based on in-
accurate accounts furnished by the Indian members of the 
IMTOOK and also suggests (p*xiil), that the decision might 
have been influenced t^ Loy Henderson, the then United 
States' Ambassador in India* As Shiv Dayal (op*cit.,p*82) 
has observed this appears* 'highly improbablei 
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fOJ^ ce*" And he declared tHat "It may be described as a 'Civil 
ckjaflict'j it may b© described as an attempted unification 
and all that, but I rattier doubt if any of these excuses can 
be taken to b© a sufficient justification for this kind of 
thing* It was aggression that is the attitude ••••• 
that is described in that statement of June 
Secondly, Hehru made clear that this aggression was 
an attempt to solve disputes by force which was dangerous 
from the point of view of world peace, because it was an 
attempt to upset the delicate balance of power* Therefore, 
it had to be prevented bs^  the United Nations by the use of 
force much as India had done in Kashmir, since a call for the 
withdrawal of forces ty the ISaited Nations had gone uinheeded* 
But the use of force had to be restricted to restore the 
fltatus QUO ante and not for the settlement of the problem 
which could be done only through peaceful means* Therefore, 
Nehru stated categorically that "In accepting the Security 
Goiaacil resolutions ladia did not accept any enlargerasnt of 
those resolutions* They refer to aggression in Korea alone 
and to no other situation," This was clearly a reference to 
96 
Iruman»s declaration on Formosa* This move of the United 
States appears to have raised suspicions in l^e minds of the 
96. See Qocuments for 1949*.6Q« p. 632 for the text of the 
declaration. ^ 
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Goveriiment of India about the United States' intentions in 
Korea, and they appear to have foreseen tSiat it might be 
willing to extend the area of conflict, if possible, at least 
to unify Korea under the auspices of the United Nations, which 
might escalate the conflict into a bigger war. ISiis appears 
to have been an. important, if not the main reason,' as Nehru 
98 later clarified, for India's refusal to contribute forces to 
tiie IM Cosmand, though the reason given in the stateisent of 
99 July 7, was quite satisfactory. 
IOC 
It seeffls, however, incorrect to conclude from tiiis 
that India was not prepared to support the UN action in Korea! 
India had not only osntributed medical unitsf^ but both 
and Raia, paid handsome tributes to the jnen fighting under the 
UN flag in Korea* But Nehru was opposed to a military solu-
tion to the Korean probl®. He, therefore, made it clear that 
97. Surg at ru95, cols, 2S4..226. See also Shiv D^al, op.cit., 
p* 96* 
98. 4 August, 1960, col# 371, 
99. See above pp. ^ , 
100. See K.Gupta., op.cit., pp. xii-xiii. 
101. See Nehru's letter to the Secretary General of the UN cited in B.Shiva Rao ^  S.Kondapi, 'India ARd Ihe Itorean crisis', India Quarterly. (Volume VII. No.4, October-December 1951), pp. 303*304. 
102. Nehru, op.cit., p. 418. 
103. S.e.Q.R. 6th Year, 478th Meeting, 28 July, 1950, pp. 
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a permaneat settlemeat of the Korean problem was possible only 
with the cooperation of Soviet Uxiion and China* IMs was 
possible only when t^ e former returned to Security Council 
and the latter was admitted into it* 
MsmLM^jm^ 
It was apparently in pursuance of this belief that the 
Governsi^t of India initiated the xuove to admit China to ISie 
iQk 
Security Council* A-s panikkay has -written, the proposal was 
put forvmrd by him secretly, in a meeting with the Vice Forolga 
Minister of China, Chang Han^Fu, on July I960, Nehru having 
already moved Bevln, the British Foreign Secretary, in the 
matter* It is not known what the reaction of Britain was! 106 However, the Chinese approval c^e on ^ uly 10, and, as an 
106 
American authority has opined, "Undoubtedly after consults-., 
tions with its Soviet partner,** 
1!hen Nehru iz^ de a formal proposal in Identical letters 
addressed to Stalin, and Acheson, ttie Onited States* Secretary 
107 
of State, on July 13, 19S0* Nehru wrotej "Sidia's purpose 
is to localise the conflict and to facilitate an early peaceful 
104. Jp. Tyq Chlx^s^ op*Clt*, pp« 103«104* 
106. Ibid. 
106, Allm S.Vjhiting, China Crosses m e Igaiu » The Decifllnn 
lo Entor !Che Korean War^  (Ihe Macmillan Coy, New ^rk, 
I960), p. 160» 
107. Supra^  n. 96, p*706 for the text of Nehru's letter. 
170 
settlement Is^  breaking toe present deadlock in the Security 
Couneil so thafc representatives of the People»s Government of 
China can take a seat in the CJouncil. Ihe U.S.S.R. can return 
to it| and whetlier ^ it^in or through informal contacts outside 
the Council, the and Oiina, with the help 
and cooperation of oth^ peace-loving nations can find a basis 
for teriainatin.g tSie conflict and for a perissuient solution of 
the Korean conflict*" 
Not surprisingly, vhile Stalin accepted the proposals 
108 109 on July iLcheson rejected them on July IS, I960* An 
Indian Scholar^^has observed that "If this peace initiative 
had evoked as favourable a response in t^e Viestern capitals 
as it did in the Korean war would have ended honourably 
long before or at least, it would have put to test Soviet 
sincerity about peace in l^rea." Nehru did not appear to have 
111 been so optimistic as he said later that "I made the appeal 
in the vague hope that perhaps it might result in some tiling 
112 
positive**' And i^ aiikkar has reco^ rded that realised that 
the proposal of seating Peking in the Security Council, however 
108# ii.i p* 706. 
109« Ibid^ i for Acheson's reply an€ Hehru's second letter to him* 
110» Karunakar Gupta, op.cit., p* xiii, 
111% Nehru, op.cit*, p* 416* 
112. fo 0p,cit*, p. 104. 
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XegiUoatei reasonable and logical, would be resisted ty tlie 
Americans since it would involve an ifamease loss of face to 
theffl# It was also obvious that in the face of definite Ameri-
can opposition Bevin vould not be able to act* Still, there 
113 
was a chancei,Panijtkar added significantlyj "Biat the 
Kussians did not expect any^ing to come out of ISiis was clear 
from the fact that Tass published the correspondence beforo 
Acheson had a chance to reply» 
thm it would appear that the Govettunent of India were 
aot anisr/are that the |«>|iposal might be rejected by the United 
States* Only a little reflection vas needed to realise it* 
islhat then did they expect from the move? In a lengthy state-
114 
meait in Parliament, on August 3, I960, Hehru explained part 
of it; with Hew China and the U.S.S»R» and some other 
countries going out of the United Nations, it has assumed a 
new shape* Xt has ceased to be what it was meant to be, for 
the time being at least*••••There is no forum left for any 
att^pt at peaceful settlemeat#»*«#^e United Nations Instead 
of being an organ for peace would inevitably drift towards 
being an organ for war or preparation for war," Nehru also 
iia* M ^g^^yjaagf op.cit*, p. 
13.4, Suora. a, 95, cols* 227^229. 
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pointed out that "fee Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
l&m Irygv© Lie coffimunicated repeatedly with toe various aiember 
nations inelading us, earlier 12iis year, pointing out these 
great develope«mts and saying that if something was not done 
soon the Onifced nations would simply disintegrate ©iat 
was what f;cygv© Lie felt, and that i$ how vq felt. 
"Baersfore*', continued Nehru, •'When this Korean invasion 
took place and «re tried to tiiink what we could do in the matter. 
• felt again, as we felt previously that one initial 
approach would surely help in creating an atmosf^ere which 
would facilitate the solution of that question. 
3Sius it would appear that the Government of India did 
not like to have an United Nations, increasingly dominated i?y 
the United States® If they had calculated that their move 
might induce t&e Soviet delegate to resume his seat in tiie 
116 Security Council, that was achieved, and the Soviet delegate, 
Malik returned to the Security Council on August 1, 1960, as 
116 its president for tfee laonth* Prof. Whiting, has suggested 
that the acceptance by Stalin of Hehru's *medlation» might 
have been an iadicatloa of the &)viet desire for compromise 
117 and that Malik's behaviour did not preclude a Soviet attempt 
116» see All^ en S.iiJhiting, op.cit., p.62 see also Suora, n. 
96, 4 August, 1860> Col* 378* 
116. Ibid. 
P« 73* 
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to exploi^ e tSi© prospects for negotiated settlement ija Korea* 
ll8 
He admits,, however, that "noising in l^llk's position commi-
tted the Soviet tJaion to specific settleia&nt of the war and by 
extending Uie Indian proposal to include til© Democratic 
People*® Republic of Korea as well as the People's Republic 
of China at fhQ talks he was merely amplifying a position 
already taken by a respected non^communist po%rer« Should the 
Soviet Union fail little would be risked, while l^ e potential 
gains were large. 
B#N*Bau was quick to foil this Soviet attempt to 
subvert India's proposal* Voting against the Soviet draft 
119 
resolution of August 4, whids proposed to in'vite tiie 
sentatives of Hort4i Korea besides those of Communist (Stiina, 
andf the witiidrawal of all foreign troops from Korea^ the 120 
Indian delegate said on September li i7e are 
discussing at present with respect to Bbrea is not a dispute 
#««»• Brief:ty what we are engaged in at the moment is not ^e 
discussion of the Korean dispute, but ratfaer of tiie Korean 
campaign* In the view of iqy Government, the question of 
hearing the representative of the Rortii Korean authorities 
118# p» 76• 
119. S/1679, Seel^aUkl*! p. 233. 
120. See 6th year, No.36, 494th Meeting, i I September 19^0, pp« 1^16. 
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caa not arise until the caapaign is over, that is to say, 
until at least hostilities have ceased and v?itiidrawai of 
the lorth Eorean forces had been agreed upon* I shaH there-
fore have to vote against the proposal that their represemta* 
tive should he invited to the council table at this stage-
and 1 emi^asise tdae words 'at this stagOt*** 
flius any hopes that India might have had of a change 
of attitude on the part of the Soviet Onion appeared frustra-
ted W the Soviet behaviour in the Security Council, Ihter^  
ISl 
vening in a debate^  the Indian Delegate said on August 14, 
inter aliat "2 was hoping that with the president's return 
to this council, a new effort would become possible and 
would be lioade inside tiie council, with such assistance as the 
other countries represented here could give* That hope has 
somewhat receded now* !Che coui'se of l^e debates in the 
Council has served t^  increase rather -fean reduce the tension 
between teie two great Powers.-..*." !12iere was, however, t±ie 
fact that the United States had rejected the Indian proposal. 
But the Horth Ko^ 'ean aricies were still advancing into South 
Korea# It was on the ground that any cease-fire at ^at 
stag© would give ttie United Nations forces time to strengthen.. 
2!heir position to launch an offensive, that the Soviet Union 
121. ^th rear, go.S9, 487th Meeting, 14 August 
1960, p. 9. 
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and China rejected the Indiai^ co-sponsored draft resolution 
(A/gi/641) of Deoember 12, 1960 in m e First Committee of the 
122 
General Assembly* therefore, even if the United States had 
accepted the proposals, still there might have been no change 
in the Soviet position* Having achieved their iiumediate 
objective, botti the Coiaaaanist Powers aight have beeome more 
uncojsproaiising^ , China would have perhaps demanded the surron^ 
der of Formosa^ among other tilings, as a price for stopping' 123 
the war, as it in fact did later, after its entry into the war. 
And India could not have opposed this a^ve, especially with 
Pannikkar as its Ambassador in China. He had frankly coafesslt^ 
that from the begixuiing he attached greater importance to 
Formosa, than to the United Nations* action in Korea* Ihe 
President of India, however, said in his speech to the Parlia^ 126 
ment on July 31, I960 that ''Had it (Nehru's proposal) been 
acceptable to all concerned, my Government would have actively 
Cooperated in bringing about a settlement through i&e agency 
122. See t V Session, First Committee » 416tii ifaetlng 12 December, 1960» p»433 for the text of the ^ oint draft resolution. See G.Alo>R.^ V Session, Meetings 324tii MtJ, 14 December 1960t p#666 for Soviet-o^ f^c. 
123. See .XiltjZ*J£«i p. 261. 
124. op.cit., p. 103* 
126. Supra^  n.96, 31 July I960, Col.10. Nehru also said, "At 
no time has M i a suggested that she would resign from 
her support of the UN Resolution about North Korea's 
aggression.*' See Nehru's statement at a Bcess Conference 
on 16 October igeQ^Doeuments for 1949,60^  p.712. This 
stal^mt also contains a good suomary of India's Korea 
policy^  
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of the United Nations and on tiie basis of the two resolutions 
of the security Couneil." 
But Mei3,ru*s proposals to Stalin md Acijeson did not 
contain any r€>f0rene© to the Security Council Besolutions and 
to the need for ^e withdrawal of the North Korean forces from 
South Korea, Had this been done, perhaps the propsals vould 
not have been accepted by the Soviet Union, and China, there-
fore, this oifflBission Jiehru) appears to have been a tactical 
fflovej calculated to secure t^e approval of 'Uie Coiomunist 
Powers, without insisting on their prior acceptance of ^e 
Security Council Resolutions, -which they had condemned as 
126 
illegal. The Governmaat of India, however, could have assured 
the Governmesit of the United States diplomatically that "feey 
were not deviating from their earlier position, Th^ did not 127 seem to have taken this step, thou^ Nehru was in close 
contact with the British Rrlme Minister, who seemed to have 
128 
accepted India's policy on China as the right policy^ It is 
difficult to say whether the Government of India also wanted 
to leave enough toom for a. tactical shift, either way, as the 
laS, See Gromyko*s note of 29 June, I960 to Secretary-General 
and his statement of. 4 July I960. Docuigents for 1949-60,. 
op#Cit,, pp, 
127# See 'Failure of a Mission», la^ e Eastern Ecogoinist 
(Volume 16, HO#4, July 28,1950) pp. 123-124. 
128, see V Session, First Committee, 431st Meeting 
26 January 1961, p ^ 6M-.647 for a good exposition of laie British stand Gladwynn Jebb. 
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Whatever lalgiit b© tb© truth, it seems clear that Nehru 
had t^en extraordinary care to see tkiat his proposals iwere 
acceptable to the Sino-Soviet bloc. This, to w mind, appears 
to be the crux of the issue* For, what India needed to stress 
most at the tijae was not its adherence to the Security Council 
Resolutions, but its adherence to its policy of Nonalignment 
and friendly relations with both the blocs. And this, for 
very importaiit reasons. Firstly, iadia had not yet succeeded 
in establishing its bonafides as a Nonaligned country with the 
Sino-asviet bloc* Secondly, tiie West and its supporters in 
India, had begun to believe that India had at last thrown off 
129 its laask of neutrality and joined the iv'estern block, in 
130 
contrast to the Ifeiited Mah Republic, which did not accept 
the June 27 Resolution of the Security Council. Finally-and 
this was, by far, t2i@ iirast important reason-there was the 
threat of an iaiatoent invasion of tEibet by Qiina. It was, 
thacefor©, imperative for jfedia to establish good relations 
with China, as quickly as possible* 
120. See*India on Korea*, Ihe Eastern Sconog^st^ (Vol. 116, 
Ro.l, July 7, 1950), pp. 
130. See Sa:rdar Hukaa Singh*s speech in Parliament « Supra 
a* 96, cols. !Ihe member said ttiat India should 
have followed the U.A»E.*s example to uphold its neu» 
trality. 
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It vas to achieve these objectives that Neiiru appears 
to have Initiated the aove to seat China in the Security 
Council* As se^ earlier^  the Government of India^  and NehrU| 
in their statesaents of June 29, cmd July 7| respectively^ 
took particular care to emphasise that their acceptance of the 
Security Council resolutions did not mean a change in their 
policy of frtondly relations ¥ith all nations. India had also 
dissociated itself from 1!ruman»s declaration of neutralising 
Formosa* But something more effective vas n^ded to demons-
trate India*© independence of the Western bloc* Nehru could 
not have, o^ viouslyf chosen a better ajove at this juncture to 
please Chlna» than to press for its legitimate place on the 
131 
Security Coun.cil» As Prof* Vfhiting has obserifed *'the Jndian 
proposal oha3.1enged tSie Coismunist image of a world neatly divi-
ded into warring camps witii no *neutral* nations occupying a 
third position* Full appreciation of this may not have come 
immediately in Moscow or Peking. Kevertheless, Jen Mln Jih 
Pao's gradual shift from criticism to la'aise of Hehru sugges-
ted at least a tactical modification of the »two camps* 
approach the Sino*Soviet reaction to the Indian proposals 
of early July stands as m important b^ch.mark in the develop)* 
ment of Chinese Cojaoiunist policyt not only in Korea, but on 1±ie 
131» op#cit., pp* 61»62* 
132, M^i 60* 
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broader probleins of relations witii Asia and the World in. 
general*" first favov^ abl© sign came one day prior to 
ttie Chinese acceptance of Panikkar's secret proposal, for^  
"on July 9 M n Jih Pao revi^^ed Indian policy without 
attacking Heiiru 132, • p * * It
It was for such a breakthoi#» tiiat India had been trying 
133 
et@r since China became independent* As Hehru said on August 
4, 19ii0t "1^ 'hat we have suggested first diplomatically and 
later in the personal appeal, was not mediation, have 
suggested a step for vhich we had be^ asking for months and 
months, vje have suggested that because we thought that it 
would ease the situation our proposal was somet^ iing which 
is entirely apart from the Korean question* have been 
trying for that for the last eight months* So it stood by 
itself and we propose it on its own merits,**.*" 
To understand,therefore, \4hy the question of China's 
representation in t2ie United Kations. was raised by India at a 
time when it was mst likely to be rejected by the ISaited States, 
one has to examine the basis of India* s China policy* The 
132. P* 
133* SuDX'a. 11*96, 4 August, 1960, col* 380* See also 
Rau's speech in ^ e General Assembly «. 6t4i 
Sessioiif ST^I^ B€»Mtg*, 19 September 1960, p. 9* 
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Second Protest Not© sent to Peking by the Government of India 
on Octoiler 31, 19e0| agatost the Chinese invasion of lilJet, 
said,^  inter aliat has l?o©n the basic policy of the Govern-
ment of India to work for friendly relations between India 
and Ghinai hotti countries recognising each other»s sovereignly, 
territo^ cial integrity and Mutual interests, These, one 
might add, are three of the five |»rinciples, later to be known 
135 
as Prnich Sseel. And "our policy towards China,** observed 
136 
Panikkar, "has been of a two-fold charactert to cooperate on 
the basis of respect of each other*s rights in every sphere 
Inhere such cooperation is possiblei and secondly to use such 
influence, as we have to bring about an understanding between 
China and oth«jr nations." 
It was in pursuance of this policy that, on August 13, 
137 
19S0f that is, 4ust on© JBonth after the Nehru proposal, "fhe 
Government of India represented to l&e Government of China that 
they ^ er© concerned at the possibility of unsettled conditions 
across their border* therefore, strongly urged that 
See itga^te, MfiRte op« ci t», 
pa. Bee also PP» 6^^653 for 
taie fuJJl tea:t, 
I3&« See Pus'ushottam L^Mehra, op*cit», p* 16. 
136. Paaikkari «India And The Far isst, United Asia^  
(October, 1962), p. 288. 
137# mw^f n. 134» 
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Sino-Tibetan relations shoui<i be adjusted through peaceful 
negotiations." This move was explained by Nehru to the 
138 Parliament on Becemoer 6, 195G» as followSi 
"Ever since the Peopl®*s Government of €3aina 
talked about the liberation of Tibet, our 
/iffibassador told them on behalf of the Gove** 
rnmeat of India, hov we felt about it, Uf© 
expressed our earnest hope that the matter 
would be settled peacefully by China and 
fibeti Ue also made it clear that we had 
QO t^cltci^tal aa^lttoaa la regard to Hlbet 
and taiat our relations were cultural and 
cofflmercial, We sal<i that we would naturally 
liice to preserve these relations and continue 
to trade with Tibet because it did not come 
ia the way of either China or Tibet. We 
further said that we were anxious that Tibet 
shoul.d laaintaln ^ e autonoiay it has had for 
at least the last forty years. We did not 
challenge or deny t^ e suzerainty of China 
over Tibet ««« They gave us to understand 
that a peaceful solution would be found 
though I must say tiiat they gave us no ass-
urance or Guarantee to the effect* On th« 
one hand, they said they w^e prepared for 
a peficeful solutioni on the otheri t^ ey 
taOJted persistently of liberation^" 
Thus Hehru and Panlkkar appear to have hoped that 
China might postpone the invasion of Tibet at least till the 
end of the Korean wax-, if not indefinitely, in view of India's 
support to China's claims* When actually 12ie Tibetan occupa-
tion was undertaken in Octo^ Jer 19So, India wrote to the Pekini; 
139 Government on October 21^  I960 that a military action at 
138, Nehruj op.cit*, p, Qo2t 
139« Cited In Whiting, op#cit», p» 146, See also Mark C» if'reer^, op.cit*, p* 376* 
182 • 
ttie present time against Tibet will give those countries in 
the which are unfriendly to China a handle for anti-
chinese propoganda at a erueial and delicate juncture in inter-
national affair® •••• opinion in the United Nations has heen 
steadily veering around to the admission of China into that 
organization before the close of the present session. Military 
action on the eve of a decision by 1±ie Assembly vill have 
serious consequences and will give powerful support to those 
who are opposed to the admission of the People•s Government of 
CSiina to aiisrepresent China's peaceful aims*" 
This was in effect the American argument against the 
140 admission of Ciilna into the United Nations* China, therefore, 
141 
wrote ironically that "The problem of Tibet and the problem 
of the participation of t^ e People's Republic of China in the 
United Rations are ti^o entirely unrelated problems. If those 
countries hostile to China attempt to utilise as an excuse the 
fact that ChijSia is exercising its sovereign rights in its 
territory Tibet, and threaten to obstruct the participation of 
the People's Republic of China in the Ihited Nations Organisa^ 
tion, it is then but anotoer demonstration of the unfriendly 
and hostile attitude of such countries towards China." 
140. See Acheson's reply to Nehru's proposal of July 13, 1950, 
Supra, n.l39, pp. 146-146. See also China's Note of 30 
October I960 in reply to India's Note of 26 October i960 
. t o n p * 
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One camwjt but conclude, therefore, that Peking had 
exhibited greater sens© of reality than New Delhi, Xet Indians 
c 
move was not entirely iia^ onsidered. In the words of Prof. 
142 
Whiting "Just as the Peopl©»s Bepublic of caiina had found 
it possible to postpone the Taiwan operation so too it could 
have delayed indefinitely the occupation of Tibet," Talks 
had actually begun between the (3hinese ambassador in India and 
the Tibetan delegation which was held up in India on its way 143 to China from early 1950, for want of visas for Honkong which 
the British Government had refused to grant in the isonth of 
144 
June 1960| after some delay in the matter. It was ti'ue that 
these talks were only a tactical move on the part of CJiina. But 
they were terminated only when China decided in favour of a 
military solution in the wake of the United Nations* decision 
to cross the 3&th parallel* This decision was taken ty the 146 United Nations' General Assembly on October 7, 1960» and| 
146 
Chinese troops began their invasion of Tibet simultaneously, 
thoiagh China announced the fact on October^only* To quote 
14£» MMMf 139. 
143. In its Note of 30 October, China accused India of delaying 
intentionally the departure of this delegation to China. 
India of course denied it in its Note of October 31,1950. 
See Aaffmml^g te l^^&Qi pp. ssi-sas. 
144. See Mark C.Freer, op.cit,, p. 373. 
145. See G.A.Q.R. 5th Session, Pl.Mtgs., 294th Mtg,, 7 Oct. 1950. 
146. Sttpra^  n. 134, p. 2, 
147. Ibid. 
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vl48 Prof. Wliit^ againi "It would appear that Ciiina considered L 
the die vas cast when the United Nations troops crossed the 
38th parallel and that then abandoned diplomacy pending 
a decision on the battle 
If, on the other hand, the United Nations had called 
for a dip3x>matia solution, Indians support vould have been 
sought by the Sino-Soviet block, Shis would have given India 
an opportunity to bargain with China on all problems, including 
149 
Tibet, as was done later* 
.At J?ii^ „„ggt;h Shis explains, to a large extent, though not in full, 
India*s impassioned appeal for a halt to the United Nations» 
160 military action at the 38th parallel* The Chinese threat of 
intervention, delivered to India*s Ambassador Panlkkar, at 
151 ffiidnigiat, on:iy served to confirm India in its desire not to 
antagonise China. Unlike tiie earlier proposal of India, this 
162 appeal ^Jas precise and reasonable, Prof*Goodrich has opined 
148. Op.cit*, p» 143, 
149. See below, pp» 200 - 201 * 
160. See Nehru's staten^ nt to a Press Conference on 30 
September 196Q*DQciiments for 1949»6Qy pp. 709-710, and 
B.N.Rau's appeal to the General Assembly^ Supr^ i n.l46, 
pp» 230-231. 
161. See In Iwo Chinas> op.clt,, p. Uo. 
162. Op.cit., p. 263. 
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that "It is impossible to say whether a cease-fire could have 
been achiev^i at this stage dn the basis of the restoration 
of t^e states gUQ aate^  with suitable guaran,tees that armed 
forces would, not again be used. In any case no serious effort 
was made But the United Nations' forces were in a 
strong position* South Korea and Formosa were secure. It 
would have been, perhaps, possible for the United Nations to 
enter into discussions witii the North Korean autiiorities* Bie 
Government of India appeared certain that there was such a 
possibility, as its delegate pointed out in the General 
Assembly, After expressing the fear that taie crossing of the 
38th parallel by the United Nations* forces might "prolong 
North Korean r»isistance, and even ••••• extend the area of 
163 
conflict," 3*N.Rau suggested that "before the United Nations' 
forces advance further, we should call upon the North Korean 
forces to cease hostilities by a certain specified date 
the North Korean forces would in their present military situa*. 
tlon, have every inducement to comply with the call,,.,," 
It would appear that such a categorical statement 
would not have been made W B,N.Rau, unless the Government of 
India had some indication that North Koreai)! woiild cease hosti-
lities if the United Nations' forces stopped, at the parallel. 
163. itissiai n, 146, pp, 230-231, 
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11)4 B#N.Hau said that each Government has to ^ udge the situation 
upon the best information at its disposal and to act accoj?- • 
dingiy*" Xhus toe ruisours of North Korean approaches for 
166 
Indian mediation appear to contain some truth, though tiiey 
were not taken seriously at the time, Whether or not this 
was S0| the Government of India would not have become preju-
diced against the United States and the United Nations, in the 
way it did, from the moment the tftiited Nations» forces crossed 
the 38th parallel, if its warning vas heeded by the latter. 
For, besides spoiling India's diances of seeking a 
peaceful solution to the Tibetan problem, this move of the 
United Nations went against otheor basic considerations of 
India's foreign policy. India opposed ttxe North Korean aggre-
ssion on South Korea, because it was an attempt to upset the 
delicate balance of power in Asia by the use of force, India 
did not want the United N^ t^ions either, to attempt to change 
this balance of power by force. This has been India's policy 
right from the beginning as has already been indicated. 12ius 
India would have opposed this move irrespective of all other 
considerations* It is significant in tiiis connection, to note 
166 that Mdia later appealed to the Chinese and the North Korean 
164, Supray n. 146, pp. 230-23U 
166, See Surveyy 19fta»60, p. 613. 
166. See ^ c^ffl^i te p. 713 for the text. 
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authorities, along with 12 ether Arab-Asian states to declare 
toieir intention not to cross tiae 3Sth parallel. This, it 
has to be admitted, vjas a perfect piece of balancing in the 
Classical sense of the term. It is also significant to note 
that Britain had supported both these moves of India on. the 
same basis* 
Cleai'lyii tlie attempt made by the United States to alter 
the balance of power in its favour was a dangerous move from 
the point of view of view of world peace. It was also dangerous 
from the point of view of the freedom of Asian nations, for 
the United States was unwilling to give proper weight to the 
views and feai-s of the Asian nations of which China 
168 
and India are the biggest. Its behaviour was high<..handed» Thus 
China's entry into the Korean war appears to have come as a 
relief to iaany Asian nations.Hence India's refusal to condean 
169 ^ad China for its entry into the Vifar. On the other hand,Nehru/come 
167. See John ^ .Spanier, Ihe Cpnlii^o.y^ y.sg M i The Korean ^ ar (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, HasachusGtts,1959), pp.38-39. According to G.H.Jansen(op. cit.jpp. 106-111}, the 13-nation appeal was Issued on the Initiative of B.N.Rau without prior consultations with the governiaents concerned and that Nehru did not like it.lie has further written ^at this move was taken upon the rep-, eated urgings of the British and United States delegates to the UH. 
168. See Nehru's statement to a Press Conference on 16th October, I960. Supra^  n.l28, pp.710»712. See also Gladwyn Jebb's speech to the First Committee of the UN GA. Supra., n. 128. 
169. See G.A.Q.H.T bth Session, First Committee, 42Sth Meeting 
20 January, 1960, pp.623*624 and G.A.o.R,^  6th Session, 
327th pj|;. Mtg., 1 February, 1961, p. 694, 
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to tb© conciU0.loft t^at tajilitary laiad iiad taken over in 
160 
Koi'ea. He was aot ©atH'ely wroxifi. The Itolted States' 
Freald^t Had to put up a to'ay^ struggXe against Mac Arthur, 
to ©alutsln UiQ supreBacy of civilian authoritr in the United 
161 States* 
Ihei-ei/ iifere other dangors involved in the Oaited 
Nations* 11^ ve to unify Eoi?ea l^jr force, it directly threatened 
162 India*® position in Kashciir, as i^ ill be shonn belo^ « 
those feara appeared to hecome a reality when the 
163 
Onited Statefi introduced the * Uniting For Peace ilesolutlon* 
or Ui© *Acheaon Flan* which sought to give the G^aeral Asseablj 
po^ fers to recoaaaend aeast^es against aa aggressor if the 
Security Council failed to take a decision* Mehru »as indig» 
nant and he case out strongly against it* In his statement 164 
of October I960 he said "It seems like converting the 
mi into a larger edition of the Atlantic met mking it a «ar 
160* Infra., n. 181, col. 6294 
161» See Sp^er, op.cit., pp» 187-207 
162* See below J pp» 190-:191. 
163* See , 1960, pp«193»196, for the text of the 
resolution* 
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organisation Mjre than one devoted to peace*" On another 
166 
occasion, he saids "Instead of being a great organisation 
for peace sloi^ ly one of its Bseffibers had begun to think of 
it as an organisation for waging «ar« Indeed, that was not 
the plan behijad the OH and tiioygh its aiarter remains some 
facts begin tci belie it, more bdA more*" 
166 labile Vishinsky of the Soviet Uhion questioned the 
167 
legality of tiie Resolution, B.H^Hau told the General Assembly 
that Government considers that this is not the time for 
stressing the military aspect of tile UN, important though that 
aspect may b e » a n d declared India's decision to "abstain. 168 
from voting on the resolution*" As one Indian scholar has 
written; "The most obvious danger stemmed from the composi-
tion and voting practices of the Assembly in the early fiftees*. 
One-third of the entire membership of the General Assembly 
belonged to one of tiie blocs in t^ e Cold War^  i,e«|- t&e western 
camp ••••• In that situation if the Assembly had established 
a force, the contlgents contributed {jy 'fee Member states would 
166» 1949-.63, op.cit^, p. 229. 
166, Supra^  n»87, pp. 18fc-l86 and 191,192, 
167, G>A,o«R,y £th Session, Plenary Meeting, 30|st Meeting, 
2 Kovember, I960, p* 336. 
168, See Swadesh Mehta, 'The Organisation of International 
Force ; An Indian Viev«, International Studi6a^^f.2gg. 
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not probably have been at the disposal of tiie UN but at the 
disposal of tii© domlnaiit bloc*" And for India there was the 
grave threat of such a force being created for the piarpose 
169 
of settling the Kashmir dispute* At that time tSie Kashmir 
170 
issue vas under the active considfratlon of the UN. The 
Indian stand on the Korean issue had ali'eady antagonised 
the United Statest The United States and Britain did not , 171 
appear to appreciate India's stand on the Kashmir dispute. 
Particularly^  India's refusal to accept Dixon's recoiamenda^  
tions and Di:Kon*s views on India had generated a great deal 
of misunderstanding between India and the United States and 
172 
England, Though the question of introducing foreign troops 
into Kashmir had not been raised till then, it did not take 
long for such a proposal to bo advanced. This was done during 173 the efforts at mediation undertaken by the Commonwealth 
mainly on Pakistan's insistence. This proposal was accepfe-
rn able to Pakistan while M i a rejected it. 
169, See B.S,Goswami, The Commonwealth And The Uniting For 
170, S12ES1 pp, 
171, See sehru, op*cit., pp, 466-468, 
172, P«470* Also see Sisir Gupta^  yaphf^ jr ^..... .^ p, ri t. ^  
), 216-'" - - - - - . _ .. . 
.sputei 
t" p, 216»223 for a detailed account of this phase of the 
I B ,
173, See Sisir Gupta, Kashmiri op.cit*, pp.227-228 for 
details, 
174, Ibid, 
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Soon after the failure of this Coaaioavealtti effort, the 
dispute was discussed in the Security Council, in February 
176 1961. It was here that further and final confirmation of 
India's fears was provided, for the United States and United 
176 
Kingdom sponsored a resolution proposing, interalia, that the 
United Nations' representatives be authorised to consider the 
possibility of raising a force, from aiaong the united Nations 
members or locally. 2he British delegates explained that a 177 neutral force was essential for a successful pl0biscite# 
178 
Not suA'prisingly, jj^ dia^ g reaction was quick and sharps 
"It is surprising that any one should think of suggesting to 
us that we should admit foreign troops whose withdrawal was an 
essential feature of our independence. It does not matter in 
what guise they are sought to be introduced or by whomj we 
shall not permit this to happen." 
It is easy to see now why Nehru did not take a firm 
stand against China on Tibet. The only way in which Nehru 
could do that was by seeking tiie support of Britain and the 
United States. But the policies of the United States, espe-
cially, towards Asian nations were highly provocative. It was 
176. See liSAiiiJ., 1951, pp. 340-349. 
176. Ibid, 
177. Ibid. 
178. See Wehru, op.cit.,pp. 466-468 and 471-472. She quotation is form a speech by India's representative at the United Nations in 1962. Cited in Sisir Gupta, Kashmiry op.cit,,p.2gi. ^ * 
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not at all prepared to accept India's Nonaligiiinent and ot^er 
policies* Nehru, on the otiieriiand, was convinced that his 
foreign policy vas sound. He vas also convinced tiiat the United 
States* policies towards China were wrong. He had pressed for 
a peaceful solution of the Korean as well as the Tibetan prob-
lems. He had disowned all political and territorial claims 
in Tit)et. It would have been difficult for him and the Govern-
ment of India to seek military or even political support from 
the i^'est in toe defence of India's vital interests when they 
were determined to eliminate all foreign influences from Asia, 
If India had sought suc^  help^ there was no assurance that the 
179 
United States and Britain would stand by India without a price. 
Iheir stand on the Kashmir issue was unfavourable to India. 
Even if the United States and Britain extended diplomatic recog-
nition to Tibet it would have been of no help to India. Tibet 
would have become another Formosa or Korea, for China had 
already occupied it and it could not have been forced out of it, 
even by the use of force. And finally, if India had sought 
Western support on Tibet China would surely have championed 
the Cause of Pakistan in Kashmir and if the western Powers did 
179. See P.C.Chakravarty, op.cit., p.36 for the contrary view, 
Jii 1948 tiie United States was reported to have told a 
Tibetan delegation, that Tibet was a part of Chinai See 
P, M^iddle Ground Between America And Russia* Forelen 
Affairs (Vol. 32, No.2, January 1964), p. 263. Uiey 
had refused to receive]^  a Tibetan delegation in 1949^  
See Kark C.Freer, op.cit., p. 373. 
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not support it, Pakistan might have joined hands with caaina 
and aiso the Soviet Union, thus increasing the danger to 
Indians security. 
Nehru's, policy, on the other hand., was to solve Ihdia's 
disput^ with neighbours without outside interference. He was, 
therefore, determined to secure the friendship of China which 
was deterjnined to secure its rights everywhere, by force, if 
necessary* Nehru, therefore, decided to pay the price deman-
ded by Ciiina for friendship with India ty allowing China to 
180 occupy Tibet and ending its autonomy. ISae then Deputy MinistQri 
181 
of External Affairs, Keskar, said that the "Government is not 
unmindful of protection of our frontiers adjoining Tibet. I 
may go furthfjr and say that the best vay of protecting that 
frontier is to have a friendly Tibet and a friendly China. 
It is obvious that such a complicated and big frontier cannot 
be well protected if we have a border country which becomes 
hostile to us «•»•« "Thus the Government of India appears to 
have attached greater importance to the jdacMohan Line and 
182 183 NEFA and to the Himalayan states and Burma, than to Tibet 
180« B.N.Rau told the General Assembly that "For us,....the 
friendship of China is desirable and natural. Ve wish 
to (ki everything possible to promote the friendly rela-
tions tiiat now prevail between us, because we feel that 
a free and independent China marching with India will be 
the most effective stabilizing factor in Asia." Supra. 
n.l33, p. 10. . 
181. See Parliamentary Debates^ Part II, Vol. IX, No*17, 
28 March, 19S1, col. 6320. 
182. See above pp.i44-4&See also Taya Zinkin 'Indian Foreign 
Policy t An Interpretation of Attitudes', Vforld Pblltlca 
(Vol.VII, No. 2 January 1956), pp. 204-206. See also 
Purushottam L.Mehlsa, op.cit., p. 19. 183. See C.H.Alexandrowicz, 'India And The Tibetan Tragedy", iQl^^n Affairs (Vol.31 No.3,April, 1953),for a good ana-lysis of the importance of Tibet for India's security. 
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for India's defence and security. It was for this reason that 
India did not support the Tibetan issue in the United Nations, 
after advising the Tibetan authorities to take the issue to the 
World body, for, by this time the Korean War had reached a 
stalemate and there were signs that the parties might start 
negotiations. India felt that it might still profit if it did 
not antagonise China further. Towards this end India opposed 
the fflove to brand China as aggressor in the First Coimaittee of 
the General Assembly on January 2o, 19S1, and voted against the 
185 resolution iri the General Assembly on February l, 1961, And, 
186 
as pointed out by Harold C.Hinton, "China also seemed anxious 
to retain as much official Indian goodwill as possible because 
of its involvement in the Korean war, in which friendly neutra-
lity on the part of India was a great help to Communist side." 
Towards this end m o Tse-Tung visited the Indian Embassy in 187 
Peking on Jan^ uary 26, 1951, the first anniversajry of the 
Indian Republic and spoke of the Indian people as a fine people, 
their thousands of years friendship^ with China and also spoke 
warmly about Nehru and looked forv^ ard to see him in China soon. 
184, See Hark C»Freer, op.cit., pp. 376»377, 
1B&* Mmmt n.l69, 
186, Harold C.Hinton, op.cit., p. 447. 
187* See In Two Chinas^  op.cit., p. 126, It^perhaps significa-nt tiiat Mao*s getsture came after Indians refusal to can China 'Aggressor*. 
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Daerefore, vhen the Sino-Sovi©t block finally decided, 
in July 1961, to accept a stalemate truce along the SStSti 
188 parallel in Korea Indians major objective of restoring the 
statusquo prior to Jiane 25, 1950, 'Mas achieved, 3iidia*s stand 
189 
was vindicated* Maturaliy^  India was called upon to shoulder 
the responsibility of conducting the armistice negotiations 
which began in 19gl» The Indian policy throughout the 
arxflistice talks continued to be governed fajy the desire to pacify 
China as far as possible. The Government of India kept in close 
contact with the Government of China through their Ambassador 
Panikkar who had played a major role in shaping India's foreign 
policy towards China. India was not willing to waste this 
opportunity of establishing permmient r&proachment witii China 
and through China with the Soviet Union. 
M^ssm^i 
!mis policy of India and the support given to it by the 
ot^er nonaligned states in the l&iited Nations led to a reasse-
ssment of attitude on the part of the Sino-Soviet bloc towards 
these states. They realised that tiiese states could be kept 
190 awa^ y from the western bloc* On the other hand, the west began 
188. See IaSaHaJm ISSlf PP» 241»242. 
189. See B.Sriiva Rao & C.Kondapi, op.cit., p. 309. 
190. Stalin himself appears to have initiated this move when 
he granted an interview to the Indian Ambassador. See 
K.P. S. Menon, They Flying Trokia (O.U.P. London, 1963), 
pp. 26-.29, 
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a new drive to recruit allies in Asia to contain the Sine-
Soviet threat of expansion* This was diametrically opposed 
to the policies of Nehru, and Masser, the latter having come in-
to power 4ust then in the United Arab Republic, at the head 
of a military Government. It was this struggle between the 
nonalignei:^  states and the power blocs ^ at culminated in. the 
Suez Crisis of 1966 as wiH be seen in the next chapter* 
An early indication of the tilings to come was given^  
when, in August 1963, the composition of the Korean Political 
Conference, came up before the General Assembly of tiie l&iitod 
Nations, while a ma^ jority of states including Britain favoured 
India's participation, the United States and the Latin Ameri-
can States opposed it* Indians displeasure with the United 
States was forcefully expressed by Nehru in a speech in Parlia-
191 ment on September 17, 1963. He said, inter alia, thatr 
"Cex'tain interesting consequences flow from 
this Vote* If the voting is analysed, you 
will see that of the twenl^one countries 
who voted against India, eighteen were from 
the Americas, seventeen from what is called 
latin America* How I have tkie greatest 
respect for the countries of Latin America* 
But the facts stand out that nearly the whole 
of Europe and nearly the whole of Asia wanted 
one thing in this Political conference, while 
a number of counties all from the Americas, 
dl.d not want it* They have as much right not 
to want it as otSiers have to want* But the 
191, Hehm, op*cit., p» 429 (Italics are jaine)* 
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"xtf.lg M^ J^^ ggl^ j^ fiK .^Qffi^ S^j^  toHirtQnaf to 
^^ YQ, PlQg^ Afl 
tolas t^ e .gQia^w is 
t^ y^ alK^ t; OQ ftQt prgpoge , jgagy^ at 
Tiiis was the crux, of til© differences between Jiidia and 
the Qaited States, not only in the Korean dispute but in tbe 
whole range of problems bet&zeen India and the West. A Careful 
3 92 study of India's refusal to sign the Peace Treaty with Japan,,' 
would reveal the same basic conflict of interests* Also» as 
193 
one JDadian scholar has observed tiie debate on tiie korean 
political conference" •*«,«concided with another incident*« 
nafljely the dismissal of Sheikii Abdullah in Kashmir on August 
8, with which rumours had connected OS intrigue," More signi-
ficant than tiiiS| waS| perhaps the fact that Pakistan voted 
against India's participation in the Korean Political Confer-
ence, insplte of a request from Nehru to Zafrullah Khan. This 
was mentioned ty Nehru in his letter to the Pakistani PriaiB 
mnister on August 28, 1953. Just a week earlier the two 
192. See Documents for 19S1> pp. 606»611 for Correspondence 
between India and lihited States on the issue* See alsp 
J.C«Kundra op*cit., pp.140-147 for an account of India's 
stand on the issue. 
193w J*C«,Kundra, op#cit#, p. 140.^  
i m ^ s p. 273. 
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Prime Ministers had come to an agreement at Delhi on Kashmii 
196 
ansi had issued a joint CSocaauaique on August 20$ 1963 whici: 
said, inter alia, thats 
"Ihe Kashmir dispute v;as especially discussed 
at some length. It ^ as their firm opinion 
t^ at this should be settled in accordance 
witii the wishes of the people of that state, 
with a view to pspomoting their well being and 
causing the least disturbance to the life of 
the people of the state. Hie imsst feasible 
Method af ajscartalnizjg tbe wishes of the people 
was by a fair and impartial plebiscite. Such a 
plebiscite had been proposed and agreed to some 
yeajrs ago* Rcogress, however, could not be made 
because of lack of agreement in regard to cert* 
ain preliminary issues. Ihe Prime Ministers 
s^ re© that these preiiminaiy issues would be 
considered them directly in- order to arrive 
at agreements in regard to tiiem# These agree-
^nts would have to be given effect to and the 
next step would be the appointment of a Plebis-
cite Administrator, Jn order to fix some kind 
of a provisional timetable it was decided that 
the Plebiscite Administeator should be appoin-
ted by the end of April, 1964, Previous to that 
date, the preliminary issues referred to above 
si^ >uld be decided and action in implementation 
thereof should be taken." 
What Nehru achieved through this Communique was the 
elimination, of the Halted Nations from the picture, at any 
rate, for the time being, without giving any concessions to 
Pakistan* The elimination of the United Nations meant the 
elimination of the Western pressure upon India. The importance 
196. Cited in j;^ ., p.2?o< 
- 199 «» 
attached to this aspe<?t Nehru became evident when he wrote 
196 
to the Prim© Minister of Pakistan on September 3, 1963 that 
"ir Kashmir becomes also an arena of conflict between the great 
powers, then not only India and Pakistan but also, the people of 
Kashmir play a secondary part." 
The acceptance of military aid from the tfiilted States 
by Pakistan appeared to undo this achievement of Nehru. This 
appears to have been one of tJxe important reasons for his 
bitter opposition to the United States' military aid to Pakls-
197 tan. He told parliament on March 1| 1964, thati 
"This grant of military aid l;^  the United States 
to Pakistan created a grave situation for us In 
India and for Asia. It adds to our tensions. 
It makes it much more difficult to .solve the 
problems which have confronted India and Pakis* 
tan. It is vitally necessary for India and 
Pakistan to solve their problems and develop 
friendly and co-operative relations !Ihese 
problems can only be solved by the two coun-
tries themselves and not by the intervention of 
others. It is, Indeed, this intervention of 
other countries In the past that has come in 
the way of their solution. Recently a new and 
more friendly atmosphere had been created bet-
ween India and Pakistan and direct consul-
tations between the two Prime Ministers progress-
was being made towards the solution of these 
problems. That progress has now been checked 
and fresh difficulties have arisen. 
196. JHSSa?."' 
197. See la^., 1964, Part II, Vol. I, March 1, 1964, Cols. 963-74. 
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military aid belAg given W the United 
States to Pakistan is a form of intervention 
in these problems which is likely to have more 
far reaching results than the previous types 
of intervention." 
198 
Earlier, in a speech on Fetouary 22, 1964, Nehru said 
that he had no "ill feeling against Pakistan and certainly not 
against America." But in his statement of March 1, 1954, he 
demanded the withdrawal of American personnel from the UN 
observers group in Kashmir, on the groui^ i that the Uhited 
States was no more impartial ia India-Pakistan disputes. 
All this seems to have confirmed the Chinese in the 
belief that India was not in the Western camp. As Harold 
199 
Hinton has written China then appears to have decided to 
use India t;o put '^ pressure oa Britain and through Britain on 
the United States for a favourable settlement in Indo-China, 
This was one of tiie most important aspects of the complex Sino-
Indlan bargaining that seems to have begun at the end of 1953> 
when an Indian delegation arrived in the CPR for the ostensible 
purpose of negotiating an agreement on Tibet," 
Inclia, on the otherhand, not only "•••••wanted to put 
trade and pilgrimages between India and Tibet on a more regular 
200 and satisfactory footing,•••• "but also to secure concessions 
198, Nehru, op.cit., p, 471-
199, Op.cit., p. ^8. 
200, p. 283. 
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from China on Soutii East Asia, The result was the agreement 
201 
on Tibet signed in April, 1954. lo quote Hintoni «Nehru 
evidently hoped that, hy getting the CPR to subscribe to the 
'Five principles* of Peaceful Co-existence', taking an active 
part in the Geneva conference on Indo-China, and assuming the 
chairmanship of the International Control Commissions for the 
three Indo»(3iinese states, India could shield Burma, and if 
possible the rest of South East Asia except for Vietnam from 
the Chinese and the NortJi Viefeiamese." 
Xhus Nehru thought that he had at last arrived at an 
202 
understanding with China, Therefore he declared that India 
had not done anything better than this in Foreign Policy since 
independence* It would be unfair to &ay that Nehru believed 203 
that China would uphold the agreement* He wrote to the 
Congress party's state units ttiat *'It is said, how can you put 
faith in sudi declarations? In international affairs, one can 
never be dead certain and the friends of today might be enemies 
of tomorrow* That may he so. Are we th^ to begin with enmity 
and suspicion and not give any other approach a chance? Surely, 
it is better, with nations as with individuals, to hope for 
201* M'i P» 
202. iut^., Vol.IS, Part II, 18 May 1964, col. T.664. ISiie 
statem^t is in Hindi. • 
203. Cited in P.C.Chstoavarty, op.cit., p.64, n.21. Also see 
G»M»Kahin, op»cit», p.7. See also Toya Zinkln, op.cit., 
p. 204. 
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and expect tlie best but at the same time to be prepared for 
any eventuality*" Hetiru was asking for time to be able to 
stand upto the Ghickese chaHea^e, It vjould Have bem folly 
to challenge China at this stage as China had demonstrated its 
willingness to defend its interests by its intervention in the 
Korean war, After all, China had been accorded great power 
status by the Big Four at Geneva* For Nehru China was the 
205 
third gr^at power. It was for this reason that he did not 
insist, even at this stage, on Chinese recognition of tiie 
MeMahon Line. He said that if this were done, then trouble 206 
would have started iamediately, instead of years later^  Per* 
haps the Government of India believed that it would take some 
time for China to renew its claims in this area, because of 
the Panch Sheel. And if it violated these principles, Jndia 
could profit, as it infact did. It was for this reason that 
China appears to have resorted to small scale operations on the 
borders aaid to strengthen its position before making its inten-
tions plain. 
13:1© panch SheSl was, therefore, a tactical device by 
which Nehru wsaited to contain China as he explained in 1964 
204. See PP- 2-3.' 
205, See Nehru, op.cit#, p. 305. 
206* n.60, Col. 1986. Also see Nehru, op»cit., pp. 
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207 itself, t^iiat h© -was not satisfied -with i&ie Panch Siaeel, -was 
also evident jDrom the fact tiiat he took the lead in arranging 
the BaAdung Conference of 1965, with a view to counteracting 
the South East Asia Treaty organisation and to seeking further 
conflriaation of China's acceptance of the principles of peaceful 
208 co-existanee. 
'^toLila Jn^ la ^jas ^Ith thesa pxolalms, impor-
tant changes had taken place in the United Arab Republic since 
1962, which were destined to bring ^e two countries very close 
to each other and to have a far-reaching affect on the outside 
world, ''^'e shall now turn to these developments• 
207. Nehru, bp.cit., pp. 303-304* ,.See Taya 2inkin, op.cit., pp. 20a-204. 
20S. See Kahin, op»cit», pp* 4-7. 
C H A P T E R V 
INDIA AND mE SUEZ AND WSSI A S M CRIfiKS 
Before ex^ining the role of Infiia in tiie Suez Crisis, 
it is necessary to trace briefly the evolution of the Non-
alignment of the United Arab Republic. For, the Suez Crisis, 
as shall be seen in this chapter, was important from the point 
of view of toe emergence of Nonalignment as a force in inter-
national politics* 
Roots of Arab Monaligniaenti 
The Nonalignment of the United Arab Republic is not 
essentiaHj/' a product of the deep anti-ts^ esternism of the Arabs 
(which was the popular form of Arab Nationalism), as is gene-
rally believed. Even Arab Nationalism was not based on mere 
hatred of the West. It was an expression of profound indigna-
tion at what Fayez A. Sayegh^has called "the callous indifferen-
ce to past and continuing western injustices in the Arab world" 
and a demcmd for justice. The history of Western policies in 
the Arab world is a chronology of mounting injustices, which 
!• Dynamics of Neutralism In The Arab World^  op.cit., p. 173. 
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207 culminated In the »supreme injustice' of the creation of 
Israel, depriving over a million Arab Palestinians of basic 
V 
and fundamental Human Rights# 
The Arabs had equal aversion for Communism and the 
Soviet Union also joined the v.'estern Pollers in supporting 
3 
the Zionist cause* As Prof, Boutras Boutras-Ghali has put it, 
thus created "a crisis of confidence between the Arabs and ttie 
rest of the world vhich had deliberately espoused the Zionist 
cause." The predicament in which the Arabs found themselves 
•I 
then the East-West struggle began in the mid 1940's has been 
4 
well described t^  Fayez A* Sayeghj "With no love for communism, 
no faith in Western democracy, and no respect for the carica-
ture of *d©iaocracy* bequeathed by Europe to the Arab world, 
Araos lacked all the elementary pre-requisites of interest in 2, Jtd,, p„172. There are many books and articles by Western 
as well as Arab scholars depicting this history of Western 
imperialism in the Arab world. Among those of special 
interest are the following. Arnold Toynbee^ 'Britain And 
The Arabs « The Need For A New Start', Ii-^ ternational Affairs 
(Vol.40,No.4, October, 1964)} Albert Hourani, 'The Decline 
of the west in the Middle East - I and II, (Vol.19, 
Nee^ -l^  Nos. 1 and 2, January 1953 and April 1953); Brigi^  
Stephen Longrig,'The Decline of the west in the Middle East 
An Alternative View», Jd., (Vol.l9,No.3 July, 1963)} Edward 
Atiyatl The Arabs (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middle 
Sex, Revised,1968)} John Campbell, Defence of The Kiddle 
East (Harper & Brothers, New Xork, 1968)} and Erskine B. 
Childers, Common Sense About The Arab World, (Victor 
Gollanez Ltd., London, I960). 
3. Op.cit., p.342, Britain, said Nasser, in 1968, had betrjjyed the Arabs in Palestine - See Nasser*s SDeeches^  1968,pp„ 104, 
Supra^  n.l, p. 172, 
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that ideological 'Great Debate* which the Cold war purported 
to be. If tiiey lent deaf eai's to Soviet professions of 'peace-
ful intent', Arabs also greeted ^ i^th sco^ n the righteous* 
claim that they represented •freedom' and 'justice* which was 
put forward by the very powers whose foi'ces had divided and 
ruled the Arab world and suppressed Arab liberation struggles, 
and whose policies had so recently perpetrated supreme injus-
tice in Palestine* The title 'Free world* preempted for itself 
by the western bloc, rang hollow in Arab ears." 
The Arabs were, therefore, justified in opposing all 
western moves to bring the Arab states into western alliances 
against Communism* The resignation of Salih Jabi's Cabinet in 
Iraq on January 27,1948, following popular resentment against 
the Portsmonth treaty between Iraq and Britain signed on 
a 
January 16,, 1948, was one of the earliest manifestations of 
this aspect of Arab Nationalism in the post-Second World War 
period. 111 the United Arab Republic proper, there were tech-
nical discussions in 1949 between it and Britain for working 
out an air defence scheme which failed because the Government 
of the day lacked sufficient support to commit themselves to 6 such an agreement* 
6. See Survey^  1939^46, p, 164, 
i^M P* 146-147. 
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Ihe UAK and the Korean Crisis; 
Looked at from this.angle, the United Arab Republic's 
response to the June 27, 1950, resolution of the Security 
Council authorising ttie use of force against North Korea, is 
perfectly understandable. Explaining his country's stand on 
7 
June 30, 1960, Fawzi, in an oft quoted statement said j "I am 
now in a position to state, on behalf of m^ Government, that 
Hgypt would have abstained from voting on the resolution adop-
ted by the Security Council on 27 J\ane.». .•had, the refflcesenta-
tive of Egypt been able to participate in the voting. 
"This attitude is dictated by the following two reasons; 
first, the conflict under consideration is in fact but a new 
phase in the series of divergences betweeh the western and 
eastern blocs, divergences which threaten world peace and secu-
rity, secondly, there have been several cases of aggression 
against peoples and violations of the sovereignl^ r and unity of 
the territories of States Members of the UK. Such aggressions 
have been submitted to tiie UH, which did not take any action to 
put an end to them as it has done now in the case of Korea*" 
8 
Tnis, says Prof« Ghali,was the first official manifee-
tation of Egyptian neutralism towards the Cold War". And 
7. See S.C.O.R.T V, Year- No.17, 476th Meeting, June 30,1950, 
8. Op.cit., p. 343, 
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sPayez A.syegh has written that this was an excellent illustratlor 
of the Arab "indifference to the difficulties experienced by 
the western Powers." Neither of these views appears to explain 
accurately the United Arab Republic's policy in the Korean 
Crisis, for these views lay stress on only one aspect of the 
explanation offered by Fawze, to the neglect of the other,which 
appears to have been the aiore important consideration. As 
10 
Georgiani^ -G.Stevens has observed correctly j "Two strsuads of 
logic underliiy the Arab position in the Ko^ e^an case, one was 
their arguiaent that the same yardstick applied to Korea should 
also be applied to Palestine, where in their view, Israel has 
trespassed on Arab territory. But more important from the long 
range view point, was their almost instinctive more toward a 
neutral and mediating role in company with India, Indonesia, 
Iran, Pakistan, Burma and Afghanistan." 
It has ali'eady been indicated that while accepting the 
United Natious action against North Korea Jiidia itself exp-
ressed the desire to end the conflict by peaceful negotiations, 
and made attempts in this regard. And the United Arab Republic 
had voted in favour of the June 26, I960, resolution of the 
9. ,SUDra^  n. 1. 
10. 'Arab neutralism And Bandung', Mddle East Journal'. 
(Vol. 11,No.2, Spring 1967), p. 141. 
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Security Council ^ hich called for the withdrawal of North Korean 
forces from SoutJi. Korea* Speaking on this occasion in the 
473rd meeting of tii© Security Council on June 26, 19S0, Fauzi 11 
said; "I welcome all action aiming at the cessation of the 
conflict in Korea* indeed it is exhilarating to note tiie 
e-nergetic attitude which the Security Council appears to be tak-
ing and which is in contrast to several earlier cases. 
And in the 288th meeting of the General Assembly on 12 
September 28, 1960, Salah El-Din Bey, explained the United Arab 
Republic's abstention from voting on the June 27 resolution of 
the Security Council, in l^ e following wordsj " I know that we 
alone have taken t^is stand. Nevertheless, we do not feel isola-
ted. On the contrary, w© feel indeed that we have voiced tiie 
sentiments of small and medium states and that the great Powers 
themselves, when they have attitude properly weighed up, 
can not but approve it and welcome its objectives.,**. 
"Fii'st is our concern for peace and our fear that it 
would be disturbed by the long standing conflict between the two 
blocs, a conflict which has of late become so fierce that anxiety 
and fear prevail everywhere.#•.*.. 
11. See S.C.Q.R... V Year, No..16, 473rd Meeting, 26 Junet I960, p* 13» 
12. See 6th Session, Plenary Meetings, 288th Meeting, 28 September, I960, p. 163
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"Secondly, there is the often observed practice of 
differentiating in treatment between states and peoples.* 
"It has been alleged that Egypt did not condemn aggre-
ssion as others have done. No> indeed •»• ^ ypt would un-
doubtedly be affiong these who abhor and condemn it the most, 
since it still continues to suffer from the violation of its 
rights. Egypt justly calls upon the Uiited Nations to use 
one and the same measure in all cases of aggression and reso-
lutely to repel aggression with the same alacrity wherever it 
may occur." 
to 
"The two reasons which led Egypt /./abstain from voting 
i 
on the Security Comcil resolution of 27 J\ane last, are 
traceable, in fact, to one single reason t the love of peace 
and concern for its protection*" 
For tShe rest one finds Fauzi co-operating with B.N.Rau, 
in every proposal putvjard by India in the Uhited Nations to 
13 
bring a peaceful settlement of the dispute. Thus the United 
Arab Republic's stand on the Korean Crisis had been less 
13. See G.A.Q.R.y V Session, Plenary Meetings, 324th Mtg., 14 December 1950, pp. and 669-660} G.A*Q.R.t 5th 
Session, First Conanittee, 429th Meeting, 22 January 
1951, p. 5285 G«A.Q.R.y V Session, First Committee, 431st 
Mtg., 26 January 1961, p.661; J^., 436th Mtg., 29 Jan. 
1951, pp.681-682- 437th Meeting," 30 January 1961, 
Pp. ^ 690-691. .an<i:G. A.O.R.'6th Session; Plenary Meetings, 
327th Meeting, 1 February, 1961, p. 695. 
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negative than iias generally De'en realised. But ttie United Aj-ab 
Republic had not yet become a nonaligned state in the real 
sense. This was achieved by Nasser. 
Arab Konalignment as evolved by Nasser was first of all» 
a demand for the liquidation of British and other foreign bases 
and armies from the Arab countries. It was thus inherent in 
Arab Nationalism and was one of the main aims of Nasser*s revo-
lution of 1962, But it differed from the popular form of Arab 
Nationalism in tiie sense that it was a rational policy basedL 
on the realities of the distribution of Power in the world, 
where as the basis of Arab Nationalism was purely emotional. 
This was where,, one has to sayt Nasser differed from tbe Muslim 
Brotherhood, for example. It is one of the great achievements 
of Nasser that he had given a rational content to Arab Natio-
alism by evolving Arab Nonalignment and identifying it with 
14 Arab Nationalisaa. 
This difference between Nasser's Nonalignment suid Arab 
Nationalism was well reflected in tiie denunciation of liie Anglo-
UAR treaty of 1964 on the evacuation of the Suez base, by the 
16 Muslim Brotherhood and tbe Communists. It is the failure to 
14, See Nasser's Speeches^  1969, op.cit., pp. 621, 623-624. 
iind G.A,Nasser, The Philosophy of The Revolution^ op.cit,, 
pp. 61-63, 
16. See Ishak Musa Husaini, The >fc)slem Brethem i The Greatsi^ t^  
of Modern is^ian^.^  ^ fovetnentSf (Khayat's College Book Coopera-
tive, Beirut, Lebanon, 1966), pp. 130-147 for an account 
of the conflict beti^ een Nasser and tiie Brotherhood, 
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see the difference that appears to be responsible for Prof. 
Ghali's^^observation that tiie treaty "was incompatible with 
Egyptian neutrality" and that "The circulation of leaflets 
denouncing the Suez agreement by Leftis^groups and the Muslim 
Brotherhood was another confirmation of the strength of neutra-
lism in Egypt." 
As indicated earlier Nasser agreed to allow the British 
to come back within a period of seven years, in case of an 
attack on the Arab League States or on Turkey (Article 4), 
because firstly, the United Arab Republic was not strong enough 
to defend itself in case of an attack, secondly there was not 
much of a chaiice of an attack from the Soviet Union which had 
not yet shown much interest in the Arab lands. He had grasped 
the meaning of the cold war very soon after coming into power, 
though he could not formulate suitable policies immediately. 
17 
As Leornard Binder has put it, he had begun to criticise the 
United States towards the end of 1953 for its "failure to 
grant Egypt any development loans in the fourteen month^since 
the revolutioni" Nasser could see that the cold war was being 
waged on the economic front. Again, as the same writer has 
16. Op.cit., p. 344. He also does not seem to distinguish 
between neutralism and neutrality as his account of the 
origins of Nonalignment suggests (p. 341). 
17. The IdeolQgjeal Revolution In The Middle East. (John Wiley & Sons, inc., New York, London, 1964), p. 238. 
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obse2've^"0n April 19, 1964, he made a thinly veiled threat 
that he might seek arms from the Eastern bloc if the ^ ^st did 
not comply with his request. On ttie second anniversary of the 
revolution he made one of his most revealing statements about 
Egyptain foreign policy and his grasp of the cold war situation, 
he said that ttiis was no longer the age of power politics, but 
an age in which the great powers were vying for the friendship 
of the lesser powers# Egypt, he announced, would withhold its 
friendship from those tvho did not co-operate with her«" 
19 
iQUs thejre does not appear to have been any * ambivalence' 
in Nasser's stand on the evacuation treaty^  He had to grant 
the concession to Britain because there was no other way in 
which he could secure a quick withdrawal of the British forces 
from the Suez base* And he must have felt that there was no 
harm in giving this concession, when there was no danger of an 
actual Soviet attack in the near future. In this sense he was 
far more realistic than either the British statesmen or their 20 
friend Nurl of Iraq. Further, this concession was offered to 
Britain in an Egyptian note of December 1964 demanding the 
revision of the 1936 treaty, which Britain had rejected at the 
18. J^., p. 239, 
19. Ibid. 
20. .^Qj, contrary view see Slizebeth Monro©, Britain* s 
MOMhl? In ffie Sftfft? (Chatto & Windus, 
London, 19<j3), p. 181, 
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207 time. Above all, Nassei' vas in need of economic and military 
aid vhich was expected to follow from the Ifeiited States and 
Britain after the evacuation treaty* 
liie belief, therefore, that Nasser was pro-west at this 
stage was without any basis. His signature of tfee evacuation 
treaty or his desire to secure aid from Western sources, was 
no more or less a sign of pro-westernism, than Nehru* s deci-
sion to keep India in Commonwealth and similar policies werei 
Dhe treaty with Britain was for Nasser the 'final liberation 
22 
from imperialism'. Though the British and American statesmen 
did not understand this at the time, there is now general agree. 
ment among western writers that they were wrong in their belief 23 and calculations. In an able analysis one writer has pointed 
out that "Ihis assumption was an unhappy illustration of one 
d of the commonest failures, of communication and understanding 
between Asian nationalists and the West," This is an under-
observed statement. As ta:ie same waiter has/a more penetrating observa-
24 tion was made by Albert Houram When he pointed out that such 
21» See Georgiana G.Stevens, op.cit*, p, 142. 
22p Cited in Soutras Boutras - Ghali, op.cit., p. 344^  
23. Georgiana G.Stevens, op.cit., p. 143. See also Charles Issawi, 'Negotiation From Strenth? A Reappraisal of Western-Arab Relations', International Affairs (Vol. 36,> No»l, 1969), p.l. 
24. Suprnj n.Sj Vol.19, No.lj January, 1963, pp. 33 and 39. 
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an asstimption vas derived froa the "complacency of force", 
characteristic of Western povjers in Asia for imperialism, is 
* 
"self-confident force imposing itself upon resentful weakness^ 
2Sf 
As a British scholar has v?ritten "while Neguib and his 
colleagues were not outwardli^  anti-western, it soon became 
clear that they were no more willing than Farouk's Ministers 
to be huiTied into a defence fact centred upon some new arrange-# 
ment for the canal base secret circulars distributed t(y 
the Pre© officers' Organisation soon after their seizure of 
power showed distinct neutralist leanings and the KLnister of 
State for Propaganda (afterwards National Guidance) in the new 
Government, Fathi Ridwan, had been an advocate of a nonaggression 
pact with Bussia. By the end of the year these tendencies were 
sufficiently in evidence for the western idea of the MEDo to 
look distinctly a nonstartor. in a dinner at the officers' Club 
in Cairo given to ^ e Syrian dictator Shishakli, on December 
14til, Negiub forO^adowed, ihe basic principles of the foreign-
policy of his own successor, Nasser, when he said that i^n these 
difficult times, when the two great blpcs are waging one of the 
greatest struRAles that history has ever known^  we wish to prove 
to the world that this part oi' the wnr\d belongs to its citl7.eng 
26, Northedge, British Foreigi> (George Allen & 
Unwin Ltd«, London, 1962), p. 213 (Italics mine). 
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and no longer accents tutelage of any one''l This is as su-
ccint and clear an explanation of Nonalignment as one could 
find in the speeches of Nehru and Nasser* 
Moreover, x^ hen India, Bui'maj Ceylon, Pakistan and 
Indonesia could remain outside power blocs, there vas no reasoE 
Mhi^ p. the Arab States could not do so. After all, all these 
nations had taken tiie UN rather seriously and they had been 
active aexabers of the UN froin tJrie start, The experience they 
had gained in the UN made them feel secure without alliances 
as already indicated. 
For the Arabs, except for a few like Miri of Iraq, 
the defence of the Arab States had to be their primary res-
ponsibility and only secondarily of the outsiders and the 
UN, 2hey had after all concluded the Arab defaice treaty in 
27 
the Arab League, prior t» the Revolution of 1052 to comter 
the British moves to form a Middle East Defence Organisation, 
One of the requirements, for the success of. this policy 
was the Nonalignment of all Arab States. Another was close 
26, F.C, Norliieage, BrjU^ l^gg^Am .Polto (George Allen & 
Unwin Ltd,, London, 1962), p.213 (Italics mine). 
* 
27. See jXC. Hurewit^ Diplomacy In The Hear And Middle East^  
A Documentary Record s 1914^1966 (D.Van Nostrand Company, 
Inc., Princeton, New Jeresy, 1966), pp. 312-314, 
^ Pakistan became aligned in 1964, 
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links vj'ith other nonaligned states. Nasser got the opportunity 
of making Konaligmaent an all Arab issue when Iraq decided to 
28 join the Baghdad Pact sponsored by Dulles, Nasser quickly 
29 
asserted his leadership of Arab Noftalignnient* Ihe Israeli 
military attack on the United Arab Republic's military frontier 
post at Gazaa on iEebruary 28, 1966, stressed the need for Arab 30* unity against Israel. Iraq's entity into tiie Baghdad Pact of 
31 
which Britain became a member on April 4, 1966, against 
Nasser's wish was not only a direct challenge to the concept 
of Arab nonalignment, but it also \«eakened the defence of Arab 
States against tfie Israeli threat of aggression. For in the Y 32 
British House of Commons, Eden assu^ ied Israel's friends on 
March 30, 1966, that when tdie Baghdad Pact "comes to be studiedg 
it will be seen that from the point of view of Israel it is 
likely to be a desirable development because this is the first 
time an Arab State is looking in other directions than simply 
28, See Dooumer^ ts fnr 1966^  pp. 286-289 for the text, 
29. See Nasser*a Speeches 1968^  op*cit., pp^  49-50, 133-134 
and 236-237. and 260 for Nasser's explanation of his 
opposition to this Pact. See also Anwar G,Che^e, 'Egyp-
tian Attitudes Towards Pam Arabism', ^ ^ddle East Joui^ nal, 
(Vol^  11, No»3, Smmrn 1967), pp, 263-64, 
: ©A See below, pp,282-90 for further discussion, 
f 
sijt. Supraf n.29, pp. 293-298* 
•3a. p. 292, 
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towards Israel," Notwithstanding the contradictory view 
33 
expressed hy Nuri in the Iraqi Parliament, in justification 
of the Turco-Iraqi pact that he always placed first 
the Zionist danger and toe need to sec\»:e the support of the 
v^ orld in order to eliminate th.a^  danger.," EdeA»s view seemed 
to represent the basic iBotive and purpose of the new defence 
pact. 
For, one of the important reasons for which the Onited 
States and Britain r.efus.ed to give military aid to Nasser, was 
that it might boost the United Arab Republic's strength vis-.a» 
vis Israel. They x^ ere trying to keep a balance^  between Israel 
34 and the Arabs which was favourable to the latter* This was 
the purpose with which Britain, the United States and Fr^ce 
3a issued the Tripartite Declaration of May 26, 1960, on the 
Middle East,, It was this vvestern position, which was opposed 
36 by the Arab League Council in its resolution of June 21,1950, 
that ultimately forced Nasser to conclude the arms deal with 
37 the Soviet Union through CzecloSlovakia in September 1966, 
33, See Elizabeth Monroe, op#cit., p# ,182 and gupra^  n.»29 p^ 286, 
34» See Charles D« Cremeans, oif*cit», p*146. 
36» S^ pra^ , n.28, pp, 308-309* 
36. pp. 310-311. 
57. pp. 402-406 and Supra^  n.29, pp. 370-372 for Nasser's 
announcement of 27 September 1966 of the arms deal. 
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after the failure of all attempts to secure arms from the 
west under conditions compatible with tSie sovereignty of the 
38 United Arab Republic. 
Just as the western leaders had earlier assumed that 
Nasser was pro-Kest, soon after the arms deal with the Soviet 
Union, they concluded that Nasser had turned pro-Communist 
and that the United Arab Republic was becoming a Soviet sate-
llite, In fact, Nasser was neither pro-East nor pro-west at 
any time, as already indicated. If the reason for tiie earlier 
assumption was the »complacency of force,* the reason for the 
latter was blind anti-communism of which Dulles was the chief 
exponent at the time. Dulles was blind to the fact that Nasser 
had not granted a single concession to the Communists in the 
United Arab Republic, even after the arms deal with the Soviet 
39 40 Union^' In fact, as one scholar 'has pointed out.. • .*effective 
co-operation between the Arab and Soviet cajOLCUssing groups at 
tlie UN had tc> wait the mid 1950's because the Soviet Union had 
endorsed tiie Palestine partition proposed in 1947. Only after 
38# See Charles D.Cremeans, op»cit., p.l44j Nasser's Speech^^, 
19S8, op.Git.pp.l82-lS3j Elizabeth Monroe, op.cit.,p, 
186j iT.C. Northedge, op.cit., p. 221,and K.K.Singh,'Posi-
tive Neutrality' in K.P.Karnnakaran, ed,, op.cit.,p.143. 38. See Walter Z.Laquew, Communism And Nationalism In Th^ fiddle aast. (Rout^ e^dge & Keg an Paul, London, 1966), 
p. 61. 
40. J.C. Hui^ a-Jitz, 'The UN And Disimperialism In OJie Middle 
East", International Organization, (Vol. 19 No.3, Summer 
1966;, p. 760. (Italics are mine). 
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the Soviet Union had given its unequivocal blessings in.1963 
to the Arabs position in the dispute with Israel did a prac-
tical basis appear for mutual support at the UN Arab.. 
Soviet Co-Qperation it should be stressed did not suggest that 
Egypt or any other state was subordinating itself to the Soviet 
Unions much less was any of them going Communist. Ayab 
such as Syriat IraOy andy most recently Algeria^  were throughly 
nationalist^ as attested to by their suppression of the local 
Nasser's clash with Khrushchev in 1959, as already 
indicated, gave ample proof of his determination to oppose 
all outside interference in Arab affairs* Even prior to this 
clash with Khrushchev, Nasser told a group of American Journa-
41 
lists on January 27, 1968i "If in future we face any pressure 
from the Soviet Union, we will definitely protest against it. 
If the Soviet Union attempts to bring pi'essure to bear upon us 
in order tofo'r^^us to accept their policies, we will criticise 
the Soviet Union, but nothing of the sort has happened*" 
Nor was Nasser's recognition of Communist China in 
May 1956 On indication of the United Arab Republic becoming 
a Communist satellite. This decision was in conformity with 
41. See Nasser's Speeches,, 1968, op.cit., p. 366. 
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th© Bandung principles of coexistence. Having accepted them, 
it would have been unfair, if not impolitic, on the part of 
Nasser, not to recognise Communist Oiina. Nasser might have 
also been advised ty both Tito and Hehru to take this step. 
However, Nasser had other sound reasons for recognising 
Communist China in May 1956, At that time the United States 
and Britain were trying to come to an understanding with the 
Soviet Union for an embargo on arms supply to the Middle East. 
42 
In the words of Al Gmnhouria^  the semi-official Arab daily 
"Gamal Abdel Nasser has recognised China and dealt a death 
blow to the projected western blockade of the Arab states.... 
People*s China is the biggest producer of armament at present 
and can supply the Arabs all the war material they need. Thus 
Gamal Abdel Nasser put Eden*s noose around Eden^s own neck." 
It was, therefore, as much an anti-Soviet move as it 
was anti-ivestern and was in the true spirit of Nonalignment. 
43 
As an American scholar has put it "the fact, that the Soviet 
Union without previous agreement with Egypt, had discussed 
Arab affairs with Britain was not viewed with satisfaction by 
Cairo. Most threatening, in the Egyptian view, was the 
possibility of an arms embargo, which had been conditionally 
42. Cited in David J.Dallin, op.cit., p. 404. 
43* Ibid. 
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accepted Khrushchev and Bulganin, and which vovCLd endanger 
Egypt's status as the emerging leader of Arab co.untries* 
•"These were considerations that lay behind the official 
recognition of Communist China t^y Nasser a few weeks after the 
visit of the two leaders to London. \^ hen Nasser*s spokesmen 
announced (May 27) that Egypt •could get all the aa^ ms 
needed from Communist China even if the UN imposed an embargo 
on weapons to the fdiddle East*j this appeared as a rebuff to 
Moscow*" 
Ihe opportunity to forge close links with other ilfro- • 
Asian states presented itself when Nasser was invited to the 
Bandung Conference. The most important achieven^nt for Nasser 
at this Conference was the friendship established with Chou 
44 
en-lai. Nasser is reported to have told an Indian journalist 
that "Here I learned and realised that the only wise policy for 
us Would be positive neutrality and nonalignment." Further, 
"It was also a source of inspiration about new trading patterns, 
for in the course of con'^ er^ a^tions with Chou en-lai Nasser 
arranged to sell Chlaa some of Egypt*s cotton suz-plus. He also 
confided Egypt's main perplexity — h i s difficulty in acquiring 
the modern ai'ms that he needed chiefly in order to please, his 
44, See Elizabeth Monroe, op»cit,, p. 166. 
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array supporters, though also of course to fortify his fron-
tier with Israel. Chou en*lai inquired why he did not buy 
46 arms from Eastern bloc countries." 
These were the origins of Nasser's arms deal with the 
Soviet Union, the recognition of Communist China and perhaps 
also of tile Suez Crisis of 1956, inasmuchas the former poli-
cies viQve responsible for the withdrawal of the ASWSBI Dam Aid 
offer by the United States and the United Kingdom, which led 
to the nationalisation of the Suez Canal company by Nasser and 
its aftermatii. However, the true origins of the Suez Crisis 
lay in the Western refusal to accept Nasser's Nonalignment, 
which did not differ from India's Nonalignment in any signl-
46 
ficant sense. But an American scholar has claimed that j "If 
America seemed inhospitable to the idea of neutralism, this 
was largely because «bdel Nasser's 'positive' variety had 
little in common with toat of Jawaharlal Nehru. It was based 
on no doctrine, no devotion to peaceful settlement of inter-
national disputes, but merely on speculating on the antago-
nisms of Great Powers." ISiis argument does not stand scrutiny 
In the first instance, it wrongly presumes that Nehru's 
foreign policy was acceptable to the lliited States, . at any 
46. Ibid., See also Charles D.Cremeans, op.cit., p. 146» 
46» John Campbell, 'America And The Middle East', India 
Quarterly^  (Vol.16, No.2, April-Jme 1969), p. 147. 
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tiffiQ. Tiie Urilted States, even to-day, lacks the visioa to 
appreciate this-policy fully. And the charge that Nasser's 
foreign policy was based on speculating on the antagonisms 
of Great Bowers is meaningless as the cold war was not Nasser's 
creation but of the Utaited States* Further, the .liiited States 
does not hold a record in being devotedlto peaceful settlement 
of disputes, to be indignant at Nasser* And the United States 
has called Heiiru^ s policy 'iauaoral' because he refused to join 
their militai'y alliances against Communism and had instead 
called for peaceful coexistence. 
Similarly, if Nasser had taken 'massive supplies of 
arms from the Soviet bloc*, it was to escape "mortagaging the 
economic future" of his country to the United States and not 
47 to mortagage it to the Soviet bloc. Again, Nasser's attempts, 
if any, at under^ mining established governments elsewhere in 
48 
the Arab world and even beyond it" were against those govern-
ments which were being maintained by the western Powers. And • 
the United States has a record of its own in the field of oVer~ 
throwing governments inid many parts of the world. Nasser him-
self had been a target of the l&iited States and its allies more 
than once. 
47. Jo^n Gampbellf 'America and the Middle East*, India DnarhAPiv, (Vol.16,Kof2, April-JUn© 1969), p.147. 
48. Ibid. 
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So far as Nasser's so-called "abusive propaganda 
49 against the Vv'est" is concerned| it has to be admitted that 
it has more truth in it than tiie propaganda made tgr the Vlesten 
60 Powers and Israel against Hasser* 
61 
Contrary to the above claim another writer has obser-. 
ved that at Bandung Hehru hoped to convert Nasser from his 
71 
evidently ^ 'o-western position to do<Jtri^4re neutralism in 
the East-v.'est struggle*" Neither Nehru nor Nasser vas pro-
East or pro-west at any time, Nehru was more pro-Britain 
than Nasser as already indicated* It is Important to note 
this difference for a proper understanding of Indians role 
in the Suez Crisis* In his anti-westernism, however, Nasser 
needed no lessons from Nehru. The Bandung Conference only 
served to bring Nehru and Nasser closer. Indeed this was 
achieved we;il before the Bandung Conference, through Nehru's 62 
careful diplomacy* Nehru had mounted a vigorous attack on 
the Baghdad Pact because of Pakistan's adherence to it, Nasser 
could not have been happy witai Pakistan over this, and, ttiis 
49. John Campbell, '-America and the Middle East', India 
Quarterly., (Vol.l6,No»2, April-June 1969), p.l47» 
60^  See Freda Utley, nil ^ he ^SP PQ (Heniy 
1960), ppaoa-106* 
61r See Georgiana G»Stevens, op*cit», p,146, 
62. Ibid. 
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gave Nehru an opportunity to wean Nasser away from his concept 
of the unity of Muslim states. As already indicated, it was 
Nasser*s realisation of the greater opportunities which tSie 
nonallgned circle offered that was responsible for his i^ss' 
of interest .In the Islamic circle df which he was an exponmt 
earlier. 
Then in February 1965, Nehru had spent two days in 
Cairo with Nasser, and the two leaders issued a Joint commu-
&3 
nique on February 16, coadeianing military alliances. on 
April 6, a few days before Nasser*s arrival in India on April 
12, a treaty of friendship between the United Arab Republic 54 and India was signed in Cairo* 
Inspite of this, Nehru and Nasser were reported to 
have diffeied at Bandung on the disQusslon of the Palestine 
issue. Nehru was reported to have hoped initially to avoid 
65 
the discussion of the issue in the conference. However, he 
consented /to it, as he had earlier agreed to the exclusion 
of Israel from the invitees to the Conference, mainly on the 56 insistence of Pakistan. Obviously Nehru did not like to 
63. See l^xts op.cit., p. 157*, 
64.^  pp. 166-.166. 
55. See Sisir Gupta, Tndl^  and Regional Integration^  op.Cit., 
p.67. 
66. See G.14.Kahin, op.cit., p. 3. 
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antagonise Nasser on such a sensitive issue, not because he 
was thoroughly convinced of the Arab case, but because he was 
afraid that his refusal might give Pakistan an opportunity 
to exploit the situation and to defeat his attempt to forge 
close links tiie Arab states. The support of India, how-
ever, unwilling tt might have been, appears to have been or 
great gain for Nasser, both internally and internationally* 
There remained only one formal step to be taken for 
Nonalignment to become a world phenomenon. This was achieved 
when Nasser, Nehru and Tito met at Brieil in Yugoslavia, on 
July 18»19, 1956, wto from then onwards came to be called the 
Big Three of the nonaligned world. Nonalignment was no more 
confined to -S^sia and Africa, but Jrt an European power also 
became interested in it. The major significance of the Brioni 
o 
meeting was, as the Joint statemQnt Issued tjy the tte'ee leaders 
67 
said, was tiiat *'The similarity in their approach in inter, 
national questions has led to close cooperation among them." 
This has since become a feature of Nonalignment as practised 
by these three states, as shall.be seen in subsequent pages, AvMr especially hi respect of India and the Unitedj)^ Republlc. 
67. Supray n.64, p. 243. 
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It has been observed earlier ttiat the origins of the 
Suez crisis lie very deep. More than the origins, the nature 
of the crisis is of importance for this study. It was a 
mainfestation of the struggle for power between two forces. 
Resurgent Arab Nationalism and waning British and French 
imperialism.A t^ ird force viz., Israel's attempt to exploit 
this struiitle in its own interests added a second dimension, 
to its intensity. 
None did perhaps express the significance of the first 
aspect of tiie struggle better and more forcefully than 
Gailjiell, the leader of the Opposition in the British House 
of Commons during a debate on the nationalisation of the Suez 
68 Canal company by Nasser on July 26, 1956. Gaitskell drew a 
parallel between Nasser's policies and those of Hitler and 
69 
Mussolini and then declared: 'i,,..* mXs episode must be 
recognised as part of the struggle for the mastery of the 
Middle East, That is something which I do not feel we can 
ignore,•,»« 
because of the prestige issues which are involved. 
If Colonel Nasser's prestige is put up sufficiently and ours 
68, PQcuments for 1956^pp,77^113 for^ Nasser»s Speech on the 
nationalisation of tiie Canal Company, 
69, see Parliamentary Debates (Hausard)^  House of Commons^  
official Report. Fifth Series, Vol,657, 2 August 1956, 
cols» 1612-1613. 
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put down sufficientlyf the effect in that part of the world 
will be that our friends will desert us because tiiey think 
we are lost, and go over to Egypt. I have no doubt myself 
toat the reason why Col. Nasser did this in ttie way he did -
aggressively, brusquely, suddenly * was precisely because he 
wanted to raise his prestige in the rest of the Middle East,^ ,,"' 
Nasser himself came very close to this when he told 
60 
an Indian correspondent on September 16, 1966 that "!I!lhe 
Vsiest was worried not so much about the Suez Canal as about 
iv'estern prestige in the Arab world. Ttie '^ est believed that 
if it lost the battle in the Suez Canal it might be ousted 
from the /*rab Ivor id. 
The resurgence of Arab Nationalism and the waning of 
Colonialism were well reflected in the complete confidence 
with which Nasser acted throughout the crisis as against the 
blundering and bungling of the western, especially the British 
61 and ij'rench statesmen. 
60. See Mideast Mirror^  (Vol.8, No.38, Sept^ber 23, 1966), p,3« Nehru was also reported to have said that the nation-alisation decision was symptomatic of the decline of Western power in mddle East and Asia . See Hie Hindu. 
2 August, 1956, 
61. See Peter Mansfield, op.cit., p. 67. 
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Hasser had already dealt blow after blow to western 
prestige ajid power in the Arab world by his aggressive Non-
alignment* Pcior to the Suez Crisis, the Northern Her Alli-
ance >posed a great challenge to M s Nonalignment. Nasser 
successfully withstood it and could carry practically the 
whole of the Arab world with him except the Iraqi leaders. Soon 
however, Nasser could make amends for th^ ds loss by forging 
firm links with Nehru and Tito at Brioni during their confer-
ence on July 18»19, 1956. It was evident to them as well as 
to the western leaders that this was a great blow to western 
policies in Asia as well as in Eux'ope. Thus the calculated 
insult hurled at Nasser, the latest to join the ranks of non-
aligned statesmen through the brusque and sudden withdrawal 
on July 19, 1966, of the proposed United States' loan for the 
Aswan Dam followedl by Britain and the world 3ank was as much 
a challenge to tlie newly forged unity between the three non-
aligned nations as it was to Nasser's survival and leadership 
of the Arabs. 
62 
As one commentator has observed "Dulleg and Eden were 
under no illusions about the imports^ce of the Aswan Dam to 
Nasser as a symbol of revolutionary purpose and achievsnent, 
nor about the risks fee would be prepared to take to achieve 
62. Terence Robbertson, op.cit., pp. 67-68. 
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his aim If, in search for an adequate weapon with which 
to strike back. Nasser grabbed the Canal» Dulles would not be 
unduly concerned. No matter what difficulties arose, he was 
-tul 
confident that American know-how and ingeninty would overcome 
them. Eden hoped that dissident elements inside Egypt and 
anti-Nasser Arabisa^other countries would revolt and over-
th-«'0tt/ Nasser before he had time to resort to drastic counter 
measures* If not| and Britain's oil lifeline was threatened, 
Eden would be justified in sending troops back into the Canal 
2bne, and Nasser's fate would be the same." 
Dulles' well-known contempt for Nonalignii»nt and his 
statement that the withdrawal of the loan was to cut Nasser 
63 down to size, gave this act of his a touch of vengeance. 
It is against this background that India's policy dur-
ing tiais crisis will be examined below. Nehru and Krishna 
Kenon were with Nasser on their return flight from Brionk to 
Cairo when they appear to have heard of the withdrawal of tiie 
• 64 Asian aid over ttie radios And on their arrival at Cairo in 
63# See Dulles* Statement at a Press Conference on March .'21, 
19S7 - te pp. 216-16. 
64. Herman Finer Dulles^  Over Suez (is^ illiam Heinemann Ltd,. 
London, 1964), p. rr But see tlierence Bedertson, 
op.cit., pp. 68 for a slightly different version. 
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the early hours ot July 20, 19S6, they got confirmation of 
the news at tii^ airport itself• Nehru and Menon had a 
number of meetings with President Nasser and his colleagues 
during their two day stay in Cairo, No Communique was, how-
ever, issued W them, Nehru and Menon left Cairo on July 21, 
196^ * Nehru told Parliaa^nt on July 31, 1966 that "These 
discussions did not relate to the Suez Canal or any aspect 
of Anglo-^yptian relations. The recent decision of the 
Egyptian Government in'regard to the Suez Csffial first came 
to my knowledge from tiie reports in the J^ess after my return 
to Delhi," 
If this was the truth and tiiere is nothing concereto 
66 
to contradict it, it was clear .evidence of the fact that 
Nasser had not confided in Nehru and tiiiat there was impor-
tant differences between them on Anglo-U^ relations, !I!hese 
differences iwere reflected in the soffle3'hat -eqiuvocal stand 
talcen W India on the British evacuation of the Suez base, 
She Suez base and the Suez Canal were vital for Indians def-
ence and economic development, !2he Communique issued on June 67 9, 1963 W the Comcionwealth Prime Mnisters said *'that the 
64, Lok SalAia Debates^  Part II, Vol.VI, No, 12, July 31,1966, 
Col, 1661, 
Terence Robertson (op-cit,, p,69), claims that Nehru was probab3^ aware of it. But Nehru denied it again on August 8, 1956 in Parliament « See below, n,8l* 
See Survey, 1963, p. 163, 
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Prime Ministers recognised the international importance of 
the Suez Canal an<i of the effective maintenance of the mili-
tajpy installations in the Canal Zone. They agreed that it 
is in the common interest that the outstanding issues in the 
Middle East snould be settled on tiie basis of ensuring the 
peace and security of the Middle East countries consistently 
with the sovereignty ,of each, and promoting their social and 
economic development." 
On his vay home from this conference Nehru had talilc^  
yith Genecal Neguib who was then the President of the iftiited 
Arab$ Republic and others, including Nasser, during his 
stopover at Cairo. Reporting to Parliament Nehru had nothing 
more to say than tiae observation that®India»s sympathy with 
68 national movements was well known. But it is known now that 
69 both Nehru and the Prime Minister of Pakistan had stressed 
70 
on the effective maintenance of the Suez base. Prof.Noriiiedge 
has written t^ at '•.••.Help was eventually to come to Britain 
from the Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers who con-
ferred with Nasser on their way home from a Commonwealth 
68. See Survey^ . 1963, p. 163. 
Y 69. A pa^ it of these discussions were conducted between the UAR leaders, Nehru and the P.M. of Pakistan - Ibid. 
70. F.C. Northedge, op.cit., p» 217. 
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premiers' Conference In Londorii which ended with the issue 
of a comtamique* insisting that the base must be effectively 
maintained. Their influence was brough't to bear on the 
Egyptian leader in the sense of the coiamanique and a further 
initiative, ,this time by the Pakistani charge d'affair|s in 
Cairo, Ta^ yeb Hussain, led to the resumption of informal talks 
by British and iigyptian teams at which progress was made with 
the two basic issues of the conditions of re-entry into the 
base and the status of British technicians who were to main-
tain the base after the evacuation." 
Thus the evacuation treaty which gave Britain the 
right to return within a period of seven years in case of an 
attack on Arab countries or on Turkey coupled with Nasser's 
agreement to obseive the 1888 convention regarding the free-
dom of navigation through the Suez Canal was in accord with 
India's vital interests.' Neither Britain nor the (Baited States 
had raised the issue of free passage to Israeli ships at tiiis 
stage* It is necessary to bear this fact in mind for , it 
was on tbds issue that the Anglo-French laid stress later 
during the crisis, thus perhaps provoking Israel in a way to 
attack Egypt, as shall be seen later. 
During 1965 and early 1966 India, and the IBiited Arab 
71 Republic had occasions to differ, notably on Algeria and 
71, See India ,In lor Id Af f ajrs 1964-56, op,cit., 
pp, 573-676 for an account of the differences between 
India and other Afro-Asian nations on Algeria.lEhough 
Contd*•*•• 
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even Israel as already indicated. At Brlonl Nehru and Nasser, 
it would appear did not agree on the creation of a nonaligned 
bloc. Ndiru was unwilling to be used by others. He did not 
want to coffliait himself and thus restrict his freedom of action 
72 
which was basic to his foreign policy. As Sisir Gupta observed 
"v^ hat heightened ladia's suspicion of the use of such a con-
ference was the fact that these conferences, while avoiding 
blocs, did tend to involve the participating countries in 
problems generated by any one of them. 
Nationalisation of the Suez Canal Companvs 
This difference in out look was perhaps tlie reason 
73 
why Nasser did not confide in Nehru, as he did in Tito, at 
any time, on the natlon.»alisation of the Suez Canal Company. 
(Continued from previous page) 
S Prof»Rajan does not make this clear, it would appear that 
Indians concilitory attitude towards France during 196&-. 
66 stemmed from the fact that during this period the 
Goverianent of India were conducting delicate negotiations 
with France about the evacuation of tiie French pockets in 
India. The treaty providing for de jure transfer of power 
was signed on May 28, 1966, Placing the copies of the 
treai^  before taie Parliament on the same day Nehru praised 
the French Government in very high terms - See The Hlndu^ 
29 May, 1966. 
72. rftnd RefiAgnal ,ftt^ egrat4Qn,.jQ,,As4^ , op.cit., p.69. 
73. Tito said in his speech on November 11, 1966, at Pula 
that Nasser had told him about it in 1966. See Paul E. 
Zinner, ed., National Gommuni^ ffi And Popular Revolt In 
Eastern Europe (Columbia University Press, 1966), p,637. 
However, when the decision was actually taken by Nasser, 
it appeared to have been kept a well guarded secret till 
the last moment.Bulganin too had pleaded Ignorance of 
any such mofe being in the offering See David J.Dailin, 
op.oit., p, 406* 
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Thus Neiiru> appeared to have been thoroughly unprepared for it 
74 when it cama on July 26, 1956. It is not known whether the 
Indian Embassy in Cairo had any inkling of this and had repor-
ted the matter to the Government of India. However ascordiag 
76 
to SifSir Gupta, "v^ hile there is no doubt that the decision 
to VJlthdraw the Aswan Dam a^d which followed the Brioni Con-
ference was appearing to this group of nations as an att^pt 
by the 0,S. Secretary of State to deal a blow to the weakest 
link of the neutralist chain at this, time, viz* Egypt, the 
violence of Egyptian reaction was unexpected and illustrated 
the inevitable involvement that it might imply in situations 
\mdeBirable from the Indian point of v i e i w A n d according 
76 
to Eden "When Egypt first seized the Sueg Canal, the Indian 
Government showed some embarrassment, no doubt accentuated by 
the fact triat Kr« Nehru had been the guest of Col»Nasser in 
Cairo only a few days before." 
74, It is a little surprising here India could be unprepared, when the Anglo»French and U.S. leaders appeared to have feared some such reprisal ty Kasser. 
76. Regional In op.cit., pp.69-70. 
76*^  Eden, op*cit», p.- 444» 
• 237 -
It is thus not surprising that the Government of India 
took more tiian ten days to make their stand clear on the dis-
pute. IhiSi Nehru did, in a leng-th^  statement in Parliament on 
77 August 8, 1966* India's immediate interests in the dispute 
78 
were well summarised lay Nehru in this speech: "The Government 
of India had to te^e a decision in the situation as it confron-
ted them. India is not a disinterested party. She is a princl^  
pal of this water and her economic life and develop-
ment is not unaffected hy the disputes, not to speak of worse 79 
developments, in regard to it." He also pointed out that "the 
Egyptian nationalisation was precipitated by the Aswan Dam 
decision of the U.S.Government in which the 0»K»Government 
later joined. Hgre the , Hay, ll^  .Xas 
however Bgypt^i^ pride ^ d self-respect and disregarded a 80 
peoplei. sentiments." Nasser, himself, is reported to have saidj 
"If you did not want to make the loan all that you needed to 
do was to say <Noi* plainly. Why add the excuses, and the insults 
about our economy) lou ^ ust wanted to teach us a lesson before 
everybody iji tiie world because we disagreed with a good deal of 
77. Nehru, op^cit., pp. 627-532. 
78. id., p. 631. 
79. Jl., p. 630 (Italics mine). 
80. Cited in Herman Finer, op.cit., j»p.Sb-66. 
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your policy — * we ha<i every r.ight to doi ^ are sensitive, 
we like nice wordsi" 
81 
Neiiru then pointed out that "!Ehe suddenness of the 
nationalisation decision and the manner in which it has been 
impleiaented man have contributed to the violent reaction. But 
the terms of the nationalisation itself under the laws of 
Sgypt are within the province of that Governitent" Nehru again 
82 
clarified thats "As I informed the House some days ago, the 
Suez Canal issue was not discussed between President Nasser 
and myself when we met recently. The consideration of it 
and the concerned decision must have been made later.** 
It Is thus not clear what Nehru wanted or expected 
Nasser to do, or wheliier he wanted him to (to anything at all, 
to face the challenge hurled at him by Dulles and Eden, espe-
cially, when it was realised that it was as much a challenge 
to the nomaigned nations as it was to Nasser, It is almost 
certain that if Nasser had not rejfcaliated in kind to the 
western move, nonalignment would have received a bo(^ y blow from 
83 which it might not have recovered. As Antiaony Nutting has 
81. Nehru, op.cit., p. 630. 
82. L,S»D.f Part II, Vol.VII, No. 18, 8 August, 1956, col. 2640. 
83. JJo end of a lesson » The story of Snev. (Cnnatablftj London 1967), p.47. Xhis is the most authentic book on the subject coming as it does from a Minister in the Ministry of Jj'oreign Affairs at the time of the Crisis. He resigned following the British attack on the UAH. 
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reVQaled, tiie aationalisatioo gave "Eden the challenge for 
vihich h© had been i^ aiting. Now at last he had fowid a pretext 
to launch sm all-out campaign of political, economic and mili-
tary pressures on Egypt and to destroy Tor ever Nasser»s image 
as the leader of Arab nationalism," fhe decision to eliminate 
84 
Hasser was taken by Eden as early as Mai'ch 1, 1966, It was 
only when toe British and French Governments had realised that 
Dulles* plcui had boomerat^ed to their disadvantage and that 
0ull©s was not prepared to use force against Nasser, that they 
began to conspire with Israel to commit the 'supreme folly 
of aggression in the hope perhaps that Dulles might st^ at 
least neuti^ al if he could not join them willy Silly* 
It Is important to note that before coming out in 
support of the United .4rab Republic, the Government of India 
waited to watch the situation in the Suez Canal which convinced 
them that it was being properly maintained by the former. So 
87 Nehru said® "Xhe present decision of the Egyptian Government 
• would appear to antedate the taking over by them of the 
88 
Company." And that "The Egyptian Government have also reitera-
ted that they will honour all their obligations arising from 
84. 17. 
86. pp.87, 90*99 and 100-109 for the full story. 
86. Peter Mansfield, op.cit., p." 67.' 
87. Nehruj, op.cit., p. S29. 
88. Ibid. 
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international agreements, and in their reaffirmation have 
referred both to the convention of 18S8 and to the Anglo-
Egyptian ^reement of 19544" 
89 > Nehru also &aid that the Government of In(iia.»«.*have 
kept in close contact with Indonesia and Ceylon and witaa 
others vho, broadly, have an approach and attitude similar 
to that of India on this question.*..," Among the others 
Yugoslavia must have been consulted, laie Government of India 
appear to have consulted the Soviet Union,especially on the 
participation in the first London Ck)nference proposed by 
Britain, U.S.A., and France, as the close similarity between 
90 the views of India and the Soviet Union would suggest. Nehru 
announced India's acceptance of the imitation to participate 
in the conference in his speech of August J8, 1966 in Parlia-
91 
ment and saids "It has always been quite clear to ti^ 
Government that they could not participate in aiyr conference 
which bound its participants before hand as to the conclusions 
to be reached. The Government would equally decline partici-
pation in any arrangements for war preparations or sanctions 
or any step which challenged the sovereign rights of Egypt." 
He then took exception to the exclusion of Jugoslavia and 
89. Mtf p. 632. 
90. JJiJaSSt PP» 162»167. 
91. ,pp.630-531. Ihis announcement appears to have prece-ded, Nasser's ovn announcement. See Mideast yilrror, (Vol.8, No.32, August 11, 1966), p.2. 
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Biicma from tha list of invitees declaring that Government 
of iMla, therefore, do not subscribe to the appropriateness 
of the list of invitees.^ 
•'They have sought clarifications from the United king-
dom Government and feel assured that iie^ participation in the 
conference does not in ar^ vay imply that they are restricted 
to or bound by the approach and principles set out in the 
joint communique. They recognise that Egypt could not and 
would not participate^ in a conference on the Suez Canal to 
which she is merely an invitee and in respect of which there 
have been no consultations with her." 
It iias more important for Nehru and India that the 
Suez canal was properl^ jr maintained ^d was not closed Irres-
92 peetive of the authority controlling it. Hence Nehru saidj 
India is passionately interested in averting a conflict..... 
The settlement of this problem, on the basis of the sovereignty 
and of dignity of Egypt, and by agreement amongst all con-
cerned, and the abandonment of postures of threats and violence 
and of unilateral action t^r either party, are of the utmost 
concern to In.dia." 
92. id., p* 631. 
93. Jd. , .p, 629. 
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193 So he regretted that "the French and the United kingdom 
Governments reacted to the Egyptian announcement quickly, 
sharply and with vehemence^ ' and that "press reports of mili-
tary and naval movements ordered by tiie United kingdom and 
France and some military measures in Egypt •*•*« have aggrava-
ted the situation, A.11 this has influenced public opinion 
not only in Egypt but over the Arab world. 3n Asia as a 
whole, with its colonial memories, great resentment has been 
aroused." Therefore, Nehru ^ »^as forced to state. "I have no 
desire to add to tiie passions aroused, but I would fail in 
my duty to this House and the country and even to all the 
parties involved in this crisis, and not least of all to 
Britain and France, if I do not say that threats to settle 
this dispute or to enforce their views in tiiis matter by dis-
play or use of force, is the wrong way. It does not belong to 
this age and it is not dictated by reason* It fails to take 
account of the world as it is today and The Asia of today..*., 
ise deepU^ ' regret these reactions and the measures reported to 
be taken .In consequence, and we express the hope that they 
will cease and the parties will enter into negotiations and 
seek peaceful settlements*" 
P» 
94. Ibid. 
. S43 . 
That there was nothing original or striking in the 
stand taken t^y the Government of India at this stage may be 
seen from the fact that it was not very much different from 
the stand of the British Opposition as Gaitskell presented 
95 
it to the House of Commons. He said: "It is difficult to 
f i n d » i n any thing •....he (Nasser) has done, any legal 
justification for the use of force. What he may dp in the 
future is another matter," He>'%.,.»we were right to react 
sharply to this move. If nothing at all were done, it would 
have very serious consequences, for all of us and especially 
for the western powers*" But he also c^tioned against hast^ 
and lll-congideE^ed actions by the British Government and saidj 
"It is important that what we do should be done in the fullest 
possible co-operation with the other nations affected.^  We 
should try to settle this matter peacefully (to the lines of 
the international comfflllssion as has been hinted* Ishlle force 
can not be excluded, we must be sui'e that the circumstances 
justify it and that it is, if used consistent with our belief 
in, and otu* pledges to the Charter of the i® and not in con-
flict wilii them." f^enon At, Conferancet " 
Vihatever were the motives of the Government of liidia 
in agreeing to participate in the First Loniion Conference on 
96. n.69:^ col. 1617. 
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Suez held during 16-1.23 August, 1966, the diplomacy of India 
as practised Krishna Menon, vith the support of Nehru, was 
directed first at the protection, and if possible, furtherance, 
of India's economic interests in the Suez Canal and then at 
the protection of United ilrab Republic's rights and interests 
96 
in the Carial. Krishna Menon did not minje words when he told 
the London Conference that India's stand was dictated as much 
by considerations of national self-interest as :by the desire 
to assist emd contribute to a peaceful settlement of the ques-
tion, Menon's speech at the Conference was full of paradoxes 
on the one hand, he stated that the canal is an integral part 
of Egypt**' On the other hand he claimed that is nece-
ssary to state that this water way has an international 
character." Again, he saidj the factual position is 
that the rulers of Egypt^ Whoever has sovereign power in 
Egypt, are really the people who can guarantee freedom of 
navigation,," So, he said; "So far as ^ problem in this issue 
is concern<3d it lies in finding ways and means by which the 
Egyptian Governjaent i$ under the obligations of law and of the 
Charter of the ON to carry out tiiis particular obligation," 
96. Suez Canal ; Nationalisation After JuLv 19 to September 131 19S6 (Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, September 1966)^ pp* 61-72, 
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A little later he said "Ihe question arises whether 
the piesent Egyptian Government would honour those obligations 
they say they would honour those obligations.*..." Jh 
the same breath Menon pointed out, obviously, unmindful of the 
contradiction involved in it, that, "Therefore, since our 
interest in this Canal is not a political one, it is a user 
interest and that user interest can best be served ty negotia-
tion, by trying to make the interest a mutual one, by persua-
sion, isiy making Egypt a partyja solemn agreement which comes 
under the obligations of international law and of the charter 
of the UN." 
Did henon not believe in Nasser and the United /^ rab 
Republic Government? Was it true, after all, as Professor 
97 
Finer, forcefully argues that "Menon hit at the root of the 
practical need for somekind of international reservation on the 
full sovereignty of Sgypt : the rei^ a^ bility of the government 
of Egypt to fulfil its obligations. Nehru the cultivated aris-
tocrat, who had twice met Nasser, at Bandung and Brioni, well 
understood the need for some, if minimal curbs on the uncouth 
dictator's powers? For, Holding Suez, Nasser had a stra$gle 
hold on India also."' 
97. Op.cit., p. 168< 
- 246 « 
That there is truth in this observation may be seen 
98 
from a careful examination of the *Menon Plan' proposed at 
the London Conference henon proposed to bind the United Arab 
Republic to a revision of tne 1888 convention to include pro-
visions concerning eQuitaole tolls and charges, the proper 
maintenancid of the canal, to "Association of international 
Interests -v^ ith the new Corporation for the Suez canal and to 
the creation of a consultative body of user interests to be 
formed on the basis of geographical representation and interests 
charged witn advisory, consultative and liaison functions. The 
United Arab Republic was also to transmit to the tiiited Nations 
annual reports of the Corporation operating the Canal. 13ie 
plan was saiu to have been formed after wide consultations, 
including w/c Aly Sabry, the Political Adviser to Nasser, who 99 
was present in London dux'ing the Conference period. Neverthe-
less, it cannot be gainsaid that the Menon Plan was not entirelj 
in accord with the sovereign rights of the United Arab^ Repub-100 101 lie. Nasser was, therefore, right when he said in 1968 that 
98. See lexts of Documents^ op.cit,, pp.249-2S0. Also Supra^ n.96, pp. 73-74. 
99. See I'he Hindu^ 24 August, 1966. 
100. Thus v^ alter tULppmann wrote that "The end result of the two approaches (Menon's and West's) might have had little real dirference" -- See pie Hlndy^ ^ 21 September, 19^. 
101. Nasser's Speeches^ 1968, op.cit,, p. 184, 
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"with the exception of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, all 
stood for ttie internationalisation of the Suez Canal," He 
would have, therefore, rejected the plan. 
It has, however, to be pointed out, to be fair to 
Menon, that he did not say or believe that his plan was absolu-
tion of the problem. He said that it wa's only a proposal for 
102 
negotiations. The acceptance by the Soviet Union of this 
plan meant that it would have furthered the Soviet aim of 
gaining a foothold in the control of the Canal, And Menon 
might have, on the other hand, calculated that India would be 
the most li^ jly acceptable choice for the chairmanship of the 
Canal Consultative ^ body, which would secure it a key posi-
tion in the management of the Canal. 
Ihei'e was another paradox in Kenon's stance, to which 104 
Nehru himseJX was a part^. Menon repeated Nehru's view that 
the nationalisation of the canal company "was an act within 
the competence of the Egyptian Government." And, following 
Nehru's example, he added : "I think, however, that my Govern-
ment would like it to be stated that there are, in the manner 
102. Siiijrs, n. 96, 
103. The Suez Canal Problem. July 26-SeDtember 22^ 19S6 : 
A PQcmmt^I Pablic^^^QQ (Department of State Publi-cation, October 1956), p. 216. 
104. S^pr^, n.96, p. 65. 
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in which the nationalisation 'was carried out, features which 
have led to tlrie present aggravated situation. We would like 
to have seen 'that nationalisation carried out in the normal 
way ol" international expropriation, where there is adequate 
notice, and the way of taking over is less dramatic, ."This 
was injudicious in the part of both the leaders. They could 
not have forgotten the motive behind the Anglo-American with-106 
drawal of tne Aswan Dam aidj Menon himself told the London 
Conference that ; "We also say that, in international affairs, 
when we haves to deal with countries, it is the approach of my 
Govei'nment that we have to take their internal sti'uctures and 
their administrations anu their Government as they arej it is 
not possible for us to approach problems by first desiring a 
change of government or constitution or persoxijel in another 
country," 
But what may be said to be the supreme paradox in 
Menon*s stand was to unfold when Menon recomciended the lilies 
106 105, Mission to Nasser on the ground that "Any atteuipt at 
conciliation deserves Indian support* V/e certainly will not 
106. J^*, p*63, "How convenient" acidly commented Prof .Finer, "in various ways, for the Indian occupiers of Kashmir 
and receipients of aid from America"- Suora^ n»99. 
106, Su|>ra, n*102, pp. 291»293 for the Five Power Proposal of August 21, 1966, sent with the Menzies Mission, 
107. See The Hlndu^ 28 August, 1966, 
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do anything •which would,throw a hurdle in the way of negotia-
t i o n s , I t is difficult to say whether Kenon thoughtthat 
Nasser would start negotiations on t^e basis of these propo-
108 
sals. Nehru, however, told Parliament on September 13, 1966 
that "Ihe Henries Mission which recently visited Cairo asked 
the Egyptian Government to accept international control of 
operation(and administration and the establishment of an Inter-
nationa corporation displacing the Egyptian National Corpora-
tion* Egypt has declined to accept them as being contrary 
to her sovereign rights and not related to the purposes of the 
convention of 1888 and the interest of users, which are freedon 
of navigation toll, maintenance of the canal, etc«, which the 
Egyptian Government alone can guarantee." 
In the same speech Nehru pointed out that the western 
109 proposal to set up a Suez Canal users Association was full 
of dangerous potentialities for it was unacceptable to the 
110 , 111 United Arab Republic* ''It is clear, he said "that the action 
108. Nehru, op.cit., pp. 632-633. 
109. Supra^ n. 10§, pp. 366-366. 
110. Nehru, op.cit., p. 633-634. For Nasser's and the Arab League's opposition to the Users' Association, See Mideast Mirror^ ¥ol.?No. 39, September 23, 1966, pp. 3 and 6. ' 
111* P» 632. 
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proposed is not thb result of agreement, but is in the nature 
of an imposed action" and that "It is not calculated to 
secure to ttie users peaceful and secured use of the canal 
which is tod should be what is required l3fy the users and the 
international coinaunity." 
112 With referencu to the reply given by the Government 
of ^ ^ the United Arab Republic to the Men^ies Mission, pro-
113,, 
posing negotiations, Hehru saidi "The reply of the Egyptian 
Government has opened a way to negotiations. In the view of 
the Government of India, such negotiations could have led to 
a settlement which would have met all requirements of the 
users and the international comtuunity without prejudice to 
or derogation of the sovereignty of Egypt and has national 
rights in respect of the Canal which is admittedly an integ-
ral part of Egypt*" He then pointed out that he had written 
to the Prime i^ inister of England and the President of the 
United States on these lines. Nehru issued a further appeal 
to them to negotiate with Nasser and added that "To seek to 
impose a settlement by force or by threats of force is to 
disregard the rights of nations even as the failure to observe 
international treaties and obligations would be." 
13.2. Supra^ pp. 187-199 for correspondence between H ^ ^ Meeen- and Nasser and pp. 199-201 for Nasser's x counter proposals. 
113. Nehru, op.cit., p. 633. 
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X14 
Nehru also regretted that Britain, France, Italy and 
others had withdrawn their pilots from the Suez Canal ; "This 
is an action not calculated to promote the use of the canal 
and is not in the interest of user nations. The Government of 
India desirous that no statement af theirs should come 
in the w ^ of efforts to lower tension and to open the way 
for negotiations. But, they cannot fail to point out that 
the steps armounced to assume the operation of the canal 'with-
out the consent and cooperation of the Egyptian Government 
are calculated to render peaceful approach extremely difficult 
and also carry with them the grave risk of conflict. I should 
like to say that I have read the report of Sir Anthony Eden's 
speech with surprise and regret as it appears to close the doo; 
to further negotiations. The action envisiUged in it is full 
of dangerous potentialities and for reaching consequences." 
116 
Nehru ended his speech with the reminder ; "As I have 
stated previously the proper functioning of the Suez Canal is 
of vital ijiiportance to India. We are convinced, however, that 
this can only be acnieved through a peacefully negotiated 
settlement ensuring the rights not only of Egypt but of all 
the user countries^" 
114. Jd,, pp. 633-634, 
M»i p. 
• 252 * 
This was then the dominant theme oi' India's diplomacy* 
Ihe west believed that this was in favour of Nasser* It was 
so only because, tiie western stand had no basis, as many inclu-
ding, Gaitskell, pointed out quite cleaily. It was not so 
because India pro-UAR, Explaining his proposals tabled at 
the first London Conference .on Suez, to a press conference, 
116 
Menon said, on the day following, that he sought to obtain 
enforcement and regulation of all political problems by treaty 
obligations," More significant was his observation that 
plan does not involve the abdication of toe position the 
Western Powers have taken upon internationalisation* They 
can keep that position. But we imst find a position between 
the western and defacto position of Egypt. The purpose of 
negotiations is to alter the position of both sides." And "we 
are trying to get a workable arrangement^' llhus India was 117 
certainly not partisi^ in the dispute as Professor Raj an has 
said. 
Then on September 23 Nehru stated at a public meeting 
in New Delbi that j "I would, however, say that the way Egypt 
116. See The Hindu 23, August, 1956, 
117- India %n V^ 'orld Affairs^ 1964-56, op.cit., p. 168. 
118. See The Hindu^ 2A September, 1956. Much is made of this statement of Nehru by Indians claiming that our style was different from that of the UAR. As has been shown above this was a rather tall claim, and in the conteiit,t in which it was made it was highly injudicious. 
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aw took hold of the Suez Canal was not e*er way. We follow a 
different way, but who e ^ I to criticise otiiers? Our way 
is a little different. If they had followed a different way 
so many difficulties would not have arisen. But they had a 
right to follow their own method." 
All this led to a suspicion among the Arabs about 
119 
India's position in the dispute. Ihe Economic Weekly^ in 
its issue of October 6, 1956, drew attention to these mis-
givings and souj^ ht to dispel them. It wrote, "some observations! 
of Pandit Nehru have caused misgivings. Not only with-
in the Qountxy, but in the entire Arab world there is growing 
suspicion about Mew Delhi's Suez diplomacy* Pandit Nehru's 
statement, that New Delhi does not approve of the manner in 
which Egypt has assumed control over the canal, seems to have 
deepened these suspicious*" 
Coming as it did, after Nehru's statement in Parliament 
dn September 13, 1966, it could not but give rise to suspi-
cions even if it were assumed that the real motives behind the 
witndrawal of the Aswan Dam aid, were forgotten by Nehru. If 
it were assume that by; /.liiis the danger of conflict were 
120 121 removed, there was no ground for such assumption. 
119. 'Asia And The Arab \^ orld*. Economic ;.eekly(llol.VIII,No.4, October 6,1966), p. 1173. 120. See Herman Finer, op»cit#, p« 268 for this view. 121. Even the Sastern Economist expressed surprise at the "bellicose tone of the British P.M.'s first statement" after the failure of Men^ies Mission. It also pointed out that Nasser*s'willingness to negotiate a new conven-tion does in fact, contain promise, and it seems xinwise 
Contd..... 
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In the light oi' thfcse developments giving rise to sus-
picions regarding the stand of India, it is difficult to 
122 
agree with toe view that "The firainess and promptness with 
which Nehru pointed out the risk of war inherent in the pro-
posal of establishing a users' Association was probably res-
ponsible for the Anglo-French decision to take the dispute 
to the UN " This is, to say the least, an attempt to 
blow too hiQh the Indian balloon* 
lo see things in their proper perspective one has to 
take into consideration the fact that there were ot^er states 
who Ware equally prompt and firm in condeming the Users' 
Associations an act of prevocation and violation of the 1888 
convention, Ihe Soviet Union was foremost in the field. 
Soviet premier Nikolai A.Bulganin addressed more or less 
X23 
identical letters to Prime Ministers Bden and i-iollet on 
Septembei' 13 and to the UN and the Soviet press was actively 
(continued from previous page} 
for any country, or for the world at large to decline such an offers Why has they been done, and the threat ol' force presented so early," The Journal asked — — See ES§.£a£EL.E2tiQi2aiSi» September 1956, p, 382, 
122, K.S.Rajan, India In World Affairs^ 1964-66, op.clt., p, 361. 
123. For the contents of Bulganin's letter — S e e Eden, op»Git., pp» 486-487* 
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engaged in denouncing the colonial nature of the western 
124 
stand on the crisis. Moreover, there were differences 
between England and the U.S. over the use of force. At a 
Press Conference on September 11, 1966, Eisenhower ruled out 125 the possibility of the use of force against Nasser. Two days 
126 later, Dulles told a press Conferences "We do not intend to 
shoot our way through" the Suez Canal and "would.... send our 
127 
vessels ai'ound the cape " According to Elizabeth Monroe, 
Britain and France took the problem to the Security Council 
"as much to forestall appeal to the UN by others thsua out of 
. faith in its supposedly slow mechanism." Above all, Nasser 
128 
had declared: "We shall not allow tiie western-proposed canal 
Users' Associatiein to function in the canal." Henon At the UM $ 
While these developments were taking place Menon was 
going from capital to capital to seek concessions from all 
sides. He arrived in Cairo on September 17 on the invitation 
of Nasser and had a series of discussions with him during his 129 four days' stay in Cairo. Piof. Finer claims thati'....it 
124. David J.Dallin, op.cit., p. 411. 
126. Suora^ n.lOg» p. 333, 
126. pp. 337-341, 
127. Elizabeth Monroe, op.cit., p. 197. 
128. M M m L M m i L , n. 1100. 
129. Op.cit., p. 247. 
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was reported that; India had induced him (Nasser) to agree to 
some form of inteinational control of the level of canal dues, 
the factor in tirie dispute of mast important^to India." On 
v\ 
September 24, Kenon arrived in, London for talks with Selwy$ 
Lloyd and other British ministers. He returned to Pelhi a e 
few days later. In the first week of October he arrived in 
Cairo again on his way to New York as the question has since 
been taken to tiie UN Security Council. Menon also halted at 
London on his way to New York from Caii'o. 
Once in New York, Menon began intense diplomatic 
parleys outside the Security Council as India was not a member 
of the Security Council* The result was a revised version of 
the 'Menon Plan* presented at the first London Conference in 
130 
Au^ iust 1956. Kenon presented this revised plan to tiie 
Foreign Minister of Britain, France and the O.A.R, as well as 
to the Secretjiry-General of the United Nations. The haste 
with which henon did all this suggests tiiat Jjidia did not want 
the Security Council to take any decision which did not include 
its Views and which might go against its vital Interests in 
the Suez Canal. Xhis type of activity was not, however, n<>w 
130« See Texts of DQCumentSy op.clt,, pp. 267-269. This plan was later published by A1 Gun^ourla on October 21, 1966, and was officially ^mounced in New Delhi on Octooer 24, 1966 - See Mideast Mirror (Vol. 8, No»43, August 28, 1966), p^li. The text is at pp. 8-10, 
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for Menon. He did mucii the same thing two years earlier, 
131 
duz'iug the Gene^va talks on Indo-Ghina. Menon•s anxiety 
was, obviously to present his own plan before the Security 
Council could take a decision. 
This plan of Menon is only of historical interest now. 
It differed only slightly from the first 'Menon Plan** As the 
132 
Eastern Bconomist wrotes "The revised Indian plan was worse 
than the original Menon plan where it contemplated no advisory 
function for the users* association^j it was better where it 
laid down that tolls could not be increased within 12 jaonths 
witiiout the prior agreement of the users' association!! other-133| 
Wise the ti-^o plans were virtually identical. Professor Ra^an 
claims that "In some respects (e*g. in the recognition of tirie 
Users* Association) they were more favourable to the users 
than the western plan." Ihey might have tiius found expression 
in the Anglc-French draft resolution, the first part of which 
was approved by the Security Council on October 13, while the 
second part, the operative part, was vetoed ty the Soviet 
134 Union. Men, however, finds a different origin for the 
131. See M.S.Ra.ian. India In World Affairs^ 1964.66, op.cit,, pp« 128.130. 
132. Eastern C^Qi^ omistf April 12, 1967, p. 631. 
133. India In World Affair^^ op.cit., p. 162. 
134. Is.ls4M» PP* 22 .. 23 and 26. 
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187. Anglo-French draft proposal. Similarly, the Indian plan 
, 136 
might have h^d the approval of Egypt broadly, for it,,..was 
worse than the original Menon plan where it contemplated nonadvisory function for the users' association.as the 
fcher 
,,138 
137 Eastern £cQnoB4st put it. Ho wonder, if "India was, there-
fore, doubly pleased at the Security Council resolution*' 
Hehru Miscalculatesa 
But India's pleasure was to pi'o:ve misplaced and short 
lived. It was on October 16, just three days after the adop-
tion of t^ e Security douncil resolution that Eden decided fin-139 ally to use force against the UAR, in toe company of France 
and Israel,, who had already prepared their plans for an attack 
140 on Egypt. The Government of India were entirely unaware of 
14'' 
these developments,'Hve had hoped", Nehru later confessed '^ in 
the Lok Sabha on November 16, 1966, "however, that afteJb the 
Security Council's resolution, more peaceful methods would be 
adopted to solve this dispute." Biere was, in fact, no ground 
136. Op«cit., p. 604. 
136. For Nehru's views expressed at a press conference - See The Hlndu^ 26 October 1966. 
137. ,^ upr,a, n. 131. 
138. §imMt n.l3§. 
139. Eden, op*cit», p.SlO. According to Anthony Nutting r (op.cit.,p.87) the collusion started on October 13,1966. 
140. See Koshe Day an. Diary of !Ehe Sinai Campaig^ ^ (Welder.;fed, And Nicolson, London) 1964, pp. 30-132. 
141. Nehru, op.cit., p. 636. 
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187. 
for such hopes for various reasons. For as Anthony Nutting 
says, neither Eden nor Mollet, the French Rremler, were in 
favoui' of a compromise with Nasser» They, thereofre, did not 
welcome the concessions, made l^r Nasser, in deference to the 
views of Nehru and his Arab colleagues. Nutting has further 
143 
said that Uiey even tried, to subvert, the talks with Faiazi 
and Hammarsk^eold when Fawzi accepted the Sl» Principles pro-
posed by the British Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloisd. 
Another Indication of the British intentions was that 
Eden had, at. this time, informed the Conservative Party Con-
144 ference that force could not be excluded for a solution to 
the dispute. Similarly the mood in Frsuace was extremely 
146 
hostile to Nasser. Further the Soviet Union was experiencing 
difficulties with the Eastern European courxtries, especially 
in Hungary, where the Communist Party had rehabilitated Imro 146 Nagy on October 13, And on October 27, the Soviet Uhion 
142, Op»cit., pp.50*61. Eden wrote that no one present in the Security Council believed that a peaceful solution was possible (op.cit., pp. 506*606). 
143, P* 76. 
144, Eden, op.cit., p. 60S. 
146. Chapter III, n^.^l. 
146. See Paul E. Zinner, op.clt., pp. 388-389. 
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announced that England, France and Israel had decided on 
147 October 23 to attack the United Arab Republic, The first 
Soviet armed intervention in Hungary occured on October 24, 
148 
According to Professor Finer, the Israeli attack on the 
Iftiited Arab Republic which was scheduled for a later date was 
brought forward to October 29, mainly to take advantage of 
the Soviet intervention in Hungary, For, "It would enable 
Israel to achieve a victory without interference either from 
the United States or from the United Nations* Moreover, the 
total impotence that the United Nations could be expected to 
display, in any attempt jfct might make to apply a civilised 
standard to the brutalities of the Soviet in Hungai'y, might 
result in some understanding and con^nation of tiie action 
of Israel. JX the United States could not apply the moral 
feave and the CStiarter to Russia, could it fairly apply them to 
Israel? One law for both, or no law for either?" 
i49 
Ifoshe Dayan himself has admitted that perhaps the 
Sinai Campaign would not have been launched, if the &)Viet 
147# See David J,Daliin, op.cit., p, 4izand Finer, op#cit#, . p. 342. 
148, Op.cit,, p, 363, See also Survey^ 1956»68, pp. 66-67. Indeed, the withdrawal of the Aswan Dham Aid by Dulles also appears to have been influenced by Soviet preoccu-pation with its Eastern European satellites - See .S.nyyey, 1965-56, Pi 304, 
149, Op*Git,, p# 186. 
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187. threat of reckets had come earlier, instead of on November 
5, 1956, oving to the situation in Hxingary. It is no.t 
difficult to say that these were also the calculations of 
Britain and Stance, Eden appeal's to have been confident 
that the Soviet leaders understood the special interests of 
161 the west in the Arab world. 
The Government of India and the External Affairs 
Ministry, however, were so much confident that "the danger 
of war was over", that their Ambassadors to Cairo and London 
were both permitted to come to India for rest during the 
second half of October, 1956 and they had to rush to their 
places as soon as Israel launched its aggression, as Nehru 
^ 162 
told Parliament on November 2o, 1956. It is a measure of 
India's unpreparedness that Nehru had to confees in Parliament 
on November 16, 1966 his ignorance of the developments after 153 
October 13, 1956. He saids "Whether there was any previous 
consultation among the aggressor countries, I do not know." 
The attack on the United A.rab Republic was the one 
thing Nehru and Menon wanted to avoid, at all costs, s.ince 
150. Supra^ n. 69, pp. 288-292,' 
151, Op.eit., p. 443. 
162. See L.S.D.^ Part II, Vol. IX, No.6, November 20,1956, cols. 587-688. 
163. Nehru, op.eit., p. 636. 
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any hostilities would affect the functioning of the Suez 
Canal and jeopardise India's econoiny* The methods employed 
by Nehru and henon, however, do not appeal' to have been 
either imaginative or affective Indism diplomacy appears to 
have been t^ jo much preoccupied with attempts to revise tolls 
and fright charges and to have overlooked to a certain extent 
the deepei' issues involved in the conflict, and the possi-
bility of Israel exploiting the situation for its own pur-
poses. This could have been foreseen perhaps with a little 
more of imagination* The aggression destroyed, though only 
for tiie t;ime, Nehru»s cherished views of Britain as a Ctommon-
wealth nation. The fact that India was a Commonwealth nation 
with regular contacts and consultations with Britain and 
other CommoHWealtti nations, the failure of Britain to consult 
India on such a crucial issue, and Eden*s refusal to listen 
to India's pleas for compromise, appear to have contributed 
to Nehru's reaction to tl:ie British action. Besides, the 
Anglo-French attempt to recapture the Sue z Canal and to over-
throw Nasser, were dangerous moves from the point of view of 
weak Afro-Asian nations. No wonder, then, that Nehru was 
164, Answering Acharya Kripalanl's criticism that our dip-lomats abroad failed to sense this, Nehi'u said that nobody had sensed it and that how they could do It was more tiian he could understand. Supra,, n^.lSl, col. 586. 
166. eol. 687. 
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indignant at the aggressors. He had no hesitation in denounc-
166 
ing the aggression as'dastardly action'. Possibly NehPu also 
wanted to make amends for his earlier criticism of the policies 
of the United Arah Republic Government. 
Equally quick was Nehru*s demand for the withdrawal 
of the forces of the three Aggressors. India's diplomacy was 
then directed to achieve this objective in the shortest possi-
ble time. Fortunately for India, not only the Cfciited States 
and the Soviet Union, but the Commonwealth and a large part 
of Afro-iisia demanded an immediate cease*.flre and withdrawal 
of forces from the United Arab Republic. The United States 
took the lead in demanding a cease-fire and withdrawal of 
Israeli forces through a draft resolution introduced oh 
157 October 29, which was vetoed by England and France, A similar 
168 
Soviet resolution was also vetoed by Ehgland and France. 
Then, Yugoslavia, prompted by India from outside, took the 
initiative t^r introducing a motion under the 'Uniting For 
Peace' resolution of I960, calling for a special emergency 
session of the General assembly, which was accepted by the 
166. See The Hindu^ 2 November 1966. Nehru did this at a public meeting at Hyderabad on the occasion of the inauguration of the new state of Andhra Pradesh. I was one of the many privileged to listen to Nehru on the occasion. 
167. See » Pp, 26 - 27 and 34, 
168. Ibid. 
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187. Security Council on October 31, 1966. Thus the Anglo-French 
attempt to paralyse tlie Itoited Nations was defeated. The 
Assembly passed the United States sponsored resolution on 
KoVQmber 2 demanding an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of 
160 foriSes behind the armistice lines of 1949. 
India also supported Canada's proposal for ti^ creation 
of a United Nations Emergency Force, a peace keeping force. 
161 Nehru, however, refused to sever the Commonwealth linic with 
162 
Britain, even temporarily, as suggested by Rajagopalachari, 
to force Britain to vacate aggression, though he appears ta 
have threatened to do so, if the other Commonwealth nations, 163 
especially Canada and Australia, had supported England. Such 
a step would have been, perhaps, detrimental to India's 
economy, whic^ was already affected by the closure of the 
Suez Canal as a result of British and French attack. Nehru, 
however, conceded that India's association with the Commonwealt 164 could not be taken for granted. Fortunately for him and rlndia, 
169, See Y.B«D.M., 1956,27-28. 
160. Pp, 28-29 and 36. 
161. SupTs^ ^ n.161, cols* 596-597. 
162. See The Hiadu^ November 6, 1956. 
163. Robertson, o p . c i t , , p. 179, 
164* Surg-a.f n.l60. See also !I3ie HlndUy November 10, 1966. 
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the Jinglo-Frencii forces were withdrawn from the Itoited Jirab 
Republic in the last week of December, 1956, giving place to 
tne UNEF consisting of forces from India, Canada and some ' 
other countries* Ihis withdrawal was achieved by a combined 
pressure from the ttaited States, the Commonwealth and an out-166 raged public opinion at home, especialJ^ in England* 
166 
Thus, as Professor Ra^an has rightly concluded s "Even 
though the sympathies of the Government and people of India 
over the dispute were with Egypt, they were equally animated 
by friendly feelings towards the west-more especially Britain, 
They were certainly not partisan in their role not only 
because tSiat would not be conducive to a mutually acceptable 
settlement (which was the final objective of their efforts), 
but also because of India's own vital interests in keeping the 
Suez Canal free aiid open," 
The Government of India appear to have put as much 
pressure on the •United Arab Republic for concessions, as upon 
1671 the Governments of 0-K. and U.S. According to Professor Raj an, 
165. See Nutting, op.cit., pp. 144* 147} Northedge, op.cit,, pp.228-239 and Survey^ 1956-68, pp,147»148 and 167. 
166. Supra J n* 119. 
167» Ibid., The Economic Weekly (Vol.VIII, Nos.61 Sc 52, December 22, 1956) wrote j "Both the Indian P.M. and president Tito are known to have exercised a restrain-
infs influence on President Nasser " According to Nutting (op.cit., p.74) some Arab States also brought pressure on Nasser. 
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again, "objective v?estem observers conceded tbat to JDidia 
as due much of tiie credit for moderation, and restraint in 
the actions and opinions of the Egyptian Government throughout 
the acute phase of t^e Suez crisis*" No wonder that Indo-
British relations were not overstrained either during the 
crisis or after it, in fact they quickly returned' to nor-
malcy soon after the crisis, no doubt due to the success of 
U.S. efforts in forcing the withdrawal of the Anglo-French 
forces from Suez, 
It would thus appear that there was some truth in 
Asoka Mehta's criticism of India's stand on the Suez crisis. 
Speaking in the debate on the international situation in 
Parliament on November 19, 1956, he drew a parallel between 
Jttidia's stand on Algeria and the Suez Crisis. Pointing out 
168 
the lack of firmness in India's stand Kehta saids "The result 
is both the French and the British Governments were emboldened 
and, perhaps, they thought th^ could get away with this kind 
of treatment or with this kind of adventure in Egypt* I am 
not saying that if we had taken a firm stand earlier these 
things would not have happened, but I feel that our record 
would have been much stronger, our moral voice would have had 
168, See Part II, Vol. IX, No.4, ]^ ovember 19, 1966., cols. 406-.406. 
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much greater authority if we had functioned in an unequivocal 
manner all tiirough." 
Apart from moral considerationsf a laore unequivocal 
stand would have perhaps saved the situation^ Such criticism 
could be made against "toe United States too, and, has, indeed, 
169 170 
been made by an Indian scholar. According to Professor Finer, 
there is enough evidence to believe titiat many in the gtate 
Department knew of the proposed attack on tiie United Arab 
Republic. Ihe United States, if it had been more careful, 
could have prevented the Israeli attack. Commenting on 
/ Eisenhower's two cables to Ben-Gurion, the Israeli Premier,on 
171 
the eve of the attack, Moshe Dayu^ Qa, has said that "Ihe terms 
of both messages were general and could be 'swallowed'.*.." 
172 
In the words of Graham Spray, ,"'rhe response and jwlicy 
of the Government of Canada.... .was instinctive but not uncon-
sidered and unprepared.».•*The possibility of military action 
by the UK,, however, had not been wholly ignored from the 
moment when foirther British forces began to move after 2 August 
169. See M^S.Venka^ramani, 'Oil And US Foreign Policy During The Suez Crisis, 1966-67', International Studies (Vol. II, No.l, October I960), p. 132. 
170. Op.cit,, pp. 3S3.-338. 
171. Op.clt., p. 71« 
172. 'Canada^ The UNEF, And The Commonwealth', International 
(Vol.33, No.3, July, 1967), p. 292. 
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to J-^ alta and Gyprus#" All they did vas to issue warnings. 
Nothing appestrs to have been done to prevent it, 
While the United States atid Canada could be indifferent 
to thu fate of Nasser an«i would have welcomed his downfall, 
India and Nehru could not be so indifferent. Indeed, India 
had a moral obligation to protect the interests of tiie United 
Arab Republic as the leading champion of Nonalignment of which 
.Nasser had become a crusader* USius India's inability to keep 
abreast of tiie developments, especially in the crucial stages 
of a crisis of such vital importance to its own security and 
economy} as well as to international peace, which appears to 
have been responsible for its failure to act with more fore-
sight and foreCthought, was laost uiifortunate» India, however, 
made amends for this failure after Aggression* 
This study would be incomplete without an examination 
of Mia's attitude towards Israel's claim for freedom of 
passage through tiie Suez Canal for more reasons than one. On 
173 the one hand, a western writer has claimed that ''The origins 
173, Terence Robertson, op.cit,. Preface, p.xvi. 
This study was intended to cover the events upto the Suez Crisis of 1956 originally and was completed in its major form before the June 1967 v»est Asian crisis. It has since been revised to include a brief-very brief mention of this crisis also. 
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of the Suez crisis lie in Israel, where the decision to fight 
a preventive war was deliberately timed to take advantage of 
what Israeli leaders thought to be widC3spread disenchantment 
with Colonel Nasser and his policies This, howeveri 
appears to be an over^simplification# On the other hand, 
India's stand has been depicted as almost ^amoral ty writers 
174 like ftrofesaors flerman Finer and Mchael Brecher. 
What gave importance to the Israeli claim for free 
pafe^ was the westei'n attempt, in their anxiety to prove 
Nasser's "Hitlerism', and to give undue importance to it, 
completely forgetting that the blockade of Israel was not 
176 
Nasser's policy aid also oV0r3ooking the fact that "Ihe 
Case of Israel was an|exception that had been tolerated by the 
Canal Company, by tiie UII, and by the world opinion generally 176 
for five years." Even Gaitskell fell victim to this error. 
He said if there is anything he has done which would 
174. Michael Brecher, The New States of -Aslay op.cit*,cWr Here Professor Brecher is critical of India's refusal to extend diplomatic relations to Israel. Professor Brecherte partiality for Israel is well illustrated by the fact ttes that in this book -iae denotes one full chapter to Israel. No other state of Asia, not even commxmist China receives such treatment. Prof.Brecher came out with a categorical assertion during the Arab-Israel war of June 1967 on the 'immorality' of the Indian stand, gee letters to the Editor, The Hindu,, 21 June 1967. See P.Kodanda Rao's 
t$Xtting reply to Prof.Brecher in The Hindu^ June 2?, 1967 Also see below 
176* Robertson, op.cit., preface, p.xlv. 
176» Supra, n. 
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Justify force at ttxe moment,it is one thing on which we have 
never used force the stopping of Israel's ships." 
177 
But as Anthony Nutting has reveal^ in January 1964, 
Eden had held almost emphatically that, as an Arab country 
still in a state of war with Israel, Egypt had sn arguable 
claim, under Article 10 of the Constantinople Convention 
governing taie Suez Canal to deny passage to Israeli ships as 
a measure necessary to 'assure the defence of Egypt 
Cf^  Lloyd had .•..•written a minute to the Prime Mnister deny-
ing that Egypt had any such rights and, on learning this, Eden 
had waxed very angry and hastened to correct his Minister of 
State." And in an intervi^ granted to press men on October 178 
9, 1969, Nasser said, inter alia s ^ 'As for the state of war, 
I was amazed when the British Foreign Minister, Selwyn Lloyd, 
asked me via the ON Secretary-General Dag Hamciarsk^eold, to 
send him a letter promisiing not to apply to British ships what 
we are app:Lying to Israeli ships. Ihis took place in 1966 
after the failure of the aggression against Egypt when the 
occupation forces were obliged to withdrawj Lloyd's point 
of view on the situation includQ:;la frank recognition that the»*«i 
was a state of war existing beto^ een us and Israel,...'^  
177. Op.cit., p. 22, 
178. Nasser's SseecheB^ 1959, op.cit., p. 583, 
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Another question is had the canal been free for naviga-
tion alvays under the western Powers? Ihe answer is an omi^a-179 tic negative, as Krishna Menon revealed at the first Lon<2on 
180 
Conference. And| according to Freda Utley there is another 
"interesting fact that when Rommel was only fifty miles 
from the Canal in 1943, ^President Roosevelt sought assurances 
that Britain was prepared to blow up the Canal pf necessary —— 
despite the provision of the Convention that the Canal was to 
remain open in time of war as well as in peace." 
181 
AB against all this, India's stand as stated by Menon 
at the London Conference was that this dispute should be sett-
led at the world Court. Professor Finer is indignant at this 182 
stand. Nehru, he writes "was as calm as a marble god about 
Israel's troubles." But he does not know, or would not wish 
or care to know that Nehi'u did not say a single word against 
Israel till it committed aggression on the United Arab Republic 
And the fact that India had either recognised Israel or that 
« 
Nehru had always reservations on tiie Arab attitude towards 
Israel till this aggression, do not matter much for either 183 Prof. Finer or Prof. Brecher. And "Menon", says the former,," 
179. n m m i n.95, pp. 66-57. 
180. Op.cit., p. 83. 
181. n. 17SS 
182. Op.cit., p.5^6 
183. p. 169. 
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"knew surely, that the Security Council had rejected the 
claim of Egypt's, and he also knex^ ; the hazards not only of 
gettingVdecision from the court, but even if it was ever 
obtained, of getting it carried out*" 
It was not India's fault, however, if the Security 
Cotincil and its members had failed to enforce its decision. 
184 
Indeed this was Nasser's charge against the UN. As he told 
Hassanain Baikal on June 30, 19S9, "It is strange that Israel 
should demand to^day tiiat a recommendation should be obeyed, 
while tiie whole world witaiesses Israel trampling a long and 
successive number of resolutions adopted isy the ON in the 
interest of Palestine people* It has even gone past the more 
violations of these resolutions to planning crimes of mrder 
against tl:te representatives of the United Nations." 2hat 
Nasser was quite right was once again proved hy Israel in its 18S inhuman killing of Indian troops of the ISISF in June 1957, 
Similarly, India is not to be blamed or ha^ied up for 
the ineffectiveness of the world Court, If the South West 
African case could be ts^en to the World Court, why not the 
Israeli claim against the U.A*R.? Ifi there any other way out 
for the peaceful solution of such intractable disputes!? 
184, Nasser*a Speeches^ 1969, op.cit., p. 666, 
186, See^  She Hindu, ru^ t: t^^^  7 
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Professor Finer speaks as if Nehru and Menon had coaanltted 
a great sin in suggesting that the matter be referred to the 
world Court. His chahvinistic bias is evident from his obser-
186 
vation that s "The world had tried hard to develop 
and to some extent has succeeded in developing, international 
officials whose loyalty is to a service, a function, and not 
a nation or nations. How could a juvenile from the primitive 
Nile village of Beni Mer, not anxious to study hard at school 
and nurtured all his life in nationalistic vendettas in army 
barracks and in the streets rise to such a civilised concep-
tion?" This is a reference to Nasser and his criticism of the 
World Bank as a political institution. Perhaps, Nasser was 
more than justified, when the Bank's loan offer for the Aswan 
High Dam, which was conditional upon the 0.S.A,'s and U.K.'o 
offers, fell through, when the latter withdrew their offers. 
Prof» Finer seems to feel that liie world Bank was more unbia-
sed than tiie Vvorld Court. does he mean that while the 
former could be influenced by the Big Powers, the latter could 
not be? 
Nasser has also been charged W Israel and its suppor-
ters everywhere, that he wants to destroy Israel, at the 
186. Op.cit., p. 40. 
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187. earliest opportunity. Eden, for example, vrotej "I thought 
then, and I think now, that the Israelis had ;Justlfication 
for their action. It is at least a grim possibility that 
they Would not be a free nation today had tiiey not taken it," 
This is patently meaningless. If this were tiie truth, it is 
difficult to understand the reasons for Eden's efforts to 
hide his collusion with Israel, resulting i» the crude Anglo« 
French Ultimatum to Israel and the UAR, which has been justly 
188 
condemned by all decent people all over the world, Eden per-
haps did not realise that his diplomacy did not bring England 
the gratitude of Israel. On the other hand, it provoked the 189 
contempt of Moshe Dayani "I must confess to the feeling t2iat, 
save for the Almighty, only the British are capable of compli-
cating matters to such a degree,*' Had Eden been alive, he 
could have perhaps derived satisfaction from the fact that 
Day an had placed Britain in good company, that of the j^ imightyj 
187# Op«cit,, p. 623. 
ISB. See Anthony Nutting, Ap.cit,, pp*100-109 for details. Also See pp. 193-194 for the text of the ultimatilm. The State Department, Washington, Ckjndemned it as "the most bi'utal in modern history" - See Survey 1966-68, p. 69. 
189. Op.cit,, p. 69. 
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187. However, Nutting has a different story to tellj that Britain 
had supplied more ai'ms to the United Arab Republic than Russia 
had done» 
lo disprove this charge against Nasser it is necessary 
to give certain expert opinions of x^ estern writers. According 
191 
to Lt* Gen* E.L.M#Burns, "Hostile propaganda has him perpe-
tually threaten^ i^ng tiie destruction of, Isreal, but in none of 
his speeches have I found that Se has gone b^ond the statemen" 
made to the York Times correspondent published as an Inter-V 
view on October 6, 1966 s is not an easy decision for 
any one, especially for ae* No Arab is saying now tiiat we 
must destroy Israel* The Arabs are asking only that the 
refugees (from Palestine) receive their natural right to life, 
..•..their lost property, which was promised to them by the UN 
resolutions seven years ago ...»# No, we are not aggressive. 
The threat is from the other sidei 
•^irVw/S 
"Ox' course, in the flood of propaganda which powers 
constantly out of the Cairo press and radio^ there have been 
many threats of direct vengeance on Israel, some of them made 
by persons in autiiority. The Israelis argue that in an 
190* Op.cit,, pp. 147-148, See also Northedge, op%cit. ,p.235. 
191. Between Arab And Israeli (George Harrap & Co., Ltd., 
London, 1962), pp. 18* 19. Burns was the chief of UN Truce Supervision ^eperations for a long pex'iod. See also 1969, op.cit., p. 625. 
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authorltariarx state, such as Egypt, tiie mass media of commu-
nication ai'e rigidly controlled, and vhat is said must tiiere-
fore refleat the policy of the responsible authorities. This 
ignores the nature oi" propaganda, •which is not necessarilyOL 
statement of intentions of those vho control the propaganda 
sources, but is a mode of inducing a desired frame of mind in 
those who listen to it« Thus it can properly be deduced that 
the Egyptiaa propaganda masters want, the Arab population 
believe that Egypt implacably hostile to Israel and proposes, 
at some indefinite time in the future, to go to war with the 
object of overwhelming the Israeli state. But it is not proof 
that they -are actually planning to do so." 
192 
Burns writes further that Nasser could not pursue the 
plan of forging ^ United Arab Nation and "simultaneously 
wage an a3J.-out war against Israel." But "If the Union of 
Arab states under a sti'ong central Government could be 
achieved the balance of power, economic and eventually 
military, would turn against Israel, and the settlement of 
the Palestine Question on terms satisfactory to the Arabs could, 
be aiahieved by economic and military pressux-e. ISiis jjossibi-
lity was t^r no means ignored by the Israelis." 
192. Ibid. 
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193 According to Georgiaaa Stevens "In 1963 and 1954, 
the period of the new regime's first sti'uggles, Egypt's 
actions in regard to Palestine reflected the general remot-
eness of that issue froui Egyptian life. An effort was made 
to keep the Palestine issue quiescent so as to prevent any 
further military encounters on the uneasy Israel • Gaza border. 
At this Stage Egypt had neither tiie capacity nor the interest 
to stage aa attack on Israel and preferred to be as free of 
the whole problem as was politically possible*" And Erskine 
B.Childers has observed that till the Gaza js raid by Israeli 
forces in February 19bt "The Egyptian revolutionary regime 
had evinced signs of at the least - wishing to reduce 
the Ai-ab-lsraeli tension." That this was true is evident from 
the fact that "There were minor agreements bbtween the two 
countries - such as the shipping agreement of July 23, 19S3 
concluded under the auspices of the United Nations." 
195 
And to quote Burns again "Gamal Abdel Nasser told me 
when I first met him on November 16, 1954, that it was his 
193, Eaypt Yesterday And Today (Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, Inc.,New lork : 1963), p.203.. 
194. Common gense About The Arab World (Victor Gollancz Ltd,, London, I960), p. lOl. <Italics aro mino)^ 
196, Op.cit., p.lS.Ji See /reda Utlay, op.cit,, p,63. Thei-e is also no proof that the raids in the Gaza area were orga-nised fay Nasser as Israel alleged* See John Morlowe, iiaElo^Eeyptian Relations 1^00^1956^ Second Editing-, (Frank Ca^s & Co., London, 1966),41^-414. 
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desire that toere snould be no trouble on the north-eastern 
bofder of Egypt, no disturbance of the six years of quiescence 
of taie armistice regime, no military adventures. But after 
the shock of February 28, 1955, as he told me and msuciy others, 
he could no longer maintain such an attitude. Shortly before 
the raid, he said, he had visited Gaza and had told the troops 
that there was no danger of warj tiaat the Gaza Armistice 
Demarcation Line was not going to be a battle front. After 
that many of them had been.shot in their beds. Never again 
could 'pQ risk telling the troops they had no attack to fearj 
never agair*. could foe let them believe that they could roloaso 
their vigilance. 
\^ hat then was the reason for ttie success of the Israeli 
p ' 196 
pi'opaganda against lifasser. In Burns' wordsj "Ihe US Jewish 
Community, through its economic power especially as related 
to many m«tdia of mass information under the leadership of the 
well-organised Zionist pressure groups, exerts an influence 
(Continued from previous page) 
It was after this raid and Israeli's refusal to accept ONTSO proposals to reduce frontier tension that Nasser accepted the organisation of the fedavin for raids into Israel - See Esskins B.Childres, op.cit., pp. 98-99j Peter Mansfield, op.cit., p. 66, Burns, op.cit.,pp.84-
Op.cit., p.287. For an account of the influence of Jewish pressure groups on the American Administration^ See Cecil V.Crabb Jr., American Foreign Policy In the A^^, op.cit., p. 229. 
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on United States policy which goes foJ* beyond what might be 
calculated froin a counting of the so-called «Jewish vote', 
"over many years, it is only Israel's side of the 
Palestine story which has been presented to Americans ••• Ihe 
picture of Israel as a small nation gallantly struggling to 
rebuild existence in its ancient home ••••• is accepted by the 
majority of non-Jewish Americans and Canadians, especially 
those Christians who believe fervently in Biblical inspiration 
This is an understatement and does not explain the 
western attitude in full. The Jewish propaganda comes in handy 
for the United States to fulfil its desire to keep the Arab 
Arab world under its domination* Israel is only a pretext 
or a tool. Perhaps Israel also realises this well. Its very 
creation was a product of this desire. The western Powers saad 
the United States wei-e warned well in advanced by the |<ing -
Crane Commission instituted by the latter, of the consequences 
» 
and the untjanability of the Zionist claims of a homeCland in 
197 Palestine, The United States just shelved the report. 
197. See Harvey Dey, "A Peep Into History : Oil Tickles Desert Guns To Boom In West Asia,' The Hindu (Weekly Magazine),, 18 June, 1967. Harvey Day explodes saother myths of western or Jewish origin viz., that Jews alone are giftecj or talented people, tiiat there is no Biblical support for the Jewish claim for a home and for Palestine, 
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Thus, there is no substance in the western claim that 
their support to the Zionist claim was a result of humaint'ari-
198 
anisiQ. This would simply meaia that the western Powers did not 
believe that tile one million and odd Arab Palestinians who were 
mercilessly driven out from Palestine to give place to Jewish 
immigran,ts from Europe, constitute a p^t of humanity, so that 
their rights and feelings could be trampled upon under the self-
styled humaintarianism of the Colonial Powers* The manner in X99 
which the Palestine Mandate was framed, bears testimony to 
this fact. Tlrmre is thus, not the slightest exaggeration in 
what Professor Hohamaiad Habib said of Israel, in a talk over 200 the All India Radio on June 14, 1967s "The State of Israel is 
198. See Cecil V.Crabb Jr., Supra, n.l96. Of course, many Arabs accept this theory. They seem to be appealing to the good sense of the western Powers without any effect so far.See Clovis Maksoud, 'Israel. The Balis of Arab case'. The Hind^  18 August 1967 for an excellent statement of Arab case against Israel and the west. 
199. It is alleged that the Mandate was based on drafts pre-pared by Zionists. See G.A.Nasser, The Pnilosophy of The Revolution (op.cit*, pp.61-63) for quotations fromli^ eiz-mann's memoirs. See also Mohammad El-Hadi Afifi The Arabs And The United Nat;Lons (Longmanns, Green & Co. Ltd., London, 1964), p. 64, n.2, 
200* See G.S.Bhargava, ed., India And West Asia s A Survey of Public Opinion (Popular Book Services, New Delhi-3, 1957) p* 46. If Indians point out the colonial and racial ori-gins of Israel, it does not seem sound to argue, as Prof. Brecher does (See above chapterjTn.^ a ) that India's atti-tude to Israel is shaped b/ anti colonial and racial feelings. Also see above n. 17^. 
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not the pro<iuct o£ Jewish culture but one or the most cruel 
types of European Jev?ish Colonialism that the world has seen*" 
Israel wants Military Superiority; , 
Having created Israel through pressure tactics of the 
worst kind ever used by a Great Power in the United Nations, 
the United States undertook to maintain a militarily superior 
Israel in the Arab world. For it was realised that Israel 
could not exist without such support as was evident during 
the first vm? between the Arabs and Israel, in which the latter 
was rescued by the western Powers, led by the United States, 
201 
once again through the machinery of the United Nations. Ihis 
was the policy enunicated by the United States and its allies 
in the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 as already indicated. 
Israel was naturally encouraged by this support and 
began to exert pressure on the western Powers to force the 
iirabs to recognise its existence and to grant it freedom of 
passage through the Suez Canal, which the Arabs were unwilling 
to do, even under the rule of decadent monarchs and corrupt 
governments which depended upon the western Ftowers for their 
very existence. The efforts of Israel, however, resulted in 
201. PP» 61-63, See Nasser•s Speech of 3 March 19bt in DQgUf^ eQts. Cgy p. 347 - , 
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the Security Council Resolution of 1951, recoiamendlng the 
freedom of passage to Israel in the Suez Canal* 
But when Britain signed with Nasser the treaty for the 
evacuation of the Suez base, Israel began to develop cold feet. 
203 
In a typical statement on October 19, 1964, the Israeli 
Foreign Ministry bemoaned s "it is more than ever necessary 
that Egypt should be called upon to respect its international 
obligations and to renounce its policy of hostility and vio-
lence towai-ds Israel* i?'or this reason, it is difficult for 
Israel to join in the chorus of congratulations which the sign-
ing of the agreement has aroused, Uie transfer of the Canal 
Zone, with all its installations without any request 
having been iaade to Egypt that it should modify its attitude 
towards Israel or calm the letter's well - founded apprehen-
sion, In fact Egypt has recently demonstrated, yet once more 
and in the clearest fashion, its complete indifference to the 
most elementary international obligations by taking possession 
of an Israeli merchant vessel. 
There is here not the slightest mention of the fact that 
if the United Arab Republic has an Intel-national obligation to 
allow freedom of passage to Israeli ships, Israel has a much 
202. See PpgyMB^ Bts ^Qy 1,961, pp. 462-63, 
203. See Documents for 1964^ p. 266. 
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more important and greater international obligation towards 
the Palestinian Refugees, not to speak of many other obliga-
204 tions of this kind. 
However, the Israeli displeasure at the Suez agreement 
was a reflection its desire to see that the relations between 
the western Powers, especially the United States, and the 
Arabs, especially Nasser, did not improve. The Anglo^U.S» 
approach was on the other hand, aimed at improving tiieii^^ re-
latioiiS with Nasser,. so as to bring the Arabs into an alliance 
206 
system aimed against the Soviet Union. As John C.Campbell 
has written* "Vihen the Suez agreement was finally reached, in 
October 1954, the United States and British Governments were 
engaged in a thorough study of all the possibilities. This t^Yvw^ 
study covered all the questions and sketched out tenta-
tive settlements in considerable detail, including frontier 
adjustments, repatriation and resettlement of refugees, and a 
special status for Jerusalem. It seemed at least possible that 
these matters could be discussed by the two western powers 
204. See in this connection, Hed/ey V.Coocke, Israel t A Bless* 
ing And a Curse (Stevens Sons Ltd.,London, I960), for a more or less objective study of the fiefugee problem and Israel's obligations towards them. This book also reveals the exclusive nature of Israeli state-an anachronism in the modern world. 
206. Op.cit., p. 87, For Dulles' report on the Near and Middle East, See Si^ pra. n.29, pp.337-342 and for Dulles' propo-sals for settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. See, Id., pp» 395-96. Also SsM for the Israeli statement See ppi 407-412. 
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separately with Egypt and with Israel, without any direct 
confrontation between the two parties.•••• 
"Wo one can be sure what iaight have come of tSiese 
endeavours had not Israeli raid on Gaza in February 1966, 
which resulted in 69 casulaties.»».frightened Nasser into 
turning all bis attention to the need for strengthening 
Egypt*...." 
The Israeli raid on Gaza was thus a calculated aove 
and an atteiapt on the part of Israel to subvert the improve-* 
ment of relations between Arabs and the Western Powers because 
it did not want to make any concessions to the Palestinian 
206 
Refugees. &s Campbell has observed* "Israel paid remarkably 
little heed to the necessity of coming to some terms with the 
fact of living in the heart of the Arab world ..... It merely 
offered compensation, in principle for their property while 
barring tiieir return, meanwhile opening the doors wide to 
Jewish imm-tgration." 
Another effort made by Israel to achieve its objective 
was its attempt to blow up the American Information service 
207 buildings in Cairo. As Georgiana G.Stevens, has put it tills 
206. p. 82. 
207. MJ^rnf n. 19§, p. 205. 
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"seemed to indicate Israel's determination to prevent, it 
possible, any improvement of relations between Egypt and ttie 
United States," 
Israel wanted to justify the Gaza raid as an act of 
reprisal against Arab infiltration and raids,. However, the 
Mixed Armistice CoMuission condemned the raid as aggression 
and the western Pow.ers were compelled to censure Israel in 
208 20Q the United Nations* According to.Burns "Dayan calculates 
that the Arabs seeing themselves helpless to counter the 
drastic Israeli military Sefeti^ fts, would be forced to realise 
that they must make peace with Israel.^ 
.the wronCness of the policy was not that it 
sought to make the Arabs stop sending marsu^ ders into Israel, 
but that it was a slightly indirect metiiod of using military 
power to force the Arab states (primarily Kgypt) to accept the 
Israeli terms of peace. That is to say, it was an attempt to 
settle an international dispute by military force, in complete 
disregard of Israel's engagements as a member of the United 
Nations." 
208. For Burns' report to the Security Council and the text of tile Anglo-French-United States resolution condemning Israel. See Documents for 1955^ pp.. 348-30. 
209. Op.cit., p. 63. 
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As if in defiance of ^ e UH censure Israel carried 
out another bloody raid on Khan Yunis on the nigiit of August 
210 
31 - September 1» The United States on the other hand, 
refused to give arias aid to Nasser, which he so desperately 
needed. France on the other hand seems to have assured 
Israel of substantial military aid, -^ as Nasser revealed after 
announcing his arms deal -with Czechoslovakia on September 27 211 212 19&5« And Erskine B,Childers has observed that ''early in 
November 196£; .••.» Nasser told a Life magazine reporter that 
the Czech decision had been taken, not 6o|much in terms of 
Israel's strength as it was then, as in terms of her strength 
when her existing secret arms arrangements with France were 
completed. He detailed the types and quantities of French 
weapons to be delivered to Israel. The next day, Israeli 
spokesman denied the existence of any arms deal with France 
at all. But in 1956, when French arms deliveries to Israel 
were revealed, it was notable that they matched very closely, 
in type .-md quantity, the details which Nasser had professed 
to know .in 1966.*' 
213 
Biirns writes that "I have been told that Prime 
Minister Nasser, decided to accept this offer (Czech arms) 
81110. p.90. And for Burns* report .^jjo, n.202, pp.366-. 369. 
211. For the announcement see Sunra^ n.20?, pp.370^373. 
212. Suura, n. 19^ 
213. Op.cit., p, 91. 
• 287 -
after 1*Jb.e Kiian lunls raid." Thus, the mlted States appears 
to have failed to make Israel give up its policy. Nasser*s 
arms deal sent the Israeli policy m^ers into a rage and 
panic, for it shattered all their plans of keeping the Arabs 
and especially, the United Arab Republidj militarily weak for 
214 ever. The effect on Israel and the western Powers has been 
216 
well explained by Elizabeth S^onroes "The whole elaborate 
structure of Anglo-American defence policy was altered by this 
coup. It nullified the western arrangement for an arms balance 
between the Arabs and Israel, it converted western aid from 
a weapon in westein hands into a bargaining counter for Egyp-
tian or Arab use in the profitable puocess of taking aid from 
both sides of the iron curtain and, above all, it confirmed 
all but a few AraWin the view that Nasser was a new Saladin. 
Others had talked; here was the man who acted and who had given 
Middle Eastern states dignity and equality at last." 
In a desperate move to rescue the western prestige, the 
United States and England decided to extend aid for the Aswan 
High Dam. And in a speech in Guild Hall on November 9, 1966, 
216 Eden proposcKi a readjustment of Israeli fJ^ ontiers. All this 
214, See Ben Gurion's Speech to the Knesset on 2 November, 196i5, Documents for 195fc, pp. 379-381. See also Moshe Sharet's Speech on October 16, 1966, Supra, n.^, pp. 407-412. ^r 
216. Op.iJit., p. 186. 
216. See Documents for 1966^ pp. 382-386 
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187. vas most frustrating for Israel. It began putting pressure 
on the United States ad»ministration to withdraw the Aswan aid 
promised to Nasser, This was one of the important factors 
in the withdrawal of the Aswan aid by Dulles, Even Eisenhower 
218 
appears to have been convinced by Israeli propaganda. But the 
United States and Britain refused to accept Israel's demand 
for large scale military aid. Two important reasons underplay 219 
this decision. Firstly, as Campbell has observed "it may 
have been soundly based on knowledge that even ttxQ heavy 
Soviet deliveries to Bgypt would not, in the present state 
of Egyptian military competence, upset tiie balance against 
Israel. let it did contribute greatly to the growing feeling 
in Israel that it was standing alone against an enemy who was 
daily growing stronger as he acquired new weapons against 
which Israel had no defence." 
220 
Campbell has also observed that "it would be a ioist^e 
to say that; the Arab leaders including Abdel Kasser, had set 
any time schedule for the destruction of Israel." And Henry 
Byroade, tlie United States Ambassador to Cairo at the time," is 
reported to have said that the Czech arms did not' make the 
217. See Ben Gurian's statement of Novemiaer 16, 1966 
PP« 3S&-.388* 
218« See Herman Finer, op.cit., pp. 46-46. 
219. Op.cit., p. 89. 
220. p. 91. 
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United Arab Republic strong enough to attack Israel, for even 
221 then the latter was twice as strong as. the former. 
The otJier reason for the western refusal to give i^re 
arms to Israel, was that they had decided to come to an agree* 
ment with th© Soviet Union for an embargo on arms supply to 
Fiiddle Eastt As already indicated it was this agreement 
between England and the Soviet Union that provoked Nasser to 
recognise CoiMiunist China, defeating tiae aims of tSie western 
Powers and of tkie Soviet Union. It was this success of 
Nasser at defeating the western policy of maintaining a 
military balance in favour of Israel, that appears to have 
led Israel to decide to destroy the ofe-^ rfeth of the United 
Arab Republic as quicly as possible through a swift military 
action and if possible to force Arabs to accept it5 militajy 
superiority. At the same time Engird and the United States 
had also decided to over^throw Nasser, through the withdrawal 
of the Aswan I>am aid# The rest of the story has already been 
told. 
It was clear from tbe beginning of the Suez Crisis that 
England and France would attack the mited Arab Republic. And 
it was plain commonsense that Israel would exploit sudi a 
situation* And there was ample proof of Israeli preparation 
221. See K.R.Singh, 'Positive Neutrality', K.P. Karunakaran, 
ed,, op.cit., p. 144. 
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for an attack against its chief enemy. According to Prof. 
222 
Finer himself "Israel's growing activism spurred the Arabs 
tov^ ards loilitai'y unions" culminating in a"4oint Egyptian -
Syrian - Jordanian command with the Egyptian Commander 
in chief to be its head if there were major fighting with 
Israeli" This was formed on October 24, 1966, long after 
Israel and its allies had finalised plans of aggression as 
already indicated. 
Thus the argument advanced by Israel and its supporters 
that it was the information of the Joint comman^ i that gave the 
signal for Israeli- to act in self-defence is contrary to facts. 
Nasser was not foolish enough to attack Israel at a time when 
the western Powers were anxious for a casus bel^ ,;^ * Nasser 
had successfully avoided falling into the trap even under such 
highly provocative acts as the withdrawal of pilots, or the 
refusal to pay canal dues to ttie new Canal Authority etc. 
But tiie military steps taken by Nasser were legitimate in view 
of the troop movements and concentrations being undertaken ber 
England, France and Israel since the nationalisation of the 
2S4 
Suez Canal company. As Nasser is reported to have said on 
September 16, "As a responsible person I have to be ready. 1 
cannot treat aggressive western declarations as mere bluff." 222. Op.cit., p. 332. 
5 223. Anthony Nutting, opccit., p.60. Also Supra^n.l6^^p.l3n. 
224. See Mideast Mirror (Vol.8,No.38, September 23,19&6)| p. 2. 
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Under th.8 circumstances, it vould have been folly on 
the part of Hehru to protest against these military steps 
taken W Nasser, as Professor Finer would like India to have 
22® r 
done. He has complained that "Nehru did not protest the 
Arab joint military command or the explicit threat to annihi-
late Israel. For Indian ships do not pass through Israel, they 
passed through the Suez Canal*" 
As soon as the three countries committed aggression 
against the Onited Arab Republic it was- evident to the Govern-
ment of India that it was all preplanned, though they did not 
know of it earlier. Thus Nehru told Parliament on November 
22V 
16, 1966j '^it is obvious that their plans fitted in, and the 
Anglo-French attack helped Israel's aggression,.," Nehru was 
thus forced to see the reality of Israeli intentions. It took 
an effort on his part to describe t^e bjutality of the aggre-
ssion on the UAR, In the same speech on November 16, 1966, 
22$7 
he saids "The story of the past three and a half months ever 
since the nationalisation of the Suez canal company is full 
of tragic drama, and events have happened which I would have 
thought could not possibly occur in this modern age. I find 
226, Op.cit,, p, 346. 
226i, Nehru, op.cit., p. 636, 
227. Ibid. 
• 292 -
it a little difficult to deal vjith this record of unabashed 
aggression and deception. Ihe explanations which have been 
given from time to time contradict one another and exhibit 
an approach which is dangerous to the freedom of Asian and 
African countries and to world peace itself,*' 
As against this, Nasser's action in nationalising the 
canal company, which Nehru ttiought was prevocativei paled into 
228 
insignificance, Hehru was forced to confess. During all the 
controversies since the nationalisation of the Suez Canal 
Company, Hlgypt has conducted herself with a large measure of 
propriety and forrbearance* Without the least justification 
Egypt was attacked not only by Israel but also by the United 
Kingdom and France Egypt the victim of Israeli aggression 
was attacked immediately after by the armed forces of the u.K, 
and Fr^ce Indeed some attempt has been made to minimise 
and justify this utterly improvoked and brutal attack on 
Egypt 
Nehru was convinced that the Arabs* charge that Israel 
was a beach-head of imperialism was a just one. Though 
Gandhiji and he himself were opposed to the partition of 
Palestine on the very sound moral, legal and political ground 
228. JLOa, pp. S36.637. 
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that it disregarded the rights of one million Palestinian 
229 
Arabs, independent India, under the latter»s leadership 
recognised Israel as a state. But India was not happy with 
Israeli and western attitude to the Refugees rights* There*, 
fore India vjithheld extending diplomatic relations vJith Isreal 
But India did not shov any hostility to it. 
However, soon India and Israel found ^emselves in the 
opposite camps in the developing conflict between national 
independence and western imperialism^ while India faad found 
more and more friends in the Arab countries. Finally, when 
Nasser emerged as the leader of Arab Nationalism, whom India 
at once recognised as a friend and ally against tibie western 
attempts at domination and dictation, Israel not only made 
frantic efforts to undermine his position but also committed 
the crime of aggression in ,the company of two of the erstwhile 
Colonial Powers. Nehru pointed out all this in his speech^ 230 Parliament on November 20, 1966» And on August 14, 1966, he 
231 
declared that "Ever since it came into existence it has 
been a soui ce of constant irritation to the Arab countries, 
The invasion of Egypt by Israel two years ago is fresh in our 
memory. Apart from this, tihere is the big problem of the old 
Palestine refugees/' 
229# See Bimla Prasad, Qrlglns.Of Indian Foreign Policy, op.cit., pp*117il23 for the Congress standpTed by Gandhi^i and Nehru 
230# n^l&l, cols. 694*696. 
231, Nehru, op*cit,, p. 283. 
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187. In toe same speech Jiehru also declared that "The aa^or 
fact in West Asia is the growth of Arab Nationalism in a very 
powerful, resurg^it way* Egypt took the lead in this matter 
and, under the wise leadership of President Nasser, has pl^ed 
a; very important part. Kasser, in fact, became the most 
prominent symbol of Arab nationalism. This fact, which was 
patent, was neither liked nor appreciated by many powers, and 
an attempt was made to split the Arab countries, in fact, 
Arab nationalism*" He also pointed out tiiat "It was stated 
that some kind of an Arab empire was being built up, which 
was dangerous. I do not know about the future, but I see no 
empire, muci), less an Arab empire," He then stated in categorl 
cal terms $ "We are convinced that any effective solution of 
the problems of west Asia must be l^sed on the recognition of 
the dominant urge and force of Arab nationalism. Any settle^ 
ment must have the goodwill and cooperation of the Arab 
nations.*..4" 
This is also what Nasser and the Arabs demand of 
Israel, tiriat it should take its due place in Vest Asia vhich 
is predomiriantly Arab. Ihus it is Israel and its supporters 
that have to accept tiie greatest reality in West Asia t the 
will of the Arabs to live as self-respecting individuals and 
232. Jd., pp. 282-283.. 
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nations. Ihen only the Arab could be expected to accept the 
reality of Israel, 
][ndla and the West Asian Crisis; 
These sj'e the deeper i ssues involved in the Arab stand 
233 
against Israel and India's support to tiiem. These are also 
the basic tenets of Nonalignment. It was, again, these motives 
that led the Government of India to stand resolutely by the 
Arabs when Israel committed Another b r u t a l a g g r e s s i o n a g a i n s t 234 them in June 1967. 
!Ehe origins of the »V^ est Asian Crisis', or the June 
1967 war between the Arabs and Israel, he in the circumstances 
in which Israel withdrew its forces from tiie Gaza strip in 
March Israel did this, under the pledges given to it 
by the United States, unilaterally, in an aide memoire of 
236 
February 11, 1967, tiiat Israel would have free passage through 
the Gulf of Aqaba and protection by the UNBF from Gaza attacks. 
It was perhaps witii tiiis intention that the UNEF was moved from 
the Suez Canal area to the Gaz^ strip, which Nehru polntedjjin 236 a speech in Parliament on March 26, 1967. This was a major 
233. This does not mean that India is not moved by national Interests in its support to Arabs. For an account of ttiese see tiie excellent article by G.H.Jansen, The .SMSssiaaQ, Apni 19, 1967. 
234. See S.A.H.Haqqi, 'India, Israel and The West Asian Crisis' Mainstream 7 ) And K.Rangaswanl, 'New Dimensions of Foreign Policy', The Hindu,. June 6,1957, Also see, below. Chapter 8. 
o 
236. See Documents for 1967^ pp.191-193. 
236. Nehru, op.dt., p. 639. 
- 296 « 
gain for Israel, a fruit of aggression and was against the 
Charter. This vas a failure of tiie United States and vas 
contrary to statements made by Eisenhoweyi» and other US 
237 
spokesman that the withdrawal should be unconditional. Another 
failure of the United States was that it could not make Israel 
accept the in its territory or to settle the refugee 
problem in accordance with the UN resolutions or on some otiier 
satisfactory basis. 
How or why the Government of India® or for tiiat matter 
Nasser, accepted this sort of unsatisfactory solution, is not 
clear, especially when Israel had declared ©penly that it would 
consider any interference with its shipping through the straits 
. 238 of Tiran as a casusjbelll for fresh aggression. However, the 
conditions on which India agreed to send troops to the UNEF, 
were stated by Nehru in categorical terms in Parliament on 
239 
November 19, 1966. He said: " I want to make it perfect^ 
clear on what conditions we sent these forces to ;5oin tSie 
United Nations Force. First of all, we made it clear that It 
• was only if the Government of Egypt agreed that we would send 
237. For Elsenhower on the ^ Ide iemoire of February 11,19^7 and pp.l99»212 for various statements by Hamarskjeold, Dullesj and Lodge, See Supr^^ n.235, pp. 197-198. 
238* id., p.205. See also Michael Brecher, The New States of Asia^ op.cit., p. 135. It is surprising that Prof. Brecher should support ttils claim in utter disregard for international law and justice. 
239. gupra, n.l6?, cols. 371-372. 
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thejaj secondly, they were not to be considered in any sense 
a continuing force continuing the activities of the Anglo-
French forces, but an entirely separate thing, thirdly, that 
the Anglo-i?xench forces should be withdrawn , fourthly, that 
the United iPJations Force should function to protect the old 
armistice line between Israel and Egypt,' and finally that it 
would be a temporary aff4ir, He are not prepared to agree to 
our forces or any force remaining there indefinitely. It was 
on these conditj.ons, which were accepted that these forces 
were sent there 
Thus when Nasser asked the United Nations to withdraw 
the UNEF he had acted within his rights. And India was right 
in accepting Nasser's demand and Secretary-General ^fhant was 
240 
perfectly justified in his acceptance of the demand. Ihe 
storm of protest raised by many people in India and by the 
Government of the United States and England against Nasser, 
U^ant and India was baseless, and extremely short sighted and 
ill considered. It only served to help Israel launch a pre-
planned and surprise attack on the UAH, Syria and Jordan, on 
241 June 5, 1967. 
If the United States and Britain led by Johnson and 
viilson, respectively, had not been carried away by their tradi-
tional hostility to Nasser, they would have been able to appre-
240. For Utiiant's defence of M s acceptance of and Nasser's right to demand the withdrawal of the UNEF. See The Hindu^ 
Contd 
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elate the nature of Nasser's move wliicii was to make the UN 
realise tiiat peace was threatened In the area on account of the 
refugee problem which had been neglected by it* fhe UNEF had 
largely become ineffective and there was Increasing hostility 
between Israel and Arabs. Israel fead not during the past ten 
years shown any inclination either to accept the UNEF on Its 
territory, or to respect it, not to speak of its supreme indi-
fference to tiie need of a solution to the refugee problem. 
Only a few iri the west seemed to be worried about the increas-
242 
ing tension in <the area. The IMEF had only become an instru-
ment through which Israel was enjoying the fruits of its aggre-
ssion in 1966, Surely it was not the purpose for which the 
UHEF was created and it certainly was not the reason for which 
either India or the linited Arab Republic accepted iti It is 
patently absurd to say that the United Arab Republic had no 
right to ask for the withdrawal of such a force. And it is 
(Continued from previous page) 
4 and 21 June, 1967^ 
241. See Eswar Sagar's report from Washington in Ihe Hindu 
7 June, 1967i*^ee G.Rashidi, 'West Asia Crisis, Ihe Arab view, The Statesman,. 17, July 1967 and G.H.Jansen, Ihe Statesman^ 25 July 1967. suggesting Americi^ collusion with Israel. 
242. See Fred J.Khowri, The Policy of Retaliation In Arab-Israeli Relations', The Middle East Journal (Vol.20, No* 4, Autumn 1966), p. 436. 
243. See Jji this connection Yashpal Tandon, 'UNEF, the Sec-retary-General, and International Diplomacy in tiie Third Arab-.lsraell War', ftit6r;iatj,onal Organisation (Vol.87, No.2^ 1968), pp. &29-&fe6. 
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much more so to ttiink that the United States and England were 
more devoted to peace than the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations# 
By demanding the withdrawal of the UNEF Nasser had only 244 
restored the conditions prior to the 1966 aggression Israel 
and had opened a way for a permanent solution of the dispute. 
Instead of ceasing this opportunity to find a solution to the 
problem, the Uaited States and England tried to discredit the 
United Nations and its Se.eretary-General, and went on to 
Champion the cause of Israel, against the Arabs in utter dis-
regard to facts. They also chose to warn Nasser, while Israel 
was preparing plans to attafek the Arabs. Once again, they 
proved that they were incapable of doing Justice to the Arabs 
against Israel* 
Ihe Israeli aggression was a repitltion of the 1966 
aggression in its jasotives, planning and execution. The fai« 
lure of the United Arab Republic to anticipate it and to be 
unprepared for it even after the experience of 1966, is sur-
pBising, indeed! Ihis is besides the point here. What Is 
relevant is that the Arabs had, once again, revealed remarkable 
244, See K.Hangaswami, Supra, n.232. Significantly, Israel's Foreign Minister, Abba Eban's Speech to the Special Session of the General Assembly in June 1967, begins from Inarch 1967 - See Special Issue of News From Israel (Vol. XIV, July 1967), pp. 2«14. 
• 300 -
poiltical sagacit^ r in refusing to accept the admirable gesture 
of Nasser to step down froiQ power* Nothing would have been 
fflore welcome to Israel and the Uaited States and perhaps to 
the Soviet tJ&iion also. 
By refusing to accept the Israeli demand for surrender, 
9 
the Arabs have once again demonstrated their determination 
not to yield to aggression. This is their greatest asset. 
Gandhiji would have understood it and admired it for it was 
the essence of his satyagraha, With rare insight, Charles 
C^ etaieaas has drawn attention to this feature of the Arab 
character ; "Refection of Israel shows aspects of Arab charac-
ter which are in striking contrast to tdae western approach to 
international problems* It is probably a mistake to attribute 
the Arabs unwillingness to acknowledge^ Israel to a lack of 
realism* A.ctually, their attitude is consistent with ISieir 
understanding of political reality and of the most effective 
ways of dealing with it» As Gandhi used passive resistance 
in the struggle against British rule in India, the Arabs 
employ theii' own weapons and technique^,****" 
Unfortunately, no living Gandhian in India had shown 
any sympathy to the Arabs' struggle against Israel. !Ehe 
246, Op#cit., p, 194» 
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criticism i@v©led against the Government of India's support to 
246 
the Arab cause, does not even take into account the fact that 
the United Nations has passed a resolution accepting tiie fact 
of Israel's aggression and demanded the withdrawal of its 
forces from Arab territories* Ihe policy of the Government 
of India during the west Asian Crisis was in the best interests 
of the country. 
In conclusion it may be mentioned that the tv;o crisis 
present two important turning points in the history of Non-
alignment. i:he Anglo-French^lsraeli attack on the tjtoited Arab 
Republic constituted a great challengejt to Nonalignm^t ^ust 
when it was blossoming into a world wide policy, Nasser's 
statesmanship supported by Nehru's rescued it from a premature 
death and the tv^ o leaders came to admire each other, aSie 
support given by the Super Povers to the lliited Arab Republic 
proved the soundness of the basis of nonalignment. For, this 
was the first occasion when a nonaligned jxsver was directly 
attacked by more powerful nations in an attempt to change tiie 
246. See The Hi^dUy July 19, 1967, Even Prof* J.L^ iTalmon of Hebrew University, admits that the Arabs have a just cause against Israel « See Hews gram Israe:^ . (Vol« XI^, Ko.16, August 16, 1967), Pfl3» 
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balance of powor in theH' favour* Ttie Super Powers Intervened 
and restored the status(que» 13ie crisis thus gave a new life 
and confidence to nonalignment and it began to grow from 
strength to strengtti, 
Ihe t^ est Asian crisis has, on the other hand, demons-
trated that the balance of power in the world has changed in 
such a VB^ that the Super Powers are not so sharply opposed 
to each other as they were in 1966, thus making it possible 
for them to apply joint pressure on the nonaligned nations. 
It thus creates a problem for the nonaligned states, and 
perhaps also indicates ^ crisis in Nonalignment from which 
it has to be rescued, if it has to serve 12ie aonaligned states 
as an,, effective foreign policy» Ihis aspect will, however, 
be discussed in the concluding chapter. 
CHAPTER VI 
TNDIA> THE OHTTED ABAB REPUBLIC AND THE 
HONGART^ REVOLUTTOW 
The Bevolutlon 
The Hungarian Revolution broke out on October 24, 
1956. Its genesis may very briefly be described as follows. 
Ever since Khrushchev inaugurated de-stalinlsation^ at 
the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union on February 14,1956, there were demands for 
freedom frora Soviet control in Eastern European states, 
o 
notably in Poland suad Hungary • In Hungary, as already 
indiaated, Iiare Nagy was rehabilitated into the 
communist party on October 13, 1956 , Six days later, 
the Hungarian Government agreed to several measures asked 
for by students including the abandonment of compulsory 4 
Russian L(^ iguage Courses • On October 22, a number of 
meetings were held in Budapest, the capital of Hungary. 
The largest meeting was held at the Building Industry 
Technological University and ended after forcnulating 
a programme of national policy demanding, interalia, 
witlidrawal of Soviet troops froa Hungary, and the 5 reconstitution of the Government under Imre Nagy • 
1. ^ e Documents for 1956, pp.355-356 and 394-4ff. 
2. For details , see Survey^ 1956~58, pp.72-79. 3. See dinner, ed. ,op.cit. ,pp. 388-389. 
5* ,pp. 438-4^. 
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4 student demonstration in sympathy with the Poznan 
trials in Polsmd was ^irst banned and was allowed on 
6 October 23 • 
Erno Gero, the then ?^ lrst Secretary of the 
Communist Party of Hungary, who had Just returned to 
Hungary after talks with Tito in Yugoslavia, condemned 
7 
the demonstration , which resulted in a violent reaction 
from the mobs. C»i October S4, Imre Nagy was raade prime 
Minister and at the sa^ ne time the Soviet forces stationed 
in Hungary under the Warsaw Pact intervened in the 
revolt of the people, on the invitation of the Government Q 
of Hungary . This marked the beginning of the Hungarian 
Revolution. 
In his famous speech at Pula on November 11, 1956, 
9 
Tito said that this intervention was *not necessary* 
and was •absolutely wrong coining at Gero's invitation*. 
On October 25, Gero was replaced by Ja«es Kadar^®. In 
the week tliat followed, ^ there were several developments 
in Hungary,, on the one hand, Imre Hagy, the prime Minister, 
6. MSSJkf Supra, n. 3, pp. 402-407; 8. For the Hungarian Government's appeal for Soviet intervention see. Id.,p. 527. 9. Id. ,p. 527 10. See Kadar»s broadcast of October 25,1956 - gupra n. 1. pp. 452-453. 
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was forced t;o accept the demands of the revoluticailstss^  \ 
such as the withdrawdl of Soviet troops from Hungary, 
Hungary's withdrawal from the ivarsaw Pact and the revival 
of deuocratlc Institutions and free elections etc. The 
Soviet Union also appeared willing to withdraw its troops 
from Hungary as it announced on October 30, and had begun 
1 ? talks with the Hungarian authorities • On the other hand, 
there were Soviet troop laovements on a large scale into 
13 
Hungary across the border . ind, finally, at dawn on 
Nove:nber 4, 1956, the Soviet troops v;hich had encircled 
Budapest, suddenly struck and began to suppress the 
revolution in a ruthless manner. 
The U«R.Besolutions 
on the same day the Second Emergency Special Session 
of the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a 
14 
resolution (1004-E. S. II) , which, among other things, 
condemned the Soviet action in Hungary and called upon 
supra , n.3, pp.4l6«4i8Wfagy*s announcement promising new policies. See pp. 453-454|s«fNagy« s Proclamation restorlfig political parties (October 30,1956) and for other developments pp.455-471, 
12. For the announcement sea Supra, n. 1.,pp. 465-468. 
13. ^pra« n, 3. pp. 463-469. For Nagy's tJelegrams of November 
1 and 2, 1956 addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations complaining a Soviet troop movement 
and seeking UN protection. See Y»B.U.H. 1956, pp.84-85 for the text and the voting record. 
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it to vithdiraw its forces from Hungary. Krishna Menon, 
on behalf of India, abstained from voting on the 
resolution along with many other Afro-4slan delegations, 
including that of the United Arab Pepublic, The propriety 
of this act was questioned by a few friends of the West 
in the United Nations^^ 
On November 9, 1956, I4enon voted against a second 
resolution (1005 S.E.-II), calling for the withdrawal 
of Soviety forces frox Hungary and the holding of 
elections in Hungary under the ausplcoc of the United 
Nations. Then began as shall be seen below, a vigorous 
attack on India, Nehru and Menon, both in In<31a and 
17 abroad. However, India also abstained on a 3rd(1006 B.X.-TI) 
18 and a 5th <1008 £. S.-II) resolution of the Emergency 
19 
Session and voted for a 4th (100? E. S.-TI) resolution as 
it dealt with relief work in Hungary, 
When the matter came up before the 11th Session 
of the General Assembly, it adopted another Six resolutions 
on Hungary, of which India voted in favour of only two, 
po m (1128 (xD) and (1129 The former was co-
sponsored by Ceylon, India and Indonesia, and sought the 
15, Sec ,G. A.O.R, ,second Emergency Session,564th Plenary Meeting; The delegite of ^ Hatinnaiist China, for exanole, inquired »• whether these delegations of Asia and Afri<"a, mean to tell us that principles of the Charter were good only for Asia and Africa and not for Europe," Suprat n. 14,p.85 for the text and voting record. 
I"". Id. ,p.94. 
18. 19. Id. , 'iu -20. Id. ,p.87.This was adopted on November 21, 1956. 21. Id. ,p. 95. This was adopted on November 21,1956. 
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cooperation and permission of the Hungarian government 
for the nominees of the Secretary-General to enter Hungary. 
The later resolution dealt with relief work. The United 
op 
Arab Republic voted in favour of the latter and 
abstained on the foraer^^. 
The United iirab Fepublie had abstained on the 
24 
November 9, resolution of the Emergency Session 
demanding the withdrawal of Soviet forces and the holding 
of elections under the United Nations auspices. It also P5 
abstained on the rest of the resolutions of the General 
Assembly along with India, since these deiuanded the 
withdrawal of forces and holding of elections and condemned 
the Soviet intervention. 
Nonaligiment and Double Standards 
What emerges from this voting record of Xnfiia and 
the United Ai'ab Republic is, that they wore not prepared 
either to condemn the Soviet Union or tb force any action 
on it, without its consent, through the United Nations' 
organs. 
22. ,p.75 23. Td. ,p.87 24. Id. ,p.95 25. These were 1127(xi) of 21 November, 1130(xi)of 4 Decerabe 1131 (xi) of 12 December, and, 1132 (xi) of 10 January 
1957-c)^ )pp.87-89 for the texts and voting record. 
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It should not have been difficult to understand 
this policy,, after all the unsuccessful attempts made 
by the Western Powers, headed by the United States, to 
undermine and subvert the authority and prestige of 
Nasser swd i^ e^hru and their policy of Monalignment and 
friendship with the Soviet Union culminating in the 
Suez Crisis which was at its height at that moment. 
as against this, the Stoviet Onion had been supporting 
them with aoral and material help^®, not only to withstand 
the pressures of the West but also in their disputes with 
Western-^ipported neighbours like Pakistan in the case 
of India, find Israel in the/sase of the United Arab Republic, 
97 
But, as K.P. S. Menon® , India's Aabaesador to Moscow 
and Budapest at the time of the Hungarian revolution, has 
observed ; "Nothing has caused so much misunderstanding..» 
regarding India's foreign policy than her attitude towards 
the Rmgarian Revolution'It would be more accurate 
to say that it was the misunderstanding of the basic 
tenets of the Nonaliga^ent of India and the United Arab 
Republic, that resulted in the total misunderstanding 
of India's role in this crisis, especially, in India. 
26, See M. S.Rajan, India In World Affair_s, op.cit. ,pp. 302-327 for a fairly satisfactory,though a little iaibal^ced, account of the closeness of Indo-Saviet relations duringi'?54-56. See also K.P. S.Menon, •Indo-Soviet Relations', in A. Appadoro; , E.d,pp.cit. pp. g?7-g37. 
27, l^di^ and the Cold war, op.cit. ,p,48. 
** 309 * 
For, no othe»r crisis prior to this ha^ revealed with 
such clarity, the real nature of Nonallgnment, as the 
pursuit of national interests and not of moral values 
and human ideals. It is doubtful, if the United States 
stand itself was inspired by such ideals. It was certainly 
not so, with regard to Britain, France and Isrealfas shall 
be made clear below. 
However, the miscoDceptions about the real nature of 
Nonalign.nent have been so deep rooted that all sorts of 
arguments have been advanced to explain the policy of 
the noDaligned states, especially India. Thus, motives 
like anticolonialisffl, antiracialism, antieuropeanlasm and, 
of course, procommunisra or belief in Marxism-Leninism, have 
been attributed to support what was supposed to be a 
•double-standard* in the approach of the nonaligned 
28 
states to western Pow rs and the Sbvifet Union, It has 
already b-^ en exaplained that these factors have not 
been the ;nain determinants of the Nonalignment of India 
and the United Jlrab Republic. 
28. See above, ipp.33See also * A Double Standard*, Eastern Economist. (tDDTH, No. 20,16 November, 1956), pp.917-f18 and 'Dawn ^ter Darkness*, Eastern Economist (XX^U. No. 21,23 November, 1956>,p.7I7. 
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And what is this charge of a »double-standard• ? 
It is in the main, an attempt to apply moral standards, 
which are irrelevant in the evaluation of foreign policy. 
Hence such criticism appears to have been motivated, 
at least in certain quarters, by a desire to "discredit 
India's Sfonalign nent" « It is, therefore, necessary to 
examine this charge in some detail. 
Professor Brecher,^^ for example, has written that 
Nehru was ••slow, painfully slow** in reacting to the 
events in Hungary and that the demand for the withdrawal 
of forces'' was immediate and sharp in the/case of ^ez, 
it was not in thejcase of IHungary, at least for a long time* ', 
the Indians, Asoka Mehta^^ and JTayaprakash Naraya^ t^  
took this line of argament, the former in Parliament and 
the latter outside it. I do not, however, think that 
Nehru was a/<,slow as is raade out by Professor Brecher, a 
little dramatically, in reacting to the So*/iet suppression 
of the Hungarian revolution. I'he moralist in him asserted 
itself imuiediately. For, speeking at the Nin^h General 
Conference of the UNESCO in New Delhi, on November 5, 1956, 
he said^^s "We see today in Egypt as well as Hungary 
S9. ^Dra« n. 27 p. 5o See quotation at n. 38 below. 
30. the New States of Asia* op. cit. ,pp. 118-119. 
31. See Lok Sabh^ Debates. Volume IK No.4, 19 November,195<>, 
colsT 403-416. 32. See The Hindu. 11 November, 1956 33. Id. 6th November, 1956. 
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both human dignity and freedom outraged and the 
forfe of .uodern arras used to suppress peoples and to 
gain political objectives. Old colonial methods, which 
we had thought, in our Ignorsuice, belonged to a more 
unenlightened age, are revived and practised. In other 
parts of the world also, move-ncnts for freedom are 
crushed by superior aight^' 
He also made a specific reference to the •«Flve 
principles", and - said^^: "we now see that those Five 
principles are also mere words without mecuiing to some 
countries who claim the right of deciding problems by 
superior might.»• This could have been a reference to 
the So«let Union, only, which had declared adherence 
35 
to the Five Principles with India . ilpd in his letter. 
In reply to Bulganln's letter promising the facts of the 
Hungarian crisis, Nehru was reported to have sald^® 
that all declarations of adherence to the Five Principles 
seemed to have no meaning left and the world reverts to 
International barbarism". And K.P. S. Men on has 
written t I myself made repeated representations to 
Mr. fiSieppilov, then Foreign Minister, to Bulganin, 
then prime Minister, and Hr. Khrushchev, then Secretary 
of the Coramunist Party, expressing our grave concern at 
34. Ibid. 35. See Texts of Documents . op.cit. ,pp. 185-.187, 36. For the correspondence See The Hindu. November 9,1955 37. aupra. N. 27,pp.48-49. 
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at the turn of events In Hungary*'. He Is, therefore, 
right in asserting^S that " The accusation of having 
adopted double st^dards, which are persistently 
levelled against India by those who would stop at 
nothing to discredit her policy of nonaligpment and whidj 
was unfortunately swallowed by many of our own people, 
has no substance*», 
But, in my opinion, this talk of Patich Sheel by 
Nehru was unnecessary, if not also Itnproper. Firstly, 
it was this type of talk that supplied aaainunitlon to 
his critics. Thus he was himself responsible for some 
of^misunderstanding about his foreign policy. Secondly, 
Krishna Msnon had already abstained from voting on the 
November 4, resolution of the ^ m^ergency Session of the 
General Assembly, calling for the withdrawal of Soviet 
forces fron Htaagary, Finally, it was not In the interests 
38. Jd.,p.SO Some Indistfi scholars appear to admit of •different* • if not •double* stoWdards In India's attitude to Hungary and tl^ Suez Crises. See M.S.Ra4an, India In World Affairs, op.cit, ,pp, 146~147. He accepts the theory that Indians believe that there Is no use critising the Soviet Union in contrast to the Western democracies where public opinion moulds policy. See also Surjit Man Singh, ** India and the Hungarian Hevolution* *. India Quarterly <XXl,No.8, April-June 1965),p. 141. But as Asoka T^ ehta pointed out in Parliament (Supra, n. 31, cols.414-.4iS >thlg would have called for a stronger reaction against the Soviet Union for, in the v/estern democracies the opposition parties could take care of the situation as in ii'ngland during the Suez crisis. 
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of the country. It was the realisation of this fact 
that appears to have made him, in fact, more eaat^oas 
and less unequivocal, in his subsequent utterances^®, 
contrary to the general impression^® that it took a 
long time for Nehru to speak out the truth. 
I,<?"Fren.c^ -,Israeli Betr^ y^ l., 
Among the factors that were responsible for the 
change in Nehru's tone was unf;oubtedly his disgust at 
western, especially British and French, attempts to 
exploit the Hungarian situation to cover up their 
41 
crimes elsewhere. He told Parliament on November 19, 
that "every attempt is being made by one party to lay 
stress on what has happened in other places so as to hide 
its own fflis-demeanour. There wes the toglo-Prench 
action in Egypt and there was a world outcry against it 
in the United Nations. Then came Hungary, Bad enough. 
39. See Nehru's speech at the All India Congress Committee (A. I»C.) meeting at Calcutta on 9 November, 1956-The Hindu. 10 November, 1956 and his speech to Parlia'Dent on November 19 - mpra n»31 cols.377-386. 
40. Commenting on Nehru* s observation in his speech to Parliament on November 19, that " the desire of a majority of the people for a change had been suppressed by Soviet armed might", Boss. N.Barkes and Mohinder S.Bedi (op.cit, 53) have observed that this "as a statenent was chiefly remarkable In that it took official India so long to make it". Ihis is to overlaok Nehru's observation at the UNESCO meet in Delhi on November 5, and his correspondence with Bulganin. 41. supra. n.31 col. 382. 
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But lnffliediately it was made use of to hide what Is 
happening In Egypt* The straggle in Hungary was the 
basic thing so as to somehow cover up the misdeeds 
in Egypt. Now on both sides this is happening**. And 
on November SO, he went further and declared^® that 
the " warfare in Hungary... would probably have taken 
a very different turn if there had be«i no:, invasion of 
Bgypt.»« 
The significance of this statement is two-fold. 
Firstly, it was a fairly., accurate statement, as it Is, 
more or less, an established fact that the Anglo-French 
attack on the United Arab Republic was to some extent 
responsible for the hardening of the Soviet and also 
Yugoslav!jin policy towards Hungary^^. And it cannot be , 
denied that it was this attack that made it easier for 
the Soviet unicMi to crush the Hiragarian revolution with 
ease^^. Secondly, Nehru seems to have realised that 
England, »ance and Israel, had deliberately chosen 
this moment to achieve their evil desi^s against the 
United Republic, as indicated above. It Is 
42. Id., No. 5, 20 November, col. 43. see Richard Lowenthal.op. clt. >op.82'»S3»Also Supra. n. 2. ,p. 115. 44. See M. S. I'a Jan, India In World Affairs., op. clt. , p. 148. 
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difficult to say whether or not Britain and fr^nce 
realised that their folly would make it impossible 
for the United States to take a firm stand against the 
soviet Union on Hungary. It was this a-aong other reasons, 
rather than real sympathy for the United irab Republic, 
that led Eisenhower and Dulles," to demand an end to 
their aggression and withdrawal from occupied territories^^ 
For, after all, the Soviet Union was, and is the first 
concern of the United States* 
It was thus iSngland, Pr^ce, and Israel, that 
chose to exploit the sufferings of an European people, 
cynically one might add, to inflict hutailiation and 
suffering on an Asian people, and not India and the 
United Arab Republic, the latter had simply refused 
to be diverted from their primary object of protecting 
their vital interests from the ambitions of the very 
same western powers. No doubt, the United States had 
condemned the aggression against the United Arab Bepublic 
and had thrown, its weight on the side of the victim 
of aggression. But, it was an act dictated by the need 
to protect the vital interests of the West as a whole. 
4 5. see "^omas Huafa^  ' "qia ^  Sue z Affairj {Weldenfeld and ' Sicolson,' X»ondoa, 1967), pp. 
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There was no other way in which the prestige of the 
west could be saved from utter disaster. Here also It 
was its struggle against the Soviet Union that was 
dominant, for if it had filled to act as it did, it 
would have conceded a walk-over to the Soviet Itolon in the 
struggle for influence in the uncoiffiBltted Worlds There-
fore, it might not have been difficult for Nehru gtfid 
Nasser to see that once the cirsis was over, the United 
States would revert to its policies agaisst the 
nonali^eci states, as it in fact did through the 
A a 
Eisenhower Doctrine for West Asia, which was opposed 
by iasser^ *^^  and Nehru^®. 
Defence of National Interests« 
In the circumstances, it was not open for India 
and the United Arab Republic to antagonise the ^viet 
Union by supporting the western Powers on Hungary. 
This would have been the surest way to lose the goodwill 
of the Soviet Union and other Communist Powers, with no 
46. See Documents fcr 1967,pp. 233-240. Eden claiffled in his Maffloirs that this was a direct consequence of 
his military adventure- See Anthony Eden, op.cit. ,p. 577, 47. For the various joint statements issued by a?ab leaders including Nasser, See Documents for 1957, pp. 257-267. 
48. Nehru,op.cit. 
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prospects of a better deal from the Western Powers. 
For, axi Bast-Vest entanglement on Hungary would have 
given an opportunity for England, France and Isreal 
to continue to remain In possession of the territcries 
of the United Arab Republic, occupied by them through 
aggression, not to speak of other dangers, like the 
occupation of the Suez Cacal itself. For England, 
which had bombed for days the Air fields and other 
milltar5*^targets in the United Arab Republic to cripple 
the latter's defence forces, it v/ould have been easier 
to force its way into the Cauial Zone if the other big 
powers did not interfere. As long as the forces did not 
withdraw from the territories of the United Arab 
Republic, the aaez Oanal would have remained closed 
putting India's economy and pl^s in jeopardy • Jtod a 
long drawn-out struggle between the Soviet tSiion and the 
United States might have put a heavy strain on the 
former* s aid progra^ nmes^ ® to India and the Unit^ Arab 
Republic, which would have further increased the strain 
on the econoffly and even the defence preparations of 
these countries. 
49. See 'The Flag of Freedom', Eastern Economist (V. 27, No. 17,26 October, 1956), p. 614. See also 'India's Trade with Hungary', Eastern Economist (27 No. 19, 9 November 1956),p.699. 
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The Soviet Union might have made this clear 
to India through Bulganin's letter to Nehru received 
on November 8, 1956 containing its version of the 
50 
Hungarian Revolution, which Nehru explained to the 
All India Congress Committee meeting on November 9, 
ihus bringing a g eater sense of reality into his 
pronouncemoits. Even if the Soviet Union had not issued 
any warning, a little reflection on the part of Nehru 
and the External Affairs Ministry would have made 
things clear to them and they might well have reflected 
on things. Tito also had written to Nehru and might have 
stressed these points. Nehru told Parliament on 
November 20, that he was to some extent guided by the 51 former's views on Hungary. 
Besides, the measures advanced by the Western Powers, 
for the solution of the Hungarian crisis, viz., withdrawal 
of Soviet troops, and particularly, the holding of 
eleotions under the auspices of the United Nations, 
go 
were diametrically opposed to India's stand on Kashmir. 
It would, therefore, have been an act of extren^ indis-
cretion, if Menon had voted for, or even abstained, on 
the November 9 resolution which Included a call for holding 
50. Supra. n» 39 51. Supra* n.42 cols 582-583, Nehru said that he attached great importance to Tito's views on Europe. 
52. See above, pp.l3r-i42yie.c-/g/^ ^ z^ r-zoo 
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such elections. The suggestion that India should have 
abstained from voting on the resolution^J was ill-
• 
considered for it would have meant an acceptance of the 
principle of holding elections under the auspices of 
. JL 
the United Nations. Therefore, Mi^ non voted against the 
paragraph containing this clause while he abstained on 
all other paragraphs of this resolution when a separate 
vote was taken on each paragraph before it was put to vote 
as a whole-explaining the para-wise voting on this 
54 
resolution to parliament , Nehru pointed out that when 
India abstained on the clause on the withdrawal of 
forces from Hungary, it stood for withdrawal^®, but 
voted against the resolution as a whole because it 
contained the clause on which India voted against. It is 
significant in this connection to add that the United 
Arab Republic only abstained on this resolution since It 
contained no such threats to its vital interests. 
A This negative vote of M'^ non, as already indicated, 
had given rise to a storm of protest in India and abroad. 
56 
It was also reported that lUnon had acted without 
instructions, ^d the instructions, I think, even if 
53. See • A double standard', Eastern Economist .Supra%n. 88. 54. Supra, n. 31, cols. 389-392. 55. Id. , col. 391. 56. See below, n. 
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they had not reached in time, would not have been 
different from what M&on did, Nehru told^ *^  Parliament 
that H0aon's vote »'was entirely in consonance with our 
general policy and instructions*'. And explaining 
JL KQ 
the reasons for Mdnon's vote Nehru said : "The resolu-
tion was, in our opinion, improperly worded. But the 
sflost objectionable part of It demanded that elections 
should be held in Hungary under the supervision of the 
United Nations. We took strong exception to this 
because we felt this was contrary to the Charter and 
would reduce Hungary to less than a sovereign state. Any 
acceptance of intervention of this type, namely foreign 
supervised elections, seemed to us to set a bad precedent 
which mi^t be utilised in future intervention in other 
countries.»' 
Though Nehru did not spell out the country where such 
intervention might occur, the CDmmunist spokesman in 
59 Parliament, i\.K. Gopalan, did it for hia: •»As far as 
the Indian vote in the United Nations is concerned. 
India had acted perfectly well. It is significant 
57. See Nehru, op.cit. ,p. 556 Also aipra, n.4g,cols589-.594. In view of this, it seetas improbable that the Foreign Ministry was surprised at Menon* s vote as the New York ^mes correspondent in New Delhi is said to have reported, unless the Forel^i Ministry was ignorant of the contents of the resolution-see Boss N.Berkes and Mohinder S. Bedi,op.cit. , p. 52. 53. Nehru, op. cit. ,p. 556 59. Supra n. 31, col. 402. 
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that oae of the chief sponsors of ther resolution was 
Pakistan which illegally grabbed part of Kashmir and 
its attitude towards this whole crisis had been of 
a doubious character. The elections under the United 
Nat I Oils auspices constitute a violation of soverei^ty 
of any country. Toajorrow, the same logic say be applied 
as far as Kashmir is concerned, so, those who criticise 
India's stand on the resolution should ponder over this 
aspect. *«. 
Western Doable^Standards 
It was unrealistic on the part of the Western 
Powers to condemn the Soviet Union for its suppression 
of the Hungaricin Bevolution and to de.n^d the with-
drawal of its forces from Hungary, a country which the 
Soviet Union considers so vital for Its security, when 
all of thera,Including the United states, felt that the 
nationalisation of the aiez Canal Comply by the 
United Arab Republic, a legally a politically justifiable 
act, was an act of Hitleris.c, Justifying military 
action on their part. Therefore, the attempts to 
equate the two crises, deliberate or otherwise, were 
and are misleading, to say the leist • As 
322 . 
K*P*S. f^enon®^  has aptly re-Harked "the Pevolution in 
Hungary, as it developed, threatened not merely the 
prestige but the security of the Soviet Union and the 
existence of that belt of States, the cordon Sa^ nitaire. 
which the Soviet Union had so laboriously'erected all 
along here vulnerable western ^d Southern frontiers. 
If reasons of State ever constitute a justification for 
a state's conduct, they existed in this case but they 
did not exist in the case of the British action in tlie 
Suez. • • 
Inspite of this basic difference and the totally 
unjustified attack by England, Fr^ce and Israel on the 
United Arab Beoublic, leading Western, diplomats aade all 
attempts to prevent a condeinnation of Bigland and Prance 
as aggressors, while they went all out to condemn the 
• a 4 Soviet Union « As Terence Robertson has written « 
*' Hlvery one asked what was the difference bfetween the 
Soviet Union crushing Hungary, and the British and French 
assaulting Egypt ? Was it because ^ attack on an African 
or Asian country was more acceptable than ^ attack on a 
60. Supra, n. 27,p. 50. Also Supra n. 2,p. 116, It has to be pointed out that Nehru also committed the mistake of equating the two on occasions^ See his speech to the 4.1.C.C. , at Calcutta on Koveaber 11,1956: The Hindu 
12 November, 1956. On November 16, 1956, he told the Lok Sabha, on the contrary, that both differed in nature- See Nehru, op. cit. ,p. 555, 61. Op. clt. ,pp. 242-43 (Author's Italics). 
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a fiuropecui country?.... Typically, however, neither 
Pearson nor Haaimarskjeold waa diverted from the 
conviction that Britain and France should at all costs 
remain imtarnished by the brand of aggression*** 
And according to prof. PrancisoO.Wllcox^^, ''Actually, 
the Assembly resolutions condemning the actions of the 
Soviet Union and the Hungarian regime vere more vigorously 
worded than those addressed to the guilty parties in 
the aiez crisis." 
In spit© of ail this, as has already been indicated, 
India did its best to restrain the United Arab Bepublic 
at every step, even when the actions of Bigland and France 
were highly provocative, and, after the initial outbrust 
against England and Prance, Nehru quietly worked with 
other coaifQonwv.alth countries to rescue Her Majesty's 
Government aDd their allies from diagraee. 
But, from the point of view of India and the United 
Arab Republic, the security of their vital interests lay 
in not antagonising the Soviet Union rather than the 
western Powers in the Hungarian crises. Narser who had 
68, 'The Honaligned States and the west', in Lawrence W.Martin, ed. , Neutralism and Konallgnmenti The • Hew States in World Affairs CFrederick "A. Praege'r, New York, 1962),p. 138. 
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been attacked by the nsajor allies of the United 
States could ally look to the Soviet Union for support • 
And Nehru, who had virltten®^ in the eai'ly forties that 
the Soviet Union could not be indifferent to India in 
its own interests, and who was to claia^^ later that 
the Soviet Union was India's second line of defence and 
vice versa, could not, indeed, have been indifferent to 
the threats to the former's security frc® the Western 
Powers in the then prevailing tension between the two 
^ 5 blocs. Tito was also motivated by sifOilar considerations 
66 
of self-interest, 
A. Balancing Act 
Thus once again the three nonaligned nations 
found themselves in full agreement over the need to 
maintain the balance of power between the two super 
Powors, in their own interests, as well as in the 6*7 interests of world peace® . For,a serious disturbance 
63. See above p.'5-z-64. Id. 65. In the early forties Nehr.u gave indication of his future policy towai^ ds the Sovi&t Union in his reactions to the Soviet claims in Iran which is highly rerainicent of his stand on Ruagary--See Biala Prasad, The Origins of Indian Foreign Policy, op.cit. ,pp. P42-243. 
66. See his speech at Pula in which he justified the Soviet action in crushing the Rev;olution-Supra,n. 3, pp. 527-530.1'iehtu told Parliament on November 20,1950 ths Tito's speech at Pula was sent to him by telegra-n-Supra n.51. See also Lowenthal, op.cit. ,pp.81-37 for a very able analysis of Tito's role in this^risis. 
67. As G.BarracloCLgh has aptly observed the'long term' contd. 
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of the balance of power which the Hungarian Kevolution 
threatened to do, was fraught with dangerous consequences 
for world p e a c e and security arxi for the position of the 
nonallgned states. 
o 
It is froa this point of view that one has to 
judge the frequent mention of the cold war and the cold 
war pacts by Ifebru In his speeches in Parliament and 
go 
outside it , during the Suez and KungaTlan cirses. 
^here was also no point in trying to force United 
Nations' resolutions on the Soviet Union which It was 
not prepared to accept. And there was no way in which 
it could be made to do so, short of a war with it, 
for viiich, the United States, least of all, was prepared®^! 
And it was most unrealistic on the part of the United 
States to believe that it would be able to make the 
Soviet Union accept the United Nations' resolutions 
when it could not or would not make a state like Israel, 
\irhich depends upon it entirely for its very survival, to 
do it, as already indicated. 
Contd, • 
consequence of the Hungarian crisis was that ''the division of spheres of influence^ agreed in 1945 at Ya^ t^a and Potsdam was Irreve^ble sc far as could humanly be foreseen...'' - Supra, n. 2. p. 137 The invasion of Ghechoslwakia in rald-1968 by Bussif only confirm the truth of this observation. 
68. Supra, n. 39. and see Hehro's speech at the A.I.C.C. Meeting on 11 ffovember-The Hindu,Ig December 1956, 69. See Wood Rouse, op.cit, ,p.61. 
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Thus, though Nehru had expressed genuine sympathy 
with the Hungarian people and their aspirations, and 
even criticised Soviet excesses, his policy was one of 
avoidance of any condemnation of the Sovietiacaction in 
Hungary''® . Krishna Menon said^^ in the General, Assembly 
on December 12, 195(5, that India did not want to call 
for the withdrawal of Soviet forces either from Hungary 
or from other East European states, but was only opposed to 
the intervention of Soviet forces in the internal affarirs 
of Hungary, for which there was no justification. Nehru 
endorsed"^^ this argument in Parlianent on December 13,1956. 
70. See the A. I.C.C. ,resolution passed on November 9,1956, •^e HindUf 10 November 1956. '^ his was criticised as weak on Hungary. Nehru defended it saying that this •'did not imply any difference in our way of judging events" and th^t it was ''difficult, having regard to facts before us, to say more'<— see The Hindu. 12 December 1956. See also the joint state.iient of the prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia and India Issued on November 14 1956 in New Delhi regi'etting the Soviet action in Hungary and demanding the withdrawal of its forces* Supra.n. 35. pp. 267-70 
71. see G. A. O.K. J.lth session, 614th Plenary Meeting, 12 December, 1956,- . 72. See Nehru, op. cit. ,pp. 561-662. 
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India's Mistakes 
But to jump froia this to the eon41usion that 
Nehru lacked moral fervour or applied double standards 
is to cosimlt a grievous mistake. Nehru was, in fact, 
more agonised over the events in Hungary, thwi many 
of his counter-parts In Western countries, who had 
chosen to exploit the situation, as was evident fro^ n 
his weak, ambiguous and soue x^ hat apologetic 
explanations of his policy in Parlianent and outside it, 
instead of a vigorous and forthright defence of it, as 
it was alargely in the interests of the country, as they 
stood then. 
Another, and perhaps a more important reason 
for Nehru's ambiguity, was of course, the impossibility 
of reconciling the policy in this case with the laboriously 
built conception of Konalignment as a moral alternative 
to 'power polities', a term which the "^ ndian politicians 
have found it too easy to condemn with or without 
justification and in or out of context. 
73, This is the inescapable Impression that one gathers from a study of Nehru's speeches. One undesirable result of this ambiguity was attacks on our diplomatic missions abroad in and outside Parliaaient. Nehru was forced to defend them in Parliament. Supra, n. 31, col. 375 and sanra n.^ -i^ eols 5a6-o89. 
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Tt Is also doubtful, If many of the Indian scholars 
are any better in this respect, who find it easy 
to disiaiss India's stand on Hungary, as a departure 
from, or inc on si stent with the so-called theory or 
74 
principles of Nonallgnment by which they rneaa the 
Panch Sheel, etc. It Is hardly necessary to reiterate 
that I|^ dia had never adhered to the Panch f^ceel whenever 
its security was threatened « 
It has,, therefore, to be admitted, in fairness to the 
foreign critics of India's policy, that their criticisms 
are uigdersCiindable, though hardly Justifiable. It is 
difficult not to lament the failure of Indian scholars 
to interpret the country's foreign policy in realistic 
and intelligible terms. Mothing appears to have contributed 
more to the misunderst^ding of India's foreign policy 
and worse still to damage its image abroad, than the 
misplaced moral fervour of many Indialti scholars. This Is 
not to forget the role of our diplomats who seem to 
have been veil trained to project this false image of 
India in the outside world, •'•'his will, however, be examirn 
in the concluding chapter. 
74. See above, Chapter g^ p.S^ ) 
C H A P T E R VII 
IBE CX)NGO CRISIS AND INDIA AND THE ysITSD ARAB REPUBLIC 
The significance of the Congo Crisis for Monalignment 
lay in thfe fact that, Dag Haxamai'skjeold, the Secretary General 
of the United Nations, in his definition of the areas and 
conflicts in which the United Nations could play a major role, 
as in the Congo Crisis, identified it with one of the major 
aspects of NonalignmentJ" viz., the prevention of the spread 
of the cold war into Africa and Asia, as far as possible* Ihese 
views were put forth cleaily and pointedly by him in his Intro-2 
duction to the 'Annual Report on -toe work of the United Nations 
Organisation* on August 31, I960, in the following wordsi 
"In Africa the first beginnings can now be seen of those conflicts between ideoligies and inter-ests which split the world. Africa is still,in comparison with others, a virgin territory which jBiany have found reason to believe can or should be won for their aims and interests..«•» 
'^FUTidamental taiough ^ e differences splitt» ing our world are, the areas which are not coaml» tted in tiie ma^or conflicts are still considerable Conflicts arising within the non-coiaiaitted areas offer opportunities for solutions which avoid an aggravation of big power differences and 
1. See above pp, ^ ^ See also Quiney Wright 'Legal Aspects of the Congo Situation*. I n t e r n a t i o n a l studies (V01.4.H0-T. July, 1962}, p.l. • 
See G f F i f t e e n t h Session, Supplement Ho. IA(A/4390/ Add;, pp. 380-381. 
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can remain uniflueneed by them» liiere Is thus a field within wiiiQh international conflicts may be faced and solved with such harniony between the power blocs as was anticipated as a condition for Security Council action in San Francisco* Agree-ment may be achieved because of a mutual interest auKjng the big powers to avoid having a regional or local conflict drawn into the spheres of bloc politics*•»•« 
.Those efforts must aim at keeping newly arising conflicts outside the sphere of bloc diff-erences* Further, in the case of conflicts on the margin of, or inside, the sphere of bloc differ-ences, the United Nations snould bring such con-flicts out of this sphere through solutions aiming, in the first instance, at their strict localisa-tion. In doing so the organisation and its agents have to lay down a policy line, but this will tihen iMjt be for one party against anotaier, but for the general purpose of avoiding an extension or achiev-ing a reduction of the area into which the bloc conflicts penetrate* 
"Experience indicates that the preventive diplomacy to which the efforts of the itoiited Nations must tiius to a large extent be directed, is of special significance in cases where liie original conflict may be said eiUier to be the result of» or to imply risks for, the creation of a power vacuum between toe main blocs. Preventive action in such cases must be in the first place aim at filling the vacuum so that it will not provoke action from any of the ma^or parties, the initi-ative for which might be taken for preventive purposes but might in turn lead to counter action from the other side. 
"The View exm'essed here as to the saecial possibilities and responsibilities of the organls;^ -tion in situations of a vacuum has reached ^ unu.sually clear expression in the case- of the £mESU—There the main argument presented for the United Nations intervention was the breakdown of law...and order» the reflection of the attempt to maintain order by foreign troops^ and the introdut^ -tion of the United Nations Force so as to creatQ the basis for the withdrawal of the foreign troop^ .^.foy the .forestalling of initiatives to intrn-ducg any other foreign troops into the territory 
^^^^^ for widen^e international con-fXifit, [STalics mine). 
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is vith this background that the initia-tive for tlie United Nations intervention in tdae Congo conflict was taken tander Article 99 o£ the Charter for the first time applied fully, accord-ing to its letter and in the spirit in which it must have been drafted* 
It is agaiiast this back ground that the roles of India 
and the Itoited Arab Republic in the Congo crisis have been 
examined belowr' 
Ihe Cr4sA§ 
Ihe Congo, which was under Belgian occupation for a 
3 
long time, had become independent on 30 June, I960, without, 
as it soon became evident, adequate preparation for the tasks 
of independence. Soon the Congolese army or the Force Publique, 4 
which was described by Rajeshwar Bayal (towards the end of 
his term as the personal representative of the Secretary-
General in the Congo) as the "greatest danger to law and order 
in the Congo today", rebelled against the Belgian officers who 
were manning the arc^ y. Taking this as a pretext, Belgium 
moved its troops into the Congo, with the 'professed objective 5 
of restoring order and protecting the civil population*, espe-
cially thQ Belgians, who were present in large numbers in ^ e 
3. For Lumumba's speech on the occasion of Independance (in French), see Documents for 1960^ pp4 263-266, 
4. See me Hindustan XimesT 14th April 1961. 
5. See Quincy Vvright, op«cit., 
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Congo x^ orkirig in different capacities. And on July 11, I960, 
Katanga, the richest province of tSie Ciongo, seceded under its 
6 president Kolse Tshombe* 
In those circumstances, on July 12, I960, the Secretary 
7 
General received tm urgent appeal from the Government of the 
Republic of the Congo signed by president Josejdfi Kasavubisr and 
Prime minister Patrice Lumumba for assistance to "protect the 
national territory of the Congojagainst the present external 
aggression which Is a &reat to international peace." They 
pointed out that iSelgiuai hafl violated the Treaty of June 29, 
I960, between it and the Congo which peraitted Belgian inter-
vention only on an expx'ess request of the Government of "ttie 8 
Republic of Congo., which had not been made. In a second note, 
the Congolese autiiorities said that aid was requested "not to 
restore the internal situation in tiie Congo but rather to pro-
tect the national territory against acts of aggressive force 
by Belgian troops,They furthei* stated that the United Nations 
force should include only military personnel of neutral coun-
tries, thus excluding the forces of the Big Powers. If the aid 
was not received without delay, the government would be obliged 
to seek help frofls the Bandung Treaty Powers. 
Supra^ n.3, p.»269 for Tshombe^s appeal to Britain for aid which was refused. 
M*9 PP*270«71. 
8. Ibid. 
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Iiuwufliba and Kasavulm also appealed to the Soviet Union 
on July 14, to watcii the situation and developments in the 
g 
Congo. Earlier^ the Congolese Cabinet with Lumumba and 
Kasavubu absent, had appealed for United States help «hich 
was refused with the advice that the United Nations be approa-10 ched. 
A^ I^ Si 
The Secretary^General responded imiuediately to the 
o 
request of the Congolese Government by invoking Article 99 
of tile Charter vhich gives him the authority to bring to the 
notice of the Security Council any development which in his 
opinion tiireatened international peace and security. The 
Security Council met on July 13, I960. After stating the case XI 
for the proposed UN action he asked the Security Council to 
authorise inilitary assistance to the Congo as he himself could 
authorise only technical assistance. In the early hours of 12 
July 14, I960, the Security Council adopted a resolution 
sponsored i^y Tunisia, with the United States and -fee Soviet 
9. gvipy.a, n.l», pp. 276-277. 
11. Supr^, n.S.5 pp. 271-273* 
12. <S/4387)- See, S.C.O.R.^ Fifteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September, I960, p.161. 
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Union voting for it, and Britain, France and China abstain-
ing* It called for the v?ithdrawal of Belgian troops from 
the Congo and authorised the Secretary General *'to taice 
necessai^ y steps .in consultation witSi the Government of the 
Kepublic of the Congoj to provide the Ifovei'nment with such 
assistance as miw be necessary until, ttirough the efforts 
of the Congolese Govei-nment with tiie technical assistance 
of the United Nations, the national security forces may be 
able, in the opinion of the government, to meet fully their 
tasks," It also requested^'the Secretary General to report 
to the Security Council as appropriate" on the implementation 
of the resolution. 
In accordance with his views on preventive diplomacy, 
Hammarsk4eold decided to make the United Nations FoJ'ce a 
predominantly African Force with some troops from Sweden 
and Ireland, both being unquestionably neutral nations* 
Ihe United Arab Republic, Ghana, Morocco, JMali and Indonesia, 
besides Sweden and Ireland, agreed to send troops to the 
13 
Congo. Jn his Report to the Security Council on July 18 
the Secretary General stated that his statement of July 13 
to the Security Council was a "basic document for the inter-
pretation of the Security Council's Mandate." He repeated 
13, (S/4389)i^., pp. 16-^. 
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that toia case for the Oiited Nations intervention was based 
on the breakdown of the instruments of law and order and the 
explicit request of the Govermaent of the Republic of the 
Congo* Therefore, he stated that "it would be understood 
that Belgium would see its way to a withdrawal*', if the 
Congo Government succeeded in restoring law and order, fflie 
Onited Nations assistance would "Xield results only after 
a certain time" and meanwhile "tdae force introduced is to 
be regarded as a temporary security force present in the 
Republic of the Congo with the consent of the government 
for the time and purpose indicated." But, he continued,""^  
"the i^ orce is necessarily under the exclusive command of the 
United Nations, vested in tiie Secrectaiy-General under the 
control of" the Security Council, this is in accordance with 
the principles generally applied tiie organisation. The 
force is t3ius not under t^e orders of the Government nor 
can it, as 1 pointed out in my statement to the Councili be 
permitted to beisome a party to any internal conflict* A 
departure from this principle would^ seriously endanger the 
impartiality of the United Nations and of the operation." 
The Secretary-General also laid down another »basic* 
principle of good faith on the part of both the host Govern-
« 
ment and l^e United Nations* He laid stress on the exclusion 
of units from any of the permanent members of the Security 
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Council, to be followed by both tiie United Nations and the 
host country while giving its consent. He said further toat 
"the United Hations^ ' operation mist be separate and distinct 
from activities by any national authorities^', and that "the 
United Nations' units must not become parties in internal 
conflicts, that they can not be use«i to enforce any specific 
political solution of pending problems or to influence the 
political balance decisive to such a solution* *• • 
14 
On July 20, 1960, the Secretary-General stated that 
all the United Nations forces had reached taie Congo} that 
India was approached to send a person to'act as military 
adviser to,- the Secretary-Gen^^ral in the Congo, and that 
Ralph Bunch of the United States, an Assistant Secretary-
General in the IBaited Nations, ^^ as sent as the personal repre-
sentative of tiie Secretary-General* 
16 
On July 22, the Security Council adopted a resolution 
which reaffirmed the July 14, Resolution and requested the 
Secretary-General to proceed with the implementation of the 
resolution. No member of the Council had questioned Hammarsk-
jeold's interpretation of the Security Council's Mandate, 
14. pp. 16-26* 
16. (S/4406), id,, pp, 34-36. 
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In a letter adiiressed to the President of the Security 
Council on July 31, 1^0 Lumumba complained of delay in the 
withdrawal of Belgian Forces from the Congo. On August 12, 
19oo the Seeretary*G©neral, who had arrived in Leopoldwille 
17 
on July 29, 19o0, told toe Congolese cabinet that all Belgian 
troops had been withdrawn from all regions in Congolese 
territory where ttiere were United Nations ti'oops, and that 
the Belgian Government had accepted, his interpretation of the 
Security Council resolution that all Belgian troops would be 
withdrawn from al.l parts of the Congo, as t^ ie United Nations 18 
i<'oiC0S arrived. Ihe "United Mations^t he said "is faced with 
no problem of Belgian opposition. This was an over simpli-
fication of the Bielgian presence in the Congo, especially in 19 
Katariga, 'fshombe had written to him on Augusts that iie 
would oppose the entry of the United Nations Force into 
Katanga, Xhe Secretary-General had threatened Xshombe, saying 
pp. 38-40 (S/4414;. 
17. See S/4417 being Second Eepoi't of the Secretary-General on the iiaplementation of Security Council resolutions of 14th July, and 2.2 July, I960* Id.» pp.445-63. 
18. M*i P« 46. 
19. i^., p» 49. 
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tnat he would ea3.1 £or a Security Council meeting which 
20 would not let him go easilF* 
Butj in accordance vith nis interpretation of the 
principle of non-intervention in internal conflicts, the 
Seeretary-General sent Ralph 3unch to Katanga on August 
to arrange with fshombe, the entry of United Nations troops 
21 into Katanga on August & Bunch returned to Leopoldeville 22 
on August ano, reported that he aet with "unqualified and 
UTiyielding opposition of fshombej his liinisters, and the 
Grand Chiefs." Mamarskjeold then returned to H^w lork to 
place ^ e questloa before toe Security Council and ask for 
a fresh mandate* 
Haiamai'Sk^ eold, aft^ giving the above accoiant of his 
23 
Visit to the Congo, told the Council when it met on August 8, 
that Tahojabe was non-cooperative and that there was 
20# p» 49. 
M*f P* 
23* See S»C*Q«R> 16tti Xear 884 Htg* August 8, 1960» pp«2-7 See Lumumba's telegram dated bth August I960, which he transmitted fco the President of ttie Security Council on 7th August stating "I shall be compelled to review supposition if Uaited Nations troops not enter Katanga on Saturday 6, August, in accordance with undertakings subscribed to by the United Nations, by yoursllf and myself (S/4421) nupra, n» 2, p.90, 
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•distrust* of the United Nations amng the Congolese Cabinet 
memoerss On August 9, tSie Security Council adopted a resolu-
24 
tion which called "foi' thfe withdrawal of Belgian troops from 
the pi^ ovince of Katanga under speedy modalities determined by 
the Secretary-General and to assist in every possible way in 
the implementation of the Council's resolutions" (para 2), 
It also declared "tiiat the entry of the Force into the 
Px-ovince of Katariga is necessary for tiie full implementation 
of this resolution" (paia 3). And reaffirmed' that the United 
Nations jforce in the Congo «ill not be a party to or in any 
way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any 
internal conflict, consititutional or otherwise" (para 4)» 
In paragraph one« it confiriaed "the autiiority given to the 
Secretary-General by the Security Council resolutions of 14 
July and 22 July" and requested him to continue to carry out 
the responsibility placed on him thereby* 
On August 12, Hammarkskjeold presented to the Security 
26 
council a Memorandum containing his interpretation of para^ 
graph 4 of the Au^ u^st 9 resolution as intimated to the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Congo* Basing his argument on the 
experience of Lebanon, the Secretary-General statedj 
"Applied to the situation in Katanga this means tiiat the United Nations is directly concerned with the attitude taken by tiie provincial govern-ment of Katanga to the extent that it may be 
24. (S/4426) Supra, n.2,, pp. 91-92, 
26. (S/4417/Add,6) P.^* 
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based on tJie presence of Belgian troops,or as being, for its effeetivexiess, influenced by" that presence ,,»tiie resolution of iugust 9,1960 which reaffirmed tixe principle of non-intervention,put the main emph-asis on the withdrawal of Belgian troops.^erefore, in tiie application of operative paragraph'^s seen in the right of precedents, it can be concluaed that If Belgian troops^  vere withdrawn and If pending full withdrawal, a Belgian assurance were given to the i Seer©tary»6eneral that the Belgian troops would in no ya^ intervtoo in or be used to Influence the outCOD© of tae conflict between the provincial government an€ the central government the question would be one In which the United Nations would in no sense be party «.« It ioight be held that the United Nations is duty bound to uphold the FunSamental Law•••.How-ever, the United Nations has to observe tiiat de .^ acto tile provincial governaent is in active opposition. 
United Nations Force can Jl not be used on behalf of the Central Government to subdue or to force the provincial government to a specific line of action. It fu3.'ther follows that the iftiited Nations* facilities caji not be used, for example to transport civilian or military representatives under tiie autho-rity of the Cfsntral government, to Katanga against the decision of the Katanga provincial government.. 
The Secretary-General concluded tor adding that "tiie 
policy line stated here repi-esents a unilateral 
declaration of interpretation by the Secretary-General. 
It can be contested before the Security Council. And it 
can be changed through an explanation of its intentions in 
the resolution of August 9. The finding is not subject to 
agreement or negotiation." 
The Secretary-General then left New York for Leo-
poldvllle via Slizabethvllle and Kamlna, raachlng Leopoldville 
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on Aiigust 14, to report to the Congolese Cabinet®®, On 
the same day he receivedi Lumumba's letter stating®^ that 
"the Government of the Republie of Congo can in no va^ 
agree with your personal interpretation which is unilateral 
and erroneous in its intervention in the Congo, 
the United Nations is not to act as a neutral organisation 
but rather that the Security Council is to place all its 
resources at the disposal of my Governement-* Lumumba 
also charged that • 'The aanner in which you have acted 
untii now is only retarding the restoration of order tn 
the Republie, pajrticularly in the province of Katanga, 
whereas the Security Council solemnly declared that th^ 
purpose of the intervention is the complete restoration 
of order in the Republic of the Congo, ^Wther more the 
conversations you have Just had with ffr, K.tsfaombe, the 
assurances you have given hioi and the statements he has 
4ust made to the press are synple evidence that you are 
making yourself a part^ to the conflict between the 
rebel government of Katanga and the legal Government of 
the Republic, that you are intervening in this conflict and 
26. (S/4417/4dd,7)Id. ,p.71. 
27» Id., pp 71^76 for the correspondence between Luaramba and Hammarskjeold on August, 14 and 15,1960» 
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that you are using tbe llnited Nations ^ orce to Influence 
Its outeome, wMch Is foriaally prohibited toy the very 
paragraph you have invoked!' Lamumba ended by saying 
It is inco!Bprehensible to me that you should have seat ©u 
only Shtfedish and Irish troops to Kat^ga, systematically 
excluding troops from the African states even though some 
of the l&tter were the first to be landed in Leopoldille, 
In this matter you have acted in connivance with the 
rebel Government of Katanga and at the ' instigation of 
the Belgian Qovc^ rnaent.' 
When the Secretary-General in his reply complained 
that LUBaisba 1^a<l raade allegations against hia?, the 
letter retorted in a letter of August 15, that he had 
only revealed '"facts which should be made known to the 
Seci;uplty Council and the world at large.»»^  In a second 
latier on the same day Luoiufflba alleged that »» If no 
member of the security council has taken the inttiative to 
question the validity of your memorandum and your plans 
of action it is because the members of the Council do not 
know exactly <?hat is going on behind the scenes...And 
he categorically stated that •* In view of all the 
foregoing, th^ Ooverniaent and tife people of the Congo 
have lost their confidence in the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations."/ 
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The effect of these developments has been well described by Catheriae HoskynsSS, on his return to Nev; York on 16 August Haamarskjeold made no effort to • hide the extent of the gulf which now existed between the United Nations ^d the Central Government, Ee was clearly furiously angry and felt personally insulted by the tone which Lumumba had adopted* to addition he felt that Lumumba's attitade was damaging the prestige of the Organisation and threatening to split the Afro-Asian block in a way which would only prejudice still further the success of the Congo operation, Joseph Lash states that at this moment Haflimarskjeold became convinced that Lumumba was an incipient dictator who in his drive for power was prepared to wreck the Congo and the United Nations 
Although the Secretary.-Oeneral was Justified in 
being offended by the tone and contents of Lumumba's 
letterSj he should not have failed to see that Lumumba 
was making a valid point in refusing to accept Belgian 
assurances in Katanga especially^. The Secretary-General 
seems to have failed to see the basic fact that the 
success of the United Nations Policy and its main aim of 
isolating the Congo from the cold war depended upon a 
speedy end to Kat^ga's secession. After all» it was this 
realisation on the part of president Kennedy, as Arthur 
hie singer Jr. 30 has pointed out, that led to his 
suppcff't to the use of force in Katanga in 196S, against 
the opposition of Britain and France, 
'^ Jje_Cpngo Since Independence . (January 1960-December i96Ty;~IOxford University Fress, London, 1965>p,174-This is a valuable study. 29. Id. , p . m 30. A Thousand Davs t JohnF.Kennedy In the White House (my Flower - Dell paperback, May Fl<3wer Books Ltd., London, 1965) p. 458-459. 
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However, when the Security Council met on August 81, 
the Secretary-General restated his arguments and answered 
Lumumba's charges^ ''. He said that if any member .di^a^eed 
with his interpretations, they might introduce a resolution 
to the effect. He indicated that he was setting up a 
Consultative Coaanittee consisting of representatives of 
states with troops In the Congo. The Soviet Union disagreed 
with the Secretary General and called for the use of 
force against Katanga or to withdraw the United Nation^ jS 
Porce^^. Among the Afro-Asians, only Guinea appeared to 
33 
disagree with the Secretary-General • 
The African Dilemma 
However, In this controversy, the sympathies of 
the United Arab Republic and the other African states» 
especially those who had contributed troops to the 
United Nations*^  ^ 'orce in the Congo, were with I«mumba« 
But they were not prepared to do anything which might 
retard the success of the United Nations' opeisatlon, 
which depended so much upon the Secretary-Generals* 
diplomacy ^ d leadership, Hkrumah, therefore, appears 
to have taken the lead In trying to impress upon Lumemba 
the need to keep on good terms with the Secretary-General 
g»C>O.R.. 15th year, SSTth meeting, SI August,l960>pp a-13 32, Id. , 883th Meeting, August 81,1960,p^-8. 33* Id. , pp. 3»9. 
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and to concentrate on internal matters of lav and ordesfi. 
He j^rltes^ ^ that in a series of letters to Lumumba in 
August, he urged the latter to keep the Force Puhlique 
under restraint and to move cautiously in his relations 
with Kasavubu. In a letter dated August 19, Mkritaiah had 
written^®: '» I am absolutely certain that the Secretary-
General will never allow the Belgians to reestablish 
themselves in the Congo, but if the situation remains 
chaotic, as at present in Leopoldville, there is a grave 
danger that the Congo which is dear to us may become a 
battlefield between East and West. This would be a 
disaster for a].l of us in Africa. •» 
Nkrumah writes^ further that Luaaimba, on the 
other hand, declared martial law and threatened to 
attack Katanga unless the United Nations enforced his rule 
there and that "with each day that passed the situation 
in the Congo grew more serious. It became clear that the 
Congo Gfovernment could neither command full political 
support nor maintain order in the country without 
external help ^^ 
34. See Kwame Nkrumah, Challenge of the Congo. (Nelson, London, 1967),p.35 35. , p. 33 
36. M ' » P« 
• 346 • 
The lawlessness in Leopoldville was such that even 
the Indian personnel In the OQlted Nations*0 troops were 
It 
aanhandled on August 18, 1960. Nehru informed ^ parliament 
on Aguust 20,1960, that he had written to Lumumba about 
the Incident. "It is a matter of sorrow", said Nehru "that 
the Indian personnel should have been given unfriendly and 
rough treatment by members of the Congolese Force Publlque."* 
But Lumusba had other plans. He seemed determined to 
attack Katanga with ^ Sovi^t support, which was ready to 
help him. In the circumstances, it was necessary to take 
positive action. Either the United Nations or the African 
States should have been permitted to give necessary aid 
to the Republic of Congo to end the secession of Katanga. 
But neither the United Nations was prepared to take the 
initiative, nor were the ATrican States in a position to 
do it, since they were committed to the United Nations*^® 
The African states who were exerting pressure upon Lumumba 
to desist from the use of force against Katanga, either 
unilaterally or with Soviet assistance, were finding it 
more and more difficult to keep up the pressure in the 
face of United Nations'^  policies.^® 
374 see The Hindu. 81 August, I960 
38. Se# Nkrumah, op. cit.,p. 38 39. For details See Hosk:^s, op.cit.,pp. 189-196. 
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The United States seems to have failed to understsuid 
the needs of the Congo, and also of the difficult position 
in which the Afro-Asian States were put. On the other 
hand, it appears to have taken advantage of the situation 
by supporting Kasavubu against Lumumba, under the eas^,but, 
false assumption, that any one that takes help from the 
40 
Soviet Union was a Communist , Nehru smd Nasser either 
did not teach them anything or taught them too much, ^ hey, 
therefore, chose not only to intensify the cold war in the 
Congo, but more seriously, to create more chaos in the 
Congo, ithe one thing that the Congo could not afford 
at the time was chaos. But this was precisely what 
Kasavubu's dismissal of Luosimba on September^5, admittedly 
supported by the United States^^ ensured. 
f Turning Point. 
This appears to have been a turning point in the 
attitude of the United Arab Republic and other African 
States with forces in the Ccngo , towards the United 
Nations' policy and the United states too. For they did 
not like Kasavubu whoqi they considered pre-west. And 
the western support confirmed them in their fears that 
the United States was working to turn the ^ongo into 
40. See Alan P.Merriam, Congot Background to Conflict (North Western University Press, 1961) pp.304-303. 41* Supra. « n.3, p. 294. 
42. Ernest L.IjSfever, 'The UN AS A Foreign Policy Instrument! The Congo Crisis', in Hilsman and Good, ed. ,op.cit. ,p, 145 
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43 a ViestQvn strong-hold in Africa, Nasser- plaintly told 
latex- that he turned against the Halted States because it 
had supported Kasavubu against Lumumba and brought j/fc kx^  
downfalls 
And on September 6, the United Nations* Fore© took 
•a step in toe Congo which created bitterness in the minds 
of all supporters of Luiaumba inside and outside the Congo. 
On that day Andrew Coi'dier, the United Nations' representa-
tive in toe Congo, orders toe closure of toe National Hadio 
Station and all airports in Leopoldville. Lumumba was refused 
permission to usa toe Radio Station in an attempt to regain 
44 
control of toe Government. Impartial observers agree toat 
tois action of toe United Nations, though necessary and Justi-
fiable in toe interests of law and order in Leopoldville, did, 
in fact, deny the only available means for Lumumba to regain 
his position. Such was toe complex nature of toe problems 
which toe United Nations had to face in toe Congo. 
At tois stage toe United Arab Republic appears to have 
decided to give help to Lumumba in regaining power, by 
allowing him to occupy toe Nd^ili Airport and toe National 
Nasser's Speeche^T 1961, op.cit., pp. 19»20 and also 
pp. 216-216. 
44. Hoskyns, op.cit., p.223 Cordier was toen acting as toe UN representative in toe Congo, as Rajeshwar Dayal had not yet o^in.©d his post to succeed Ralph Bunche. 
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Radio Station closed by the United Rations Force, 
According to Nkrumah, his ambassador to the Congo .vrote 
to him^® that ''the UAR representative told us that in 
view of the improper interference of the United Nations 
in the internal affairs of the country, they had 
received communication from President Nasser authorising 
their soldiers to withdraw when the Congolese arrived 
to take the Airport-«»^  
The ambassadors of the United Arab Republic| 
f^ orocco and others were also reported to be making 
attempts to effect a reconciliation between Lumumba 
and Kasavubu^®# In a letter addressed to Nkrumah on 
September 17,Lumumba mentioned this and blamed 
Kasavubu for the failure of these efforts and accused 
the latter of playing the game of the imperialists. 
The efforts of Rajeshwar Dayalf® who had taken over 
from Ralph Bunche as the United Nations' representative 
on September 8, also failed to bring the two leaders 
together. 
45. Nkrumah, opcit. , pp. 40-41. 
46. see Hindu, September 18, 1960 
47. Nkrumah, op.cit. ,p. 62. 
Supra, n. 46. 
• 350 • 
Any lingering hopes of a reconciliation between 
Lumumba and Kasavubu, were dashed to earth, when Colonel 
Mobutu, the army Chief sij^ power on September 14, 
dismissed ParliaTaent and appointed a Council of Commissioners 
consisting of University students to run the Government^®. 
He also expelled the Russian and Czechoslovakian missions from 
the Congo. According to a Western scholar®®, •• the 
immediate object of the United States policy^ ihe ousting 
of Russia • had been achieved, with tfobutu's expulsion of 
com unist bloc missions in September. The congo was saved 
from becoming a " Central African Cuba* and Lumumba (who 
accepted Soviet aid for his attack on Katsaiga) prevented 
from assuming the role of an African Castro Lumumba» 
in the Americfiui view, remained completely unaceeptable..,»» 
India*s Initial Response 
'feanwhile, the ^curity Council had met on September 14, 
for syiother discussion on the Congo. The Soviet Union, 
infuriated by Luaiumba's dismissal, attacked the Secretary-
General bitterly®^. On September 16, Ceylon and Tunisia 58 introduced a draft resolution, endorsinig the fourth report 
Supra, n.3, p. S98. 50. See ^ rvey« 1961, op.cit. ,p.461, 51. See U.Y.B.U.N. , I960 pp. 61-62. 
Id. , p. 63. 
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of the Secretary-General on the Congo operation. The 
Soviet Union vetoed ihe resoluticai^®. ^he United States 
responded by invoking the Uniting For Peace Resolution, 
which was approved^^. The Emergency Special Session of the 
General Assembly opened on September 17, 1960^®« This 
marked the beginning of greater interest by India in the 
Congo operation. 
India's initial response, as that of the United jftrab 
Republic , was one of whole hearted support to the 
Secretary-General* s policy. Though the Secretary-General 
did not ask India for troops, he was depending upon India 
for various technical personnel and aid. It was reported®''' 
on July 17, that India was shipping 1000 tons of wheat to 
Congo in response to a request from HamtnaTskjeold. And on 
August 2, the First contingent of 36 Indian Air Force 
personnel was sent to Congo^®» Nehru informed^® Parliament 
on August 31, 1960, that j Some countries have been called 
Upon to send their armed forces to the Congo, we are not 
one of them. But we have rencJered a good deal of assistance, 
53 Id. , pp. 63-64 54. Id. ,p. 64 55. Ibid. 
56. See The Hindustan Times. June 17, 1960 57. li^. 
58.1d. , August 2, I960 59.L. S.D. . Eleventh Session, ^cond Series, August 31, 1960, Col. 5390. 
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rather ijuportant assistance Of the principal 
officers whom we have sent, one is a kind of Military 
Mviser to iJamai'skjoeld, and another is very soon 
going to be his pei-sonal representative in the Congo. 
Ihere vas very recently another rather heavey deiaand on 
us for setting up imediataly a 400 bed hospital^ in the 
Congo we were pressed very eax'nestiy, and we agreed," 
61 
Nehru told Parliament on August 31, that the choice of 
Dayal was made by the Secretary-General himself and that he 
had reluctantly agreed to relieve him. He said that Dayal 
would be repreaenting and reporting to the United Nations 
and not to the Government of India* 
Thus India was not involved in any way in the Congo 
operations, though it was contributing to it. Nehru also 
refused to offer an opinion on the controversy between 
aammarskjeold and Lumumba, on the plea tiiat it was before 62 the Security Council. At his monthly Press Conference 
on August 11, I960, he had paid a tribute to the Secretary-
63 
General fof- having acted with "vision and also wisdom." 
He also saiu. that the situation in the Congo was both 
strai^t forward and also complicated and that it was the 
presence of the Belgian troops that had aggravated the 
60. Ea^eshwar Dayal was appointed in this capacity on Augw-20,1960. See The Statesman^ August 22, I960. Twelfth Session, Second Series (Nos. I.IO) Col. 1605, 62. See JMJiAMiJ, August 21, I960. 63. jd,, August, 12, 19S0. 
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trouble in the Congo, though there might be other reasons 
too. Therefore the sooner the Belgian troops departed from 
the Congo the better. He added that India recognised only 
oneCongo State. 
on August 31, 1960, Nehru paid a similar tribute to 
the Secretary-(3eneral and the United Nations, In Parliament®^* 
•»When the troubles arose in the Congo, the United Nations 
was appealed to and the latter responded with speed and 
efficiency. This particular action which the United Nations 
took in the Congo is unique. In a sense it marked a new 
phase in the activities of the United Nations* Taken all 
in all, I think it is a good and desirable phase and the manner 
in which the United Nations has functioned in the Congo 
has be^ commendable. I do not quite know ^hat would happen 
in the Congo if the ^n^ted Nations was not there. Apart from 
the possibility of a great deal of internal conflict, there 
would be a possibility of intervention by other countries, 
big and small. I would like to express on behalf of the 
Government our appreciation of the steps which have be«i taken 
broadly by the United Nations in the Congo* 
64. Supra, n. 59, Col. 5989. 
• 354 « 
And as late as September 26, Nehra refused to 
say anything against the Secretary-General's policy®®. 
One reason for this hesitancy appears to have been lack 
of first harid information on the developments, people 
and personalities in therCongo, including the leading 
figures like Lumumba and Kasavubu^®, India wisely 
decided to open an Embassy in Leopoldville, in the last 
67 week of August, 1960 , and the appointment of a chargei^  
1 - 6 - 68 dl affaires was announced on September 12, 1960. 
V/ith the opening of the Emergency Special Session 
of the Gneral Asserably India appears to have decided to 
take active part in the proceedings* On September 20, the 
69 
Emergency Session adopted a resolution supporting the 
Security Council resolutions of July 14 ^d 22, and 
August 9, 1960 and appealing to all the Congolese within 
the Republic of Congo to seek a speedy solution by 
peaceful means of all their internal conflicts for the 
unity and integrity of the Congo, with the assistance as 
appropriate, of Asian and African representatives 
appointed by the Advisory Committee on the Congo, in 
65. See The Hindu. September 27, 1960 66. See The Statesman. August 23, 1960; The Hindu. September, 15, i960. The Times of India. August 24, 1960 m Z l l M u , September 13, 1960. 69. For the text and the voting record seeif Y.B.U. N. ,1960, pp. 99-100. While the date of the resolution is given as {September 20 in this source, the G. A. O.K. ,4th Emergency special session, 17-19 September, p. 102 shows the date as September 19. 
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consultation with the Secretary«General, for the 
purpose of conciliation. 
On October 3, 1960, Nehru urged in the' General 
70 
Assembly that steps should be taken to help.. Parliament 
(of Congo) to meet and function so that out of its 
deli^v.rations the problems of the Congo may be dealt with 
in the people themselves »' He also suggested 
that a Commission might be sent to the Congo to inquire 
into the situation obtaining in the Congo. Lumumba was 
reported to have welcomed the suggestions of Nehru'' 
PH Recognises ^ C.^ s^ vaba 
The next move of the Afro-Asians was an attempt 
to seat the Lumuaaba delegation in the United Nations. 
Lumumba and Kasavubu had appointed two separate 
delegations'''^  on September 11, and the matter was 
referred to the Credentials Committee which was expected 
to meet in December, I960. The initiative to seat the 
Lumumba delegation wds first taken by Sekou Toure of 73 Guinea when he proposed it in the Assembly on October 10,1960 
70. G. A. O.R. . 15th year, 882nd Meeting, 3 October, 1960, p. 327 71. See The Statesman. October 5, 1960. 72. Supra, n.3, p.298. 
73. Y.B.O.N. , 1960, p.69. 
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On October 18, India and the United Arab Republic 
Joined others in co-sponsoring a joint resolution to 
t h i s e f f e c t ' ' ^ . They soon appear t o have r ea l i s ed t h a t 
75 
there was no ch^ce of the resolution being accepted 
and therefore Ghsuia moved for an adjournment of the 
debate till the concilation Commission which had been 
set up by the Advisory Committee on the Congo, had 76 Visited the Congo. This motion was adopted on November 
But the United States pressed for an imiiediate meeting 
•w^Jr' 
of the Credentials Committee whichj^ on November 9 said 10 
and recommended Kasavubu's delegation''''''. The United Arab 78 
Republic and Marocco did not p a r t i c i p a t e in the Committee. 
The General Assembly accepted, on November 22, Kasavubu's 
delegation by a vote of 53 to 24 with 19 abstentions, 
with India and the United Arab Republic voting against 79 the resolution . 
India's permanent representative at the United 
Nations, C.S.Jha, told®® newsmen on November 24, that 
he deplored deeply the fact that India's vote against 
74. See The Hindustan Times. October, 19, 1960 75. Hoskyns, op.cit. , pp. 261-262. 
76. G. A.O.R. , 15th Session, Plenary Meetings, 913th Meeting, 9, 1960. pp.848 and 854 
77. Y.B.U.N. 1960 p. 70. 78. Ibid. 79. See G. A. 0«R« 15th Sessicxj, H^nar^Meetings,924th mtg. 
November 23, 1968, pp. 978-979 . For the text of the 
resolution see Y.B.U.N. 1960, p. 101. 
80. See The Hindustan Tjmes. November 25,1960 see Also G. A.n.R« 15th Session, pl^ar^L Meetings, 917th Mtg. 18 November t960,, p. 875. ^ 
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the seating of the Congolese delegation named by 
President Kasavubu, was described in some press 
coffimentai.'ies as a vote for the ousted Premier, Patrice 
Lumumba tmd against Kasavubu. He said that India had 
always recognised Ksisavubu's status as Chief of State, 
adding that he had himself gone to convey his Government's 
respects when Kasavubu came to New York for the Assembly 
meeting. India, he said, did not favour any on© person 
or party, and had not voted for Lumumba against Kasavubuf 
it siiiiply considered tiiat in the existing situation it 
was better to delay seating any delegation until ttie 
Conciliation Commission could finish its task# He also 
rejected the Soviet interpretation of Indians vote as a 
vote agaiiist the United States as not correct. He finally 
stated that the Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission should 
go to the Congo on November as arranged* 
81 
Nehru was reported to have expressed the opinion 
that perhaps it would have been wiser to defer a decision 
on tile seating of the Congolese delegation in the Ohited 
Nations till the United Nations delegation had gone to 82 ttie Congo :ind reported. For, he told Parliament that 
"the process of some kind of reconciliation ete^, 
envisaged in the Congo >'as hit on the head", 
81. See m e Hindu, November 26, i960. 82*. Nehru, op. cit,, p» 618, 
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Another result of the United Nations* decision 
was, as Nehru pointed out®^ that Lumumba escaped from 
his place of detention, taking himself out of the 
protection of the United Nations. He was arrested hj 
Mobutu's men and put in jail. As HaimnarskJeold told 
OA 
the Security Council on February 15, 1961, the United 
Nations' Force had neither the authority nor the means 
to prevent his arrest or to know his whereabouts^ 
The U. Attacks The UN Policy 
At this stage Nasser appeared to be moving away 
from the United Natioffis* policy and contemplating 
unilateral intenrention. On the other hand, Nkrumah had 
begun to press him for the creation of an African High 
Command. In a letter dated November 2l, Nkrumah made 
formal proposals for Nasser's cai si deration®®. For s<»Be 
reason Nasser did not appear to favour NkrumahJs proposal. 
Then, on December 2, 1960, the United Nations' Force 
including the troops of Ghana were asked to stand by, 
ti^ en Lumumba and his companions, were transferred to 
Jail from their place of detention. This was a humiliating 
83, Ibid. See also Hoskyns, op.cit., p.2?3, 84, S.C.O.R., 16th year, 935th meeting, February 15,1961, pp.2-11. 85, Nkrumah, op.cit,« p.86, 
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experience for the Africans and others present cai the 
scene. 
Then Kasavubu expelled the United sg^ ab Republic»s 
Embassy Staff frotn Leopoldville and ordered the closure 
of the Embassy* Nasser retaliated by breaking off 
diplomatic relations with Belgium and seizing Belgian 
fifi 87 assets to the 4oy of his people , and, Nkrumah 
congratul,ated Nasser on December 6, saying that Ghana 
had also jevered diplomatic relations with Belgiuia* 
Clearly, Nasser was thoroughly disOllsioned with the 
United Nations* policies in the Congo. The frustation felt 
by the United Arab Republic was evident from the fact 
^hat Al»Ahraa. Cairo's most influential newspaper, 
launched a scathing attack on Brig. Inderjit Rikhye, 
blaming him for allowing Col. Mobutu to hold an impressive 
military parade in Leopoldville .OT the United Nations Day, 
for permitting the expulsion of the Ghanaian diplomat 
Helbeck, and, for withholding an inquiry into the allega-
tions that western sources had helped to pay Col.Mobutu's 
86. See The Times of India. December 5, 1960 87. op.cti. , pp. 88-89. 
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Indisclplined forces. Reporting this, K.C.Khanna of the 
Times of India *« News Service'* observed®®that 
'•significantly.... the disclosures made by Al^Ahram 
closely follow a meeting the U.AiR. Deputy Foreign 
Minister, Mr. Hussain Sulficar Sahry, had with the 
Indian Defence Minister, Mr. V.K.IQrishna Menon, at 
Cairo airport on the morning of November 30, when the 
latter was on his way to New York, this, ^ d Nehru's 
own statement®® in Parliament that it was wrong to 
have allowed Mobutu to bring back his indisciplined 
soldiers into Leopoldville after they had been pushed out 
(I 
from there with some difficulty, go to show that Al»Ahi^ m«s 
story was not entirely 'one sided' as the Times of India 
correspondent had surmi-sed. 
The west Asia Correspondent of The Statesman in a 
dispatch published on December 31, 1960, wrote " in a 
conversation with one of president Nasser's closest friends 
and advisers, who because of this wished not to be named, 
criticism of India's refusal to withdraw her trcpps 
and of both Mt. Dayal and the Brigadier were professed, 
though more of the latter officer than of the former. 
88» aupra. n.86 89. Nehru, op. cit. ,p. 52S 
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They were accused of being too formalistic and of 
placing loyalty to Mr. Hatninarskjeold above loyalty to 
the cause of freedom. There were many occasions, according 
to my inter/ocutor, when they should have disobeyed 
orders from New York or resigned. Only the U.A.R. •s 
friendship for India prevented these criticisms from 
being made aiore frequently rad openly, he (!ald**« 
md speaking in the Security Council on December 9, 
go 
1960, Pawzi asked indignantly : «• Are we in the 
United Nations merely to adopt paper resolutions and 
express futile resentfments If those resolutions are 
flouted and looked on with disdain? Are we to continue 
for ever to talk about helping the Congo, while 
imperialism helps itself to the Congo?.,• Anew, more 
realistic and responsible approach by all of us to the 
present situation and eventually to other situations 
has become imperative••. He was pleading for the 
release of Lumumta. 
Though Nasser had threatened to withdraw his troops 
from the Congo, he had not yet carried the threat Into 
actlcn possibly throu^ pressure from India and Ghana* 
S.C. O.R. , 15th year, 916th Meeting, 9 December,1960, pp 19 • For the full text of the speech see pp.l6*SS« 
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on the other hand, the United Arab Republic joined India, 
Yugoslavia, Ghana, Indonesia, Ceylon, Iraq and Morocco, 
in co-sponsoring a draft resolution^^ on December 19,1960* 
The resolutiOT urged »• the icaraediate release of all 
political prisoners under detention, more particularly 
members of the Central Government of the Congo and the 
officials of parliament and others enjoying parliamentary 
iomiunity; .... the immediate convening of parliament and 
the taking of necessary iffotective measures thereto by the 
United Nations including custodian duty;' and finally 
demanded'=-* 'that all Belgian military and quasi-military 
personnel, advisers and technicians be iamediately with-
drawn in pursuance of the resolutions of the United 
Katio}s and the repeated pledges and assurances given by 
the Government of Belgium in the interests of peace and 
security*'. In the first operative paragraph of the 
resolution, the United Nations was told that it • »must 
henceforth implement Its mandate fully*«. Hammarskjeold 
did not recom-nend the draft resolution on the ground 
that national conciliation and a return to normalcy 
could only be achieved by the normal political and 
diplomatic means of persuasion and advlce^^* The draft 
resolution was rejected on December 20, by 42 to 28 
votes with 27 abstentions.^^ 
91. The operative part of the draft resolution was read in Parliament by Nehru-See Nehru, op.clt. jp.ri-i' 
92. See Y.J^ UtN.'.^ '^^ p. 77-78. 93. Id. , p. 78. 
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With the failure of this resolution the United Arab 
Republic appears to have become convinced of the need of 
withdraw Its troops from the United Nations' Force and to 
take unilateral action®^. This W4S the line it appears to 
have adopted at the much publicised Casablanca conference 
of heads of the Governments of Ghana, Mali, Morocco, Guinea 
and the United iVrab Republic. According to Kkruniah^ ®, »'The 
central problem for discussion was whether the African 
states should withdraw their troops from the Congo. It was 
felt that the United Nations was clearly not going to take 
effective action and that our troops should no longer be made 
available. 
•* I spoke strongly in favour of allowing African 
troops to remain in the Congo pointing out that withdrawal 
would be tantamount to betrayal. But after much heated 
discussion it was finally agreed that troops of the 
Casablanca powers should be withdrawn unlesss the United 
Nations acted immediately in support of the Central 
Government of which Lumumba was Prime Minister. I, however, 
remained adamant ...< < 
94. In fact this was what all the African States with troops in the Congo, felt. See Hoskyns, op. cit. ,p. 272. 95. op.cit. ,p,91. See also Survey 1961, op.cit. ,pp.465-66. 
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In his Address on victory I>ay Celebrations*' in 
Cairo on December 23, I960®®, Nasser made, perhaps the 
first major attach on the Ifeited Nations* operation in 
the Congo : 
••Western newspapers often claim that the UjflP does not support the tinited Nations in the Congo and that Gamal Abdei Nasser bites the hand that fed him In 1956. 
•'That is all wrong, when we went to the United Nations in September this year we declared that the Congo was in Jeopardy, as was the United Nations itself. 
In 1956, we expressed our gratitude to the United Nations for its attitude against aggressicaa. We had thought that was a turning point in the annals of the world orga-nisation to which small powers attached great hopes. 
However, those hopes were totally dashed later when the United Nations assumed responsibility in the Coqgo and allowed itself to be used as a vehicle for big Colonialist powers carrying out a Colonialist policy which st^wds for the overthrow of National rule and makes of Patrice Lumumba 
a lesson for the entire African continent. 
* 
The United Naticn s has become a vehicle for imper-ialism. If it has become a tool in the hands of imperialism, and the imperialistic countries, and if it has becon® a means for the implementation of imperialistic policy, the people will look tt the United Nations the way it looks at the imperialistic countries. 
96. Nasser's Speeches. 1960, op.cit.,pp. 176-178, 
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•• The United Nations has unfortunately betrayed itself in the Congo. I hold the imperialistic countries responsible for this betrayal. And I hold the United Nations Secretariat also responsible, 
»»When I was in New York last September we said that the United Nations had succeeded. We said that we wanted to preserve the United Nations and keep its prestige. But the events in the Congo have given the proof that the adminis-trative system followed by the United Nations requires a change* •« 
Nehru Blames the UN Policy 
That the charges levelled by Nasser were not entirely 
unfounded,, is evident from Nehru's own exposition of the 
failures of the United Nations' Policy in the course of 
his speeches in Parliament. The press in India had also 
begun to criticise and attack the Western policies. 
The Statesman, for example, wrote on November 25, that 
"when .*.» on August 5th at Leopoldville a nervous United 
NatiOTs' spokesman told journalists that the move into 
Katanga, due to start in another four hours or so, had been 
suspended, the implications of the retreat were already 
clear to some. At the end of that line of repeated retreat 
lies the latest United Nations' decision to accept the 
Kasavttbu delegation, perhaps the United Nations will yet 
serve some purposes in the Congo; these may be the 
ones some big powers consider good..,. They are, however, 
definitely not India's ...." . And, The Times of India 
wrote on the same day that " at the back of it all, of course, 
is the full laidiluted wickedness of the cold war. It is a 
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matter of deep regret that the United States should be 
leading its Western allies In a mischievous and dangerous 
compaign to bolster the lawless and unrepresentative 
regiue of Col, Mobutu* 
On November 22, Weferu drew the attention of Parliament 
to the Second Report of Dayal on the ^ ingo and said®''. 
" Miany facts come out of this. One basic fact is I regret to say, that Belgi^s there have not functioned, as they ought to have functioned. Indeed, after the first four weeks, Belgians who had left in the earlier stages of independence returned in considerable numbers In the Congo. This became a he^vy flow, not only in a province like Katanga which, of course, is practically completely controlled by Belgians of all types, military, civil, technical, and others^ but even in Leopoldville itself. The House will remember that the Security Council said repeatedly that Belgians should be Aiade to withdraw. IJaturally tl:^  Security Cooncil referred to the military element, but the military people are there still, having gone back there In some numbers..." 
After quoting passages from Dayal's report, he 
©fes observed in a significant statement t 
«» You will find that wherever Belgians are in the greatest numbers, that area is asking for separation from the Congo and the separate statehood, tn fact, Belgians are often leading these movements. It is not an unjustifiable assumption for me to make that one of the first things that should be done in the C^ngo is to carry out firmly and cftearly what the Security Council said previously about Belgians. In the circumstances, it is very difficult to drsiw a line between civilians, military personnel and para-military formations. I feel a basic fact is that the Belgian authorities there are supporting the disruptive elements....»• 
97, See Nehru, ,op.cit,, pp. 513-616* 
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Clearly, the premises on which the Secretary-General 
based his aetlcai originally tUat with the introduction of 
98 
the United Nations' Force Beigian would see its way out 
were proved wrong. There" was, therefore, now need for 
strong and positive action, W the circu-nstances, the 
failure of the Vestern Towers^ especially the United 
States to support the Afro-A^i^ draft resolution of 
liecenibBT Tsas -atil oTt-^ Oiai^ *^ 
as has been mentioned, too dici not support this r esolution. 
ain the words of a western scholar®^ »* it was questicable, 
to say the least, whether' », the principle of non-intervention 
on which the Sectetary-Generai laid the greatest emphasis 
till the (3id, "was a principle which <» uld be applied In 
the anarchic context of the 6i>ngo# Hamniarskjeold argued 
that the Congo operation followed in a direct line from 
its previous coimnitiBents in tH® Middle ISast, but the Congo 
crisis had' in fact confronted the United IJations with an 
unprecedented problem demanding unprecedented responses". 
But "Hammar skjeold appeared extremely reluctant to draw 
this conclusion."^ 
Thus the United Nations had become largely ineffective 
in the Congo. Nehru pointed out in Parliament on Decetaber 80, 
1960^^, that »• the position of the United Nations in 
98. ^ upra^ n.l3,. 99. See Sarvey* 1961, op. cit. ,pp. 469-470. 
100. Nehru, op.cit. ,pp. 518-S19* 
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the Congo underwent a change. They became less and less effective and Col. Mobutu became the most effective person though not wholly so. -^ hey ( the UN) could not do anything. The instructions that they got were that they must be completely neutral-whatever that might mean. Actually this meant that while the killing of one group by the other took place on a big scale in front of them they looked on. So from the point of view of law and order they had no position at all because of the instructions or the interpret at iras of the instructions of the Security Council. In effect the Congo gradually began to disintegrate**. 
He continued If the United Nations can not effecively deal with the situation it would fade away in the ^ ongo and its reputation will continue to suffer. The suggestion that we should withdraw our contingent has not been approved by us. The fact remains that under present conditions, our men, cr any country's men there, are frequently Insulted and mstfihandled by the Congolese soldiers under Colonel Mobutu. We have put up with the many difficulti-es that face us, but I can not, if our people are not treated properly and given opportun-ities to do the work for which they were sent, guarantee that the question will not arise whether it is worthwhile keeping them there are or not. Normally we would have withdrawn them, but we have hesitated and we hesitated to do so because it would reaJ.ly mean the collapse of the United Nations* work. It would mean most Inevitably leaving the Congolese to fight it out amongst themselves, and it would also mean the intrusion of foreign powers with their troops and, therefcare, war *«• 
On D(3cember 21, 1960, Nehru criticised^®^ the draft 
resolution introduced by the United States and United 
Kingdom in the General Assembly which failed to secure the 
required two-thirds majOTity as containing •• a number of 
pious hopes but contains nothing you can get hold of. It 
101. ,pp.5S1-522. This resolution would merely request the Secretary General to continue to discharge his mandate and continue his vigorous efforts to ensure the non-entry of milit^y and para-military personnel into Congo, to do everything possible to assist the Chief%state of the Congo in establishing conditions in which parliament could !i»et and to continue his efforts to help the Republic of Congo to ensure respect for civil and human rights for all persons within the countries etc. See. Y.B.U.N. 1960, p.76. 
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aeaia comes against the same difficulty which has been 
pursuiDg the United Nations* work in the Congo namely 
tying up the hands of the Secretary-General, limiting 
what he can do and he cannot do. This has pursued him 
almost from the beginning". If the United Nations* 
Force were to take action only in self-defence*•, he 
said, "*they need not have gone there. But they were 
sent there to help not to interfere, not to encourage 
conflict, but surely, when the need for it arose, to 
prevent wrong doing". Re pointed out further that "if 
you look at the whole context of events, you see how 
by gradual pressures a situation has been created in the 
Congo in which the United Nations* Forces have been put 
in a most difficult position, '-^ h^ey have been humiliated 
often and they have to watch humiliating spectacles 
without being able to do anything. A large number of 
Africarj countries have been infuriated by the turn of 
events# They have started withdrawing their forces froM 
the Congo* *. 
Nehru concluded his speech by saying that '*Bi 
such circumstances, it is difficult for a country like 
India to function effectively or tii help fully 
Our tooad attitude is in favour of the Afro-Asian approach. 
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That does not me^ we agree with everything they say, 
like the formation of an all Afriemi force» They have 
demanded many measures which we think are not feasible* 
Out attempt has been to put forward something which we 
think might avoid this elen^nt of anger as much as 
possible and also be feasible otherwise* 
Nasser Witfa^ y^.q Trqop^ 
Thus Nehru had identified himself with the position 
of the United Arab Republic and other African states of 
the so called 'radicai^®^ or Casablanca group on the 
role of the United Nations' Force, even while disagreeing 
with their jaroposals to remedy the situation* He was still 
hopeful of making the United Nations change its 
attitude. But it has to be noted that the Casablanca 
Powers had been making these attempts ever since they 
agreed to join the tfeited Nations' ^ orce, without much 
success. The Secretary-General who had invited them 
to participate in the united Nations' enterprise, appeared 
to be less and less willing to take their counsel, perhaps 
because they had identified themselves with Lumumba, or 
because they were suggesting what were considered to be 
•radical* views, which were being suppcarted by the 
Soviet Union. 
102. see Survey. l961,op.cit.,pp.464-466. In contrast Nehru was called a moderate (vide p. 485). 
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Bveu then the United ib'ab Republic had not wltMrawn 
its troops yet. It appeared to entertain a lingering hope 
of influencing the United Nations' policy and perhaps of 
saving the life of Lumumba. These hopes might have vanished 
wh(Hi Kasavubu took that fatal decision on January 17,1961, 
of getting rid of Lumumba when the latter together with 
his compguiions was transferred from Thysville ari^ y camp 
to lSlizal)ethville, the capital of Katanga''^®. As eANY^^dU^^ 
104 
has obsei'ved J •• clearly Kasavubu now felt the moment 
had arrived to rid himself of Lumumba's explosive prei^nce 
before the precarious balance of forces tipped defiisivd.y 
in his favour. Since Lumumba was certainly the most 
hated figure in Katanga, he was virtually signing his 
death warrant and consigning him to his executioners". 
Three days earlier, January 14, 1961, Kasavubu 
105 
had requested the recall of Dayal . And a few days later 
he requested for a security Council meeting alleging 
flagrant Interference in itns domestic affairs by the 
United Arab Republic, though no specific charges of 106 
interference were made . Jfere than anything, this appears 
to have been a move to counter the United Arab Republic's 
severe attack on him eoid its demands for thejrelease of 
Lumumba. There were, however, rumours that the United 
Arab Republic had supplied arms to Lumumbist forces in 
103. S.C. O.R. .16th year. Supplement for January-February and March, 1961, p.24. 104. See survey , 1961, op.cit. ,p.473, 105. Supra, n. 103-<S/4629). 106. Id. ,pp. 59*60. 
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StanXeyvliie^®''. At the same time, the United Arab 
Republic, Indonesia and Morocco announced their intention 
108 
to withdraw their troops from the United Nation's Force • 
Clearly the conditions stipulated in the Casablanca agreement 
were fulfilled and Nasser appears to have acted accordingly, 
Nehru Detnands Use of Force* 
Whatejver might be the demerits of this decision 
of the Casablanca Powers, It was this withdrawal of troops 
by them that appears to have given a ^olt to the United 
Nations. Por, nobody, least of all the secretary-General, 
was willing to ptill out of the Congo, for, above all, his 
own personal prestige was at stake in the f411ure of the 
United Nations in the Contjo. There were only two 
alternatives in which he could continue the United Nations* 
operation. One was to ask the states withdrawing troops 
to reconsider their decision, and the other was to ask 
other nonaligned stages to contribute troops. In the event 
HantTiarskJeold appears to have resorted to the second 
J 
alternative by writing to Nehru on J^uary 21, 1960, 
for a battalion of Coabat troops . Nehru, very wisely, 
took this opportunity to impress upon the Secretary-Genrral 
107. For Lo^ti's rej^ utation of charges of supplying arras to Lumumbist forces. S.C.O.R. ,16th ypar,932nd Meeting, 7 February 1961, p. 24. Also see p Y.B.U.N. 1960, 
p.^9«81. 
108. See, Y.B»U.N. , 1960,p.80. 109. supra, n. 103,pp. 81-82. 
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tbat before India could send troops, the United Nations* 
policy in the CcMUgo had to undergo a chdRgeV^ 
Explaining the conditions stipulated by Iftdia, Nehru, 
111 said in Parlia-nent on 'February 15, 1961, that tte 
United Nations "can stay on only if it changes its past policy very largely arsd if insists on these basic matters. One of the actions xvhich are quite essential i«J4that the foreign elements must be controlled and must be made to withdraw., specially Be3^ans«... We hope that it may be possible for the Security Council to come to firm decisions so that the United Nations authority can function there effectively and strongly* T^his means that it should function even if it is necessary to use armed force and not merely look on while others use armed force for a wronpc purpose. that the foreign elements oust go from there, and that the so-called Congolese army should be controlled and disarmed* HAving got the situation under control, tte United Nations should try to get parlia®ent to meet for deciding what kind of government they will have, the object being that the unity, integrity and independence of the Congo should be preserved. If any help has to be given to them it should go through the United Nations and not thrDUgh other sources.... If our views could be accepted,^ould get over our reluctance and help by sending some combat troops to the Congo. That is the position we had taken up earlier and it still holds' 
Then on February 10, it was announced by one of I 
Tshombe's Ministers that Lumumba fead escaped, giving rise 
112 to suspicions of foul play , which were confirmed cm 
113 
February 13,)9t) t by the s^ ate Minister at a press conference 
Called for the purpose. It was murder. And it shook the 
110. itiS-11Session, Second Series, Vol. 50,83 Februit'y lirsi,Col. 1558. 111. Nehru, op.cit. ,pp. 5?5-5g6 (Italics are mine) 112. Id. ,p.524 . 113. For the announcement see Supra^ n. 3, pp. 734-6. 
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United Nations to its foundations, the Soviet Union in 
a 'savage' attack against Hatunarskjeold accused him of 
complicity in the murder, dematfided his resignation and 
announced it® withdrawal of recognition from hiaj^ ^^ , 
Nehru and Nasser were equally indigoant, fhe latter 
charged Kasavubu and Ishoabe for the murder, accused the 
ifaperial powers for conspiring in it, and den^nded an 
ifflmediate inquiry into it^ "^^ * flehru wrote^^^ to Hamtriarskjeold 
that it was an ''international crime of the first magnitude" 
in 
He wrote further s " I know that you have be^ trying your 
utmost to control the situation but unfortunately United 
Natimis activities have been obstructed both directly 
and indirectly by some countries who have been supporting 
Mr. Tshoabs aid Mag, Gen. Mobutu. The feeling in our 
country is strong and unless effective steps are taken 
iastnediately it will be difficult for India to associate 
itself vrith policies which permit the perpetrators of these 
crimes to continue in their gangster methods'*. 
Security Council A u t h o r U s e of Force 
In addition, the United Arab Republic also extended 
diplomatic recognition to Gizenga*s Government of 
114. See. S.C. O.ii. ,16th year, 934th sieeiing, 15 February 1961 pp. 14-24. 115. Nasser's Speeches,1961 oo.cit, ,pp.lO-SO 116. Thejin^, February 16,1961. 
f^ae Indian Express, February 16, 1961 
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Staniejnaile^^®. Nehru, ofcourse, did aot take this step. 
It was feared that the United Aeab Republic might intervene 
119 
unilaterally on behalf of Glzenga . Actually, it joined 
Ceylong and Liberia in sponsoring the crucial resolution 
of February 21, 1961, which was adopted by the Security 
Council with the Soviet Union and France abstaining from 
voting^?® A Soviet draft resolution of February 14, 
calling, among other things, for non-military sanctions 
against Belgium, the arrest of Tshombe and Mobutu, the 
termination of the United Kations* operation within a month 
and the removal of Haaimarskjeold was defeated by 8 to 1 votes^21 
The February 21, 1961, resolution based the authority 
of the Iftiited Nations on the; threat to international peace 
and security and it called upon the United Nations to 
take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the 
occurence of civil war in Congo, including arrangements 
for cease-fires, the halting of all ailitary operations, 
the prevention of clashes, and the use of force, ifi^  
necessary, in the last resort. It also called for the 
110. See Jsiss^, 1961, p,477. 
119. See Survey, 1961,op,cit. ,p. 455,There was an implied tkireat in the Resolution adopted by the Foreign Ministers of ®iana, Algeria, Mali, Morocco and the at Accra, on 20 February, 1961rSee Rkrumah,op.cit,, p. 136 for the text of the resolution. 
120- For the text see aapra^ n. 103,pp. 147-8. 121. For the text of the resolution see Supra n. 114,pp. 23-24 For the voting see Id. ,942nd Meeting, 20 February, 1961 
la. 
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withdrawal of all Belgian and other foreign personnel 
of alX descriptions and merceneries and it also decided 
to hold an ieiaiediate and impartial investigation into the 
circuJBstances of the deatii of Lumumlaa and his colleagues 
and to punish the perpetrators of ttiese crimes. 
She acceptance of this resolution by the Itoited 
States clearly indicated a change in its attitude, which » 
Was expected with the assumption of office lay John F. 122 KenneJdy as President in January, 1961* Besides, with 
the r@M>val of Lumumba from the scene, it appears to 
have felt that the Congo was safe from Soviet and non-
aligned Influences, At the same time, the image of the 
United states x^ h^ich the new President wanted to project 
requli-ed this chatige in its attitude in order to placate 
Afro-Asian opinion, especially when the Soviet aiion was 
moving earth and heaven to influence tiie Afro^Asian 
nations, especially India, ^s was evident from the letter 
123 
addressed ty Kliurshchev to Nehru, on Februaiy 22 
denouncing the United Nations and the Secretary-General 
and also renewing his proposal for the reform of the 
Secretariat ligr replacing the Secretary General three 
Seci etaries-Genssral representir^ the cold war blocs and 
the neutral bloc. ° 
See Arthur K* Schlesinger Jr, ^ •cit. ,pp,468-661 > for a brief account of Kennedy*s approach to the Congo< liVmafflb^ g Truth About A Itonstrous Gyime iQf 13ie Coloniali^ stg (Foreign languages publishing house, J50SC0V, 1961 )pp,9-23, 
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lad la Sends Combat Tfoops 
184 On February 23, Webru Indicated In Parliament, 
in answer to a question that the passing of the Security 
Council resolution of February 21, had niade it possible for 
India to agree to send troops to the Congo. India announced 
125 
its decision to send combat troops on March 3 , through 
a letter from Jha to the It was generally 
believed that this decision which was made even before the 
clarifications sought by N^hru from the Secretary-General 
wert received was a polite but firm rejection of the 
^oviet views on the United Nations and the C'^ ngo stfid a 
reaffirffldtion of India's faith in the Secretary-General and 
1 P6 the United Nations . V-lhile this was true, Nehru did 
appear to have received some clarifications, at least, before 
127 
the decision was announced* For it was reported on Februiiy28 
that C.V. TJarsintfian, Assistant Secretary-General (Political) <ln 
the United Nations had met Nehru the previous day in New 
Delhi on the initiative of Hasamarsk^eold and had a thirty-
sainute exchange of views in this regard. Sarsiahan was also 
reported to have met the Defence Minister,Krishna lNPsnon# 
1g4,sjpra, n. 110, ^ ol. 1559. 125. The Hindu, March 5, 1961, Ihe St ate S.T an . .61. 126. see, for example. Surveyor 's article in The ^ Imes Of India. March 6, 1961. " 127. See The Hindu. February 28, 1961# 
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However, on March 6, 1961, Nehra annoaaced in 
Parliament that he had received a reply from the Secretary-
General whicn v;as satisfactory, and, that India would 
be sending troops to the ^ ongo* This decision of India 
and the additions made by Malaya, Tunisia, Ethiopia and 
129 
Liberia bo their troops, rescued the United Nations from 
its worst crisis to-date. 
But the implementation of the February SI, resolution 
was not easy, since it was opposed by the Congolese 
authorities as well as Britain, France fiwd Southern Rhodesia. 
Kasavub^ and Tshombe opposed it largely on the ground 
that it had accepted the views of the Casablanca Powers^^^* 
They h<4d also opposed the entry of Indian troops into 
the Congo and threatened to wage w ^ and Hamarskjeold 
131 
wasj pressed hard for the recall of Payal froa the Congo •• 
Nehru Was reported to have threatened to withdraw the Indian 
troops if Dayal who had been called back to Mew York on March 10|1961 for consultations, was not returned to the 
133 
132 Congo. As Kasavubu opposed his return he vrns not 
sent again and none was jappointed In his place formally. 
1 S8. Nehru, op. cit. ,pp. 526~5g7. 129. airvey^ 1961,op. cit. ,p.43? 130. For details see Roskyns op.cit, ,p. 333-34 2, Also se^ survey iseijop. Cit. ,pp. 485-87. Also see The Hindu, .i^ rch 23,1961. 132. See^Koskyns, op.cit. ,p. 364, 133. See in this connection The Hindu. March 28,1961. 
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It was stated that Kehru accepted this formula on 
condition that the British and United States*Ambassadors 
in Lfiopoldville would also be replaced, as they were, 
soon after I>ayal»s resignation towards the end of Mayl961^^? 
Also Britain and Rhodesia kad started a compaign 
against India. The resignation of Conor 0' Brien, who had 
been sent to KJitanga .<as United Nations' representative 
for the implementation of the resolution of Febriaary 21 
on December 1961, and his accusation^^® that Britain, France 
and Belgium are putting obstacles in the way of the United 
Nations work and that they had been spreading false 
accusations against Indian troops in the Congo, which 
1 36 
Nehru endorsed , put a heavy strain on India's relations 
with Britain. It was also reported that not all of 
India's ^ger with Britain and Prance was based on the 
Congo issue alone, •^'heir attitude to Portuguse Colonialism 
and France's Algerian policy were also counted as factors 137 in shaping India's attitude*^  , 
134. See Hoskyns, OP. cit. 365.The Nefe York Times congratualated Nehru on May 28 for not withdrawing Indian troops. See The Hindu May 29,1961. 135. See The Hindu. December 6, 1961. 136. Id., December 11 and 12, 1961. See also The Hindustan Times, December 7,1961. 137. TFTg-Times. London, September 20, 1961. 
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The Onlted Nations Uses Force 
The rest of the story''^ ® could be rapidly told. 
CftJ April 17, 1961, Kasavubu signed an agreement^with 
the United Hations, accepting the February Si resolution 
of the Security Council. Under these agreements Pso* 11 anient 
was convened and a coalition government headed by 
Cyrille Adoula was for?aed in the first week of August. At 
the request of the Adoula Government- the United Nations 
moved against Katanga by occupying strategic points in 
^iizabethvilie. Tshombe»s troops resisted the United 
Nations force and the latter opened fire after seme 
hesitation. This brought the United '^ations under heavy 
criticism from Britain, Prance and their friends. Worried 
by the happenings, Hasmarskjeold decided to fly to 
Katanga to arrange a cease-fire between the United Nations 
and Tshombe/and met with his tragic death in a plane 
crash near Ndola in Southern Rhodesia on Seoteraber 23,1961. 
Soon after, U Thaut was appointed Acting Secretary-
Gen ral and he made It clear on November 24, 1961, that 
he would not hesitate to take firm action against 
Tshonfitee' g mercenary force^^^. Meanwhile a cease-fire 
138. For details Sos > 1961,pp, 57-8S and 18. ,1'36S 
139. Y.B.U«Kf. .1961. pp. 58-59, 
1^0. S.C.O.R. 16th year, 982nd Meeting, ?4th November 196 pp 19-22. 
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was arranged between the United Nations and Katanga 
which dragged on for another year. Though Tshomlpe 
accepted the authority of the Central Government and 
the indissoluble unity of the Ccmgo and recognised 
141 
Kasavubu as head of state and Kitoncu » on December SI, 
19(51, he seemed unwilling to take the logical step of 
ending Katanga's secession as evidenced by his unwilling-
ness to execute the TIN plans of September 1962, and, 14? m. 
his harrassraent of the United Nations* force , 
position of Adoula was beco.'ning more and more difficult 
and things appeared as bad as they were in the previous 
yaorl". 
In the circumstances in December, 1962 U Thant gave 
his consent to the United Hat ions Force in Katanga to use 
force to end Tshombe's resistence. In a swift action the 
United Nations' Force put an end to Tshombe's resistance 
which coliapsed all too soon. Thus was ended the three-year 
old seeeission of Katanga and it was finally Integrated into 
the Congo in January 1963. 
141. For the text See Docuaents (for 1961, op,cit,,pp.770-771 
142. See Y.B.U.N 1962, pp.71-74, 143. See The Statesman. Hoveabcr 10 and 11,
. 382 • 
Throughout this period, Ifidia stea4-fastly refused to 
be pressurized by England and others, and stuck to its 
position that string action should be tjilcen, if necessary, 
to end Tshombe's resistance. The United Arab hepublic 
appeared, by and large, to accept India's lead and 
Nasser continued to keep the United Haticras under 
pressure dem^dlng strict and prompt implement at ion of 
144 
the resolution of February 21, 1961. Ke also continued 
to support Gizenga's Governnient^^®, till the Belgrade 
Confercrnee of the nonaligned states, in a^ptember 1961 
which was attended by Adoula, Gizenga and Bombobo# This 
appears to have made him and other Afro-Asian leaders 
less hostile to the Adoula Government^^®, 
In conclusion, it may be observed that India's role 
iu the Congo Crisis beginning with the acceptance of 
Haaoiarskjeold's concept of preventive diplc^ aacy and strict 
non-intervention and ending with the acceptance of a 
fflilitary solution, repealed, once again, that Nehru*s 
advocacy of peaceful settlecaent of disputes did not 
preclude the use of force when circumstances really 
deaianded it. If an^ fthing, this should have made it clear 
that India would, if aecessary, take Qoa by force. Bat 
144. Nasser's Speeches. 1961, op.cit. ,pp. 19-.20,31-33,105 110.-111, 125-126. 
145. Ibid. 146. For details see Hoskyns, op.cit. ,p.413. 
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veiy few in the ^ est appear to have grasped tStie 
significance of the Indian policy and adopted a 
0omplacent attitma towards Portiigal* Vshen finaliyj 
India took Qoa tovcQ in Deoember 1961 the Onitedl States 
in pai ticular accused India for violating its own norias and 
also ti3s Charter, Of all tht^  unhappy things said about 147 
Mehru's Goa policy^ the viaws of Arthur M.Schlesinger Jr., 
appear to be unfortunate not bsicause he is an Merican} 
but l3€jcause he is an ^lightened American. 
Perhaps lehru's observation at the Belgrade 
148 
conference on ColonialiM vras a factor in shaping the 
5f^ est«rn attitude to Bartugal. In contrast, Hasser and 
other Afro-Asians laid as much stress on Colonialisia as 
on the cold war. Hov^ evar, even a perceptive observer like 149 
Chai'lcs D.CrejneanSf cocmmts that "unlike Nasser. 
seeas funciaiEientally opposed to any arrangement which would 
involve the unooaaiittid countries in tiie use of force"»Md 160 
in a Goffiiaent on Masser's Congo policy he observes that 
Hassei? "bea^ iffle so obsessed '.vith the danger of the reesta*» 
blishjQs^ t of Colonialisffl that he would not evaluate Soviet 
actions ^ ith his usual obieetivl% Kasser did not 
see the Corigo as a likely seed bed for Goffimunisa". 
14?, Op#Git»,p.4£l, see also pp»4r2«23 for a brief account of-Hehru-Kennedy exchangee. 14S» See above, p, 4b* 149. 0p.cit#|Pp»27a-276. ISO* Id. I p. 
» 38^ • 
This, in my opinion, is not correct, m underlying 
factor in Nehru«s and Nasser's opposition to Colonialism 
has been the fear of the spr--ad of Concnunism^^^. They 
understood far better than the Western powers that 
Colonialisffl £«d its continuance were the real seed beds 
of Coamunism. Their opposition to Colonialism and 
support to Nationalist independence aioveaents was an effort 
to f5ght Coataunlst infiltration as well as Western 
Colonialism. If Nasser had aipported .Ugerlan Nationalists, 
it was because of his realisation of this danger. His Congo 
policy was also an effort to support Liiiaumba in order to 
prevent the growth of Soviet influence as well as Western 
Influence, and also of Israel, in Africa • 
In the Co..go crisis, Nasser appears to have realised 
that there wus less chance of Soviet infiltration, once 
the Belgian forces were withdrawn and the authority of 
the Central Government restored all over the country. If 
there had b-en a real threat of Soviet intervention, 
pirjiaps the United States would have adopted a different 
151, See atove pp. 44..50> 146- 149. 
152. see Nasser *s speech to the National^  Assembl;'/ on January 23, 1961, explaining his objectives in attending the Casablancet Conference'-Nasser« s Speeches, 1961, op. cit. ,pp. 4..10. 
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policy in the initial stages. The western scholars 
tend to overlook or minimize the importance of tte fact 
that Luffluniba's government had first sought help from 
the United States. It is very difficult to find 
substance in the charge that Nasser failed to see the 
threat of Soviet infiltration, for an not a single 
occasion did be appear to support the Soviet policy 
on Congo. After all is sai<t and done, it has to be 
admitted that not all of the Soviet Criticism of the 
United Nations' Congo policy was unfounded. So it was 
the Soviet Union that identified itself with Ihe 
nationalist forces rather than the latter identifying 
themselves with the former. 
C H A P T E E VIII 
IHE UNIXED AEAB BSHJBLiC AND INDIANS CONFLICTS V.IIH CHINA AKB PAICISTAN 
The border dispute between India and China which 
had been 3 source oi tension between th« two countries 
sine© 1969, suddenly acquired the dimensions of a large-
scale armed conflict between them, when China launched 
a mass!?© attack on India on October 20, 1962, The liapact 
of this attack on India Nonalignment has alreac^ been 
examined. It is proposed to examine here the role of the 
United toab Kepublic, as a leading nonaiigned countiy 
Viil^  -v&ry close relations with India, 
taie first response of the United Arab Republic was a 
cable from Kassei' to Nehru and Chou En-iai, the Chinese 
Prime Rlnister, on October 21, suggesting conciliation and 
2 offering his good offices* Hhis proposal of Nasser 
3 disappointed the Indians* l^ ehru himself was reported to 
4 have sbt aside this su&gestjLon * Itore recently Theodore C, 
See liax'geret W*Flsher| Leo E*Rose and Robert A.Huttenback, 
(Fredtirick A.praeger, New Ifork, London, 1963), for a good study of the dispute b'ised on Indian and Chinese official Documfcnts. See »Statement Issued by the United Arab Republic Presidential Council on 31 October 1962», UAR NElfS (I&sued l^y the Press Bureau of th'o 0AR Embassy, New Delhi, special Press Helwase, November, 1962), p.l, 3. See K«Rangas'.vami, «A leiter from New Delhi', The Hlndu^ Octobtir 29, 1962. 
4, See G,H.Jansen»s report in the Stattosm^^ October 25,1962, 
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Sarensonf has sdvanced a similar view* This view does not, 
6 
hovevei', fit ia ^ '^ith viek' of G,H.Janseiii that Nehru did 
not oaly iccept Kisser's offter but that " Indian OAi'icials 
actually suggtjsted to the United Arab Republic that it should 
not taka a firm denunciatory line against China lest this 
jeopardise its role as a future mediator^ ''^  
I 
That such a suggestion might have been made 
apptsars true from vhat Mehru said in Parliament on January £6, 
7 
1963 • " ivhen Ali Sabry their Prime Idinister, comes here 
he is askud to say that China is an aggressor* Here is a man 
coming as i> mediator. He has to behave with some decency 
to'wai'ds the prirties concerned* It is very unfortunate that 
he ti-eated that 
It would ISius appear that the United Arab Republic had 
told India, through diplomatic channels, that it considered 
that China wus an aggressor* Otherwise, the question of India's 
suggestion for restrain;t^ on its part would not h'ive pexhape 
arigen at ail* Even if the United Arab Republic had not taken 
such a stance against China so early in the crisis, the fact 
Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy-y (Bantam Books mc,, New York. 19661 p* 747* 6* Afro-^ Asia ^ n^d Nonalignment op.cit*,p*331* 7* Series, Third Session, Part II j(Vol*12, 
Nos.27-31, January 23, 1964 col.6647* ' 
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that N€)hru and so©© others In the External Affairs 
Mnlstx'y thought that the United Arab Republic should not 
oondejun China and play a mediatory role, suggests an identity 
of approach between India iind the United Arab Republic or 
at least bet7.Jeen Nerhru and Nasser, Did they then tiiink 
that however deplorable China's action might have been 
their long range interests ^ ould be better served in 
coacll^tion with China ? If they had tiiese calculations 
in xttind they app^ sar to huve busn correct at Itast to some 
extent;, as the developments since the Chinese aggression 
indicate, especially the increasing r^approechment beti^ een 
the UELited States and the Soviet Onion. Indeed if this 
XVere true it also vindicates Nehru's whole approach to 
China as we shall point out in the concluding remarks. 
However, it was this type of mediatory role that India, 
and especially Kehru, had attemptud in .many international 
crises including the Guez Crisis, notvjithstanding Nehru^s 
condemation of the Anglo-French-Israeli attack on the 
/ United Arab Republic. Nasser might have, iSierefore 
thou£^t that Nehru would v.'elcome such a move from him in 
/ 
India's dispute with China. Go much so he might not have 
likeato coadeMi China thus spoiling the chances of 
mediation. 
Nasser's initial response could perhaps be compared 
to the response of India to the nationalisation of the Suez 
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Canal Compsiny W Nasser* Further India does not appear to 
liave at any stage taken either the l&iited Arah Republic 
or any other country into Confidence in its dispute with 
China* ks A,G#lloorani® has pointed out, Nehru did not raise 
the issue aven at tiie Belgrade conference of the nonaligned 
Stated in September 1961* It has been mentioned earlier that 
a iiajre intelligent and judicial use of nonaligninent by-
India would huve perhaps prevented tiie Chinese attack or 
at least would have prepared the vjorld to grasp its 
significance sjuch earlier and much better than x^ hen it 
come ^t an extremelgp delicate situation in International 
relations | It was the extreme stress of the Cuban Crisis 
that appears to have produced some of the distortions in 
10 
the judgeaicnt of even eminent taiinkers like Betrand Russel 
on the merits of the Sino-Indian dispute* 
It isi not without significance tiiat the United Arab 
Hepublic in a post-mortem analysis of the debacle bitterly 
lamented that^ so "poor had been India's diplomatic and 
public relations '^'ork amongst Afro*.Asians that few countries 
had any clear idea about the disputej and few were prepared 
to believe that the Chinese had mount<^ d a powerful and 
8. Our credulltar And Negligence^ op.cit,,p»S7 Stoe above pp«ia0.103* 10. 0p^cit,5pp*64-108» 11» Cited by S.N» Dwivedy in Parliament - Suprai n*7' cols. 6 W - 8 see also Jansen, Afro-Asia And Monaiitrnmenty • op»cit,,pp, 349« 
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massive invasion of India's frontriestV i^iis conforms 
to the ajxound failure displayed by India in various other 
spheres in this dispute* 
a^ss^y Iftte*? 
However, it is to the credit of Nasser that he grasped 
the real nature of China's aggression, as socm as the facts 
were known to him, if not from the begining itself, and took 
a firm stand f::^ vourable tx> India i^r proposing in letters 
addressed to the Krime Ministers of the two countries on 
October J3S, 1962 inter alia tiiat both sides cease fire and 
wil^druw to the positions held by theo prior to September 8, 
12 1962, a proposal which Nehru himself had made just tvo 
13 days earlier, on October 24, v^ hile rejecting the 
14 
Chinese proposal of the same day as completely unacceptable, 
Niisser^ s proposal was made public by the United Arab Republic 
through a statement of the Presidential council on 
October 31, 1962 thus ending public speculation as to 
where it stood_ln the conflict. 
12. Supra, n.2 p«2 see also The Hindu^ November 2, 19S2* Chinese Aggression In V>ar and Peace. Letters of the Prime Mnistei- of India, p. 12. The Hindu. Oct, £4, 1962. Supray n#2 pp* 1*3* 
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Dils proposal of Nasser earned from Nehru a well deserved tribute which the latter paid on November 8, 1962 in Parliaiuent.Nehru said^ -o. " I must pay my trlbuto to President N-sser in this matter because he did liot jB^e a vague proposal in the air. People advise us to be good and peaceful as if ave are inclined to var people talking to us' to be good iDoys and mk© it up has no particular meaning unless they come to grips with particular issues involved. Now President Nasser took the trouble to understand tho facts and theryaft^r, issued a presidential Uecree or comuniqu© issued by the Bcesident-in-CouiiCil of the United Arab Republic iri wnich he laade certain ^oposals. These proposals were not exactly on the lines we had sufofctisted but were largely in conformity v;ith our proposals* They laid special stress on troops withdrav/ing to their lines where they stood prior to the 8th of September, That was a ma^or thing that fitted in with our proposal, China hss re^ vsctted this proposal maae by Pi'esident Nasser.**^  
Thiit China h^ id rejected the proposal made by Nasser 
17 announced on November 2, by All Sabry in Cairo. i>hy did 
China tnis? The answei* given ty Nehru on 10> 18 
1962 in Parliament ^  " We decided long ago, two or three 
months agoji to suggest this 8th September line because, if 
accepted oy the Chinees Government it shows that all tiiat 
has happened since then has been their aggression. It Is a 
Very big ttiing for them to accept and they have not 
accepted it*'." 
This proposal of Nasser proved that his offer of 
mediation was not based on a refus-il as some had thought then 19 
to see the ri^ts and wrong of the dispute • It might have 
been a reflection of uncertainfer about Indians own stand 
in the dispute. 16, liA^ &Dj.,Third session, Third series (Vol IX, No, 1,November 8-20, 1962) cols, 1&8-129. 17, See November 3, 1962 18, L,S.D,. Third Series, Third session, (Vols, 10 & 11, December 10, 1962) eol* 521b, 19, Supra, n,3 & n, 4. 
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It might have been a reflection of uncertainty about India's own 
stand in tiie dispute. Once Nehru spelled out his tei'ais, Nasser 
accepted tilem and tried his best to secure the approval of as many 
Afro-Asian and nonaligned countries as possible as statement 
20 issued loy tne Presidential council made clear* 
Ifasser Appeals for Afro^Asian Support: 
Finally, Nasser was also concerned with the damage that 
the conflict between India and China would cause to the Afro-Asian 21 -solidarity. As the statement of October 31 put its 
"Motivated,. ..by the spirit of Bandung and the principles of Afx'o-Asian solidarity, ti;i6/0nited Arab Republic hastened to assume its incumbent role of positive action and to take such steps as are required to stop these armed clashes, clear away the growing shadow of danger and contribute to a peaceful solution of the problem and eliminate the cause of dispute between India and China, both of whom occupy positions of prominence and great influence among the comm-« unity of African and Asiaxi countries.** 22 It also, saidi "while the United Bepublic believes in the principles of Bandung which call tSie countries of the world to solve their international problems through means other than the use of force, it still holds unsha-keable faith in the need for the application of this call in particular to the problem between two countries which are signatories of the Bandung Charter-China and India « both of whom contributed to the establishment and to widespread adoption of the principles of the Charter. 
"The United Arab Republic asserts that it will spare no effort in its endeavours to preserve the wonderful image of Afro-Asian solidarity unblemished by drops of blood and battles between countries working for peace." 
Nasser appears to have been been more interestested in 
unnaturally, Banduns Prijiciples than India had ever been and this not/For India, 
20. n.2,p.3. 21. Mmm* n-2. 22. p«3. 
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^ e PaACh SJie«l was more attraqtive than tiie Bandung 
principles. NatiSfer n<2V«r openly subscribed to the Panch Sh^ei. 
Afro-Asian solKJarity iv^ s le-s attiactive for India Ijecauso 
of its riv jlry with China vhich was becoming laore and mo^ 'e 
open. The uses of Afj-o-Asian solidarity weie bettor iilustiated 
in probleffis of colonialisai tiian ©Istewhere to the extent tiiat 
India was not so imediately concisrned m^/or confronted 
v;ith this problem it had l^ss use of it. One important occasion 
on vhich India had uepcnied upon this Afro-Asian solidarity in 
the United nations was wh^n ^ large number of Afro-Asian states 23 and the Soviet bloc supported India's seizure of Goa» 
Ihus Nasser appears to h-va appealed to Afro-A&isan nations 
especi-jlly nonaligned nations to make coioaion cause in the matter, 
24 
According to the statem^ -nt of the Presidential Ckjuncil " in 
pursuance of the policy of consultation and exchange of views 
currant among the fiiendly states on all events, President 
Gamal Abdul Nasser communicated viith the hegds of state-and 
heads of ftovernments of Afghanlstani Indonesia, Algeria, the 
Sudan, itorocco, Ceylon, Ghana, Guinea, Cambodia and l-jali, 
inviting ttisffi to join in tiie coiiitaon effort of the Casablanca 
Charter countiies atid the nonaligned countries in Africa and 
Asia to ward off the dang^ sr on the frontiers between India and pc China pll correspondent reported from Colombo that 
23. liBjJki^t X961 pp. 1£ 9-131. 
See mfcj tfifidu Decembot- 10, 1962. 
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t 
All Sabz7 S'aid that "As soon as the conflict oc cured, the 
13AR GovfeXftment got in touch not only vith P^klag but a 
nuffibes- of nonaligned Governements as well • It would have 
been very useful had there been a cozabiaed approach to idae 
problem then. However ... some GovernuHtents aiide Individual 
approaches and this to some ejttent vitiated the position*^ ." 
26 
The Eastarn Economist wrote on 26 October that tile 
Chinese note of October £4 " was the outcome of the mediatory 
efforts performed by President Hass^r'" ^ The Soviet Itoion 27 
was also believed to have exerted influence on China . It was 
possible that Nassc-r had also approached the Soviet Union 
as he was Reported to have done after India's appeal for 28 arms to the United States, 
However, Indians were not satisfied with the response 
29 
of Hatser. A member of Parliament, U,M«trivedi ® observed 
that "we v.'antfcd stronger words from President Nasser in our 
h©lp"» It would thus appear that Nasser had missed a golden 
opportunity of earning the ;gratitude of the Indian masses W 
his failure to condemn China before anything else. Had he done 
so, he would have become as much a hero for Indians as he ia 
for his own people, even if he had done nothing else afterw«irds-
It was surely a tactical mistake on his part, since his 
XXXXXi Wo. 17, October 26, 19^2,p*769. 
2bI See Jhe Main Stream, VO1.I,'NO# 11, November 20,1962 ,p.4, 
29. Supra* n.l6 col, 186. 
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friendship for India was genuine and sincere. If the 
Government of India had not restrained hi% as reported 
Ife might have as well done itj sooner than he actually did» 
and tlims established a reputation for himself among the 
people* 
But, for good or bad, he chose a less attractive and 
more difficult role of supporting India»s cause in the 
Afro-Asian circles. And he seems to have succeeded in his 
role to a lai'ge extent especially in the role his country 
playea an the Colombo Ck>nfarence of the Six nonaligned 
states iS shall be seen in a moment. 
As the conflict deepened with no sign of China 
stopping short of completely humiliating India, Nehru o..iibr-
came his reluctance to seek military aid from the Hest and 
So 
appealed initially, it is said ^ for • sympathy» and 'support' 
of the United States, Soon however, he h-d asked for large 
scale military aid from the United States, which Kennedy did 
not thixik ^ ise to supply without first ascertaining India's 31 needs 'snd capabilities. There was, however, an immediate 
supijly of small arms in large quantities, which however 
were considered insufficient for any offensive to be takon 
32 
by India . In the wake of tiiis supply of American arms 
came the news of the resignation of Krishna Menon as 
30. See Sorensen, op.cit, ,p,748i 51, Ibid. 3£, .SiiESa, n.8, p. 135, 
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33 i)<jfence Minister. Siis meant an obvious increase of 
34 
United States Influence In the GoV&znment of India* Suet 
a development vas of direct concern to Nasser. At this stage 
he appears to have decided to intensify his efforts to 
bring greater pressure on C3iina to desist from further 
sggression. To this end he was said to haVe approached the 
Soviet Union also to bring sense to China as indicated above. 
It is from tiiis point of view that one hais to view 
his decision to make public his proposal of October 26, and 
to support India publicl|^  and influence others to do tiie 
same. And once China rejected these proposals toe press in 
the United Arab Republic called China aggressor in its var 
with India. On the same da/ November 6, the official 
Jugoslav Nevspaper Borba cam© out vith criticism of China 
36 on the Grossing of the idcKahon Line. 
333©2a, on^Novismher 21 cbXaa h^vii^ ovexTim more than 
14,000 square miles of India^ r territory, announced a 
37 unilateral cease-fire begining from the next day and a 
33. Sor^sen writes t^ iat Kennedy was greatly satisfied with this development. (Supra n.29),perhaps the acceptance of the American aid was not approved by Menon and might havQ been a factor in his resignation. 34, Ibid, 36. See !£ha Hindu,. November 6, 1962 36. Ibid, This would suggest close contacts between Nasser 
and lito. 37. See Xhe Hindus Rovember £2, 1968, 
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withdrawal from December 1962 to what it called the 
line of actual control , s t i p u l a t i n g that Indian troops 
should not attack aftei- ttie cease-fire, nor again advance 
to the line of ac tual control in the eastern sector, that 
is the 'illegal* mcMah&n Line, and/or refuse to withdJ-'aw 
but remain on tfee actual line of con?irol in th« middle raid 
western sectors. It also s t ipu la ted that Indian troops 
should n.ot cross the line of actual control and regain their 
p o s i t i o n s prior to September S* 
As A.G. Moorani^^ aptl^ observes " these were clearly 
surrender terms which a victor would impose on the vanquished, 
like the eaili^ r^ thrse point plan, except for one more 
condition, namely that India should not move her troops to 
/ 
the MacMahon Line*^ ." India clearly had only two alternatives 
either to reject the cease-fii-e and fight to regain its 
territory or to accept the humiliating terms offered 
China. It is difficult to say what China would have done 
if India had decided to ^ight. But the question is was Iiidia 
in a position to fight to regain the lost territory? It 
Was joot, as the Harriman report to Kennedy made clear, 
Kennedy was ^tiiei efore, not willing to support Jjidia to v;tn 
back the lost teri itory f^ Similarly, Khrushchev also 
apptjaxed laiwilling to go furtner to make China withda':uv. 
38. gMSa, n.8, paoi. 39# Sorensen, op*cit. ,p«76o, 40. See N, J.H#, .Playingj It Cool, Times of India^ December 
17, 1962. 
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even If he couM, having perhaps already exerted pressure 
on China to cease-fire, without nedang@3?ing his position 
in ths Krejialia^ J' Sie fact that h© did not support China 
against India was proof of his rejection of C2iina*s claim 
that it had acted in *self-defence% ruling out there'py 
42 
Soviet support for China under the mutual'-seeuritgr trealgr » 
even afttsi' iWaerican arms supply to India* Khrushchev might 
hfave also known that Kennedy was prepared to provide air-43 defence;? to India in case of further attack against M i a • 
Indisi, therefore, needed a better alternative than 
the acceptance of the Chinese cease-fire. Ihe Colombo 
proposals of the Six nonaligned nations provided India with 
the alternative vnich India so desperately needed to, make 
its acceptance of the cease-fire look less humiliating 
than it might otherwise have been, as shall be beloVi 
12ie course of India's resijonse to the proposed Colombo 
conference itself suggests that tois is not an unjustifiable 
conclusion* fhe initial response of India and the United Ai'ab 
Republic to the idea of the Colombo Conference was not 
44 enthusiastic. As G»H»Janseiar^ rsjxjrted from Colombo on 
41, See H.J.N./Playing It Cool', Ximes of India, December 17, 1962. SHprsy, n.l, p. 144 
43. Sorensen, optCit,,p,160* 44. See !]l!he Statesman^ December 10, 1962* 
. 410 • 
December 1962 " tiie suggestion of Ceylon happened 
to fructify mainly because one of those invited, Buraa, 
respontied proiaptiy and gave it a certaia momentua, Ghana 
tried to shift its venue to.Accra and till a few days 
ago there xvas a strong feeling here that if the United 
Arab Republic temporised further then it should be left 
cut.'' tore recently Hansen has revealed that^^ **Froin the 
start India 'was not at all eniaiusiastic about the Colonibo 
Conference*India..•^at first tried to Seattle, and 
then to delay, the holding of the conference^ In this she 
was aided by the United Arab Republic - also most reluctant 
to attend. Egypt managed, by requests for clarification to 
delay the opening from, the 1st December until the 10th 
but on or about the 6tii, an indignant Ceylon Issued a 
scarcel/ veiled threat to the United Arab Republic that the 
confterence would be held vith or without And that 
Ihe United Arab Republic seems finally to have agreed 
to att^id mainly in order to be of assistance to India*','" 
This reluctance on the part of the United Arab 
Republic pQ attend the conference appears to have been due 
to tiie fact that Nasser was conducting mediation between 
46 China ajad India in Cairo# As Jansen reported from Cairo 
46. See Afro^ Asisu- And Konalignmentt op, cit. ,p.334^ December 8, 1962, 
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"while tile nonaligned begin to foregather In Colombo, 
the i-eal dialogue between India and China is taking pl'-Aee 
in Cairo with President Nasaer acting as intermediary, 
*'Hav.lns heard the Indisua point of view twice over, 
from the special Indian mission. President Nasser^ v^ ith some 
Indian prompting, is in a position to ask th© Chinese Deputy-
Foreign jMinister, Mr^ Htvang Chen who arrived here yesterday, 
what his country*s final negotiating position is» 
"fhe bargaining will probably involve some struggling 
between military and civilian control over territory between 
the line of September 8, and the line of October BO^" 
But once it was evident that the Colombo Conference 
would be held even* without the United Ax-ab Hepublio, it 
would have been a grave mistake for the United Arab RepubliCf 
47 to refuse to attand, and India to persuade it to do so for 
India would h-^ ve achieved nothing and perhaps the outcome 
• 
of the conference would hiVe been different from what it 
actually was mainly due to the presence of the United Arab 
Republic at the Conference. Vshen Gbina, which was in a st3?ong 
position, was making efforts to iiifluence the outcome of the 
Conference, it would have been folly if India iiad tried to 
J^ eep aloof from it^ by persuading the one friend it had 
47, Jansen fevls that India should have done tnis. See 
ilj^asAsia A|^ d- cit^ , PP4 334-336, 
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not to atteJid it and try to influence its deliberations^ 
48 
As sueh it is difficult to agree with tne opinion that 
"At this stag© those conducting Indian foreign policy were 
thoroughly flustared,,•...Indians Foi'eign Ministry was off 
balance" ^lat the United A^ -ab Republic itself was motivated 
by such calculutions v'as evident from the statement of 
Ali Sabry laa'^ e to a P#T, I.correspondent who had travelled 49 
with the latter from Bombay to Colombo^ toat "Since so 
many Governments v^re participating in the Colombo Conference 
it coasiuei'ed" desiraule for the United Arab Republic 
as veil to do so-" ^  
^he ,PQlQi|i,bp PrppQsals Cens^r^ Ch^a ' 
At the vury begining of the coni'ex ence Aii Satey made 
it clear that one of t^e pi'inciples which should govern 
60 
the conference deliberations was that "there must b© no 
gain on account of military operations'^ .'' K.Nadarajah^^ of 
Express Nows Service wrote on December 11 from Colombo that 
"the United Arabs Republic would like to call a spade a 
spade and pronounce a fortfe^ ight view on aggression. However 
it is not expected Ur^t auy such stand will be taken because 
that would bring about an abrupt and of the Conference," 
^Though the United Arab Republic failed to get its view 
adopted, it was at leQst able to get its principle of 
'no gains on account of military operation', incorporated 
48. J]Dld* 49. Supi-a^  n.2fa. 
Se® Ifae Statesman^ & The Hin.jM December ll,19t5k 
t l , Se© Ihe Indian Express December 12, 1962» • 
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52 as oae of the principies und«rXying the Colombo proposals, 
CO 
aS one of tiie Docxiiaents of the Colombo Conference 
presented to China along witai the proposals makes it clear» 
It said, iixter alia j 
"In th»s formulation of these proposals, the six paid 
particular -ittention to the follovJing principles! 
(A) Neither side should be in a position to derive 
benefit from military op^ di'^ tion} 
(3) A stable cease-fire must precede any attempt at 
negotiations butv/een China -nd Indiai « 
(C) Any cease-fire aiiangements must be without 
prejudice to the bouniary claims of either p^ ^^ rtyj 
(D) lJ.i the establishment of a stable cease-fire e 
neither side should be i-equested to withdi'aw from territoJy 
which is admittedly theirs, or from territory over which they 
exercised exclusive civilian administration} 
(E) Tiie establishment of a staole cease»fire may or may-
no t according to circumstances require toe establishment of 
uemilitaj-'ized zone^ .'' 
It was reported in Xhe Hindu on May 14, 1963, that 
"One of the documents of the Colombo Conference of the 
nonaligned countries' which has just become available, has in 
efftoct, accused China of having comiaittcd aggression on India* 
It is believed Peking rejfccted toe Colombo proposals because 
of the clear indictment of China*^ *' 
Ihis document of the Colomk) Conference also states thati 
62. See Ihdia«.China Conflict* (^ linlstry of External Affatrs, New Delhi) Appendix I, pp« 17-18. 
Appendix II, pp*19-23.See also Ihe Hindii . May 14,1963 
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"I. Ki© Slno-Indian boundary dispute; must be 
settled peaceful negotiatlos between China and India* 
The oojtset of tiie Six is to create^ an atmosphere whlc^ i 
would enable China and India to enter negotia"tiions v?ith 
dignity and self-r(aspect* 
33ae proposals of tiie Six a^e intended to create 
such an atiaosphere. 
.In Qonsidering the proposals mside by thsm, the 
six welcoiaed the unnouncemynt of unilateral cease-fire 
and i^ ithdrawl made by China on Hovembcsr 21, 1962'' 
put together, ttie * principles* of the Six and the 
statement of objectives iixdicato that they had devised 
a subtle diplomatic device of telling China that it 
had conaaitted aggression and that tiiey did iiot accept its 
gains, iristead of an open and forthright condemation as 
All Sabry advocated initially, since their purpose was to 
aediate ^nd no to arbitrate the dispute* As the 3!imes of 
India comuiented on D^ ct^ mber 13, 1963i "It is to their 
very I't^ al credit that tftey have rejc-cted the easy way out 
of adoptirig an innocuous resolution vaguely coaanending 
the virtues of peaceful'negotiation. . It is unreasoAiable 
to expect any membur of a mediating group to cofamlt itseli? 
to an assesment of the merits of the dispute itself* Any 
tendency, indeed, to 'take sides* even by powers which 
are basically sympatiietic to New Delhi would be inconsistent 
with the larger interests of promoting a rational 
settlement*.. the preference for'qui^t diplomacy' is 
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undoubtedly an ejctiemely wise one 
It v?as in defe^ hce to tiiis consideration that the 
United Arab fiepublic appears to have accepted the quiet 
diplomacy of the Colombo proposals. It is difficult to 
agree with tlie view^ that the United Arab Republic had 
compromised on its principle of *no gains on account of 
aggression^ in agreeing to the Colombo proposals. For the 
proposals were neiti&er a solution of the dispute nor did 
they ^udge the merits of the dispute but were only an 
attempt to make India and China start negotiations, with 
dignity and self respect So mu*^ so their acceptance by 
either India or China did not mean their re^ c^ ction of 
56 
their conception of ttie dispute as Nehru himself said • 
The same could be applied to the Colombo PowerThe 
United Arab Hepublic might have also calculated that if 
the nonaliiined ni^ tions failed to reach an agreement at 
Colombo it would deal a b3ow to Nonalignmeat when it was 
supposed to be "at a discount" as a commentator put it ^  
in the wake of India*s failui'e to meet the Qiinese aggression 
Accepts The pg^ppsa^s 
It is pei'haps a measure of the strict neutrality 
of the Col.ombo proposals th^t while many in India have 
67 criticised them as unsatisfactory China re;5ected them 
64. See M. G,Agwani, The Heaction of ivest Asia And The United 
Arab Republic', Intel-national studies (VQl«6tHos.l».£, 
July -October, 1963) p,77. 
66» See below n»69 
67, See below & 62 , 
« 416 » 
as supporting tiie Indian claims?® Siat tlie Chinese 
interpretation was not entirely unfounded was borne out 
by the fact that the Government of India and parliament 
accepted the proposals. Explaining the proposals in 
Parliament on January 23, 1963, Nehru said®^; 
proposals as originally framed were not 
clear %iith regard to one or two matters and were liable 
to different interpiet^itions^ Therefore the first thing 
which We did when the representative came here was to ask 
the© to claT^ ify their proposals and to xasJie us understand 
what they were in or.^ -^ to avoid aiiy misinterpretations or 
diffuj!*ent iaterpretations. 
" ISie issue b«.foie us vms how far these proposals 
were in conformity Witii what we had said repeatedly, namely 
that the position prior to the 8th September be restored. 
It must also be rememboi'ea that it was stated all along ttiat any rs-sponse th-.t we or "ttie Government of China may give to t±ie Colombo confer ence proposals would not prejudice in the slightest ^e position of eithiir of the two Governments as regards their conception of the final-aligmaent of the frontier, 
"Sie merits of the dispute w^re not considered 1?y the Colombo countries, The conference was designed only to pave the way for discussion between the representatives of both ^ e pai'ties, 
"These proposals as explained and amplified by the represtentatives of the Colombo Conference in answer to our questions related to thre^ sectors, the westfc^ rn, Tdid^ l^e and eastern of our border, 
lisgard to the eastern sector, the position prior to the 8tSi September was that the Chinese forces were to the noth of the international boundary called the McMahon Lin^ and the Indian forces wert to the south of this boundary. Before the Blii September no Chinese forces hnd come across that bounuiiry except in Longju, 
Supray n, 62 pp.10-11 69, Suura^ n.7, cols 6989-6992, 
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in Longju. In reg£u?d to this, the position that was taken was that for the present neither party should occupy it. Ilie Chinese forcibly occupied it previously and later it was suggested that neither pai'ty should occupy it, Ihe Colombo conference proposals as clarified by tiie visiting delegations, confirm this position except as regards the Xhag La ridge area, which the Chinese call Chedong anci- where we have a border post kno^m as t^ e iJiola post* Ihe Colombo proposals and tdie clarifications refer to these areas, Ihag La ridge and Longju, as remaining areas arrangements in regard to which are to be settled between the Governments of India and China by direct discussion* That is to say, in regard to tiie eas-tern sector, the 8th September position was acco^ d^ing to the Colombo conference proposals, entirely restored except in regard to Hhag La ridge area and the Dhola post* Eiese are withing three miles of the KcMahon Line. The Colombo proposals stated that this matter might be left undecided* 'Xtiey left it to the parties t^  decide by direct discussion* 
regard to the middle sector, the Colombo Conference proposals required the status (^px? to be maintained with neither side doing anything to disturb the status .aafi* 3?his conforms to the Government ^f India's position that the status quo prior to the 8th September, 1962 should be restored as there had been no conflict in this area and the existing situation has not been disturbed* 
"Coming to the western sector of Ladakh, the restoration of the status quo as it obtained prior to the 8th September would result in reestablishment of all the Indian posts shown in blue in the map cii'culated to Memfeers* ISiis would also mean ttiat the Chinese will maintain tiie old Chinese posts at the locations sixown in red in 1;aie same map. The Colombo Conference proposes that a 20 kilometer area will be clears by title witSidrawai of Chinese forces, Jmd this area is to be administered ,by civilian po-sts of both sides,Covers the entire area in which Indian posts exi-sted prior to the Stti September except for two or three posts to at the west of Sutodo.On the other hand the 20 kilometer withdrawal tile Chinese forces entails the Chinese forces going several kllom-meter beyond the international bundary in the region of Spanggur and fur tilei' south* The Colombo Conference proposals and ^e dari-fications thus satisfy the demand made for the restoration of the status q^o prior to the Sth September, m e slight variation is abou two or three Indian posts west of SuiKio* This is however 'taied by Chinese witiidrawals in the region of Spanggur and further south;i,and also by the fact that many Chinese military posts have to be removed from the wi^drawal areas. If hon.Membei's consider th.i matter with the help of maps they will observe that this position,a indicated by tiie Colombo Conference proposals,has certain advantage over the one which we had previously indicated, tiiat is the restora-tion of the 8th Sept.position. In the gtii Sept.position the Chinese were there in very large strength and we had also some posts in tfcia area. If the Colombo Conference proposal in regard to the westeana sector,is accepted, it removes the Chinese strengtii from that 
376 
sector and makes ttiat sector a demilitarized area,v;ith our posts as well as Ciiinese posts by agreement being civilian posts, in equal number of people and siiailarllgr of arms. It would be civil armS} police arms or small arms. I think this is definitely better than the restoration of Chinese posts in that ai'ea in a big way with large arms. 
*'0n fan consideration of these matters as contained in the Colombo Conference resolutions and their clarifica-tions we came to the conclusion that these proposals ful-filled the essence of the demand made for a restoration of the status cmo prior to the 8th September* 
ISiis statement has been reproduced here at such length because it explains clearly the Colombo Conference proposal; and the reasons why tiie Government of India accepted them as fulfilling- their-'demand of restoration of the status quo prior to September 8,1962, lidiru^ had repeated 12ie same arguments on January 29 and saidsS^ 
"The question is how to bring about the Chinese withdrawal to.a certain extent in order to be able to deal witaa this ^ matter in a maoner whl-cih may lead to r e s u l t s * I think from both the political and the diplomatic points of view this is aesirable, our rejec-ting tJie Colombo proposals would be harmful to us, dip*. lomatical.Ly and from every point of view, Kot only the countries which have made these proposals, but other countries big and small will think that we are acting wrongly and will not continue the support they have given us..»»*" 
The proposals were criticised by some, especialO^ r by 61 
A*G*Nooi'ani/'Indeed", he said? ''the most damaging effect of 
the proposals was ttiat it completely restricted India's freedom 
of actiont" How, this was alone so,is not easy to comprehend 
60f See Mehru*s Speeches, Vol«4, op#cit»,ppt261-265i 
61. gupra^ p«116. 
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unless it could be assumed that but tor the proposals^ Jhdla 
could have sent its troops into areas occupied by Cnina or 
thrown the Chinese out from our territories. This was hardly 
possible. Similarly, even if the"proposals sought .to give 
China what she wanted in the western sector-that she considered 
important — and to satisfy India in the east, which was the 
62 
vital ai'ea for her," the alternative would have been surrender 
to Chinese terjns, 
63 
The United Arab Republic has conceded that the propo-
sals did not give India all she wanted. But they gave India 
sufficient to start negotiations with China with self-respect 64 
and dignity. Thus they were definitely what Nehru once called 
•tiie lesser of the two evils^. And the United Arab Republic 
was not satisfied with tnem. Commenting on the refusal of 
some of India's neighboi^ rs to demand the" vacation of aggression 66 
by China it says that "The Asian neighbours of China were 
apprehensive of China's wrath.*' This might have been true and 
the United Arab Republic might be justified in being angry with 
them. But Jhdia and the Indians, smarting under the blows 
62. Jansen, Afro-Asia And Honallgnment^ op.cit., p. 342. 
63. Supra,. n# 11. 
64. Nehru, op.cit., p.3i~ 
65. Sjisrs, n.ll. 
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inflicted by Ciiina neither had, nor have, any justification 
66 in accusing them of moral failure as G.H.jansen does. 
Ihe role of the Six nonaligned nations appears to have 
been quite in conforiaity vlth the role which the nonaligned 
nations have generally played of not allowing either side to 
gain jnuch ovqv the other, consistent with their interests* 
Moreover they had also to keep in mind the fact that the 
major powers should not be allowed to step in on either side 
in older not to turn it into a world wide conflict. And as 
seen above the Big Powers themselves were not prepared to give 
all out support to India. It is just possible that they might 
have felt that the Colombo Conference serves their purpose and 
interests better than anything that they might do. It is 
difficult to say whether the Big Powers could not have made 
China accept the Colombo proposals t^r concerted pressure. It 
is also difficult to say whether an offer of the Security 
Council seal^  to China for voluntary ren^ciation of its aggre-
ssion against India would not have made China more responsive 
and given Kennedy the much wanted break-through in United 
67 States relations with China. 
66. Afro-Asia And MonallgnmentT op.cit., p. 330 and pp.326-329. He admits, however, that they cannot be whol^ blamed. o 
67. See Sorensen, op.cit., pp. 760-761. 
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U.A.R.Support to Indiat 
However, in all this, there was at least one country, 
besides India which was not satisfied with the outcome of the 
Colombo Proposals and it was the United Arab Republic, Inspite 
of the initial offer of mediation, the United Arab Republic 
had consistently supported the Indian Government in all phases 
68 of the crisis* G^H.Jansen reported from Cairo that "Inspired 
•leaks* to Indian correspondents speak of President Nasser's 
full moral and material support to India." He also later on 
69 
wrote that "Indian newspaper correspondents in Cairo, and 
through them the world were informed that President Nasser 
had bluntly told the Chinese Chargejl^ffail's in Cairo that 
China had committed aggression and should withdraw, but not 
one word of this appeared in the United Arab Republic's press. 
The question is not so much whether the United Arab Republic's 
stand was given publicity in tiie United Arab Repuglic as 
whether or not the information given to the Indian correspon-
dents .was accurate* 
70 
It was also reported that Nasser was believed to have 
categorically rejected Peking's contention tiiat India was 
68. Supra^ n. 46 
69. Afro»A34a Afid pgna^ r^ n^ffl^ h^ y op.cit., p. 332. 
70. See Afrlca-Dlary, 1968-63, p.888. In all this, there was one single furring note. It was reported that there were fitting articles on Indians in the UAR's press. -4S&3 
^ Contd..... 
^ 4 U « 
violating the Bandung spirit by taking arms from the United 
States and otiiar western countries* At a press conference 
vith members of the third floating world conference of journa-
71 lists at Cairo on October 1, 1963. Nasser said, in reply too-
» question on the rejection of the Colombo Conference proposals 
by China, that "a^ opinion was that all troops should return 
to the lines tbey were on tiie 8th of September, 1962, the day 
on v/hich incidents started between India and C h i n a , , A b o u t 
the rejection of tiie proposals by China he said "China had 
some reservations, then MCs Ali Sabry, President of the DAB«S 
Executive Council, visited Peking, he demanded that China 
should have no reservations on what Colombo Conference coiant-
ries had decided. And they said that they will withdraw their 
reservations." China had not. On the other hand it had begun 
to accuse the Colombo powers of favouring India and being unfair 
72 to it) as the Political correspondent of Statesman reported. 
(Continued from previous page) 
l^i ff». AgwRni, 0pi0it»)» It is not difficult to understand what or who prompted suda writings, was it, by any chance in response to similar stuff in Indian papers or journals? Even if this were not so, was it government sponsored? It is not known whether the Government of India took note of it an.d protested against it, 1316 effect of this has been naturally damaging. It is remembered even to-day in India, See K.Rangaswami* s article in The Hindu. June 1967. 
71. See J M J i M , op.cit., (Special Press Release, October . 1963), p,S4, 
72. See me, Sunday. Statesman^ March 24, 1963. 
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He wrote further that "lo prove this allegation it has cited 
the fact that India finds 'toe proposal better "teian ev®a the 
September 8 line" and tiiat'W. ChorwEn-lal*s letter to the 
Ceylon Bc'eaiex is stated to be quite offensive in tone. It 
criticises th© nonaligned nations for going beyond their 
mediatory role and trying to judge the merits of the India-
China dispute* Apparently, China wanted to use the nonallgned 
countries to compel India to negotiate on Peking's terms but 
when they refused to oblige it has started condemning them." 
Indian Grievaiices Against^  Arabsi 
Despite all this, the feeling somehow persists even in 
some well informed and influential quai-ters that not only the 
nonaligned neighiH5urs of India but also the United Arab 
Republic and the Arabs have not reciprocated India's friendship 
fully, oaius ISie Hlnduy wrote on April 11, 1966, in its review 
of the External -Affairs Ministry's annual report for 196&-.66j 
*'Ihe main objectives of any country's foreign policy are to promote its national interests to win the friendship and support of other countries necessary for the advancement of its cause ..... What is India's record in this respect? When Pakistan attacked us last year, not a single country with the exception of Malaysia, was prepared to come openly to our support and condemn Pakistan's aggression even tiiough the U.N.observers had squarely found it guilty. tJuch the same thing happened at the.time of the Chinese attack in 1962, when apart from the Western Bloc members, the other countries all chose to turn the Nelson's eye on China's aggre-ssion, This was a sad reflection on our 
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foreign policy* It meant that all we had achieved since Independence was to maintain fairly easy relations superficially with most of the world but had not been able to establish such terms of firm friendship with any country as would make it stand us through thick and thln» Ihis was largely the result of the ambiguity in our own attitude to other countries, liie double standards we have some-times adopted in judging otiiers, a pusillanimous reluctance to call a spade a spade, the absence of give-Olid-t^e in oux' foreign relations, and a gene-ral lack of clear cut objectives and direction in our policy. The ssnjustice done to Israel in not establishing diplomatic relations witii it is an example of our Government's pus^illanimity. Nor does it seem to have been worth the candle, Jud* ging by what the mnistry*s report has said about Arab attitude towards India, Among our immediate neighbcturs, Nepal, Burma and Ceylon have all nor-mal relations with Israel and .they do not seem to be any the worse for it»" 
It will not perhaps be wrong to assume that much of 
this criticism is in relation to India's relations witJi the 
Arabs and in so far as the United Arab Republic is not excep-
ted, with it also. Indeed, since it has been the most friend-
ly Arab country^ ihis may as well be mainly against the 
Onited Arab RepubliCt To the extent it is meant for India's 
relations with the Arabs in general and the liaited Arab 
Republic in particulai', these views are, it is submitted, not 
in accordance with facts* 
It has been indicated above that the United Arab 
Republic has consistently supported India in its conflict with 
China. Ittea among the other Arab states none supported China, 
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As Professor M.S*Agv.'ani. written "In sum governments as 
well as tile Press (barring 3 small section which was favou-
ably disposed towards Peking)» and the general public in the 
region, grasped the true nature and meaning of the Chinese 
threat to India No government in the area approved of 
the Chinese action or rendered her any support." 
Indian Pakis tan ivar : Wftaaar Supports India;. 
During the India-Pakistan war in 1965 also the United 
Arab Hepublic ;iind a nia;5ority of the Arab states were not 
merely neutral, but were positively friendly to India. As 
it is not possible here to isake an exhaustive analysis, a few 
press reports and comments quoted below to illustrate the 74 point. Ihe Indian Express wrote on 16 September 1966: 
"In the Arab world tiie cj&m^ enting force is language and culture, not religion. Saudi Arabia is no doubt a theocratic ^tate, but tiie United Arab Republic, Lebanon, ^yria, Iraq, and Sudan as well as the countries of Maghreb are essentially secular states. It may be liiat India is somewhat disappointed in the .stand adopted by the United Arab Republic and some other countries but it will not make the mistake of thinking that their attitudes have been determined by considerations of religion. II 
73. Op#-cit., 78^79 
74. The Indiitfi Express (Vijayawada), September 16, 1966, 
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Here are a reports from A.N.Dar of tiae Express 
Nev;s Services 
76 "Cairo^ September 14$ "Opening the third Arab summit in 6asablancai> yesterday President Nasser gave no hope to Pakistan that he would allow its Ontd-Indian game to be played here. He spoke of IndianPakistan fighting with "regret" and refused to go beyond this one-line statement«*.»»'Ihe UAR continues to be opposed to allowing the summit to be used for anti-Indian manoea-vres. Pakistan has been banking on countries like Syria and the four kingdoms of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Libya and Hordeso to help it in rousing Muslim senti-ment on the Arab stage» Arabl$'have been looking with distaste at the way Indonesia^ Iran and Turkey have let Muslim sentiment have better of their reason in the content of India-Pakistan fighting. The Chinese prestige too has slumped by its open fanning of flames." 
76 "Cairo, September 168 Saudi Arabia and Syria were to-day reported to b^trying to get pro-l'akistan reference included in an appeal which the third Arab submit now meeting in Casablanca is likely to issue for peace in the JiidiEin sub-continent. Several other countries taking a bold lead from President Nasser were still holding out against Pakistani pressures Earlier Yesterday, the summit was reported to have rejected a proposal from Pakistani is friends to name India as the agg^ressor^ That this suggestion was summarily rejected shows the :tack of support Pakistan*s friends could muster. This was a rebuff to Pakistan. one thing is clear inside the summit India's battle is being heroicaiay fought by president Nasser despite ttxis forcing on him the addi-tional burden of his having to fight off appeals for Muslim sentiment in a predominantly Kuslim gathering. » » . . V 
76. Jg., September 16, 1966. 76. jEd., September, 16, 1966. 
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77 "Cairo, September 18: The Arab summit which ended at Casablanca Yesterday issued a cocanu-nique which does not favour Paklstm but which it will be able to exploit in its cam-
paign against India. 
"A vaguely worded paragraph in the final coffimunique urged India and Pakistan to put an end to fighting through peaceful means in accordance wito the principles and pre^utions of the UN, Though a not-so-clever an attempt, this statement is linked with another para which in a genera/statement calls for ending international problems by peaceful means and respecting the right of self determination. 
"Despite Pakistanis pleadings it refused to believe the Pakistani lie that India was the aggressor. It gave no support to Pakistan's claim on Kashmir. 
"But reading the ti-^o paragraphs together one can discern the hand of a draftsman who is not able to find support for any kind of stand against India. He managed "to give Pakis-tan a crumb which it could exploit to bolster its morale at home than to find support abroad." 
78., Cairo, September 26j "Mr, V.K.Krishna Menon ended his three-day visit here Yesterday with a marathon two-and-half-hour meeting with President Nasser and the impression that Pakistan and Chinese propaganda against India has cut no ice here. 
"He discussed with Mr. Nasser the situation created by Pakistani aggression and the latest Chinese posture. He said after the meeting that so far as UAE was concerned it wished for peace in the Indian sub-continent. The resolution passed by the Arab «summit* in Casablanca, Mr.Menon was told, was a general statement of ON principles and nothing more. 
77. j;d., September 19, 1966. 
78. J ^ , September 27, 196S. 
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"So far as self-determination was concerned^ Mr. Menon has been categorically told here that UAR does not subscribe to It except in general 
Qt the Ghar1;er tQ lah^ qh Jn^ ja, ,a3.s,o subscribes^"(Author's Italics). 
Only one conclusionife is possible from the above facts. 
79 A.N.Dar has drawn it. He writes: 
"Much has been said of the Arabs* lack of support to India during the recent trouble with Pakistan. Despite the religious link^ Ihey did not act-ively support Pakistan either. So far as the United Arab Republic is concerned, there is a limit to which this sullenness can be taken.The Indian Government spokem|n have several times acknowledged that it was President Nasser who stood against the passage of an anti-Jiidian and pro-Paliistani resolutito at the Arab summit at Casablianca while the fighting was on." 
80 
And K.P.S.Menon has written "The United Arab Republic is 
firmly wedded to the policy of nonalignment. No coimtry 
barring India is so sincerely and unflinchingly devoted to 
this policy as the United Arab Republic; nor has any other 
state been more friendly to India. Between President Nasser 
and jawaharlal Nehru, there was complete understanding, res-
pect and. affection." Even if Shastri failed to establish 
such cordial relations with Nasser, according to Hassanein 81 82 Heikal of Al-Ahyam, who's views could be questioned, the 
79. i^., April 13, 1966. 
80. „Jfl4j.a Aj^ d yne CpJLd V/sff, op.cit., p. 6£. 
81. n« 78. 
82. I doubt if Heikal*s views always autiientically reflect Nasser's views. 
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United Arab Republic's friendship for Jiidia did not lessen. 
Why, otherwise, did it declare a "seven ds^ mourning-tiie 83 
longest period declared in any country", as A.N.Dar has put 
it, on Shastri*s death? CoMuenting on Bi-ime Minister Indira 
Gandhi*s decision not to visit Cairo on her first tour Abroad, 
breaking a tradition set by her father ^d her predecessor in 84 
office, A»H.Dar said: "If Mrs. Gandhi knesw (as doubtless she 
does) of the enthusiasm here which greeted her election pre-
cisely because she was Mrs. Indira, she would have known how 
much store people here lay by the continuance of the tradition 
of friendship." 
One would have, therefore, expected The Hindu to 
correct the impression created by the report of the fecternal 
Affairs'*" Ministry-lf that was the impression created by it — 
that there was something seriously wrong with Indo-Arab 
relations if not also with Indo-OAR relations or that Pakis-
tan's religious propaganda has been more successful than 
India's own propaganda. If things are against India in two 
or three Arab countries, it does not seem proper to conclude 
that it is so witti all the Arabs and then to proceed to anta-
gonise, perhaps permanently, all of them by establishing dlp-
86 lomatie relations with Israel. As a report of a seminar held 
83, ^aars, n.78. 84» Ibid. 
86. See Bimla Prasad, U Fresh Look At India's Foreign Policy^ International Studies^ (Vol.8 No.3,« January 1967),p.286. Also SuDi'a^  Chapter 6, n.233 and 234. C^HJ^t^ VUAW^ J 
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at the Indian school of Internationai Studies puts.it, such a 
"iaove on our part at the present moment is bound to unsettle 
our Vell-established and cordial relations with Arab nations 
in the economic and political fields, and this might result in 
incalculable harm to our economy and facilitate the success of 
Pakistan's campaign against us in that region." 
In more significant wordS| it adds j "It was also stre-
ssed that by not establishing- diplomatic relations with Israel 
we Were neither j«iopting an unfriendly gesture towards that 
state nor violating any basic principle of our foreign policy* 
After ally we do r^ ot have diplomatic relations with every countr:^  
in the world. On the other^  hand^ we have never followed the 
XX^^ OR ifiJ^ f^l 4ft mUK^jj " Still claimi 
that Indians Government has been pusillanimous in not having 
diplomatic relations with Israel, M d when tiie Arab League 
supported the condifiature of Syria for the Security Council seat 
86 
against India, it came out"with tiie comment that : "it is a pity 
that tSie Arab League should have chosen to oppose India's can-
didature for the latter has always been a staunch supporter, 
sometimes going out of its way, of Arab causes. There may 
perhaps be a lesson ^in this for our Government which has more 
86. See Ihe Hindu^ November 14, J 
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than once taken internatlonai stancesf even if they went 
against tiie grain, in the hope of pleasing some other country 
or countries* Appeaseiqent never pays in tiie lon^ run* " 
'I (io not excuse the Arab League for its sponsorship of 
Syrians candidature against India* But I do think that it 
was not an aati-Indian step. If it was, perhaps it was a 
reflection of toe growing disenchantment between India and the 
Arabs towards which the supporters of Israel in iidia appear 
to be contributing freely. But the claim that India has ever 
appeased the Aji-abs or even the liiited Arab Republic is not ,Ln 
accord with facts where the entire Arab world was overCjoyed 
over the nationalisation of the Suez Canal company, Nehru 
and India expressed reservations on the manner in which it was 
done, unjustifiably, as^been said earlier. If Nehru had not 
condemned Israel and then England and France when they committed 
aggression on the United Arab Republic, he would, perhaps, have 
condemned India in t^e e^ yes of the world, though he might have 
gained the goodwill of a few people here and there. He would 
certainly have incurred the'wrath of- the Arabs and Pakistan 
would have benefited greatly* 
In the other Arab causes like Algerian independence, 
87 Yeman» etc., India's attitude has been equivocal. But in this 
87# Sgpra, n.4. Also see Mainstream,. (Vol.1, No. 17 December 22, 1962), p,6. 
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talk of Arab appeasement, it is not at all remembered that the 
United Arab Republic and the Arabs had given full support to 
India when it occupied Goa by force which some said was a vio» 
88 
lation of the Qiarter. If tiie liberation of Goa was an article 
of faith with India, the fight against Israel is no less an 
article of faith with the Arabs* 
That the Government of India does not share these views 
became evident when Chagla and Indira Gandhi promptly rafeed 
to the support of the Arabs in the Kest Asian crisis of 1967. 
Chagla, certainJi^ , cannot be accused of being an appeaser of 
Muslims^^either in India or ^ i d e India unless every act of 
friendship with tiae Arabs is dubbed as such* 
If India had supported the Arabs against Israel in 
1956, it was to gain their goodwill, l£ it had supported them 
in 1967 it was not merely to retain it, but also to advance 
its own claims against its enemies* Perhaps the supporters 
of Israel in India do not realise that the talk of injustice 
to Israel, gives a lie to Indians claims against Pakistan and 
its stand ctn Kashmir. 
88 • Sunra^ 
89* According to Acharya Kriplani India's West Asia policy is based on fear of Arabs5 Pakistan and slims in ttie country, Ihis last is a fantastic claim. See Sie Hindu July 19, 1967. 
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it iias already been pointed out that iiidia*fi support 
to the Arabs goes much deeper than merely the need to Contain 
Pakistan, in which, however India has not..'succeeded in so 
far as the latter*s relations with tiic Big Powers and China 
are conpei'ned. If India loses the goodwill of the'Arabs also 
it is not very difficult to imagine the consequences to Indians 
position in the world. All this could be brought about by a 
Simple act of extending diplomatic relations to Israel, In 
other words India would be reduced to toie position of Nepal, 
Burma, and Ceylon, in its relations with the Arabs and possi-
bly with the outside world also. 
On the other hand, if we can make proper use of our 
relations witii ttie Arabs, it is possible to mend our fences 
with Pakistan and much else, v,"he,ther or not tiiis is desirable 
will be examined in the next few pages* 

CONCLUSION 
It is not my purpose here to give a brief resume 
of the main conclusions made in the earlier pages. 
What follows is a general discussion containing certain 
general observations based on the analysis of the foreign 
policies of India and the United Arab Republic, in 
theory and practice made in the preceding pagesi and 
in the light of some recent policies of the big Powers 
vis-a-vis India ^ d the United Arab Republic, 
The central thesis of this study has been that 
Nonalignment is a balance of power policy and that its 
primary object has been the protection of the security 
and the progress of the country . According to its Chief 
exponent, Nehru, the policy has three main aspects viz. 
(i) The maintenance of a defensive balance of power 
through friendly re.lations with the Big Powers, 
(ii) Maintenance of the world balance of power as far as 
possible, and 
(iii) Prevention of the spread of the Influence of the 
Big Powers in the Afro-Asian states which have 
attained statehood in the wake of the second 
world war. 
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As has already been indicated the three aspects were 
closely integrated and have the same main objective namely 
the protection of the security and the progress of the nation, 
The other aspects of the foreign policies of India and 
the United Arab Republic such as their fight against 
Colonialism, recialism and communism have also the 
same main objective. 
This policy has been based on a deep understanding 
of international politics as well as the forces at work 
in the resurgence of Asian and African nationalism and 
its basic urges. For, Nonalignn^nt stood and stands for 
these basic urges, which are comm to all national 
movements. Firstly, there is the desire to throw out ^ 
Vestiges of foreign doaination and to shape one's own 
future to the best of one's ability. Secondly, there is 
the desire to be indep^dent in foreign as well as 
domestic policies as far as possible, in a world of 
ever increasing interdependence. Thirdly, there is the 
desire to play a major part in world affairs consistent 
with their past achievements, present possibilities ^d 
future potentialities. 
When the second world war ended, and the United 
Nations was created, there emerged two super Powers, 
with a number of satellites around each, each being hostile 
to the other . And both were determined to dominate the 
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vast areas of Asia and Africa which were struggling 
to thr ow out the shackles of colonial!sni» It appeared 
to many at that stage that these small, weak, and poor 
nations, have no other choice, except to Join this or 
that bloc. The Big Powers seemed certain about it. 
Hence they were shocked when there arose a voice 
which clearly declared that there was a third alternative, 
that of nonalignment . They could not believe either 
themselves, or these voices, which had soon multiplied, 
and, therefore, denounced them out right. 
However, the architects of Nonallgnment clearly 
saw that the struggle between the SMper Powers was not 
primarily ideological, as it was presented to them, but 
that it was a struggle for power. In so far as the 
ideologies represented by these Powers were COTcerned, 
they found that neither was of exclusive use to them. 
Even after accepting one or the other of these ideologies, 
either in full, or in pa^ 't, these states were not 
prepared to join in the ideological crusade, 
Ih so far as the struggle was a power struggle, 
the nonali0ied leaders realised that,their interests 
would be better served by not Joining either side, rather 
than Joining one side against the other. This was, 
again, conformity not only with the hard realities 
- 424 -P 
of International life, bat also with the deeper urges 
of national resurgence, awakening the Asian and 
African nations from decades and centuries of slumber 
and slavery. 
Konalignment, therefore, put a halt to the 
growing bipolarity of the world driving, it to a 
precipice from which there might have been no possible 
retreat. It also put the nonaligned nations in a 
position to influence world affairs in a larger 
measure than would otherwise have been possible for them. 
That this was a well thought out policy is evident 
from Nehru's statements on foreign policy made in 
the late forties, which have been extensively quoted 
in section one of this study. 
It was unfortunate that this policy should have 
been interpreted in terms of human ideals and religloij-
philosophic terms. Indian scholars, and in terms of 
anticolonialism, antiracialism and procommunism by 
western scholars. While Indian scholars like Prof. 
Appadorai^ have taken the balance of power to be out-
moded following some of their counter parts in the 
1. ^ e A» Aspadorai, 'Bidia's Foreign Policy, International RelationSt (vol. IT, No. 6, October 1960), pp.69-70. 
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western couxitries, some otiier 'western scholars 
2 
like Alan Du Rousettj have argued that the 
nonallgned powers deride the balance of power while 
taking shelter under the balance of power which is 
maintained lo^f the western powers» ^^ hile accepting ^ e 
criticism ibhat the Indian scholars have failed in a 
larger measure to explain India's foreign policy in 
realistic terms, I find tiiat to he no reason why the 
western sdiolars should be excused for their o ^ 
failure to underst^d it, especially when India's 
chief spokesman on foreign policy for over 18 years, 
had cusre often than not, explained his policy in 
idealistic teras# 
Moreover, there is no substance in the argument 
that the nonaligned states are shielded by the balance 
of power, maintained by the V^ estern povers for it 
requires irore than one side to maintain it» Even if 
tells were accepted for the time being, it is no proof 
that the Western Powers were willing to allow the 
nonaligned states to be shielded by the balance of 
power vathout asking a price for it. 
It has already been explained in earlier chapters,, 
how the nonaligned nations have been struggling to play 
'On understanding Indian Foreign Policy', (Vol. I, No. 11, April, 19fc9), pp.643-666^ 
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a more and more responsible role in mitigating the 
dangers of a bipolar balance of power and to bring 
about a ®o e stable balance of power. It has also been 
seen how these ftttempts have been aften foiled by 
the Western Powers, only to realise their folly 
i«id to make one retreat after another. Even now the 
United ^ates appears unwilling to accept the legitimate 
policies of the nonaligned states since they stand 
in Its drive for an all powerful place in the world, 
which is being opposed by its own allies in Europe. 
Some of the misunderstanding of India*s foreign 
policy abroad and in India is no doubt due to the false 
image of India projected outside India mainly by our 
embassies abroad swd also by our politicians who visit 
foreign countries « ^d some of our failures in foreign 
policy were also no doubt due to lack of proper 
understanding of tie basic tenets of NoOalignment, 
especially among the persons who were in charge of 
the implementation df this policy. Some times Nebru 
himself, and his closest political advisers like 
Krishna Menon, appear to h^ve been carried away by 
what they wanted to see» Instead of seeing what 
actually existed, especially in India's relations with 
China. Some of these defects in the working of the 
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External Affairs Ministry, ahd its executive organs 
3 
abroadt have been pointed out by Badruddin Tayabji ^  
India's former ^bassador to Japan, and a one time 
Secretary in the External Affairs Ministry, It Is 
difficult to say how far the situation has improved in 
recent years. 
However, as Tayabji says •*Konalignraent was and 
is the right policy for India, situated as she is, 
historically, geographically, and econoniically. India 
is too big a country/Malign herself with either of the 
Super Powers*' • 
Even Nehru's policy towards China does not seem 
to be that bad cm secc«id thoughts, especially in the 
light of the more recent trends in the Big Power 
policies. Nehru wsuited to be friendly with China, as far 
as it was humanly possible, because he realised that 
India would not be able to meet the Chinese challenge 
without depending upon the Big Powers for a very long time 
to come, '^his is precisely the position in which India 
finds itself today. S'ome might say that this was of 
Nehru's mfiking but it is not true. 
3. 'Subjective Policies without the subject', The Statesman. March 5, 1968. 
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Nehru's approach to Pakistan was also marked by 
the same concern not because Pakistan posed a serious 
threat to India, but because he realised that Pakistan 
as a small Power would naturally lean towards 
some big Power, if it felt Insecure, perhaps Pakistan 
would have made friends with China and the Soviet Union, 
instead of the United States, if India had taken up 
the Chinese challenge at the time of the Korean Crisis 
and the Chinese occupation of Tibet <as Sardar Patel 
is believed to have advised) in the company of the 
United States. It is difficult to say what the 
consequences would have been f or India» but Nehru, 
as already indicated, said that the present troubles 
would have arisen then. It would have led to a further 
bipolarisation of the world. Internally, perhaps, there 
would have been a polarisation in public opinion between 
the right and the left, with what consequences, it is 
difficult to say. Certainly, the forei^i policy of India 
would not have made the impact it had made on world a ^ 
affairs, due to Nonalignment. 
Again, the criticism of Nehru and his approach 
to China, seem to over^look the fact that u^ ien China 
became independent in 1949, the United States, Britain 
and the Soviet Union, had all been particular to make 
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friendship with China. Even today, the United states 
would prefer China's friendship to that of India. The 
friends of the tJhited States in India, do not seem 
to know this, either in their enthusiasm for it, or 
out of fear of, or hostility to, China* 
perhaps China kn<bw its own position, and it is 
this that appears to have raade it press it demands on 
India to such an extent as to make India an enemy. Of 
course, it might have also realised that it would not 
be ablet to make good its claims if it allowed India 
to grow stronger, for India was building its strength, 
though at a slow pace. Hence it struck the blow in 196J3, 
for which the Indian leaders should have be«j prepared, 
when they were not prepared to accept a compromise solution 
with China on its claims on India's border, possibly 
because of the fear of public opinion. 
The same fear of public opinion appears to have 
been responsible for Nehru's inability to translate his 
desire for friendship with 'Pakistan into some compromise 
c 
solution more attra|;ive to Pakistan and to the popular 
leaders of Kashmir of course, ^ehru himself and many of 
his advisers on foreign policy had, for historical 
reasons, a greater dislike of Pakistan and what it 
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stands for, than for China and what it stands for, the® 
giv03 a chance, it would have been easier for th«n to 
make up with China, than with Pakistan* 
Moreover, friendship with China rather than with 
Pakistan, is of greater importance to India, for it 
would relieve the big Power pressure on Indians foreign 
policy, especially in other fields like Pakistan, 
because Pakistan is able to exploit India's conflict 
with China, not only to seek concessions from India » 
but also from the big Powers theaiselvesi who are more 
afraid of China, than is realised by people in 
India, 
It is not without significance, that after the 
initial angiy outj&rust against the Soviet Union, at its 
proposed military aid to Pakistan, Prime ftlnister Indiaa 
G^Jdhi said that India's attitude towards China and 
Pakistan was not rigid but flexible. Thus the SDViet arms 
supply to Pakistan, has put India back by two decades. 
It has created for the Indian policy makers the same 
dilemma in which their predecessors were probably placed 
in the late forties viz,, whether or not to seek the 
friendship of China and Pakistan in order to be Nonaligned 
and be free from the big power pressures. 
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It is difficultj therefore, to agree with the 
viev held many important pedple in India, that Nehr^ u's 
policy tov)ards China lacked reaXity. Keiiru«s realism 
was so that he was dubbed an idealist* 
Indians struggle with China is a struggle for Bower 
in Asia* If it has to succeed in this struggle, it has 
to act as potential big Power, which it is« 3Che solution 
uotis not lie in joining the westei'n bloc or depending 
upon it exclusively as some of the opposition parties 
in India se*smf to believe, The solution lies rather 
in building liidia's own strength as rapidly as possible 
and at tlie same time to isolate China from its neighbours 
and its allies. India simply cannot afford to lose the 
friendship of the Soviet 0nionj not only because it is 
essential for its security against Ciiina, but also because 
it is a great power which is capable of providing aid 
to liidia in many ways* Otherwise, India would have to 
o 
dtjpend exclusively upon the western powers which is not 
at ail desirable. India has, therefore, to avoid 
interfering in the Soviet Union's struggle against the 
western Powers in Europe, which had been divided into 
zones of influence by the Soviet Union and the v?estern 
Powers. There is no use blaming the Soviet Union alone^ 
for the state of affairs in Europe. It is a legacy of 
the past vhich was a legacy of conflicts as Nehru said 
again ana again. And Nehru also said a number of times 
t^at India would not take any part in these conflicts. 
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In the c ire an stances, the stand taken by the 
govermient of India on the Soviet invasion of 
Cyechoslavakia in August 1968, seems justifiable from 
the point of view of India's national^ interests. 
Still the popular reaction against the Soviet Union 
seems to have been enough to put heavy strains on 
Indo-Soviet relations. The Indian Public does not seem 
to realise that the state of affairs in Europe is a 
direct consequence of the division of Europe into 
% 
2<Kies of influence. This wasj|no direct consequence 
for India's interests, ^d hence the popular reaction 
appears to have been mostly ill-informed, if not 
irresponsible too. 
Whether this was in any way influenced by the 
anger generated in India at the proposed Russian supply 
of arms to Pakistan is difficult to say, but there can be 
no doubt that the latter had some affect on the former* 
While the government and the people of India had 
greater justificattcn in protesting against the supply 
of arms to Pakistan by the Soviet Union, I feel that it 
should not have been carried to aich hysteriaal 
proportions, bordering almost on jingoism. In a 
A 
speech in Parliament in 1959 Nehru cautioned the 
House against jingoism. One wonders whether Nehru's 
caution has gone unheeded. 
4. See Rajya Sabha Debates, Part II, Vol,27, aecember 0,1959 
col s"iy82-83, 
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It is difficult to say that the Soviet supply 
of arras to Pakistan was an exclusively ;^ti»Indian move. 
It might, however, well have been^caution to India 
that the rise of ^ti-&>viet elements in India in the 
recent past,, is not unnoticed by the Soviet Union, 
Shrewd tacticians as they are the Soviet leaders seem 
to be building Pakistan as alternative to India 
in their' struggle against the V'est and if necessary 
against India* Sny way it is not only in their interests, 
but also in our interest that Pakistan should remain out 
of China's sphere of influence. We could have, therefore, 
been more restrained in our protests to the Soviet Union. 
In the normal course it should have been India's 
responsibility to isolate China in Asia. Since India is not 
able to do it because of its hostility to Pakistan and its 
weakness vis-a-vis '-hina, 'the Soviet Union appears to 
have stepped into the Asian arena. It is time India plays 
a more positive role in :Vsia, than merely reacting 
to the Moves of others in an irresponsible and hysterical 
fashion. India has, therefore, to strive to improve 
its relations with Pakistan,. If Big Powers like the 
Soviet Union and the United States-try to help Pakistan 
in one way or the other, it should be a lesslon for India. 
* 4S6 « 
It is diffUcult to jsay what should be done by 
India to improve its relations with Pakistani since 
it is not merely a question of Indians intenti® s 
alone. But one or two steps aiight yield positive 
results. The first is to allow Pakistan to secure the 
arms it might feel necessary for its defence without, 
opposing it all the time, We have, of course, to be 
prepared for all contingencies, which does not call 
for angry protests against the Western Powers or the 
Soviet Union, which, however, go unnoticed ^d would 
create unncessary frictions. 
A more positive step aiight be to make use of 
the good offices of a country like the United Arab Republic 
to make Pakistani leaders realise ^ need to seek better 
relations with India. It is difficult to s ay whether the 
government of India, had at any time ^aade such aR 
attempt. Perhaps they had been concentrating on the 
need to isolate Pakistan from these friends . Now that 
Iniia has fairly strong ties with the United A-ab 
Republic i^ particular, it may not be difficult for India 
to make such an effort, as it is not uerely in the interests 
of India but also of the United Arab Republic and also of 
Pakistan that India and Pakistan should live in peace. 
For it would then remove the major irritant in the 
relations between India and the United Arab Republic 
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on the one h^d, and the United Arab Republic and 
Pakistan on the other, India might then be able to 
have the enrtire Muslim world behind it in its struggle 
against China . They might then be able to make a 
greater impact on the super Powers than they are able 
to do at present. Jince such a development would be 
as much in the interests of the Arabs as of India, 
"ihe Arab States friendly to Pakistan should be made 
to exert some pressure on Pakistan to come to terms 
with India, provided the Arabs want to retain the foodwill 
of India on a permanent basis. 
Even otherwise, India needs to be on friendly 
terms with as many Arab states as possible, since Pakistan 
is at present able to carry half the Muslim world on 
its side. India can hardly afford to lose the support 
of the other half represented by the states. It is, 
therefore, difficult to understand the atMtude of the 
opposition parties and a large section of literate public 
in India towards the Arab-Israeli dispute*^ 
Harrassed as they are by Israel supported by the 
* 
United States, the Arabs now look mainly to the Soviet 
Union and other nonaligned powers to support them. They 
have fairly good relations with China but they do not have 
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as good relations with it as with either the Soviet Onion 
or India. Still China is potentially capable of helping 
them in their struggle against Israel, if they chose to 
take its help. Since we cannot help the Arabs in any 
significant measure, we should not demand 'outright 
conderanation of China from the drabs for what it has done 
to us. 2!he United Arab Eepublic had incurred the displeasure 
of China in its role in the Sino-Indian border dispute. 
It is not for nothing that the Soviet Union is supporting 
the United Arab Republic and the Arabs in its struggle 
against Israel. If the Soviet Union does not support them, 
they would have only wie source of support and that is 
China. 
Public opinion in Idiiia, appears to be at present 
as hostile to the Arabs as to the Soviet Union • If this 
trend continues it is possible that these countries 
might become unfriendly to us, one after tte other or all 
of theji together. And with China and Pakistan already 
hostile, India would be completely isolated in Asia. Whether 
the United States and its allies would thsn be able to 
protect all our interests is difficult to say. India might 
then be reduced to the status of a western satellite. 
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The GovernmeDt of the United Arab Republic appear 
to have committed the sc>aie mistakes in June 1967, which 
the Indian Government did in 1962, that is of not being 
prepared for the aggression from Isreal and then to '^ eL^  
too much on the capacities of the Great Powers to 
restrain unscrupt)lotis states like China and Israel, 
unless their own vital Interests are at stake. In both 
the cases the aggressors have not so far vacated their 
aaggression. China is a great Power , Hence it is difficult 
to see how Sbina would be * made to vacate its aggression 
unless there is a big war against it. But it is not so 
with Israel. Israel is neither a great Power nor is one 
potentially, unless it succeeds in expanding Itself 
f0r more tham at present in size as w^il as in numbers. 
Hence, the failure of the tJnited States and the Soviet 
Union to make it vacate its aggression seems to pose 
a greater challenge to NoOalignment than the Chinese 
aggression on India did. 
Indeed, it seems to h^ve brought about a crisis 
in Nonalignment in as mcuh as capacity of the Nonaligned 
states to influence the Big Powers has declined. This is 
due to the detente in the Ejist-West relations and the 
desire of the Onited States and the Soviet Union to decide 
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International issues on a bilateral basis, '^his has 
come to pass beaause the nonaligned nations have come 
to depend upon them more than e^er, in view of their 
disputes with their neighbours, '^ his is particularly so 
with the United Arab Republic and India. For both, the 
solution would seem to lie in seeking a detente with 
China, in order to make the Big Powers more reasonable. 
But this has Its own difficulties, and it might be very 
risky to take this step at this stage. Moreover China 
does not seem to be 4n any mood for a rapproachement with 
India. May be a day will come when China would need the 
support of the nonaligned states. But this would be 
possible when it is completely isolated and when 
the nonaligned states strengthen their own position. 
^us the one course open for the nonali'gned states 
is to close their r^ks, ^ d to recruit aore members 
into theBYfold if possible froa Europe also. For India, 
as already indicated, it may be necessary to make friends' 
with Pakistan and other neighbours. The Arabs have to close 
their ranks. If the Arabs could do this, then their pos^ion 
in the world would undergo a great change . The Arabs 
seem to ?ieed many more Nassers, than they have at present. 
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Ihe Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia may 
present a similar Tito of Jugoslavia* 
He has to be more cautious and careful in his 
dealings with the Soviet Union as veil as the 
western }?overs* It is difficult to say whether the 
proposed conference of the nonaligned states would 
achieve greater unity amng the% and whel^er the 
nonaligned states 'would emerge stronger and axjre 
4 
dfaterjained in their efforts to resist Big Bower 
pressures and also to meet the challenge posed 
hy aggressions from China on India and Israel on 
the United Arab Republic, Clearly^ a great effort 
ib needed to rescue nonalignmmt from the present 
crisis* otherwise, nonalignment might not die, but 
it would cease to be a force in international affaris • 
Each nonaligned state may then have to salvage its 
own affairs to the best of its ability %«ith the 
suppoi't of one or the other of the Dig Powers* 
Note s The biialiography contains only tiiose somces which have been actually used in the writing of this tiiesis. Instead of a list of articles, only a list of the Joui^ nals and Periodicals consul-ted is included for brevity* 
I* Parliaifientary Debates 
At SMGWP 
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard)^ House of CommQi^ f^ Official, Records^ Fifth Series, Volume bb7, 2 August, 1966» 
mm 
1* goh.^ A^^ Q^ht A^.^mPly QX.lnU^ M(Legisi,aUya.} 
D^MSg, part II s 
(i) Volume II, March 8, 1949, 
(ii) Volume VI, November 28, 1949, 
2. Lok Sabha Debates. Part II s 
(i) Volume V, Nos,l-5, July-August i960. 
(ii) Volume IX, No» 17, March 1961, 
(iii) Volume I, March 1, 1964. 
(iv) Volume III, No,32, March 29, 1966, 
(V) Volume VI, No»12, July 31, 1966, 
(vi) Volume VII, No. 18, August 8, 1966. 
(Vii) Volume VIII, No,46, September 13, 1966, 
(viil)Volum@ IX, Nos. 3-6, September 16,19,20,1966, 
« 455 » 
(ix; Volume I, February 23, 1961. 
(x) Volume VI, Nos. 1-10, August 10» 1962* 
(xi) Volume IX, November 8-20, 1962. 
(xii) Volume X aii4 VI, December 10, 1962. 
(xili) • Volume XII, January 23, 1963, 
(xlv) Volume XX, September 2, 1963. 
(XV) Volume XLIV, August 30, 1965. 
3. Ra„iya Sabha Debates. Part II t 
(i) Volume 27, December 1, 1969. 
(ii) Volume 37, March 20, 1962. 
A. o m g ^ q 
B. 
U) 
(ii) 
(iii) (iv) 
(V) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) 
(X) 
(xi) 
(xii) 
(xiii) 
(1) 
(ii) (iii) 
6th Session, Plenary Meetings,277th 14eeting, September 19, 19b0. " " Plenary Meetings,294th Mtg.,October 
7,1^60. 301st Mtg.,Nov.I960. 324th Mtg.,Ddc. 14,1950 327th Mtg.jFeb. 1,1962. 3rd Session First Committee® 232nd Mtg.,Dec.7,1950. " " . " 416th Mtg#,Dec.l2,l9£0 428th Mtg.,Dec.20,1950 431st Mtg., Jan. 25, lS3fjl Second Emergency Special Session,Plenary Meetings, 564th Meeting, 1956. 11th Session,Plenary Meetings 614th Mtg., December 12,1956. 15th Session,Plenary Meetings 882nd Mtg., October 3, I960. 15th^Supplement No. IA/4390/Add. 
) S 
it ti It 
« It 
II II n 
n 
11 
II II M 
O II 1» 
l» n H 
II w 11 
5th Year, Ros. 15-17, 473-475th Meeting, 
25,27 and 30 January I960. 5th Year, No.20, 478th Meeting, July 28, 195o. 5th lear. No.29, 487th Meeting, August 14,1950. 
• 456 » 
(iv) Year, No.36, 494tii Meeting,September l,196o. (V) tear 887th-S89th Meetings, August 21-22,1960* (vi) Itith Sfear 9161Si Meeting, Becember 9, I960. (vii) 16til ^ ear 936th Meeting, February lt>, 1961. (vUi) 16th iear 982th Meeting, November 24, 1961, (ix) 15th Xear, Supplement for July, August and Sept-ember, I960* (x) 16th lear, Supplement for January, February and March, 1961. 
C. |he i;nj,ted HaUQhg s 
Volumes s 1947-48, 1949-60, 1961, 1956, 1967, I960, 1961, 1962 and 1963, 
III. 
Conference Publicationsi 
(i; } h m Xfl (Information Service, Indo-nesia. Embassy of The Republic of Indonesia, Hew Delhi). 
jaflA .Qf, tfa,^  jPjLrs.t As^aa Qon" il^ w B p m U ^^ Qfa-AprjLi,, 1^7 (Asian Rela-tions Organisation, New Delhi, India, 1948). 
( m ) J^Sae , Hgad§ p^ Sl^.atfs .pr. Ggv^ rnffieflt;, Qt Monaligqed countries. Belgrade^ September 1-6,1961 (Publicistico, Izdavacki Zavod, Jugoslavia). 
B. Indiai 
(i) Oiinese Aggression In war And Peace^ (Letters of the Prime Minister of India). 
(ii) Foreign Policy of India ; Texts of Documents 19^7-59 (2nd edition, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1969). 
(iii) India-China Conflict (Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi). 
« 457 » 
(iv) Jawaharlal Nehru, X^ c^ jja'g Fprej^ aa Pol4<?y • 
S^ pt^ fflb^ y > 4pyX3L (Publlca-Uons Division, Ministry of InTormatloni^ Broad.-caiJting, Government of Jiidia, New Delhi, 1961), 
(V) ^^aw^agajt. ^ eh]:>vt* s f - (Publi-cations Division, Fiinistry of Information and Broadcasting, Governiaent of India, 1964), 
(vi) Ma^^n^ J^y^^^s Aa ^eX^%XQn§ (Hinstry of External Affairs, Government of India,New Delhi 
(vii) Jae^ fiWil » A i Jujy 19 J^ S^epteffib^ r (Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, September 1956), 
(Viii) b^tQ Paper Qn .J^ tn^ i An(| K^^tMAft (Government of :Cndia, New Delhi). 
C, isEasit 
(i) If^ w^  jfi-9^1 Volume XI7, July 1967 (Special Issue). 
(ii) " " - tt Volume XIV, No.16, August 15,1967 
D. iiOiliJ 
ii) /regid^ft^ G^fflajL Ab4^a. gpQ^ph^s fr^gg Interviews (United Arab Republic Information Department, Cairo), Volumes 1968,1959,1960 & 196£, 
(ii) The 0,A.R, And Ihe Policy of NonalignmentT (Minis-try of National Guidance, State Information Service, Cairo). 
(iii) U.A.R, NEVtS (Issued by tiie Press Bureau of the U.AtR. aabassy, New Delhi). 
(i) Ihe Suez Canal Problem. July 26 > September 22^ } A (Department of State Publication, October 1956). 
. 458 • 
U ) Patelce Lumumba i She r^ utfa Ataout A jtonstrous 
Grliae of m e Colonaiists^ (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1961), 
IV. other Publications: 
1. Hurewitz J.C., I^lpAomgy Ifl ^ be 
A Documentary Record 1914*1966 (D.Van Hostrand Princeton, New Jeresey, 1966)» 
2. Hoplai, S.L., ed*, Select Documents on Asian Affairs, 
India 1947^50 VQI. II, Extemal...Affair^^ (Oxford 
University Press, London, 1969)• 
3. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents Qfi (Oxford University Press, London), Volumes s 1947-48, 1948-60, 1961, 1962,1963, 1964,1966,1966,1967,1950 and 1961. 
4* dinner, Paul £*, Hat^ Xo^ j^. (a?fflmna48ffl PogUjg^ y 
Revolt In Eastern Burofte (Columbia University Press, 1966), 
V. mmXw 
Is. Day an, Ho she, 
2, Eden,Sir Anthony 
3• Nkrumah,Kw ame 
4, Nuttings, Antony 
6, Panikkar,K.ri» 
(Weidenfeld And Nicolson, London, 1966), 
(Casell, London, I960). 
• •• g^^aUW^ Of, Iftq gQflfiO) (Nelson, London, 1967)* 
IfO Qt ^ 3.egs,oB i of Suez (Ck>nstable, London, 1967) 
t gie mmin.Qt k Diplomat (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., Iondon,1966). 
459 . 
S E C O N D A R Y S O U R C E S 
A. moM 
1. Afifi, Koiiaiamad El-Hadi, ^ e A^^^S (Longfliansj Green & Co.Ltd*, London, 1964), 
2. Appadorai, A, Bd., In PpgAgjl, Ayx^  fOXlUgal Dsjislsuaasat (Asia, 1961), 
3, J^ tlyah, Edward, The Arabs CPengulnf Harmonds vort^, 
Kiddlesea, 19 es-), 
4, Avasthi, A,, and Varma, S.N,, Asg^ fftf,^ , AAffltolg^ t^^ lQft (Allied Publishers, New Delhi,^84)• 
6. Bains, J.S., ed., .SWA^g Ir, ?QllU<r^l /Asia, 1961). 
6. Barawy, Hashed El, Mm^ary, QqW ki i ki Anajy^ tical Study , (Ihe Renaissance Book^  Shop, Cairo, 1962). 
7, Bericers, Ross N*, and Bedi, Ifehinder S., The Diplomacy of Ifidja ; fodjafltFqIX<S¥ In P^e (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1966). 
8* Bhargava, ed*, M U ^ And ,i A ..teV^ y q£ Public Popular Book Services, New Delhi, 1967). 
9. Binder, Leonard, The Ideological Revolution In The Middle Bast (John v.-lley & Sons, inc*,New York, 1964). 
10. Black, J.E., and Thompson, K.^ ?., Foreign Policies In A World of Change (Harper and low Publishers, New York, 1963). 
11. Bowles, Chester, Ambassador's Re^rt (Comet Books, Collins, London, 1954). ^ 
12. Bowles, Chester, Conscience of A Liberal (Harper & Raw, New York, 1963). ^ 
13. Brecher, Michael, liyiia^ s Foreign Policy i An Interpreta^ tion, (InternationalTSecretarlat," Institute of Pacific"^  Relations, New York, 1957, Mimeographed). 
14. Brecher, Mchael, m e JJew States of Asia i A PoliticAl Analysis (Oxford University Press, London, 1963). 
16. Burns, Lt. Gen.E.L.M., Betweer^  Arab And Israeli^ (George G.Harrap & Co.,Ltd., London, 1962). 
^ 448 * 
16. Burton, S A G^^eyal ^qpr/i (Cambridge University Press, London, 1965)• 
Burton, J.W., Honallgnment (Andre Dentich Ltd*, London, l96o)» ^ 
Campbell, John C«, Defence of The Middle East t Brobletns 
gf Ajnerlean Pnllcy (Harper St. Brothers, New York, 1958). 
19. Chakravarty, P.C., India's China Polleyf (Indiaaa University Press, Bloomington, 1963). 
20. Childers, Erskine B., CoiBtaongense About Ihe Arab Vorld (Victor Gollancz Ltd., London I960). ^ 
21. Choudhua?i, Kir ad C., The Continent of Gircey (Jalco Publication House, Bombay, 1967). 
22« Cooke, Hedley Israel : A Blessing and a Curse^ <Stenen£5 & Sons Ltd., London, I960)* 
23. Crabb Jr., Cecil V., The Elephants And The Grass t A ,g,Wy M: feftalififlismt; (Frederich A Praeger, New JTork, 1965). 
24. CrabD Jr., Cecil V., Ajserican Foreign Policy In The Nuclear Aae^ (2nd edition, Harper & Row, New York, 1966). 
25. Cremeans, Charles D., Apabs M d yt^ e ^ (grederich A Praeger, New York, 
London, 1963). ' 
26. Damn, David J., gQYje.t r (J.B^Lippiaett Coy., Hew York, 1961). 
27. Dayal, Sniv, ladja*^ figXe.fe , KQ^^m i A 
U^uOy fo^^ma^UofiaA ^^m jSiaJM; OJelhi, 1969). 
28r Deans, Vera Michels, New Patterns of De^cracy In Indl?^  oxford University Press, London, 1959). 
29. Donnelly,, Desmond, Struggle For The World i. The Gold 
(Collins, London, 1965). 
30. Drekmeir, Charles, Kingship And Community In Early India (oxford diversity Press, London, 1962). 
31^ Etinger, Y., and Melikyan, 0., The Policy of Nonallgmne^^^ (Progress Publishers, Moscow). 
« 461 » 
32. Fies, Herbert, Foreign Aid And Foreign Policyy (MacMillan 
& C04, LMt , 1964) . 
33. Finer, Heriaan, Dulles Over Suezy (William Heinemann Ltd., 
London, 1964 
34. Fischer, Loui, America and She Uorld (Bharatiya 
Vidya Bhavan, Boiabay 1963), 
36. Fischer, Margeret W,, Rose Leo, E., and Huttenback Robert H.f Himalayan Battle Ground t Sino^Indian Rivalry In .^adakhy (Frederick A Iraeger, New lork, 1963). 
36. Foot, Michael and Joiies, Heriams, Guitty Men^ t 1967 (Victor 
Go 1 lane z, London, 196?)* 
37. George Krishna Menon (Jonathan Cape, London, 1964), 
38. Gupta, Karunakar, ]-ndja«s Foreign Policy In Defence of Mational Interest^ (World Press Ltd», Calcutta, 1966). 
39* Gupta, Sisir, India And Regional Integration In Asia. (Asia, 1866). 
40* Gupta, Si sir, J^a^jy f A Stv^ 4.y ja . (Asia, 196t)* 
41. Hil^man, Roger, and Good, Robert C., ed., Foreign Policies In m e SiJctiGS i Ihe Issues And m e Instruments, (John Hopkins press, Baltimore, Maryland, 1966). 
42. Hinsley, F.H., Pgwer And .She Pursint of Peace tCambridge University Press, London, 1963). 
43. Hinton, Harold C., .ffl^jUi^  (Honghton Mifflin Cot, Boston, 1966). 
44. Hoskyns, Catherine, Ihe Congo Since Ir^dependence {January 1960-SeceiiBber 1961), (Oxford University psess, London, 1966J 
46. Hussaini, Ishak Musa, The Moslem Brethem t The Greatest of Modern Islaml MQVement5^(Khayat»8 College Book Coopera^ tive, Beii'ut, Lebanon, 1966). 
46. Indian Goxxncll of o^rl<i Affairs, India And The United jatiQfig (Manhattan Publishing Co», Nev York, 1967). 
47. Jansen, G„H., Afrg-Asla and jjonallgnmeflt (Faber & Faber, London, 1966). 
462 . 
48, Joimston, Wiillaffi C., JurmaIs Foreign Policy s A Study In Neutralism • (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Kasachusetts,. 1963). 
49, Kahin, G.M*, The Asian^Afr|,can conference, (Cornell liiii?ersity Prs&s, 1966 
60. Karnik, ed.j China Invades India^ (Bharatiya Vidya Biiavan, Bombay j 1963). 
61. Karunakaran, K.P., India Ip ^ nrld /Affairs j August 1947-
january 1960^ (Oxford University Press, London, 1962)4 
62. Rarunakaran, K.P., ^ndia v^ orld Affairs 1960-53, (Oxfoi'd University Press, Calcutta, 1968). 
63. Karunakaran, K.P., ed., Outside TtiQ Contest t A Study of 
Rn^^UmWQfi^ And Of, gQj^ e Countries .(People»s Publishing House, Mew Delhi,1963). 
64. KanJ;, Lt. Gen. B.M., The Untold Sfj^ rvj (Allied Publishers, Bombay, ].967). 
66. Kavic, I^ irne J,, India's Quest for Security t Defence Policies, 1947»1967y (University of California Press, Berkeley) Los Angels, 1967. 
66. Kishore, K.A., Jan Sangh's Approach to Pcoblems of India's ForeiRft ,Policy , (Unpublished Phwa, Thesis submitted to the Aligarh Muslim University, Alilarh, 1966). 
67. Korbel, Joseph, Panaer In Kashmir^ (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jeresey, 1964), 
68. Kundra, j.C., India's goreien Policy : A Study of Relations with the Vestem Bloct (J.B.Walters, Groningen, Netherlands — . Vora di: Co., Bombay 1966). 
69. Lagueur, Walter, Communism And Hationalism In The Middi^ 
lasS, (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1966). 
60. Levi, v,erner, Free India t;^  As;i,^  (Minnesota University Press, Minneopolis, 1962). ' 
61. ^wenthal, Richard, World Communism » The Disintegration of 
A Secular Faithy (Oxford University Press, Kew York,1964). 
62. Lyon, Peter, Neutralism^ (Leiscester University Press,1963) 
63. Mander, John, Great Britain or Little England. (Seeker & Warburg, London, 1964). 
- 424 -P 
64. Mansfield, Peter, ^^ assar's Egypt (Penguin Books, Hurmonds worth, 1966;. 
65. hartin, Lawrence ed*, ff^U.t^lam Jou^ f^iflffiSJa.t? s 
m e States Ig Vj^ rld Affairs ^  (Fredej^ ick A. Praeger, New rork, 1962}. 
66. hehnert, Klans, And (Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1963}. " 
67. Kenon, K.P.S., Ir^ dia And' The Cold 'way (Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay 1966). ' 
68. Menon, lUP.S,, p\Q fl^ yinti: Irylka^ (Oxford University Pxessi London, 1963). 
69. Menon, Y.P., pie Stpry qX. th^ la^ jgfl, State.?j (Orient Longman*s Ltd., 1961). 
70. Meriam, Alam, P., .(ggngQ jl. tg Qgntljc %, (Kortda Tftestern University pn-ess, 1961). 
71. Miller, Richard I., DaR^ liajBrnarskAeold And Crisis Diplo, macy^(Qceane Publications, Inc., 1961). 
72. Monroe. Eliaabeth^ Britain's Itoaent In The Middle S^st 1914,b6, (Chatto & Windus, London, 1963). 
* 
73. Moraes, J-^ rank, The Revolt Ip Si bet, (Sterling Publishers Ltd., Jullunder & New Delhi, 1966). 
74. Morgentha^, Hans J., Qf -"^ffl^mL^HMfiili (The University of Chicago Press, 1962). 
75. FiOrXawe, John, Anelo^Egyptian Relations lSQ0^l956y (2nd edition, frank Case ^ Co., London, 1966). 
76. Kurty, Nehru *s foreign Polloy, fThe Beacon Infor-mation And Publications, New Delhi, 1963). 
77» Nasser Gamal Abdel, The J^ nilosopiiy of The Revolutions (K^istry of National QUidance, Information Administration,] 
78. Natarajan., L,, /^ a^ pipifi ^ ^dQW (People* s Publishing House, Bombay, 1962). 
79. Netou, jawaharlal, The fiisooverv of frd^a (Asia, Bombay, 1967)» ^ 
- 424 -P 
80» Nooranl, A,G., Our Credulity And Megligance. (Ramdas G. 
Bhatkal, Boiabay, 1963)# 
81. Koorani, A^G., Kashmir Questloay (Manaktala* s, Bombay, 1964), 
82. Northedge, F.C., t ^ e Qt Readjustment 1946^1961^^ (Geogge Alien & Unwin Ltd., London, 1962). 
83. Northrop, F.S.C., fh^ , XmMuQt: IfaUQQ^ ? A .S^ u^ Y jg gie Cultural Bases of International Relations (The KacMillan Coy, Hew York, 1953). 
84. A Kutting Anthony, A^^P^ , ? A a^yr^ tlJlye IfiSfayy .frpffi '^^ t^ ^^ f^ a^d to toe Present ^  (Hollis & Carter, London, 1964). 
85. Palmer Perkins, ^e^at^^WS i J:^® ^'Q^ Comcamity In fransition^ (Second Edition, Scientific Book Agency, Calcutta 1965). 
86. Panikkar, K.K., of (Asia,Bombay, I960). 
87. Penrose, The Revolution In International Relations : A BtjoAy IXi the ChaaRWi Ql* B^ j.fiQce pI' PQW> (Franh Cass & Co*, Ltd., London, 1965). 
88. Powers, Paul f., Gandhi On v^ orld Affairs^ (London, 1961)^ 
89* a-asad, Bimla, Ihe origins of Indian Foreign Pnlicy s The . Indian Mational Congress And l^ orld Affairs ia86>1947, (2nd edition, Cal<uutta 1962)* 
90. Proctor, J.Harris, ed., Islam And International Relations 
(Pall Mall Press, London, 1965). ^ 
91. Ludhaktisiman, S., Indian Philosajc^ yy (Ihe MacMillan Coy, New York, Geofege Allen & Onwin, London, 1968). 
92. Raj an, M.S., A t t U m 1964-56, (Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1963). 
93. Rao, R,P., fo (Asia, Bombay, 1961). 
84,- Robertson, lerenco, Crisis t m e Inslda Story of The Sue;?. Conspiracy^ (Hutehinson, London, 1965). 
95»- Romein, jan, laie Asia^ Centurjy, (University of California, Berkeley, 1964), 
• 465 » 
96. Royal Institute of Interiiational Affairs, SmSZJaLJinSer-iiStMoiiai-MXsJirg, (oxford University Wess, I^ndon), Volumes for 1939-46, 1949-60, 1951, I9fa2, 19&3, 1964, 1966-1968, 1960 and 1961* 
97. Kussel, Bretrand, Tlnariged Victory, (Penguin Books Ltd., 
Harssondswortli, Middlesex, 1963). 
98. Sas-va, S,K., ©d., Kight For Peace t ISae Lom Road To jiashkeqt .(Hardy & Allejt (India), New Delhi, 1966, 
98. Sayegh, Fayez A., ed., The Dynamics of Neutralism In The Arab World s A Symposium, (Chandler Publishing Co., San Franciscd>, 1964), 
100. Schlesinger, jr. Arthur S., A QMS I ^ Q^m.^* 
Kennedy In The White House* (Mayflowes Dell Paperback, Mayflower Books Ltd., London, 1967). 
101. Sen Chanakya, Against The Gold War. (Asia, Bombay, 1962), 
102. Shah, A.B.,, ed., |hdla»s Defence and Foreign Fblicles. (Manktaia'is, Bombay, 1966). 
103. Sheean, Vjjicent, Mehru s Ihe Years of Power^ ^ (Victor 
GoUancz, London, 1960). 
104. Situramayya, p., The History of Indian National Congress^ Volume II, (Padma Publications Ltd.,Bombay, 1947). 
106. Sorensen, Iheodore, S., ^ennedy^ (Bantam Books Inc,> New iork, 1966). 
106. Spanier, John, Ihe M.V^^r .gofltfi^ ov^ ryy Afid The Korean War, (The Belknap Press of Harvard diversity Press, Cambridge, Masachusette, 1969). 
107. Sprout & Sproutj The FQHndgtftog Qf, fot^.raattoaA 1^ 3.1 (East-vvest Edition, Affiliated East-West Press Pt.Ltd., New Delhi, 1964), 
108. Stevens, Georgiana G., Egypt i Yesterday And Today,. (Holt, Rinchart aiid Winston, Inc., New Xork, 1963). 
109. Thomas, Hugh, The Suez i^ ffairSy (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1967). 
110. Utley, Freda^ Wil^ i The ^^ jddle East Go V/eat? (Henry Regenry Company, Chicago, 1967)* 
• 466 » 
111. Whiting, Allen S,, China Crosses m e lain i lihe Deci^a^t^n to Enter ThQ Korean War^ (Ihe HacMillan Co.,New lork, I960}. 
112. V.'ooa House, C,M., British gorelgn Policy Since ISie Second ^ voria War^ (Hutchnison & Co., London, 1961).-
Amer_lcan Political Science Review (New Zork). 
2. Eastern Economiat (uew Delhi). 
3* Incounter (London 
6. India Quarter(New Deljii)* 
International kffai^s (London). 
7* (Boston, liassahusetts), 
8. International Relations (London). 
9. Ihternatlanal Studies (New Delhi). 
10. tfiSlMly^w (New Delhi). 
11. Mddie Eastern Affairs (Washington). 
12. Kiddle Bast Journal (Washington). 
13. g^ciap A^ia^r^ (Canada). 
14. Quest (Calcutta). 
16. Seminar (New Delhi). 
16. Xhe Mnals qX the Aaierican.Acadeffly of Political Selene^ (Philadeliihia) 
17. The China quarterly (London). 
IB. Xhe .Economic And Political Weekly (Boinbay). 
19. ?;he.„Jhdlan Journal of Political Science. 
• 456 -
20. .gie , j^ djafi BgpK , Iflt^maUoftaX AmJL^g (Ma<iras), 
21. ffie Modern Review (Calcutta). 
22. (London), 
23. v>forid T<3day (London), 
24. world Bplltlcs (Princeton^ Nev Jeresey). 
lear Book of iVorld Affairs (Lon(k>n). 
News pa per Si 
1. The Hindu (Madras). 
2. me Hindustan Times (New Delhi). 
3. The Indian Express (Yijayanadai Hew Delhi). 
4. IM-BsSSSffi^a (New Delhi). 
6. me Times of India (Hew Delhi). 
2. iESkJi'jam* 
3* .mrrpr. 
4. Keesingfe Contemporai'y Archives. 
The Asian Recorder, 

NONALIGNMENT WITH PARTICULAR 
REFERENCE TO THE FOREIGN POLICIES 
OF INDIA AND THE UNITED 
ARAB REPUBLIC 
ABSTRACT OF THE 
THESIS PRESENTED TO THE 
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY, ALTGARH 
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 
By 
Mohd. MAHAFOOZUR RAHMAN 
Uuder the Supervision 
of 
Dr. S. A. H. HAQQI 
Professor and Head of the Department of 
Political Science 
Department of Political Science 
Aligarh Muslim University 
ALIGARH 
1 9 6 8 

A s s y R A g : ? 
This is a study of HonalJLgnment with particular refer. 
enc© to the foreign policies of India and the United Arab * 
Republic in theory and practice. It is an endeavour to inter-
pret Nonaiignment in realistic terms as the foreign policy of 
these countries, and to evaluate it on its own merits and 
demerits. 
The study is divided into two major parts and a 
Conclusion* 
part I presents an analysis of Nonaiignment as formu» 
lated and explained by Nehru and Nasser, It has three chapters 
In the first chapter an attempt has been made to explain 
that Nonaiignment is not baaed on such principles as nonvio-
lence and noninterference in the internal affairs of other 
states, that its basis does not lie.in religion, and that it 
is not neutralism or passivi^. 
In the second chapter, it has been explained that main-, 
tenance of peace, anticolonialism, antiracialism and anti» 
communism, have not beeas, either the major objectives, or the 
* The reference is to Sgypt which is known as the United Arab Republic even after the dissolution of the union of Egypt and Syria which originally formed the United Arab Republic. 
2 . 
major determinants of Nonallgiyaent, a$ is generally believed. 
It has also been explained that Monaligniaent does not either 
mean Independence, or a Ixjtal rejection of all tailitai'y alii,-
ances and military aid, but is only a rejection of entangling 
alliances which go against the aims and objectives of the non-
aligned states. 
The third chapter explains the central thesis of this 
study-, that Nonalignment is a balance of power policy divided 
into thre^ major aspects and that its primary objective has 
been the protection of the security of the nation and achieve-
Dc ment^rapid economic and Industrial progress. 
Part II deals with the Nonalignment of Jjidia and the 
United Arab Republic in practice. It is divided into five 
chapters. 
In the first of these, i.e., the 4th chapter, the ibeginn-
ings of iidia»s foreign policy have been traced briefly, to be 
followed W an analysis of India's role in the Korean Crisis. 
It was in this crisis that India's Nonalignment made a debttt 
in international affairs. 
In the next chapter, tiie 6th, the evolution of Arab 
Nonalignment in the hands of Nasser and the emergence of Non« 
alignment as a world phenomenon with the development of close 
relations between India, the iftiited Arab Republic and Yugoslavia 
and their leaders, Kehru, Nasser and Tito have been sketched. 
» a 
Thi,s is followed by aa anal;irsis of India's x'ol© in the Suez 
Crisis vhich shovs tkiat India acted in such a vsy as to pj-o-
tect its Vital interests, without antagonising either party 
to the dispute, This ehapter also contains an analysis of 
the nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict and Indians stand on 
it. 
The 6th chapter contains an analysis of the foreign 
policies of liidia and the Snited Arab Republic in the Hunga«-
rian crisis. It xvill be found that the roles of India and 
the United Arab Republic were consistent with the basic tenets 
of Nonaligniaent and strictly in accordance with their national 
interests as they stood ttien. 
In the 7th chapterthe foreign policies of India and 
the ISaited Arab Republic in the Congo crisis are analysed. 
This crisis symbolised the struggle of the nonaligned States 
to contain the Big Powers from gaining influence in Africa 
and high lighted the type of role the Ifoited Nations and its 
Secretary-»General could and s|>oul<i play in such situation^ ,'' 
Oux' analysis of this crisis brings out the fact ttiat insp|.te 
of some superficial differences in their approach to the 
problem posed by Colonialism and CoaiEiunisiH there was basic 
agreement between India and the United Arab Republic on 
essentials. 
. 4 • 
Tiie next chapter, the 8th, contains an analysis of the ' 
stand of the United Arao Republic on the Chinese invasion of 
India's boi^ ders in 1968 and Pakistan*a aggression against 
India in 1966, It becoiaes clear that in both the cases, the 
United Arab Eepublic led by Nasser, staunchly supported India. 
In the light of this some recent criticisms of Indians support 
to the United Arab Republic and the Arabs in their conflict 
with Israel have also been exaained. 
Israel's refusal to withdraw ^om the Arab territories 
occupied by it after tiie aggression in June 1967t and the 
refusal of China to vacatcj India's territories occupied by it 
in 1952, coupled with the increase in the Big Power pressures 
on the nonaligned States, pose a challenge to Nonalignjment and 
its future validity as a force in international politics, This 
is the theme of the Conclusion, wherein it has been argued that 
India and the Itiited Arab Republic have to strive to coine closer 
and then to wean away all their neighbours from the infmence 
of the Big i\>wers and Ctiina, foriaing a solid group of noh-
aligned States. Then only will they be able to resist the 
growing Big Power pressure on them and resist such Big Pbwer 
acts as the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia. 
